

POL 2-1

JAPAN

1/1/66

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9/5/95

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The remaining material was declassified as of that date.

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ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 2-1 JAPAN	
INR-10			AIRGRAM		FOR RM USE ONLY	
RM/R	REP	AF	A811	CONFIDENTIAL	AM 8 31	PRIORITY NA
1			NO.	1966 JAN 10		HANDLING INDICATOR
ARA	EUR	FE	TO : FUKUOKA, KOBE/OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO,			
NEA	CU	INR	YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT,			
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L	FBO	AID	BANGKOK, SEOUL, DJAKARTA			
SP	SL	PC	FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO			
AGR	COM	FRB	DATE: January 7, 1966			
2	2		SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 1			
INT	LAB	TAR	REF :			
TR	XMB	AIR	CONTENTS			
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POLITICAL			1. New Year's Opens with Focus on Budget			
a. 51st regular Diet session recessed December 30 as scheduled. While opposition leaders and most rank and file Diet members of all parties scattered to their electoral districts for New Year's holiday, Prime Minister Sato, Finance Minister Fukuda and LDP SecGen Tanaka concentrated on preparing government			Group 3			
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draft of budget for JFY 1966. Finance Ministry draft as presented to Cabinet January 6 provided total of over ¥4,310,000 million in general account for increase of nearly 18% over original budget previous fiscal year, while investment and loan proposals totaled an additional ¥1,910,000 million, about the same proportion of increase. Virtually all ministries and agencies promptly issued traditional protests against cutting of some of their pet projects and announced they would seek re-adjustment.

b. Sato New Year statements to various newspapers and other media stressed priority on domestic economic recovery in program for 1966. Various newspapers as usual gave their own slants and interpretations to what Sato told them on foreign policy, but substance boiled down to re-affirmation of support for close U.S. -Japan relations and peace as primary objective in foreign policy. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Sato's general avoidance of controversial items in outlining New Year program and emphasis on unexceptionable objective of economic recovery in part reflected spirit of season. Combined with strong "recovery" budget draft, however, it also implied intention of avoiding moves which public would view as provocative of political opposition. Other LDP officials during week hinted strongly to press that Lower House dissolution and general election would be put off until near end of 1966 at earliest if LDP had its way. Both major parties, particularly JSP, appeared to have eye primarily on forthcoming party conventions and it may not become clear until end of January when conventions are over whether Sato will face all-out opposition effort for rest of Diet session. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. JSP Publishes "Blueprint" for Socialist Japan

a. JSP headquarters January 4 published long-range program outlining policies to be followed by Socialist Government in Japan, which it envisaged as coming into being about 1970 after two or three general elections. Forty-three pages in length, document entitled "Hopes for Tomorrow--Government by a Socialist Cabinet" will be submitted to JSP national convention which meets in Tokyo January 19-22 for formal approval. Socialist "blueprint" calls for complete Japanese neutrality, abolition of U.S. -Japan Security treaty, non-aggression pacts with Communist neighbors, and protection of national security by collective Japan-Soviet-Chicom-U.S. Asian treaty system. Among domestic measures envisaged are conversion of bulk of Self-Defense Forces into "National Resources Conservation Corps"; complete nationalization of banking, insurance, energy and airline industries; government control of other key industries; and "cradle-to-grave" welfare services for people. Document promises "truly democratic" parliamentary government with suffrage for 18 year-olds, government-run,

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"corruption-free" elections, and provision for dissolution of Diet and decision by voters when Government and opposition parties are stalemated, but predicts that with socialization of economy "capitalist opposition parties" will gradually wither away. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Publication of long-range program attracted press interest as sample of thinking of left-wing Sasaki leadership. Press reaction predictably picked holes in program and stressed unrealistic nature of JSP leadership's thinking, especially in field of defense and foreign policy. Less critical JSP rank-and-file for whom "pinkprint" chiefly designed, however, likely to accept document as vision of future and meaningful goal for party.

3. GOJ Supports U. S. Peace Drive

a. Initiating series of GOJ efforts in support of current Vietnam peace moves, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hashimoto December 31 issued statement that GOJ hopes strongly that "all participants in Vietnam struggle" would begin discussions as soon as possible and that GOJ intends to seize every opportunity to prevail on them to do so. FonOff spokesman January 5 reported FonOff opinion that peace still possible and GOJ should try to facilitate talks. First step would be to have Shiina discuss subject during mid-January visit to Moscow. PriMin Sato told Cabinet meeting January 6 that U. S. and other nations making maximum effort seek peaceful settlement of Vietnam war and that GOJ intends take opportunity seek peaceful settlement.

b. In press briefing same day, Hashimoto said that besides Shiina visit to Moscow, GOJ may seek contact with DRV reps through Japanese ambassadors in neutral countries. He also said GOJ should convey to Hanoi true U. S. intentions for peaceful settlement and urge positive Communist response to American peace call. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: GOJ recognizes that its influence on Hanoi and Moscow is minimal and even less upon Peking. However, as one of leading Asian nations, it feels it must do something. In terms of domestic politics, GOJ feels it must leave no stone unturned to help bring about peaceful settlement in Vietnam (UNCLASSIFIED)

4. Ambassador Harriman Visits Japan

a. January 7 morning press prominently front-paged arrival of special envoy Harriman previous evening and speculated that Harriman would request

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GOJ cooperation in current Vietnam peace drive. Asahi Shimbun, reporting on airport meeting with press, quoted Harriman as saying he would not comment on Hanoi's reaction to peace proposals, having only seen press accounts of it, but that he wished to watch how Hanoi reacts as international opinion on this matter builds up. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

5. Madame Dewi Visits Japan

a. Indonesian President Sukarno's wife, Madame Dewi, arrived January 4 for five-day visit. She informed press upon arrival that Sukarno had no plans to visit Japan or any other country in near future. She said her purpose was to arrange for construction of Sari Asih hospital in Djakarta, and following Japan trip she would go to Rome and Paris to inspect medical facilities. Madame Dewi saw PriMin Sato January 6 and presented letter from Sukarno inviting him to Indonesia and thanking him for special credit for import Japanese textiles to be used during lunar New Year celebrations. During press and TV interviews, Dewi claimed that all is now normal in Indonesia. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: GOJ officials have told us that credit referred to in Sukarno's letter covering export of \$6 million of Japanese textiles was intended as gesture toward Indonesian people and not for benefit of any particular faction (EmbTel 2140). Other exports to Indonesia have come to halt as result of payments difficulties and GOJ decision not to extend export insurance coverage. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. Japan-Korea Ambassadors

a. GOJ appointed Shiroshichi Kimura its first Ambassador to Korea following recent normalization of relations. ROK appointed Dong Jo Kim, head of Korean Mission in Tokyo for two years, to continue as Ambassador. Agreements exchanged in Seoul January 5. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Kimura, senior career officer and former Ambassador to GRC, was Japan's second choice. ROK made clear its dissatisfaction with first choice Yujiro Iseki because of his past association with Korea during unsuccessful earlier attempts to negotiate normalization and during Japanese imperial administration. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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7. New JSMDf Destroyer Launched

a. JMSDF ship TAKATSUKI (DDA-164) launched January 7 at Tokyo Shipyard of Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries. TAKATSUKI, designed primarily for anti-aircraft role, will also be equipped with DASH and ASROC anti-submarine weapon systems. (UNCLASSIFIED)


b. Comment: TAKATSUKI, largest and most powerful ship constructed for JMSDF, was planned under 2nd Defense Buildup Program and commissioning is expected one year from launching. (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. JDA Studying Production of Supersonic Jet

a. JDA Director General Matsuno recently ordered study possible production supersonic jet trainer in Japan. Proposed trainer, dubbed TX, would be produced for use during Third Defense Program beginning 1967. Matsuno stated that TX would reduce jet pilot training hours by 25 percent. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: It is acknowledged by JDA that cost of such item developed and built in Japan would far exceed off-shelf cost of foreign-developed product. However, desire apparently exists to go home-made route if possible as in case of CX now in late planning stages. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

For the Ambassador:


Thomas W. Ainsworth
First Secretary of Embassy

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NAVATT: SPStrickland
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(Item 1 in draft)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 JAPAN
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A-839
NO. 1
DEPT. OF STATE
TO : FUKUOKA, KOBE/OSAKA, NAGOYA, MANA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, CINCPAC, COMUS/J, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, RANGOON, BANGKOK, MOSCOW, SEOUL, SAIGON
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FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 2

REF :

DATE: January 14, 1966

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2. Socialists prepare for Party Convention
3. Harriman Encourages Japanese Peace Initiatives
4. Shiina Visit to Moscow - Preliminaries
5. Korean Ambassador Presents Credentials
6. Media Reaction to "State of Union Message"
7. Defense Budget

POLITICAL

1. Budget Draft Completed (Weeka No. 1, Item 1)

a. After usual flurry of lobbying had practically monopolized governmental and LDP attention for week, GOJ ministries and agencies and LDP leadership January 13 finished annual round of "adjusting" Finance Ministry's budget draft. Cabinet in early hours January 14 approved final draft remaining at slightly over ¥4,314,270 million (US \$11,984,000) in general account, but increasing

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1966 JAN 18 AM 9 01

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from Tokyo

investment and loan program to ¥2,020,000 million (\$5,611 million). Finance Ministry gave appearance of more flexibility than usual in agreeing to fund increases for health and welfare, public works, pensions and education, and among other Foreign Office items approved funds for setting up Consulate General at Nakhodka. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: FinMin appearance of willingness, without knock-down fight, to restore some of earlier cuts from other Ministries' budget requests strengthened public impression of stimulative "recovery" budget, even though in general account restorations were accomplished by shuffling funds from allocation for "contingencies" (presumably including this one-- political pressure) without increasing total. Business community as well as LDP taking favorable view of draft, and even chronically critical press has found little to complain about. Ironically, few years ago present PriMin Sato and FinMin Fukuda would probably have been among first to criticize such budget. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Socialists Prepare for Party Convention

a. JSP Central Executive Committee meeting January 10 approved draft of 1966 Action Policy which will be submitted for debate and endorsement by delegates to party's 27th (regular) national convention slated for January 19 - 22. Written by leftwing faction, which now controls party executive, draft action policy expands on thesis that "American Imperialism" will step up its efforts to include Japan in its aggressive plans in Asia and that JSP should support Asian peoples' struggles against imperialism and colonialism. Anti-mainstream faction led by Organization Bureau Chief, Saburo Eda, immediately charged that action policy reflects Communist Chinese line and violates established JSP policy of peaceful coexistence, and made known their intention to attack draft at convention.

b. Action policy was also criticized on different grounds by Sohyo leaders Kaoru Ota and Akira Iwai, who charged that it focused too much on abstract international and ideological issues and failed to come to grips with practical needs of working class. Ota in TV interview scathingly criticized Socialists for "meaningless factional struggle" over action policy and said JSP must become militantly involved with workers on their problems.

c. On January 12 JSP Chairman Kozo Sasaki during visit to Kyoto told press conference he: 1) is willing to stand for re-election as party leader, 2) would want to retain Secretary-General Tomomi Narita and most of present executives in office, and 3) is thinking of responding to invitations to visit

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Communist China, North Korea, Soviet Union, and Eastern European countries this year for purpose of promoting "peace diplomacy." Sasaki also reiterated vision of Socialist government by 1970 embodied in JSP "blueprint" issued January 4 (Weeka No. 1, Item 2) and dismissed Eda faction charges of pro-Chicom tendencies in 1966 policy draft by pointing out that Eda, as member of executive, had in effect endorsed document. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Bitter dissatisfaction of more moderate factions with Sasaki leadership promises acrimonious and heated debate on convention floor next week, but significant weakening of leftwing domination of party is unlikely. Sasaki and most of his followers are expected to retain their present posts, with only major change foreseen in Diet Policy post now held by Koichi Yamamoto, who is under attack within the party for suspected deals with the LDP during the Korea Treaty Diet deliberations. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Harriman Encourages Japanese Peace Initiatives

a. Ambassador Harriman arrived Tokyo January 6; conferred with PriMin Sato, lunched with FonMin Shiina and talked with prominent representatives of LDP, JSP, DSP, Komeito and Domei on January 7; held off-the-record briefing of American correspondents on January 8; and left for Australia on January 9. In Tokyo conversations Harriman summarized his mission to date and reactions he had received. He emphasized U.S. seriousness in pursuing peaceful means of defending South Vietnam from external attack. PriMin Sato called on Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov January 10, told him GOJ was convinced of sincerity of US motives and urged Soviet Union to use its influence to bring parties to conference table. Japanese Ambassador Nakagawa gave same message to Soviets in Moscow, and FonMin Shiina is expected discuss Vietnam during his visit there starting January 16 (See Item 4).

b. Harriman visit given extensive play all papers. Most editorial opinion welcomed suspension of bombing and regretted negative reaction from Peking, Hanoi, and Moscow. Press also approved GOJ's efforts with Soviets. There was little optimism that anything concrete would ensue from current diplomatic efforts, however, and some apprehension evident that US would resume bombing of North Vietnam in near future. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Ambassador Harriman's visit dramatized to GOJ and Japanese people that US objective in Vietnam is peace and that it is Peking, Hanoi and Moscow which stand in way. This is first time GOJ has openly urged Communist side to meet US initiatives and public is also directing its

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attention to need for Communist response. However, there was subdued but evident suspicion in some press quarters that US suspension of bombing was only device to justify subsequent military escalation. Willingness of rival groups from political and labor fields to meet jointly with US representatives was very unusual and illustrated high degree of interest which subject holds for Japanese. All of participants, including JSP, exhibited genuine interest in Governor's presentation and appeared accept sincerity of US search for peaceful settlement. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Shiina Visit to Moscow - Preliminaries

a. After PriMin Sato's talk with Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov about GOJ's hope for early solution of Vietnam conflict (See Item No. 3), FonMin Shiina conferred with Vinogradov in effort to speed up negotiations for civil aviation and trade agreements so that Shiina can sign them in Moscow.

b. On January 12 Shiina conferred with Vietnamese Ambassador and assured him of intention to support SVN position during visit to USSR. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: The Japanese have built up much interest in Shiina's forthcoming visit and they hope for constructive results. Although chances appear good he will return from Moscow with reasonably acceptable trade agreement and tolerable air agreement, his chances of making significant contribution toward persuading Soviets to lead North Vietnamese to negotiating table seem less than good. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Korean Ambassador Presents Credentials

a. Korean Ambassador KIM Dong-Jo presented credentials to Emperor January 14. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Kim, who headed the Korean Mission with the rank of Ambassador before diplomatic relations were normalized December 18, 1965, heads first Korean Embassy to Japan since 1905. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

6. Media Reaction to "State of Union Message"

a. Japanese media reaction January 13 and 14 to "State of Union" message was mixture of cautious hope over President's keeping door open for

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continuing peace efforts, skepticism about his ability to carry off "guns-and-butter" policy without serious inflation, and sympathy and understanding for US dilemma over Vietnam.

b. Most comments saw message further clarifying "U.S. enthusiasm" for peace, and recognized negative Communist response as main reason President could offer no clear prospect on peace and ultimate impact of military spending on economy in 1966. Some editorials saw consideration for 1966 elections as reason for "lack of clear lines" in message and for plugging "Great Society" measures and measures to hold down federal budget. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Further expressions of appreciation for U.S. peace efforts and awareness that negative Communist response is blocking progress toward talks illustrate currently improved U.S. psychological position in Japan. Negative aspects of reaction appear to reflect Japanese editorialists' compulsion to find fault with public statements of free world leaders, including their own, rather than concrete objections to content of message. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

MILITARY

7. Defense Budget

a. Finance Ministry on January 12 approved 340.7 billion yen (\$946.4 million) for Japan Defense Agency's FY 66 budget. New budget provides 39.4 billion yen (9%) increase over FY 65 defense budget and represents 7.9% of total GOJ budget. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: JDA had hoped for FY 66 budget of 2% of GNP. Approved defense budget will be but 1.38% of GNP, as compared with FY 65's 1.33%. Slight increase will be largely offset by increased costs of equipment and personnel. (UNCLASSIFIED)

For the Ambassador:



Thomas W. Ainsworth
First Secretary of Embassy

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TWAinsworth
WHBruns
JMFarrion

ARMA: Lt. Col. HENewman
USIS: HLBurleson (Item 6)

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE/OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA,
HICOMRY, CINCPAC, COMUS/J, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC,
CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, RANGOON, BANGKOK,
TAIPEI, MOSCOW, CAIRO, MANILA

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE: January 21, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKKA NO. 3

RE

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2. Diet and LDP Take Breather
3. Shiina Visit to Moscow
4. Japan-USSR Trade and CivAir Agreements
5. JCP Group to Visit Communist China
6. FonOff Shifts
7. Fourth Wave of Seamen's Strike
8. Domei Convention Passes Resolution on Vietnam
9. UAR Deputy Premier's Visit
10. Newsmen Return from Taiwan Trip
11. Memorial Service for War Criminals
12. Another SSN Visits Sasebo

POLITICAL

1. JSP Convention Heads for Sasaki-Eda Showdown (Weeka No. 2, Item 2)
 - a. JSP 27th National Convention opened four-day meeting January 19 to adopt policies and action program for 1966 and to choose new party executives for coming year. Confrontation between

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pro- and anti-Sasaki forces manifested from very outset in elections for chairmen of various committees. Anti-Sasaki forces won chairmanship of strategic convention steering committee which controls handling of convention proceedings and of three other committees charged with deliberating party's new policies on organizational, financial and publication activities. Sasaki faction, however, captured chairmanship of committee deliberating controversial action program, which is focus of attack by opposition. Latter charge that draft program approved by the leadership is "Chicom-oriented" and violates basic peaceful coexistence line of party.

b. On first day SecGen Narita's report on party activities during past year became target of bitter attack by anti-Sasaki delegates who used occasion to lambaste Sasaki leadership for failure to follow consistent policy in Diet fight against ROK treaty ratification, for promoting joint struggles with Communists, and for overemphasizing ideology at expense of practical matters. Attack on Sasaki leadership continued on second day with renewed intensity when debate on action program began.

c. Meanwhile, Chairman Sasaki's preconvention proposal that existing leadership structure be preserved went out the window when Vice Chairman Wada in surprise announcement January 19 said he was resigning his post and would not seek further party office. On January 20, Secretary-General Narita also announced he would not seek reelection and urged choice of Eda as his successor in name of party unity. In late evening following Narita's announcement, however, representatives of Eda, Wada and Kawakami factions met to discuss common strategy and decided to back Eda and Wada's heir-apparent, Seiichi Katsumata, for party Chairman and Secretary-General respectively. In response, Sasaki faction is reported to have offered Secretary-General post to Katsumata on Sasaki-Katsumata ticket. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Convention debate thus far has been unfavorable to Sasaki and reveals high degree of delegate dissatisfaction with Sasaki leadership. Sasaki may have to step down if anti-Sasaki mood continues to mount and if satisfactory compromise solution not reached. Such compromise would require, at very least, giving up far-left domination of Central Executive Committee. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Diet and LDP Take Breather

a. As JSP convention took over political spotlight (Item 1), Diet suspended business and LDP leaders fanned out to provinces to mend fences before holding own convention January 22 and then getting down to work on budget

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and other business of regular session. Prior to informal recess, Upper House January 18 passed deficit bond authorization held over from December (Weeks No. 51, Item 1). Situation in House of Representatives less smooth as JSP January 17 and 18 rejected LDP efforts in Steering Committee to reach agreement on agenda. JSP revived perennial demand for allocation of Lower House Committee Chairmanships in proportion to strength of party representation, and when LDP pointed out that Socialist leaders had not brought up this point in December "Diet normalization" negotiations (Weeks No. 51, Item 1), replied that circumstances had changed and earlier commitments not necessarily still valid.

b. PriMin Sato, accompanied by MITI Minister Miki and Construction Minister Setoyama, traveled to Osaka January 19-20 to view site of 1970 World Exposition, but devoted most of effort to reassuring Osaka area business and financial circles concerning GOJ determination to bring about economic recovery during 1966. LDP SecGen Tanaka same day visited Sendai to back LDP candidate in election for mayor, and told press he thought general election should be scheduled for June or July, 1967. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: JSP attitude on Lower House agenda implies intention to pursue policy of procedural obstructionism again this session. Performance this week, however, may merely be part of atmospherics in advance of Socialist convention. Tanaka remarks on general election timing also appear slanted for tactical purposes. Although LDP wants to put off general election until signs of economic upswing are visible, most LDP sources continue to predict late 1966 as target time for poll. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Shiina Visit to Moscow

a. FonMin Shiina departed Tokyo January 15 for seven-day visit to Soviet Union as official guest of Soviet Government. In Moscow, Shiina-Gromyko talks covered over-all Soviet-Japan relations and Vietnam. Japan press interest emphasized Gromyko rejection of Shiina gambits on Northern Islands question and on possible Soviet moves to influence North Vietnam in direction of peace talks. Shiina expected to sign recently concluded Soviet-Japan civil air and trade agreements (See Item 4). Shiina also officially invited Gromyko to visit Tokyo in March or April this year. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Shiina is first Japanese FonMin to visit Soviet Union since resumption diplomatic relations following World War II. Few Japanese could have really expected much from initiatives on territorial and Vietnam questions, but reports of short shrift which Shiina received on these issues may prove timely reminder to Japanese public that Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" does not bridge gulf between Japanese and Soviet interests. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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4. Japan-USSR Trade and CivAir Agreements

a. In rapid succession Japanese and Soviet negotiators in Tokyo initialed civil aviation agreement January 15 and new trade agreement January 17. Both will be formally signed by FonMin Shiina during his current visit to Moscow.

b. Air pact provides for joint operation of air services between Tokyo and Moscow using only Soviet planes for initial two-year period. Last-minute delays in reaching agreement gave public impression of hard bargaining. New five-year trade and payments agreement calls for increase in trade which, according to GOJ estimate, will reach total of \$450 million by 1970. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: None

5. JCP Group to Visit Communist China

a. Nine leading members of Japan Communist Party, including SecGen Kenji Miyamoto, planning visit Communist China in near future. According press, they plan to stay about one month and discuss with Chicom leaders whether to accept CPSU invitation attend 23rd CPSU Congress in March. Other members of group include Masayoshi Oka, Akira Kudo, Koichiro Ueda, and Tetsuzo Fuwa. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: In context of developments in Vietnam and in Sino-Soviet controversy, Chicom position on line JCP should take toward Soviet Union and GOJ's attempts influence Soviets toward peace in Vietnam are awaited with interest. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. FonOff Shifts

a. Cabinet January 18 approved appointment Heishiro Ogawa, former Director of Division of Research and Analysis, as Director of Asian Bureau, replacing Torao Ushiroku, and of Kinya Niiseki, former Hong Kong ConGen, as Director of Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau, replacing Akira Sono. Assignments for Ushiroku and Sono, who are of ambassadorial rank, not yet determined. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Both Ogawa and Niiseki are familiar with China, and press has speculated these appointments are in preparation for over-all review of Japan's China policy. Niiseki is also Soviet expert. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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7. Fourth Wave of Seamen's Strike (Weeka No. 52, Item No. 4, 1965)

a. Japan Seamen's Union (Kaiin) Central Executive Board decided January 17 that fourth wave of strike will run from midnight January 24 to noon, February 8. Strike reportedly will tie up 1239 ocean-going and coastal vessels. Shipowners and union seem no closer to agreement and there is no indication so far that Government ready to step in and mediate settlement. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

8. Domei Convention Passes Resolution on Vietnam

a. Domei's Second Annual Convention passed resolution on January 18 entrusting Central Executive Board with task of conferring with CVT, Vietnam Labor Federation, in order to determine ways of aiding Vietnam labor movement. Resolution also called on ICFTU and other unions to join Domei in aiding South Vietnamese. Convention addressed by leader of eight-man CVT delegation.

b. Convention otherwise marked by lack of color and debate, and overshadowed in news by JSP convention. Major work of Domei Convention passed unanimously, including Vietnam resolution and other resolutions which called for return of Okinawa to Japan and for aid to Seamen's Union strike. Approved action policy calls for 15% wage increase. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Resolution on Vietnam significant because it is first expression of support by any Japanese labor organization. How Domei will follow up remains to be seen. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).

9. UAR Deputy Premier's Visit

a. Mohammed Abdel Kader Hatem, UAR Deputy Premier for Culture, National Guidance and Tourism, arrived January 13 for two-week visit which will include meetings with PriMin Sato and other GOJ officials, plus side trips to Kyoto and Fukuoka. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Hatem is guest of FonOff and visit is mainly of goodwill nature. He asked, however, for increased GOJ technical assistance and reportedly obtained favorable response from Sato. Visit is receiving moderate publicity and serves as convenient stage-setting for LDP Vice President Kawashima's trip to Cairo scheduled for next month. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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from Tokyo

10. Newsmen Return from Taiwan Trip

a. Twelve Japanese newsmen returned to Japan from Taiwan January 18 after six-day visit. Group interviewed President Chiang Kai-shek. Spokesman told press that group was impressed by unity of people on island. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Visit was product of Chinese Embassy effort. Serial articles, resulting from trip, have already begun to appear in press and trip should provide background for fuller and more understanding treatment of news from Taiwan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

11. Memorial Service for War Criminals

a. Memorial service was held in Tokyo for executed war criminals (including wartime PriMin Tojo) and all other war dead on eve of 20th anniversary of execution of Generals Yamashita and Homma. Ceremony took place at home of rightist Ryoichi Sasagawa, ex-Diet member. Among those present were widows of Tojo, Yamashita and Homma and former flag rank officers.

b. After ceremonies Sasagawa mentioned plan to erect monument in Philippines for Japanese war dead. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Plan to erect monument in Philippines appears at minimum premature and unlikely to receive Philippine Government approval. LDP source informs us that Philippine President Marcos told former PriMin Kishi, in Manila for Marcos' inauguration, that his brother was killed by Japanese forces and he personally had resentment against Japanese for World War II actions, but added that he recognized necessity for two countries to cooperate in Free World interest. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

MILITARY

12. Another SSN Visits Sasebo - Ho Hum!

a. USS SARGO arrived Sasebo morning January 18 and tied up alongside AJAX to commence six-day visit. Eighth SSN arrival evoked only token leftist demonstration (about 40 demonstrators) despite only three-week interval since last SSN call. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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
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from Tokyo

b. Press comment concentrated on decline in public and media excitement over SSN visits, rather than on visit. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Correction on Budget Draft Item

In Item No. 1 of Weeka No. 2, U. S. equivalent of general account draft budget should read U. S. \$11,984 million.

For the Ambassador:



Thomas W. Ainsworth
First Secretary of Embassy

WTBreer *AMB*
POL: TGTsukahira *AMB*
TWAinsworth *AMB*
JMFarrion *AMB*
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

PO 2-1 JAPAN

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A-906
NO. CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY
HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE/OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, CINCPAC, COMUS/J, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, RANGOON, BANGKOK, ~~KATPEX~~, SAIGON, MOSCOW, BONN.
FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO
SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 4
DATE: January 28, 1966
REF :

CONTENTS

1. 51st Regular Diet Re-Opens
2. JSP Convention Reelects Sasaki and Narita
3. PriMin Sato to Make Special Effort on Vietnam
4. FonMin Returns From USSR and Germany
5. GSDF Map Exercise
6. French Warships Visit Japan
7. Mainichi Foreign News Chief Omori Resigns

POLITICAL

1. 51st Regular Diet Re-Opens

a. Joint session for formal re-opening 51st regular Diet held January 27, followed by policy speeches January 28 by PriMin Sato, FonMin Shiina, FinMin Fukuda and Economic Planning Agency

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 from Tokyo

Director Fujiyama. Earlier in week LDP agreed to give JSP chairmanships of three special committees in Lower House, but none of permanent committees. (UNCLASSIFIED).

b. Comment: Economy-stimulating draft budget (Weeka No. 2, Item No. 1) will be principal business of 51st Diet for remainder of its session, with little other major legislation likely. JSP leaders continue to voice strong line of fighting government program and seeking early Lower House dissolution, but LDP sources predict relative Socialist moderation in practice, on grounds that public as well as business community looks forward to economic recovery effect of proposed budget and hard fight against it, especially appearance of mere procedural stalling for political purposes would backfire against JSP. Gesture of giving JSP committee chairmanships appears designed as public show of LDP reasonableness in further effort to tie Socialist hands against all-out fight on budget issue. Timing of budget passage on other hand presents problem for LDP, since relatively late introduction of legislation faces party with choice of either severely limiting time for Lower House debate or having to pass bill through both houses instead of permitting automatic coming into effect 30 days after Lower House passage. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. JSP Convention Reelects Sasaki and Narita (Weeka No. 3, Item No. 1)

a. Socialist Party national convention on final day, January 22, re-elected Chairman Kozo Sasaki and SecGen Tomomi Narita after lengthy efforts failed to forestall showdown contest between Sasaki and challenger Saburo Eda. Open elections for both top party posts were necessitated when successive schemes for negotiated settlement broke down. With Sohyo and Kawakami faction applying strong pressure on him to compromise, Eda had at one point decided to accept Narita's plan to settle for SecGen post under Sasaki. Anti-Sasaki leaders in Wada faction and among his own following, however, insisted on Eda running at head of Eda-Katsumata ticket. Eda's decision to challenge Sasaki brought Narita back into race for SecGen against Katsumata. Sasaki won reelection in close contest 295 to 276, which in no sense represented overwhelming endorsement. Narita's margin of victory was 321 votes to Katsumata's 246. Vice-Chairman Mitsu Kono (Kawakami faction leader) was reelected without contest; second Vice-Chairmanship vacated by Wada was not filled.

b. Fourteen of 19 Central Executive Committee posts were decided by negotiation. Of five contested by ballot, anti-Sasaki candidates won four, including key Organization Bureau Chief, People's Movements Chief, and Policy Research Board Chairman positions. Sasaki faction and extreme-left Heiwa Doshikai now has minority position of 8 posts in CEC.

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Page 3 A-906
from Tokyo

c. Convention debate on policies and program was featured by strong criticism of Sasaki leadership for "leaning toward hard Chicom international line and abandoning established policy of peaceful coexistence," for improper guidance on "joint struggles" with Communists, and for failure to conduct effective Diet fight against ROK-Japan Treaty ratification. In end, however, despite critical speeches from floor, right and left wings patched together revised compromise action program, accommodating views of Chicom-leaning left wing which stresses hard militant line in domestic and international affairs and relatively more moderate advocates of "structural reform" at home and "peaceful coexistence" abroad. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: (Embtel 2567) Despite sound and fury of debate on action program, final compromise reflected Eda faction's willingness at time to go along with Narita's Sasaki-Eda harmony ticket, and reinforces widely-held view that JSP policy debates are largely devices to promote factional interests. JSP convention set stage for stronger confrontation between right and left wings of party. Open contest for top posts resulted in exclusion of leaders of Eda and Wada factions from executive positions for coming year and left party clearly divided into two rival camps, almost evenly balanced. Fact that balance is close will inevitably exacerbate rivalries as each side prepares for another showdown at next convention. Although ideological differences were papered over in the action program, heightened personal antagonisms resulting from closely fought election and continuing differences of views on policy certain to plague party with constant internal friction. Despite fact combined right wing now has majority of CEC posts, there is no sign that JSP under present top leadership will make major shifts in foreign policy from present leftward course. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. PriMin Sato to Make Special Effort on Vietnam

a. PriMin Sato in January 25 press conference announced intention send retired diplomat Masayuki Yokoyama as special envoy to nations concerned with Vietnam war in effort to pave way for peace talks, including possibility of reconvening Geneva Conference. Yokoyama told press that following visit to Southeast Asia, he planned mid-February departure for European capitals where he had friends whom he knew in Vietnam during World War II. Seventy-three-year-old Yokoyama retired from diplomatic service in 1941, served as economic advisor in Vietnam to Japanese mission during World War II, and is now advisor to construction company with interests in Vietnam. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: While no one probably expects it to do much toward its ostensible purpose of bringing about peace talks, Yokoyama's mission serves emphasize to Japanese people and world at large that GOJ making effort achieve peace in Southeast Asia despite disappointing Soviet reply to FonMin Shiina's representations in Moscow (See Item 4) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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from Tokyo

4. FonMin Returns from USSR and Germany

a. FonMin Shiina January 26 returned from 6-day visit to USSR, where he signed civair and trade agreements (Weeka No. 3, Item 2) and exchanged views with Soviet leaders, and from 2-day visit to West Germany, where he held third in series of annual Fonmin-level consultations. Shiina's mission to Moscow, including meeting with Kosygin, failed soften Soviet rejection of Japan's claims to Kunashiri and Etorofu islands, and to get Soviets to cooperate in Vietnam peace effort. Japanese press jumped on report, attributed to member of Japanese delegation after leaving USSR, that Kosygin was very blunt in rejecting Shiina overture for further consideration on Northern Islands. Lack of success disappointed Japanese and brought into focus Japan's weakness in negotiating with powerful Soviet neighbor.

b. ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Shiina's visit to Bonn was of routine nature, main purpose of which was to keep Japan-German relations flourishing.
(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

MILITARY

5. GSDF Map Exercise

a. JGSDF began five-day map exercise (no actual troop deployment) January 24th at 12th Division Hq. (Gumma Prefecture). Purpose of map drill to obtain data on deployment of units, GSDF-ASDF cooperation, establishment of supply routes, and defense against nuclear weapons. This is first time radio-activity detection incorporated into large-scale exercise. Handling of deserters and civilian support of SDF operations also studied. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Exercise is expected to be this year's largest. Despite public announcement of drill, there has so far been no public opposition, perhaps because exercise is not joint Japan-US operation. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. French Warships Visit Japan

a. French Navy helicopter carrier, JEANNE D'ARC, and escort ship, VICTOR SCHOELCHER, arrived Tokyo January 27 for five-day

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from Tokyo

goodwill visit. After visiting Tokyo, ships scheduled to make calls at Kobe and Etajima, then continue around-the-world training cruise. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Among 850 crewman of 12,000-ton, 182-meter long JEANNE D'ARC, are 150 naval cadets. Newspapers reported, without comment, carrier equipped with new radio-active fallout decontamination/ * (UNCLASSIFIED) equipment

PSYCHOLOGICAL

6. Mainichi Foreign News Chief Omori Resigns

a. Although no public announcement has been made, knowledgeable sources say that Mainichi Board of Directors ^{last week} accepted resignation of Foreign News Chief Minoru Omori, who won notoriety in early fall of 1965 with series of uncritical reports from Hanoi. Resignation, submitted on January 13th, was rumored for number of weeks, and various sources have suggested that pressures from business community, GOJ and other sources were responsible for departure of Omori from Mainichi. Popular weekly magazine Shukan Jitsuwa carried detailed account of Omori case and concluded that pressures outside of Mainichi were not instrumental in bringing about Omori resignation. Said however that Ambassador Reischauer's criticism of Omori's Hanoi reports was "turning point" in events leading to resignation. Omori is now expected to embark on career as free-lance writer and commentator. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Despite what Shukan Jitsuwa concluded, it seems highly probable that outside pressures from Japanese business and political circles, together with pressures from his critics inside Mainichi, were important factors in Omori resignation. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

For the Ambassador:



Thomas W. Ainsworth
First Secretary of Embassy

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ORIGINAL SOURCE

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE: February 4, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 5

REF :

INFO: TEHRAN, KUWAIT, KARACHI

Contents

1. Diet Debates Off to Stormy Start
2. Reaction to Resumption of NVN Bombing
3. Elections - LDP Wins Two, Loses One
4. JCP Group Gets Passports for Communist China
5. Diet Members Visit Taiwan
6. Special Envoy Yokoyama's Itinerary
7. High-Level Visit to Middle East
8. Moscow Mayor Visits Tokyo
9. USSR Signs Cultural Agreement with Japanese Group
10. Seamen's Strike Ends
11. MSDF Commissions New ASW Destroyer
12. JDA to Produce SDF Publicity Film

POLITICAL

1. Diet Debates Off to Stormy Start

a. Current session of Diet opened January 31 with three days of interpellations in both houses by party representatives. Opening sessions were characterized by strong and direct confrontation between LDP and JSP. JSP bitterly criticized GOJ

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POLITICAL

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from Tokyo

economic program but attacks contained little beyond general charges that measures were inflationary and GOJ was betraying peoples' interests by failing to curb price rises. Heated exchanges on foreign affairs centered around Vietnam issue and Japan's defense. JSP attacked Sato for supporting "deceptive" U.S. peace efforts in Vietnam. In reply Sato expressed regret that US peace overtures had failed because of refusal of Communists to respond. He denied JSP charges that Security Treaty turning Japan into nuclear base and said Treaty was essential to Japan's security. In response to LDP member's question, January 31, Sato remarked on necessity of dispelling popular misunderstanding fostered by left that Security Treaty expires in 1970 and said there is no requirement for revision then. In February 2 reply to DSP question, Sato said he not now thinking of revising Security Treaty, but would continue to study international situation carefully.

b. Diet proceedings were interrupted one whole day by uproar following disclosure that former secretary to Yotoku Shigemasa, LDP Upper House member, had been arrested on charges involving 1963 sale of pistols in Diet building to gangsters. JSP demanded LDP assume party responsibility and Shigemasa resign from Diet, but LDP finally got issue settled through Shigemasa's apology, Sato's and Upper House President Shigemune's expression of regret, and Shigemasa's resignation from LDP. Shigemasa will remain in Diet as independent, but official LDP Upper House strength has dropped to 138 seats. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: (Embtel 2685) Attitudes shown by LDP and Socialists in opening days of current session indicate strong and bitter confrontation will continue. GOJ/LDP stress on fact that U.S. -Japan Security Treaty does not automatically require action in 1970 is part of positive GOJ program to educate public on need for Security Treaty and forestall leftist buildup of crisis atmosphere which has 1970 as target date. While flap over pistol scandal held up Diet only one day, opposition can be expected to do best to exploit it further to damage LDP public image. Press comment on Diet interpellations were generally critical of both sides, taking attitude that neither GOJ nor opposition Socialists were engaging in constructive debate for benefit of nation but merely seeking to serve partisan ends. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Reaction to Resumption of NVN Bombing

a. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hashimoto expressed official GOJ reaction to US resumption of bombing of North Vietnam when he told press January 31 that it was extremely regrettable that because of imperative military necessity US had been forced to resume bombing of North Vietnam. He added hope that US would continue efforts for peace and that North Vietnam would respond to world opinion and take constructive steps toward peace.

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move to inscribe Vietnam item at UNSC.
b. GOJ instructed UN Ambassador Matsui, February Chairman of UNSC, to support US ~~Vietnam item at UNSC~~. In Diet interpellations February 2, PriMin Sato stated he would consider asking US to suspend bombing again after UNSC had successfully arranged for peace talks and North Vietnam had ceased its infiltration. JSP spokesman said war could spread to Laos and Cambodia and alleged US peace offensive was "conspiracy to deceive world." DSP regretted US action and asked Government call for immediate suspension of bombing. Komeito also regretted action but added that North Vietnam should respond to US call for peace. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Reactions were along predictable lines. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. Elections - LDP Wins Two, Loses One

a. In January 30 Hiroshima by-election to fill House of Councillors vacancy caused by December 8 death of Tadayasu Iwasawa (LDP), LDP candidate Makoto Nakatsui (former member of prefectural assembly) won with 266,782 votes. Nearest rival Yoshito Fukuoka (JSP) polled 199,337 votes. Conservative vote was split by surprise candidacy of Vice-Governor Mitsuo Takagi who ran as independent and polled 162,314 votes. JCP candidate Tsuneyuki Murakami had 44,080 votes. Voting rate was 46.3%, extremely low even for by-election.

b. In February 1 Kyoto mayoralty contest, Seiichi Inoue (conservative independent) won clear majority with 222,924 votes. ~~Opponents~~ were Seiichi Okamoto (JSP-backed, 121,265 votes), Shinzo Yasui (JCP - 84,435), and Gan Takada (ultra-right independent - 2,452).

c. In January 28 Sendai mayoralty election incumbent Takeshi Shimano, backed by JSP, DSP and JCP won with 121,922 votes against 97,928 votes for former Ambassador to Indonesia Hiroo Furuuchi (LDP). (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Hiroshima victory briefly (See Item 1, Para. b.) restored LDP Upper House strength to 139. JCP showing in Kyoto election fell considerably below that in 1965 Upper House election. Sendai JSP victory surprised LDP, who thought they had winner in Furuuchi. (UNCLASSIFIED)

4. JCP Group Gets Passports for Communist China (Weeka No. 3, Item 5)

a. On February 3, press reported GOJ approved passport applications for high-ranking JCP 10-member group to visit Communist China at invitation of CCP Central Committee. Group consists of JCP Presidium members Kenji Miyamoto (SecGen), Masayoshi Oka, Itaru Yonehara and Korehito Kurahara, Central Committee members Koichiro Ueda, Tetsuzo Fuwa, and Akira Kudo, plus secretary, interpreter and doctor. Departure schedule not yet announced. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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from Tokyo

b. Comment: This is largest group visit of JCP leaders to Communist China. Public Safety Investigation Agency confirmed press reports that Agency opposed granting passports, for which applications had been pending four weeks. According press, Justice Ministry and Foreign Ministry decided to grant passports in view of judicial reversal of previous passport refusal cases. Press speculated JCP group hopes for important discussions with Chinese leaders concerning Vietnam war and forthcoming CPSU convention. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Diet Members Visit Taiwan

a. President of House of Councillors Yuzo Shigemune scheduled make official eight-day visit to Taiwan starting February 8, together with LDP members Naotsugu Nabeshima and Masafumi Yoneda, JSP member Akio Yanaoka, and Komeito member Kunihiro Shibuya. Entire group expected to meet President Chiang Kai-shek. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: This is another of periodic visits to Taiwan by ranking Japanese; however, this one is notable for inclusion of opposition Diet members. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. Special Envoy Yokoyama's Itinerary (Weeka No. 4, Item 3)

a. Masayuki Yokoyama, PriMin Sato's special Vietnam peace envoy, informed press after meeting with FonMin Shiina February 3 that his primary mission is to discover possibility of direct contact with North Vietnamese but he would not go to Hanoi immediately. During 2-3 month period starting mid-February, Yokoyama plans visit France, Poland, Austria, UAR, Pakistan, India, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

7. High-Level Visit To Middle East

a. LDP Vice President Shojiro Kawashima, accompanied by one DSP and four LDP Diet members, departed February 1 on twenty-day trip to UAR, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. Kawashima, designated Special Ambassador, will be official guest in UAR, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Purpose is goodwill and enhancement of Japan's economic and general interests. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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from Tokyo

8. Moscow Mayor Visits Tokyo

a. Five-man Moscow municipal delegation headed by Mayor Vladimir F. Promyslov arrived in Tokyo January 31 for five-day visit at invitation Tokyo Metropolitan Government. During stay in Tokyo, Promyslov met with Tokyo Governor Azuma and other municipal officials. Soviet delegation also made sight-seeing trips to Hakone and Nikko. Azuma was invited by the Soviet delegation to visit Moscow in near future. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

9. USSR Signs Cultural Agreement with Japanese Group

a. E. V. Ivanov, visiting Chairman of Soviet National Commission on Cultural Relations, and JSP Diet member Shichiro Matsumoto, Director Japan-Soviet Friendship Society, on February 2 signed 1966 Japan-USSR Cultural Exchange Agreement. Non-governmental agreement calls for "cultural exchanges" in business, science and entertainment fields, and reciprocal visits by local officials. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Japan-Soviet Friendship Society, inaugurated April 18, 1965 after breakaway from pro-Chicom JCP-dominated Japan-Soviet Association, signed similar private agreement last year. This is substitute for official cultural exchange program which has long been discussed without agreement. (UNCLASSIFIED)

10. Seamen's Strike Ends (Weeka No. 3, Item 7)

a. Agreement reached between Japan Seamen's Union (Kain) and shipowners on January 30 ended 35 days of strike activity and called for average monthly wage increase of 6,870 yen (\$19.09) effective February 1, for period ending March 31, 1967. (Embtel UNN Feb. 1, 1966) Settlement represents roughly 70% of union's initial demand. GOJ now considering ways to ease financial burden of wage increase on shipowners, including easier terms to ocean-going shipowners participating in GOJ Maritime Reorganization Program and subsidy payments designed to beach surplus coastal vessels and thereby drive up domestic shipping rates. General public not affected by strike, but mass media critical of both union and owners for bargaining with GOJ aid in mind. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Union disappointed that longest strike in Japanese maritime history gave it 10% less than it has averaged on past demands and somewhat amazed at owners' unity and resistance. Owners reportedly satisfied with settlement. Their united stand against Japan's strongest union will encourage organized management in other industries in its efforts to unite against annual wage demands during this year's spring struggle. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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from Tokyo

11. MSDF Commissions New ASW Destroyer

b. Comment: YAMAGUMO is first of two DDKs laid-down under 2nd Defense Buildup Program to be completed. After shake-down cruise, YAMAGUMO slated for 2nd Escort Flotilla homeported Sasebo. (UNCLASSIFIED)

12. JDA to Produce SDF Publicity Film

b. Comment: Since much emphasis will be placed on US military operations in Japan and the Far East, the film can be viewed as part of GOJ plan to sell public on need for Security Treaty and counter leftist movements for abrogation in 1970. (See Item 1 Comment) (CONFIDENTIAL)

Richard Smith

Thomas W. Ainsworth
First Secretary of Embassy

WTBreer

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LABATT:RFPfeiff

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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 CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, RANGOON,
 BANGKOK, SAIGON, TAIPEI, MOSCOW, SEOUL

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE: February 11, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 6

REF :

CONTENTS

1. Diet Deliberations Shift to Lower House Committee
2. JSP Plans "Diplomatic" Initiatives
3. Sohyo Warms Up for Spring Struggle
4. GOJ Reaction to Honolulu Conference
5. Diet Members to North Korea
6. JCP SecGen Miyamoto Departs for Communist China
7. Waseda University Students Strike Entering Third Week

POLITICAL

1. Diet Deliberations Shift to Lower House Committees

a. Lower House Budget Committee, which convened February 5 to deliberate 1966 budget, opened session with discussion of February 4 All-Japan Airlines' Boeing 727 crash which claimed 133 lives. PriMin offered condolences and silent prayer and promised GOJ would make all-out effort discover cause of crash and prevent others in future. He appointed blue-ribbon commission, headed by

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from Tokyo

Transportation Minister, to carry on investigation. Akahata (JCP organ) demanded immediate grounding of 727's and laid blame for crash on GOJ's "policy of subservience" to U.S. imperialism.

b. In February 5 and 8 Budget Committee hearings PriMin quoted as saying he saw no need for revising U.S. -Japan security treaty under present circumstances. He rejected suggestion of Democratic Socialist Party interpellator that it might be possible to amend agreement to allow stationing of U. S. forces in Japan only in emergency.

c. PriMin at February 7 and 9 Committee hearings, in response to JSP question, stated that he has no intention of asking U.S. to suspend bombing North Vietnam as long as it continues its aggression against and introduction of men and arms into the South.

d. Bulk of Budget Committee hearings centered around question of inflation with opposition attacking GOJ for inflationary fiscal policies and government replying that larger budget expenditures and deficit financing necessary promote business revival and citing steady wholesale commodity prices as evidence inflation not rampant.

e. Lower House Transportation Committee, which scheduled take up pending rise in national railway fares early in week, failed to gain agreement of LDP and JSP on agenda items. LDP, originally pushing for February 15 passage of new rate schedule, has settled for February 23 passage with new rates to be effective February 25. (UNCLASSIFIED)

f. Comment: Appears that JSP's major target this Diet session will be GOJ economic policies and some editorials have commented on party's increasing realism and sense of responsibility - this remains to be seen. Socialists have thus far shown caution in using procedural delaying tactics (in Transportation Committee) but they may revert to more extensive use of such measures; SecGen Narita told press February 9 that because budget introduction delayed he did not see how it could pass by end of fiscal year (March 31), and Sohyo made at least token call for fight against budget (Item 3 below). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. JSP Plans "Diplomatic" Initiatives

a. JSP Foreign Affairs Committee, meeting for first time under chairmanship newly-elected International Bureau Director Koichi Yamamoto, decided February 9 to promote: 1) program of personnel and cultural exchanges with North Korea (See Item 4), and 2) "conference of Asian peoples" to seek peaceful solution of Vietnam issue. Project to broaden contact with North Korea was reportedly justified on grounds that establishment of diplomatic relations with

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 from Tokyo

South Korea needed "balancing" and that recent relaxation of GOJ restrictions on travel to North Korea made expanded exchange feasible. Asian conference idea, first proposed by Chairman Sasaki in Hiroshima last month, is apparently conceived of as means of uniting Asian neutralist and "anti-imperialist" movements under JSP aegis. Committee decision calls for immediate formation of study group on Vietnam situation and dispatch of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Yamamoto to Cambodia to meet Sihanouk and to other Asian countries (as yet unspecified) in March to discuss possibility joint JSP-Cambodian sponsorship of neutralist, anti-imperialist conference on Asian affairs in Tokyo.
 (UNCLASSIFIED)

positive

b. Comment: Initiatives decided upon in JSP Foreign Affairs Committee reflect new JSP emphasis on actions as opposed to "negative oppositionism." Latter strongly criticised at recent party convention. With Chairman Sasaki and Sasaki-man Yamamoto setting tone and pace, JSP positivism in foreign affairs field is marked by typically flamboyant and "catch-as-catch-can" style of JSP left wing and is taking form of efforts to promote closer relations with "anti-imperialist" camp. Recent case in point is signing of non-governmental cultural exchange agreement between Soviet Union and JSP-dominated Japan-Soviet Friendship Association (Weeka No. 5, Item 9). Latest proposals seeking to broaden JSP influence among "anti-imperialist" Asian countries. Although prospects for realization of Tokyo "Conference of Asian Peoples" do not appear very bright, JSP probably hopes to improve image through positive effort. Proposed exchange program with North Korea appears more practical in view active interest on part substantial minority and special-interest groups in Japan for increased contacts. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Sohyo Warms Up for Spring Struggle

a. Sohyo Special Convention held in Tokyo February 9-10 to whip up rank and file support for spring struggle adopted action policy calling for strike action to back up demands for ¥ 7-8,000 (\$19.44 - \$22.22) monthly wage increase and for defeat of "inflationary" GOJ budget in current Diet session. Kickoff of spring struggle calls for 200-300,000 parade and family-outing type demonstration in Tokyo February 27 to protest rising prices. Also called for are one-day strike on March 29 to back up demands for shorter hours and higher minimum wage and mid-April strike led by private railway and public enterprise unions which will be climax of spring struggle. Convention also adopted resolution which protests resumption of bombing of North Vietnam, calling it clear evidence of U.S. aggression and violation of international law. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Behind Convention bravado lies stark fact of continuing low profits for most Japanese firms and increasing resistance by organized management to other than cost-of-living wage increases. Most important determinant

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Page 4 A-975
from Tokyo

in wage negotiations will be rising cost of living. Ota-Iwai leadership, faced with election at annual convention this summer, likely to use political issues in spring struggle because of improbability of spectacular wage gains.
(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. GOJ Reaction to Honolulu Conference

a. Press February 10 quoted FonOff sources as stating that emphasis placed on measures to stabilize livelihood of South Vietnamese was highly reassuring and encouraging; economic and social measures should lead steadily to stability of GVN. Sources noted US pledge to respect South Vietnamese independence and determination defend South Vietnam from aggression from the North. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: This FonOff ^{are} backgrounder to press and PriMin Sato statement in Diet (See Item 1) among GOJ efforts influence public opinion along lines which will be more favorable to U.S. interests. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Diet Members to North Korea

a. JSP Upper House member Tokuji Kameda and nine members of group sponsored by Japan-North Korea Friendship Society left Osaka for North Korea February 10. Passports for group had been approved by FonOff and Justice Ministry February 5. ROK Embassy protested issuance of passports February 8. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: FonOff has told us that request for passports difficult to refuse in view special status of Diet members and also precedents established in 1960 and 1963 when groups led by Diet members were given passports to go to North Korea. FonOff anticipates group will issue communique of some sort condemning GOJ treatment of Koreans residing in Japan and establishment of normal diplomatic relations with ROK. Such communique likely include other favorite Communist issues, such as Vietnam, etc. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. JCP SecGen Miyamoto Departs for Communist China (Weeka No. 5, Item 4)

a. JCP SecGen Miyamoto and party of 9 departed Kita Kyushu City February 8 for Shanghai aboard Chicom freighter. Party expected to remain in China about one month. At pre-departure press conference Miyamoto reported to have said that purpose of trip to observe situation in China and Asia at first hand.

b. February 5 Akahata (JCP ~~house~~ organ) broke long silence and announced decision to send delegation. Paper vehemently denounced GOJ agencies and

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 from Tokyo

and bourgeois press for hinting trip might not be in best interests of Japan.
 (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Akahata uncommunicative attitude on purposes Miyamoto visit did not dampen speculation elsewhere that delegation, largest high-level JCP group to visit Communist China, would attempt ease Sino-Soviet friction.
 (UNCLASSIFIED)


7. Waseda University Students Strike Entering Third Week

a. Waseda University students' strike, which began January 20 and has brought all Waseda activities including final exams for graduating seniors and entrance exams for new students to virtual standstill, shows no signs of being resolved in near future. Strike originally called to protest proposed rise in university fees (which would affect only students entering in 1966 and beyond), made necessary by skyrocketing costs of education. Strike also involves competition between JCP-controlled and anti-JCP Marxist/Trotskyite students for control of Waseda student movement and demand by both groups for right to manage new student union center.

b. University authorities have held their ground thus far, despite continued harassment including barricading of administration building by student zealots, and have not sought police assistance to maintain order. Though university authorities have shown willingness to discuss pertinent problems with students, students still holding out for complete retraction of tuition increase. Group of prominent alumni, including Dietmen from various parties, scheduled to meet February 11 to seek solution. In meantime, moderate student movement (representing overwhelming majority), appears to be building up, calling for reasonable solution and opposition to "hysteria." (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Present Waseda struggle follows similar but less spectacular disturbance at Keio (Tokyo's other leading private university) last year and is symptomatic of financial difficulties of private universities in Japan. Waseda strike has focused much public attention on irresponsible and destructive role of extremist student organizations, and appears likely to strengthen public and official sentiment in favor of curbing activities of such student groups.
 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

For the Ambassador:



Thomas W. Ainsworth
 First Secretary of Embassy

POL:WTP:eer:mfd
 TGT:shira
 JMF:for

LABATT:RFPfeif
 USIS:HLBurleson
 NAVATT:CDR PBShepar

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OSD	USA	NSA
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PC	HEW	NSC
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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE: February 18, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO.

REF :

CONTENTS

1. GOJ and JSP Skirmish in Diet
2. Miyamoto to Hanoi
3. North Koreans Forbidden Entry
4. Japanese Reaction to UNSC Proceeding
5. Heavy Schedule of Visits

POLITICAL

1. GOJ and JSP Skirmish in Diet

a. GOJ efforts to expedite Lower House passage of bill to raise Japanese National Railway fares ran into difficulties as JSP February 17 forced further postponement of final action by Transportation Committee. JSP resorted to delaying tactics in Lower House Budget Committee which was preparing to vote out fourth supplementary budget bill for fiscal 1965, which also concerned JNR budget. JSP interpellator Masashi Ishibashi side-tracked budget hearings with questions on armament and alleged "spy" activities of Maritime Safety Agency, N-armament of U.S.

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1966 FEB 21 PM 4 50

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Page 2 A-1003
from Tokyo

Navy nuclear-powered surface ships in connection with rumors they may visit Japan, and other matters not directly related to budget. JSP leaders simultaneously threatened to resume physical obstruction of Diet proceedings if LDP tried to ram bill through Transportation Committee. Compromise finally reached permitting late evening passage of supplementary budget by Lower House plenary session February 17, while action on JNR fare raise delayed. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment - GOJ will obtain ultimate passage of JNR fare raise, but JNR revenues reportedly suffer to tune of ¥ 500,000,000 (approx. U. S. \$1,400,000) each day increase is postponed. GOJ had originally scheduled February 15 as effective date for higher fares, but March 1 now looks more probable. JFY 1966 general budget assumes new JNR rates as of February 15, so that additional supplementary budget or special financing measures for JNR may become necessary. JSP is determined to use Transportation and Budget Committee forums to maximum extent to attack and embarrass GOJ. JSP delaying tactics have been more skillful than in Korea-Treaty Special Session last fall, and GOJ, especially Transportation and Local Autonomy Ministers, have not done very well in interpellations. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Miyamoto to Hanoi (See Weeka No. 6, Item No. 6)

a. JCP SecGen Kenji Miyamoto and party arrived Shanghai February 10 and were met and entertained by CCP Central Committee member Liu Ning-i, members of the Shanghai CCP committee, and others. Arrival statements re-affirmed common struggle against "American imperialism" and "modern revisionism." On February 13, Miyamoto reportedly held conference in Shanghai with Peng Chen, CCP Politburo member and Peking mayor. Miyamoto party departed Shanghai for Canton in company of Liu Ning-i February 15, and on February 17, according Tokyo press reports of NCNA broadcast, flew to Hanoi. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment - Miyamoto's visit to Hanoi suggests consultations with DRV leaders concerning Vietnam war, solidarity in international Communist movement, and attendance at 23rd CPSU Congress. Fact that group did not go directly to Peking casts some doubt on widespread speculation in Japan that main purpose of Miyamoto's visit is to persuade Chicoms to be more cooperative with Soviets in aiding North Vietnam. On other hand this would in any case not be quick-visit undertaking, and talks in Hanoi could obviously fit in with preparations for such effort. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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from Tokyo

3. North Koreans Forbidden Entry

a. Press reported February 18 that FonOff had denied visas to five North Koreans who requested permission enter Japan in connection with prospective \$48 million purchase plant facilities. Visa applications were reportedly favored by MITI, which is pushing exports, and not opposed by Justice Ministry, which said entrants would have nothing to do with politics, but were refused by FonOff, which feared further antagonizing ROK. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment - FonOff position reflects sensitivity generated by earlier ROK protests over permission given to two Korean residents in Japan to visit North Korea at end of December and to Kameda group (Weeka No. 6, Item No. 5). (UNCLASSIFIED)

4. Japanese Reaction to UNSC Proceedings

a. UN Security Council's efforts in dealing with Vietnam question have been watched with special interest in Japan since Japanese Ambassador Matsui assumed presidency of SC at beginning of February. FonOff told press February 17, however, that chances were slim Matsui could conclude this SC action before his term expires. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment - Many Japanese, fearing exacerbation of problem by clashes in UN, will probably feel relieved when Matsui steps down from presidency at end of month. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Heavy Schedule of Visits

a. During past week press carried announcements that, apart from number of important American visits to Tokyo, GOJ schedule would include:

(1) Special Ambassador Masayuki Yokoyama leaving February 18 for Paris to start extended tour of Europe and Asia in Vietnam peace effort.

(2) First meeting of Japan-India Consultative Committee will open in New Delhi March 2 attended by Deputy Vice FonMin Ushiba for political discussions between two governments.

(3) GVN PriMin Nguyen Cao Ky coming to Japan March 22 for state visit.

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
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from Tokyo

- (4) Japan to host SEA Economic Ministers Conference April 6-7 for discussion ways and means of speeding SEA economic development.
- (5) Soviet FonMin Gromyko will visit Tokyo mid-April to sign consular convention.
- (6) Burmese Premier Gen. Ne Win will visit sometime in May.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment - Number and scope of visits points to growing Japanese interest and initiatives in international areas. (UNCLASSIFIED)

For the Ambassador:



Thomas W. Ainsworth
First Secretary of Embassy

POL: TGTsukahira
WTBreer
JMFarrion
WHBruns

USIS: HLBurleson
ARMATT: MAJ DDHarris, Jr.

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QUESTION/ACTION

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PRIORITY

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE/OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, CINCPAC, COMUS/J, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, RANGOON, BANGKOK, SAIGON, TAIPEI, SEOUL, MOSCOW

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE: February 25, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 8

REF: Notes

Mar. 9, 1966
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1. Diet Makes Slow Headway on Budget
2. Miyamoto to USSR?
3. Police Called in to Waseda Dispute
4. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
5. North Koreans Refused Entry
6. Steelworkers Decide to Join JC-IMF
7. Goodwill Visit of Astronauts Schirra and Borman
8. Nimitz Death Saddens JMSDF
9. Peruvian Naval Training Ship Departs Japan

POLITICAL

1. Diet Makes Slow Headway on Budget
 - a. Focus of Diet interest shifted from railway fare increase (Weeka No. 7, Item 1) to JFY 1966 regular budget, as former bill cleared Lower House hurdles. Minor Socialist protests marked committee passage of railway fare measure February 19, primarily because committee chairman tore up written non-confidence motion

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 from Tokyo

against himself after LDP majority had voted it down and passed fare bill in sudden action initiated while JSP member still engaged in questioning. Lower House plenary nevertheless passed railway bill February 22 and Upper House committees began deliberations on it February 24.

b. LDP-JSP understanding on handling of budget legislation, on other hand, indicated regular budget Lower House passage would probably be delayed until about March 3, raising possibility budget would not become effective until after April 1, start of new fiscal year. JSP began claiming delays in legislation as victories which would help push government toward early general election. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: JSP tactics thus far appear dictated more by intra-party politics than by any broader consideration. Delaying budget legislation has no practical significance except as it may force GOJ/LDP to introduce additional supplementary financing measures. Intra-JSP factional competition currently seems to center on which faction can demonstrate more obstructionism in Diet without resorting to strong-arm tactics which are generally viewed as having produced adverse public reaction during last fall's clash over treaty with ROK. LDP members are keeping one eye on Diet proceedings and other on home constituencies; there is spreading belief that general election will take place before end of year, although leadership (especially SecGen Tanaka) continues to deny likelihood. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Miyamoto to USSR?

a. Sankei Newspaper, citing Japanese security authorities, reported February 24 that JCP SecGen Kenji Miyamoto, presently sojourning in Hanoi, plans attend 23rd CPSU Congress, opening in Moscow March 29. Press report speculates that Miyamoto in attending Congress will not only be working for Communist unity in Vietnam effort but may also be attempting establish own independent position in Asian Communist movement. ~~Reported to be a member of the CPSU and a member of the CPSU Central Committee.~~ JCP organ Akahata February 21, on other hand, featured article which accused CPSU of "helping group of traitors to Communism in their subversive activities in Japan" and charged Soviet Union was "collaborating with Sato Government and United States and trying to sow seeds of dissension in ranks of JCP and democratic forces of Japan." (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

3. Police Called in to Waseda Dispute (Weeka No. 6, Item 7)

a. On February 21, Tokyo police, at request of Waseda University authorities, entered university campus and evicted striking students who had

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from Tokyo

occupied administration and other buildings for past several weeks. After restoring order, police immediately withdrew, but waiting students promptly re-occupied buildings same evening. In early morning February 22, police again ejected students, arresting about 200 and issuing warrants for the principal leftist leaders, who immediately disappeared. Police continue to stand guard on campus and entrance examinations began February 24, according to schedule.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: University authorities reluctantly called cops when caught between totally uncompromising attitude of student leadership, which refused to discuss issues unless assured of victory in advance, and necessity of holding entrance examinations. Press, which tends to overlook (if not sympathize with) leftist student adventures, has taken "both sides are wrong" attitude, saying that Waseda management has been less than frank with students and public concerning university financing and planning. Thus far there has been less press attention to fact that strike activists, small minority of Waseda student body, are led by extreme leftists (anti-JCP Marxists of "old" Zengakuren stripe), including some from other universities, who base refusal to compromise on ideological grounds. Waseda events are likely to help discredit ultra-left student groups, but this may have ironic effect of strengthening JCP control over leftist student activities.
(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

a. Attention to questions of Japan's security against nuclear attack and its role in non-proliferation was greatly increased by news of Kosygin proposal concerning non-nuclear weapon countries. Vice FonMin Shimoda in statement to press February 17 gave only qualified support to Kosygin proposal and created controversy by asserting that Japan should not seek its security under "nuclear umbrella" of great powers. Subsequent statements in Diet by FonMin and PriMin "clarified" GOJ's position to effect that Japan would not concur in non-proliferation agreement unless 1) it includes all countries possessing nuclear weapons, and 2) it requires those countries to make "sacrifices" through progress toward nuclear disarmament. Statements also clarified Shimoda's reference to "nuclear umbrella" by asserting that Japan relies on US nuclear power as war deterrent, but has no intention to provide bases for nuclear weapons or join multilateral force. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

b. Comment: Shimoda's statement, which was not cleared at top level, caused momentarily embarrassing press flurry, but GOJ succeeded in minimizing controversy. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. North Koreans Refused Entry

a. Following consultations among Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, and International Trade and Industry, GOJ February 18 decided refuse permission

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 from Tokyo

for five North Koreans enter Japan for purpose negotiating plant purchase. FonMin Shiina at press conference February 18 said that GOJ will deal with North Korean entry applications on case-by-case basis. Press speculated ROK protests over recent North Korean travel cases (Weeka No. 6, Item 5; Weeka No. 7, Item 3) had caused GOJ defer entry permission in this case. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: On basis previous comments to Embassy from FonOff, press speculation probably right. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Steelworkers Decide to Join JC-IMF

a. Special Convention of Sohyo-affiliated Steelworkers' Federation (Tekko Roren) voted February 18 to join Japan Council of International Metalworkers Federation (JC-IMF). Sixty-two percent of Convention delegates voted for affiliation, which marks high point of nine-year JC-IMF organizing campaign that has garnered 800,000 workers and includes unions from Domei, Sohyo and Churitsuroren. Tekko affiliation considered by mass media and by many labor leaders to mark emergence of JC-IMF as new national center and beginning of reorganization of Japanese labor movement along industrial lines. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

b. Comment: Major significance to JC-IMF of Tekko affiliation is psychological effect of making JC-IMF look like "wave of future." Actually, JC-IMF is loose organization of politically diverse unions held together by requirement of unanimity for action and by avoidance of political controversy. If it retains present organizational form and modus operandi, it can be expected to grow at expense of Sohyo, Domei and independent unions whose preoccupation with politics and organizational infighting has been absent in JC-IMF up to now. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE) ✓

PSYCHOLOGICAL

7. Goodwill Visit of Astronauts Schirra and Borman

a. Astronauts Walter Shirra and Frank Borman, command pilots of Gemini 6 and 7 flights, arrived in Tokyo with their wives on February 22 for 3 1/2 -day Presidential goodwill visit. Activities of party have included extensive media exposure through press conferences, live and videotaped TV appearances, meetings with students, space scientists, GOJ leaders and science journalists, as well as appearance in public forum and reception by Ambassador Reischauer. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: While visit is much briefer than similar tour last fall by Soviet Cosmonauts Nikolayev and Tereshkova, who as guests of JSP engaged in some political propagandizing, Astronauts' openness and informality and focus on scientific aspects of their space experiences has created very good

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from Tokyo

impression on their Japanese contacts and audiences.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

MILITARY

8. Nimitz Death Saddens JMSDF

a. February 21 passing of Fleet Admiral Chester W. NIMITZ saddened military officers within JDA and JMSDF. Immediate condolence messages dispatched from Chairman Joint Staff Council, Admiral SUGIE, and from Chief of Maritime Staff, Admiral NISHIMURA, who directed JMSDF to half-mast colors until evening of day of internment. Media coverage stressed Nimitz wartime accomplishments and postwar assistance and cooperation with Japan.
(UNCLASSIFIED)


b. Comment: None

9. Peruvian Naval Training Ship Departs Japan

a. Peruvian naval training ship INDEPENDENCIA (formerly USS RAVEN AKA200) departed Tokyo February 23 enroute San Francisco after one week visit in Tokyo and previous Nagasaki portcall. Ship's company and cadets visited Yasukuni Shrine to honor Japanese war dead during Tokyo visit. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Late arrival in Tokyo necessitated cancellation of first day's courtesy calls, marring otherwise well-executed visit. Peruvian honors to war dead at Yasukuni Shrine follows example set by British, French and German naval crews during past year. (UNCLASSIFIED)

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim



Thomas W. Ainsworth
First Secretary of Embassy

POL:TGTsukahira
WTBreer
WHBrum
JMFarrion
TWAinsworth

USIS:HLBurleson
LABAT:RFPfeiffer
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 JAKARTA

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE: March 4, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKLY NO. 9

REF

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1. Budget Deliberations Appear "Over the Hump"
2. JSP-Chicom Relations
3. Sohyo Starts Spring Struggle With Protest Against Rising Prices
4. Japan Rebuts Soviet Criticism
5. Taiwanese Demonstration
6. Japan-India Conference
7. Socialists Return from North Korea
8. Matsumura to Peking
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11. Aid to Vietnam
12. Reaction to Ghana Coup d'etat
13. JCP SecGen Arrives in Peking
14. JDA Establishes Committee to Protect Classified Information
15. JSDF Role in U. N. Effort Debated

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from Tokyo

POLITICAL

1. Budget Deliberations Appear "Over the Hump" (Weeka No. 8, Item 1)

a. Upper House Transportation Committee March 3 passed bill raising national railway fares by average of 25%, which has been focus of JSP opposition at current session. Passage followed noisy committee session March 2 in which LDP carried motion to cut off further debate on question, but committee passage session itself was routine. It now appears likely that Upper House plenary session will pass measure March 4 with fare increase to be effective from March 5.

b. In Lower House, LDP, JSP and DSP reached agreement on handling controversial LDP proposal for revision of property tax assessment system which would increase taxes on property holders. Contents of settlement not revealed, but LDP did not challenge opposition assertions that former had pledged in 1964 not to raise tax in question, so that general belief is that LDP has backed off to some extent. Agreement paves way for final budget committee hearings on JFY-66 budget and probably for passage of budget package on March 5. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: If Lower House passes budget package on March 5 it is uncertain whether LDP will undertake further struggle to secure Upper House passage of measure. (Budget bills become law without Upper House action 30 days after Lower House passage.) Four-day delay in effective date of budget could presumably be borne without necessity of supplemental measures. Net effect of JSP stalling tactics in Diet has been limited to embarrassing LDP for not being able to pass budget bill according to timetable, with no effect on substance of legislation. Both LDP and JSP have moved cautiously thus far in this session, apparently exploring potentialities of "Diet Normalization" understanding reached last December (1965 Weeka No. 51, Item 1). Indications are that LDP in particular not satisfied with current basis for Diet business, which in effect institutionalizes procedural traditions inhibiting effective Diet action. New Lower House Speaker Yamaguchi has set Diet Secretariat to work studying better arrangements. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. JSP-Chicom Relations (Embtel 2991, Embassy's A-1049)

a. Asahi Shimbun February 25 carried item stating that JSP Chairman Sasaki had received letter from Liao Cheng-chih, Chairman of China-Japan Friendship Society, which said that Peking would like to send delegation to Japan in accordance with October 1964 agreement for regular exchange of meetings between JSP and Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs and that if Sasaki wanted to come to China, he would be welcome any time. Press stated that JSP

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from Tokyo

noping to set up visit latter part of March and expected Liao or Vice FonMin Chao Kuan-Hua to head Chinese delegation. Asahi said that Sasaki had informed JSP Central Executive Committee of letter at recent meeting.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

b. GOJ officials queried on subject have displayed cautious attitude, according press. Justice Minister Ishii, in reply to Socialist question in Diet, reportedly stated entry of Chicom leaders "could not be easily permitted," in view of experience with Nam Nan-chen last year (1965 Weeka No. 31, Item 4). FonOff spokesman took similar view, declaring that approval of entry would depend on purposes of mission and that "political purposes," including periodic talks with opposition party, would be considered unacceptable. Chief Cabinet Secretary took more forthcoming line with press, suggesting that if visit "were premised on thaw in international situation," this would help to offset political coloration of such visit.

c. Comment: Chicom visit apparently serious bone of contention within JSP with Sasaki-led left wing promoting visit and right wing taking view that Chicom "conditions" for improving relations with JSP, including proposed visit, were unacceptable to JSP. According to right wing, Chicoms seeking to force JSP to reunite split anti-A and H-Bomb movement and to modify party's position supporting partial nuclear test ban treaty. In view factional opposition within JSP, chances of visit materializing this year appear dim. (CONFIDENTIAL).

3. Sohyo Starts Spring Struggle With Protest Against Rising Prices
(Weeka No. 6, Item 3)

a. Sohyo and Churitsuroren sponsored rallies on February 27 protesting rising prices, which drew 230,000 throughout Japan. In Tokyo 90,000 people attended rally addressed by JSP and JCP representatives and participated in orderly parades. Rally emphasized Sato Government responsibility for rising prices. Turnout in Tokyo fell far below Sohyo prediction of 300,000, but was largest recent Sohyo effort and included large numbers of women. Notable was relatively small number of posters protesting Vietnam war.

b. After Cabinet meeting March 2, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hashimoto said "measures" would be considered against government workers who carried placards in demonstration demanding overthrow of Sato administration. Sohyo and JSP leaders promptly protested to Hashimoto.

c. Comment: LabMin observers feel Sohyo's success in turning out rank and file on cost of living issue will make this fulcrum of spring struggle and will also put pressure on JCP to top 90,000 figure in its avowedly political demonstration

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scheduled for March 20. However, Sohyo leaders likely to add political issues if rank and file enthusiasm for spring struggle increases significantly. GOJ appears unlikely take severe measures against government employees for prohibited political activity; threat of sanctions probably intended discourage their ardor for future exercises of this kind. Active role of GOJ employees in Sohyo political campaigns has long been thorn in side of LDP. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Japan Rebuts Soviet Criticism

a. On February 26 Vice FonMin Shimoda handed Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov GOJ's reply to February 17 Soviet note (delivered at Moscow) which criticized Japan for permitting U.S. use bases in Japan for "aggression" in Vietnam. GOJ reply pointed out that Vietnam situation is result of illegal infiltration by North Vietnamese and asserted that U.S. utilization of bases and facilities in Japan is appropriate under Security Treaty. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. Comment: GOJ was annoyed by Soviet criticism and especially by Soviet publication of its note during UNSC consideration of Vietnam problem. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Taiwanese Demonstration

a. According to press, 300 Taiwanese representing "Provisional Government of Republic of Taiwan" and "United Formosans for Independence" paraded in Tokyo February 28 to commemorate 1947 incident. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Parade given routine inside-page treatment and otherwise unnoticed. This is first time for the two rival Taiwanese groups to cooperate in this manner, but it is premature to predict unification of faction-ridden movement. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. Japan-India Conference

a. Deputy Vice FonMin Ushiba and Torao Ushiroku, until recently Asian Bureau Director, left for New Delhi March 1 for first Japan-India consultative conference. Questions of disarmament, nuclear proliferation, China and South-east Asia among items to be discussed. Ushiba plans visit Djakarta on way back to Tokyo. Press reported GOJ considering \$2 million emergency aid to India in form of fertilizer and rice, and other aid measures. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Conference may provide stimulus to heighten Japanese interest in Indian problems which until now has been at relatively low level. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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from Tokyo

7. Socialists Return from North Korea

a. JSP mission to North Korea headed by JSP Diet member Tokuji Kameda (Weeka No. 6, Item No. 5) returned to Japan February 28. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: No Japanese accounts of visit have yet appeared in press other than factual report of return. North Korean releases during visit said Socialists joined in denunciations of normalization with ROK and called for free travel and increased trade between Japan and North Korea, standard JSP lines. (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. Matsumura to Peking

a. Press reported March 1 that Kenzo Matsumura, senior LDP Diet member and leader of LDP's (Communist) "China lobby" plans to visit Peking for about 10 days in early April to exchange views with Chicom officials on matters of mutual interest, such as Sino-Japanese relations and Vietnam. March 4 report amended this to say Matsumura would wait to check plans out with Sun Ping-hua, leader of Chicom trade office in Tokyo, when Sun returns from present Peking trip. Date of return unspecified. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Matsumura has visited Peking three times in past and there had been some speculation in January that he would go then. (UNCLASSIFIED)

9. U.N. Security Council

a. Security Council's consideration of Vietnam question attracted more than usual attention principally because Japanese Ambassador Matsui played key role as SC President during February. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Japanese generally looked favorably on Matsui's efforts but press regarded SC's deliberations as foredoomed and criticized U.S. failure to work hard enough to push own proposals. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

10. Ky Visit Postponed

a. Press reported March 2 that state visit of Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao Ky postponed from expected date of March 20 to sometime after end of Diet session on May 18. Diet business and JSP opposition given by FonOff spokesman as reasons for postponement. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Vietnamese Embassy had not been informed of postponement prior publication of news stories and considers GOJ's rationalization unconvincing. GOJ on other hand had been embarrassed by what it considered premature Vietnamese announcement of visit plans. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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11. Aid to Vietnam

a. On March 2 Cabinet approved furnishing ¥ 72 million (\$200,000) worth of medical supplies, blankets, and textile goods as aid to Vietnam. Money to come from JFY-65 (ending March 31) emergency funds. Aid reportedly based on recommendations of recent LDP visitors to Vietnam. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

12. Reaction to Ghana Coup d'etat

a. Press gave extensive coverage to overthrow of Nkrumah and subsequent events in Ghana. Editorials discussed coup in context of other revolts in A-A area and pointed to Nkrumah's dictatorial policies and unsatisfactory economic-social conditions as principal causes. Ghanaian Embassy has sought GOJ recognition of new government but GOJ has yet to act. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

13. JCP SecGen Arrives in Peking (Weeka No. 8, Item 2)

a. JCP SecGen Kenji Miyamoto and party arrived in Peking February 28 after ten-day sojourn to Hanoi. Group was met by leading Chicom officials, among whom were Teng Hsiao-ping, Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien, Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-chi and others hosted large reception same evening. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

MILITARY

14. JDA Establishes Committee to Protect Classified Information

a. Under February 28 instructions from JDA Director-General Matsuno, JDA will set up committee of 13 members, chaired by Vice-Minister Miwa and including the three service Vice Chiefs to prevent leakage of classified information, principally, Third Defense Buildup. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: According to press, it appears actual purpose of committee is to ensure actions of JDA personnel not invite unfavorable comment, and information does not reach public and opposition parties which would embarrass JDA (such as Mitsuya Plan disclosure last year). So far no indication it will complicate JDA relations with U.S. officials. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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
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For the Ambassador:


Thomas W. Ainsworth
First Secretary of Embassy

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AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 JAPAN

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE/OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKO-
HAMA, HICOMRY, CINCPAC, COMUS/J, CINCPACFLT,
CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, RANGOON,
BANGKOK, SAIGON, TAIPEI, MOSCOW, BUENOS AIRES

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE: March 11, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 10

REF :

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1. Defense Questions Highlighted in Diet
2. Lower House Passes JFY 1966 Budget
3. JSP Plans to Promote Chicom Relations
4. JSP Reaffirms Stand Against All N-Tests
5. Bui Diem Visit
6. First Ambassador to Korea
7. Argentine Visitors
8. U.S. -Japan Cultural Conference
9. Bloc Cultural Exchanges

POLITICAL

1. Defense Questions Highlighted in Diet

a. Prime Minister Sato March 8, in response to LDP question in Upper House Budget Committee, expressed view that continuation of U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty after 1970 appeared essential, from present international situation, and that long-term nature of defense planning, which difficult under year-by-year continuation provided in present treaty, must be considered in

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from Tokyo

handling issue. Sato reaffirmed need to consider defense problems in long-term context March 9 and 10 in same committee, but in answering Komeito and JSP questions avoided directly advocating extension of treaty for fixed term beyond 1970.

b. In reply JSP questions March 10, Sato affirmed that if Okinawa came under military attack Japan could not watch compatriots being killed and, having due regard for fact Okinawa under U.S. administration, would "do what must be done." Legislative Bureau Director amplified this by stating "self defense" of Japan could extend to Okinawa if U.S. agreed.

c. Foreign Minister Shiina and LDP SecGen Tanaka quoted in press as unwilling at present time go beyond view that present treaty, with provision for year-by-year continuation after 1970, adequate for Japan's protection.

d. Press unanimously interpreted Sato's remarks as indicating policy of renewing treaty for fixed term of several years beyond 1970, in line with views of former Prime Minister Kishi and other LDP conservative elements. Although several editorials questioned timing of pronouncement, arguing it might tie Japan's hands diplomatically and national consensus on issue had not been established, statement received prominent but factual treatment. (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. Comment: There is division of opinion even within LDP as to method and timing of handling U.S. - Japan mutual security arrangements beyond 1970, but general agreement on necessity of maintaining mutual security system. Reliable sources indicate LDP conservatives worked hard to get Sato to make statement, and there may be internal LDP factional questions involved. LDP initiative in raising issue in Diet nevertheless appears to be significant part of GOJ effort to develop serious discussions of Japan's security needs in order increase public acceptance of defense arrangements. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Lower House Passes JFY 1966 Budget (Weeka No. 9, Item No. 1)

a. JFY-1966 budget, amounting to 4,314,270 million yen (\$11.9 billion), was passed by Lower House on March 5 by party-line vote of 231 to 117. Upper House budget committee hearings opened March 7. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: LDP appears hopeful of securing passage by March 30 but not willing to clash head-on with JSP to do so. JSP plans to resist passage but unlikely resort to force. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. JSP Plans to Promote Chicom Relations (Weeka No. 9, Item No. 2)

a. According press, JSP Central Executive Committee meeting March 9 formally approved party leadership's decision to invite high-level delegation from

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 from Tokyo

Communist China to visit Japan "in nearest possible future." Timing of visit was left to JSP Chairman Sasaki and SecGen Narita. Same meeting also gave official approval to trip by International Bureau Director Koichi YAMAMOTO to Phnom Penh to seek Cambodian cooperation in JSP plan to hold Asian People's Conference in Tokyo this year.

b. JSP also announced on same day Chairman Sasaki's plans to visit Communist China in response to letter of invitation received from Liao Cheng-chih, Chairman of (Communist) China-Japan Friendship Society. According JSP headquarters, Sasaki trip expected to take place in late May or early June. Press speculates, however, that trip hinges on success of Chicom goodwill visit to Japan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: (See A-1049, March 4, 1966) JSP decision on invitation to Chicoms and Sasaki plans to visit Peking are responses to personal letter from Liao reportedly received by Chairman Sasaki in January. According GOJ sources and informants in JSP, Chicom offer to send delegation to Japan partly contingent on JSP willingness to modify its attitude toward Chicom nuclear tests and to reunify divided Japanese anti-nuclear movement. CEC decision March 9 (See Item 4) reaffirming party's policy of opposition to nuclear testing by any nation, may put crimp in visit. GOJ is maintaining flexible attitude toward projected but still hypothetical visit. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. JSP Reaffirms Stand Against All N-Tests

a. JSP Central Executive Committee, after reportedly heated meeting March 9, reaffirmed party's established policy of "opposing nuclear tests by any country, including Communist nations." Issue touched off vehement debate between left-wing leadership and right-wing Eda and Wada faction members who charged that Sasaki leadership was attempting to align JSP with Communist China and to wreck anti-nuclear movement led by Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikin) which supported by JSP and Sohyo. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: (Cf. Item 3) Decision signified failure of attempt by party leadership to modify JSP policy and bring it into closer alignment with position of pro-Communist Japan Council Against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikyo). Apparently strong effort by Sasaki faction to bring about modification of party policy on nuclear testing appears to confirm allegations that such modification demanded by Chicoms as condition for improved relations. If allegations true, decision of CEC reaffirming established policy may make Chicoms unwilling to accept JSP invitation for Japan visit of high-ranking delegation. CEC decision also of interest as measure of JSP right wing's determination and ability to resist leftward course of Sasaki leadership. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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5. Bui Diem Visit

a. Vietnamese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Bui Diem arrived Tokyo March 5 for week's visit. He called on Vice-FonMin Shimoda March 7 and on MITI Minister Miki and FonMin Shiina March 9. At party hosted by Japan Land Development Association, composed largely of LDP Diet members and business/financial leaders interested in long-range economic development plans in Vietnam, Diem said his principal purposes in coming to Japan were to improve Vietnam's image in Japan by explaining its cause and to increase trade relations for which GVN has own foreign exchange resources, about \$70 million of which it is ready to spend in Japan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Diem will be meeting press later in week. He has received moderate front page press coverage. No editorial comment so far. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. First Ambassador to Korea

a. Shiroshichi KIMURA, former Ambassador to GRC, departed March 9 to take up duties as first Japanese Ambassador to ROK. Scheduled present credentials March 12. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Kimura is seasoned diplomat, one of most senior FonOff career men and China expert. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. Argentine Visitors

a. Argentine FonMin ZAVALA-ORTIZ, accompanied by wife, eight high-ranking officials and several businessmen, arrived in Tokyo March 9 for week visit to promote economic, political and cultural relations with Japan. Zavala-Ortiz March 10 called on PriMin and FonMin, and made speech at Foreign Correspondents' Club. Schedule also includes audience with Emperor, participation in regional meeting of Chiefs of Argentine diplomatic missions, and round trip to Vietnam during weekend March 12-13. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Zavala-Ortiz and his high-powered group will probably have favorable impact on Japan-Argentine relations. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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PSYCHOLOGICAL

8. U.S. - Japan Cultural Conference

a. U.S. - Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange was held in Tokyo March 2-7, with government officials and educators of both countries meeting to discuss specific aspects of "role of universities in promoting international cooperation and understanding." Conference topics included:

- 1) Obstacles to accurate understanding of each other's cultures;
- 2) GOJ sharing costs of Fulbright program and Hawaii East-West Center;
- 3) More in-country area-and-language study for scholars and students of each country;
- 4) Facilitating translation of Japanese scholarly work by establishing clearing house for translation, etc.;
- 5) Improved handling and servicing of exchange students and possible reduction of trans-Pacific travel costs for students.

b. Conference specifically recommended that prior to next biennial conference joint committees and working groups be set up to study above matters and other specific subjects, and that each country support such committees either publicly or with private funds. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: None

9. Bloc Cultural Exchanges

a. March 10 issue of Mainichi carried announcements of current and upcoming Mainichi-sponsored cultural exchanges with Communist nations. Events reported:

- 1) Soviet Union's Borodin String Quartet opened in Tokyo March 9 with first of series of concerts under joint sponsorship of Mainichi and Shin Geijutsuka Kyokai Artists. ✓
- 2) Bolshoi Circus is to begin 23-day run in Tokyo March 26 under joint sponsorship of Mainichi and Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS). This will be Bolshoi Circus' fourth Japan tour since WWII.
- 3) In May, Czech violinist Josep Suk will present concerts under sponsorship of Mainichi and Shin Geijutsuka Kyokai.

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
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b. Same issue of Mainichi also reported that on March 9 Waseda University men's basketball team and Nichibo girl's basketball team left Tokyo by Garuda Airlines for Hong Kong. Teams will have "Japan-China Friendship Basketball" tour of China, playing in Peking, Tientsin, Nanking, Shanghai and Canton. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Above events are only those in which Mainichi has interest, or which were newsworthy on single day March 10, so that above is not complete list of current or scheduled events, but is indicative of volume of Japan-bloc cultural exchanges. (UNCLASSIFIED)

For the Ambassador:



Thomas W. Ainsworth
First Secretary of Embassy

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WTE: ~~Wakihira~~
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKO-HAMA, HICOMRY, CINCPAC, COMUS/J, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, RANGOON, BANGKOK, SAIGON, TAIPEI, SEOUL, BONN, DJAKARTA, BUENOS AIRES, NEW DELHI

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE: March 18, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 11

REF :

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3. ROK Seizes Japanese Fishing Vessel
4. Japan Turns Down East German U.N. Bid
5. Government Announces Population Figures
6. Miyamoto to Pyongyang
7. Japan Cautious On Indonesia
8. Bui Diem Concludes Visit
9. Argentine Foreign Minister Departs for Seoul
10. U.N. Visitor
11. FY 63 Destroyer Commissioned 19 March 1966
12. Orchestra Disaffiliates from Leftwing Music Council
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14. "Japan Conference of Journalists" Inaugurated
15. Media Commentary on Gemini 8 Mission

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 from Tokyo

POLITICAL

1. Diet Fireworks Over Defense of Okinawa (Weeka No. 10, Item 1)

a. PriMin Sato, in response to opposition question at House of Councillors budget committee session on March 10, stated that Japan could not stand idly by if Okinawa compatriots came under armed attack. After referring to Security Treaty Agreed Minutes PriMin said that, keeping in mind Okinawa was under U.S. administration, Japan would "do what must be done." Legislative Bureau Director added that Japan could legally extend "self-defense" concept to include Ryukyus if U.S. agreed.

b. At March 11 committee hearing JSP counterattacked, alleging discrepancy between Sato remarks and position of then PriMin Kishi and FonMin Fujiyama at time of 1960 treaty hearings. JSP demanded Sato retract statement or justify change in GOJ policy. When Sato stuck to his guns, adding that he expressing national feelings about defense of Ryukyus, JSP members walked out, bringing hearings to halt.

c. After five days of deadlock, LDP and JSP agreed on compromise March 15 by which PriMin in committee session "clarified" GOJ position to effect that in light of Constitution, pertinent treaties and Self-Defense Force Law, JSDF could not be sent to defense of Ryukyus while U.S. exercised administrative rights there. PriMin also agreed to affirm that his statements were "frank expression of feelings as Japanese" concerning extremely remote contingency, and LDP reportedly agreed to "study establishment as soon as feasible" of Diet committee on Okinawa questions. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: It appears JSP thought it had significant ammunition with which to embarrass government but public reaction failed live up to Socialist expectations. General editorial reaction took line that, though Sato statement ill prepared and hasty, it was designed to force open discussion of security questions which most papers presently favor. JSP criticized by Asahi for its belligerency.

e. Okinawa statement appears clearly to be additional step by GOJ to promote public airing of defense questions. Sato's apparent back-stepping amounted to tactical measure to place onus for Diet disruption on opposition without really weakening impact of original remarks. Though committee deliberations returned to normal March 16, Socialists likely continue obstructionist tactics in order delay Upper House passage of budget (which, in absence of Upper House action, automatically becomes law April 4). LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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from Tokyo

2. Chicoms Accept JSP Invitation

a. JSP invitation to Communist China to send delegation to Japan (Weeka No. 10, Item 3) elicited cabled reply March 17 from Chang Hsi-jo, Director of Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, expressing willingness to send eight-man delegation in near future to "exchange opinions in friendly atmosphere in order to step up our campaign against American imperialism." Cable said delegation would be headed by CPIFA Deputy Chief HU Yu-chih and would include CHAO An-po, CHAO Cheng-i, LI Meng-ching, WU Hsueh-wen, CHIN Su-cheng and two interpreters.

b. JSP, planning on basis Chicom visit in early April, promptly approached GOJ and LDP to ascertain their attitude toward proposed visit. JSP SecGen Narita called International Bureau Chief Koichi Yamamoto, who now in Cambodia, to return via Peking to discuss details of visit.

c. Decision on admittance of Chicom delegation now being deliberated within GOJ. JSP (and press) noted that Chao An-po and Wu Hsueh-wen previously refused entry to Japan by FonOff. Press reported FonOff and Justice Ministry displaying negative attitude, but anticipating question will be referred to PriMin Sato for final decision. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: (Embtel 3267) Decision poses ticklish problem for GOJ. JSP will assail any refusal to admit group as indication of anti-Chinese attitude and subservience to U.S. dictation. Even if only one or two members of delegation singled out for exclusion, Chicoms likely to call off whole visit. According some JSP sources, JSP regards Chicom visit at this time as "embarrassing problem" and would welcome having it torpedoed by GOJ, which would then bear onus for affronting Chicoms. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. ROK Seizes Japanese Fishing Vessel

a. ROK patrol craft seized Japanese fishing vessel No. 53 Kaiyo Maru March 14 west of Chejudo at point Japanese claim was 4.5 miles outside Korean exclusive fisheries zone. Seizure made despite protest of captain of Japanese Maritime Safety Agency vessel which was alongside. Japanese crewmen claimed both their fishing vessel and MSA boat equipped with radar and loran and Korean vessel was not and therefore Korean assertion that vessel inside Korean exclusive fishing zone difficult to substantiate. GOJ has orally requested return of boat several times, both in Tokyo and Seoul, but no official reply from Seoul yet received. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Ambassador Kimura begins tour in Seoul (Weeka No. 10, Item 6) under difficult circumstances. Seizure has received extensive press

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play in Japan with graphic stories by crewmen of captured vessel, who escaped to nearby MSA boat, about brutal treatment by Koreans. Incident will tend to confirm many Japanese attitudes about Koreans and make friendly relations more difficult to achieve, despite GOJ efforts along this line. Issue may affect good will impact of contemplated trips to ROK by former PriMin Kishi, former speaker Funada and group prominent Japanese newspaper editors. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Japan Turns Down East German U. N. Bid

a. Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov asked Vice FonMin Shimoda March 15 to support East Germany's application for U.S. membership. Shimoda declined, pointing out that Japan recognizes FRG and cannot support bid of East German Government which is merely "agent" for Soviet Government in administering Soviet-occupied territory and not independent nation. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: GOJ's response was unusually forthright and strong.
(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Government Announces Population Figures

a. On March 17 Prime Minister's Office announced that, as of October 1, 1965, census, Japan's population stood at 98,274,961, increase of 4,816,000 (5.2%) since last census in 1960. Urban areas increased 9.9% overall while rural areas decreased 3.6%. Kanagawa Prefecture, in which Yokohama is located and which has become "bedroom town" for Tokyo, reported largest increase - 28.7%. Other neighboring prefectures - Saitama and Chiba - gained 24% and 17% respectively. Among cities, Tokyo led way with absolute increase of 1,185,442, or 12.2%, but Osaka increased by 20.9%. Decreases were noted in Shikoku, Kyushu, and northeast Japan.

b. Five-year 5.2% increase exceeds that recorded for 1955-1960 period (4.6%) but still remains substantially below immediate postwar (7.3%) and pre-war periods (which ranged from 6.8 to 7.9%). (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Figures are graphic evidence of pace of urbanization.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

6. Miyamoto to Pyongyang (Weeka No. 9, Item 3)

a. According to JCP organ Akahata, JCP SecGen Kenji Miyamoto and party departed Peking for Pyongyang March 11. Peking airport departure ceremonies attended by Chou En-lai, Peng Cheng, Li Hsien-Mien, and Liao Cheng-chih, among others. Delegation was met at Pyongyang by Kim Il-song and other leaders of North Korean Workers' Party. In contrast to posture

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 from Tokyo

when in Hanoi (as reported by FBIS), Miyamoto devoted considerable part of March 15 speech at Pyongyang citizens' meeting to condemnation of "modern revisionists" and made only passing reference to "international united action" and cooperation in Vietnam. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. Japan Cautious on Indonesia

a. Japanese DCM in Djakarta Matao Endo returned to Tokyo March 16 for consultations. In press conference March 17 he said GOJ should not start economic aid to Indonesia until conditions there stabilized. He predicted military would eventually assume control of country and then concentrate on rebuilding economy, without, however, abandoning "Crush Malaysia" policy. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: GOJ has been following Indonesian events closely and is anxious that any assistance be economically useful and contribute to strengthening Japan-Indonesia ties. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. Bui Diem Concludes Visit

a. GVN Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Bui Diem returned to Vietnam March 12 after week's visit (Weeks No. 10, Item 5). In press conference March 11 he emphasized GVN efforts to obtain support of rural areas. He said elections could not be held under present circumstances but predicted referendum in November for draft constitution with elections sometime next year. He also emphasized desire purchase more Japanese goods. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Diem visit received routine treatment in Japanese press. Both GOJ and Japanese business sources have complained to Embassy that Diem did not see enough of Japanese primarily concerned with increasing Japanese aid and trade with Vietnam. Diem's trip was worthwhile but could have been more successful if he had followed up policy-level talks with conversations with economic experts. (CONFIDENTIAL)

9. Argentine Foreign Minister Departs for Seoul (Weeks No. 10, Item 7)

a. Argentine FonMin ZAVALA-CORTIZ departed March 15 for Seoul. Main impact of week's visit was, according to Argentine Embassy sources, stimulation it may give to future economic relations. Discussions apparently touched on Vietnam and final communique stated intention collaborate in Security Council toward "re-establishment of peace." Zavala-Cortiz invited both

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from Tokyo

PrMin and FonMin to visit Argentina this year. Argentine Embassy seems hopeful FonMin may in fact make visit. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

b. Comment: Or~~ez~~' statements seemed have little public impact. His only public speech (to Foreign Correspondent's Club) was principally denunciation of Castro-type revolutionary activities in foreign countries. Press gave attention to his efforts obtain payments on Japanese use of copyrighted Argentine tangos. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

10. UN Visitor

a. UN Under Secretary Narasimhan, enroute to ECAFE Conference in New Delhi, visited Tokyo March 13-17 as guest of Foreign Ministry. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: According to FonOff, Narasimhan's visit was substantively not significant, although he discussed prospects for Vietnam peace and exchanged views on such Asian economic matters as Mekong River project and ADB. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

11. FY 63 Destroyer Commissioned 19 March 1966

a. JMSDF Ship MAKIGUMO (DD113), commissioned March 19 at Kurihama Shipyard of Uraga Heavy Industries and will join YAMAGUMO (DD114) as part 21st Escort Division, 2d Escort Flotilla based at Sasebo. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: MAKIGUMO and sister YAMAGUMO are destroyers configured for anti-submarine warfare missions. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

12. Orchestra Disaffiliates from Leftwing Music Council

a. Press reported March 17 that Tokyo Ro-On New Symphony Orchestra, affiliated with Communist-dominated Tokyo Workers Music Council (Tokyo Ro-On), decided in March 15 emergency meeting to break with Ro-On because of "political pressure" from that body. Decision was reached unanimously by 200 orchestra members and conductor Yasushi AKUTAGAWA, noted composer.

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 from Tokyo

b. Break precipitated by Ro-On moves to reorganize orchestra, dismiss Akutagawa, and place orchestra under direct control of Ro-On management committee. Akutagawa complained management committee began applying "political pressure" last year, including attempt to get modern Chinese Communist music included in orchestra's programs.

c. Orchestra members decided to organize as new amateur group calling self "New Symphony Orchestra Association" with Akutagawa as leader. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: None

13. Chicom Volleyball Teams Arrive

a. Thirty Chicom men and women volleyball players and officials, headed by China Volleyball Association Chairman CHANG Chih-Huai, arrived March 16 for eleven "friendship matches" in nine Japanese cities. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

14. "Japan Conference of Journalists" Inaugurated

a. Conservative-oriented "Japan Conference of Journalists" (Genronjin Konwa Kai) was formally inaugurated March 12 in Tokyo at reception attended by some 200 journalists, GOJ officials, Diet members and business leaders. Membership includes many middle-road and almost all important conservative political writers and commentators in Japanese media. Directors Ryugen HOSOKAWA, Tatsuo IWABUCHI, Ryuichi KAJI, Tatsuo MITARAI and Toshie OBAMA are front-rank conservative political commentators. Trustees include prominent writers, scholars and journalists -- primarily freelancers.

b. Group made it clear that leftists' broad political attack through media against Japan's basic political alignment and foreign policies was major stimulus to organizing Conference. Stated aims make clear that Conference will act as moderate-conservative pressure group taking issue with cases of leftist bias in major news media. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: c. Banding together of influential commentators of centrist or rightist persuasion rapidly stirred leftist reaction from JCP daily Akahata which even saw nefarious design in choice of English name very similar to that

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 from Tokyo

of Communist-dominated Japan Congress of Journalists.
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15. Media Commentary on Gemini 8 Mission


a. Japanese media March 17-18 gave prominent attention to Gemini-8 project and its premature termination. All commentary praised success of initial docking, and several commentators said that even difficulty causing emergency splash-down was useful in providing data for future experiments. Comment uniformly favorable except for minority reiteration of disapproval of space race having dual military purpose (eg. March 18 Yomiuri editorial).

b. Asahi editorial March 18 praised space-control center's decision for early termination and coolness of astronauts in emergency situation, noting possible temptation in space race for over-extending efforts. Editorial mentioned continuing secrecy of Soviet moon project, said Vostok 5 and 6 "group flying" did not constitute real rendezvous, and urged equal efforts to cure social ills on earth.

c. Mainichi editorial March 18 complimented U.S. for success of emergency re-entry and safe retrieval of astronauts and said this in itself had "important technological and experimental significance." (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: None

For the Ambassador:



Thomas W. Ainsworth
 First Secretary of Embassy

TWAinsworth
 POL:WTBreer
 TGTsukahira
 WHBruns
 JMFarrior

USIS:HLBurleson
 AIRA:LFVik

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKO-
HAMA, HICOMRY, CINCPAC, COMUS/J, CINCPACFLT,
CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, RANGOON,
BANGKOK, SAIGON, TAIPEI, SEOUL, MOSCOW

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE: March 25, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 12

REF :

CONTENTS

1. Diet Activities Return to "Normal"
2. JSP Asks Entry for Chicom Delegation
3. JSP Mission Visits Hanoi
4. JCP SecGen Returns to Peking
5. JSP's Wada to Retire from Politics
6. ROK Fishing Boat Seizure
7. JCP-Sponsored Demonstration Draws 100,000
8. Asian ForMin Conference
9. Ryukyus Riots Draw Little Attention

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Action Item

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April 1, 1966

INTERPRE

96. Jansen

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

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Drafted by:

See last page

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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Clearances:

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from Tokyo

POLITICAL

1. Diet Activities Return to "Normal"

a. After settling controversy over hypothetical Okinawa defense question (Week 11, Item 1) Diet subsided into routine proceedings, House of Councillors continuing budget hearings while Lower House turned to large backlog of domestic legislation. Major item of week was March 24 Lower House committee passage of local property tax bill after compromise reached among LDP, JSP and DSP reducing amount of proposed increase. (Week 9, Item 1).

b. However, at Upper House Budget Committee interpellations March 24, JSP Dietman Shiina INABA, raised question of basis for tax-free exports of US special procurement items destined for Vietnam. Fukuda replied that basis was Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and related agreements. In response to succeeding question, concerning relationship of Vietnam war and Japanese security, FonMin Shiina responded that US actions in Vietnam were directly related to the peace and security of the Far East, consequently related to Japan's security. Inaba then asked if Vietnam was included in "Far East" as expression used in the treaty. FonMin replied that Vietnam was outside "Far East" in this sense, but said that at time when events in Vietnam had an influence on the maintenance of peace and security in "Far East", it would be considered to be covered by treaty. Shiina added U.S. was aiding South Vietnam at latter's request and was constantly striving bring about discussions which would lead to peaceful solution. Exchange ended with JSP questioner concluding that, by including Vietnam in "Far East" in treaty sense, GOJ had broadened interpretation of treaty. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: JSP questions seen as effort to elicit points which could be used in domestic efforts to gain public support for JSP line on application of Security Treaty and alleged danger of its involving Japan in war. FonMin responses reaffirmed GOJ support for U.S. action in South Vietnam and appropriateness of present degree of U.S. utilization of facilities in Japan. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. JSP Asks Entry for Chicom Delegation (Week 11, Item 2)

a. JSP March 24 filed formal entry application with Justice Ministry on behalf of 8-man Chicom delegation invited by JSP to visit Japan for joint talks. Application stated purpose of visit was "to promote friendly relations between Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs and Japan Socialist Party and to discuss various problems of mutual interest". April 10 to 30 specified as period of visit.

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from Tokyo

b. Since GOJ had informally taken attitude it would refuse entry if purpose was "political," JSP in submitting application attached statement guaranteeing that mission would refrain from political speeches and acts during stay here. JSP also pledged on behalf of Chicom delegates that while in Japan they would not do anything that ran counter to explicit purpose of visit. JSP asserted, however, that JSP-Chicom discussions on foreign relations would not constitute "intervention in internal affairs." At March 23 Central Executive Committee meeting JSP had said it would launch "struggle" for entry of Chicom group, clearly assuming GOJ would reject application.

c. Chief Cabinet Secretary HASHIMOTO in press conference March 24 rejected JSP stand and reportedly said GOJ would not approve application for entry because proposed foreign policy discussions would "constitute intervention in Japan's internal affairs." (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: FonOff source has indicated to Embassy that GOJ will reject application after political decision is made at high level. All GOJ comment up to present has implied decision certain to be against visit. GOJ will presumably do best to keep matter in low key and prevent escalation into major political issue. JSP, after taking great pains to whittle down charges of "intervention in domestic affairs," is likely to try to squeeze maximum political mileage out of anticipated GOJ rejection. Moderate JSP source, however, expressed doubt issue would have much popular appeal. Both JSP and Chicoms have handled question of visit in way which virtually ensures GOJ rejection, an aspect which Mainichi reporter pointed out ~~article from~~ Peking with comment that case seemed to be viewed there as "test" of Sato administration, apparently in preparation for even tougher Chicom line toward GOJ. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. JSP Mission Visits Hanoi (V)

a. JSP International Bureau Director Koichi YAMAMOTO's five-man mission to Cambodia, ostensibly to promote JSP-sponsored Asian People's Conference (Weeka No. 10, Item 3), left Phnom Penh March 22 for Hanoi. According press, Yamamoto mission greeted by leaders Vietnam Fatherland Front, Vietnam Socialist Party and Vietnam Democratic Party on arrival. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. According to JSP headquarters sources, Yamamoto mission left Phnom Penh without issuing joint communique. Results of talks with Prince Sihanouk not yet reported, but Asian People's Conference idea is believed to have been dropped. Goodwill trip to North Vietnam was in original plans, if Hanoi came through with invitation. Visit will probably result in some sort of declaration reaffirming JSP support for North Vietnam cause. Yamamoto's group will not visit Peking as instructed last week (Weeka No. 11, Item 2), but will return directly to Japan on March 29. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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 from Tokyo

c. Comment: None

4. JCP SecGen Returns to Peking (Weeka No. 11, Item 6)

a. JCP SecGen Kenji MIYAMOTO returned to Peking March 21 after eleven-day visit to Pyongyang.

b. JCP and North Korean Labor Party issued pre-departure joint communique calling for "united action and united front in struggle against U.S. imperialism." Communique soft-pedalled "anti-revisionist" theme, referring to "revisionists" as "opportunists" and failing to mention Soviets specifically, while it specified that struggle should be waged not only against "modern revisionism" but also against "dogmatism" and "sectarianism." (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Tone of communique is taken by some Japanese observers to indicate strong unity of views between North Koreans and JCP. Asahi article March 25 cited police agency sources as predicting JCP would send delegation to Soviet twenty-third party congress which, in face of Chicom boycott, would be evidence of determination by Miyamoto to loosen slightly shackles that bind JCP to CCP. Joining denunciations of "revisionism" and "dogmatism" is of course familiar ideological practice, but at present juncture JCP-Korean Labor Party communique wording appeared more than pro forma, and clear swipe at Chicoms. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. JSP's Wada to Retire from Politics

a. Hiroo WADA, former JSP Vice Chairman, made public March 24 his intention to retire from active politics for reasons of health. According to Wada lieutenant Seiichi KATSUMATA, Wada will shortly return to his constituency in Okayama and formally announce decision not to run in next general elections for Diet.

b. Wada, in poor health for number of years, has indicated his desire to leave political arena before, but held on in order not to weaken his moderate faction in JSP. After serving for one year as one of two party vice chairmen, Wada withdrew from active party leadership at last January's convention (Weeka No. 3, Item 1), and has since turned over leadership of right-wing Wada faction to former International Bureau Director Katsumata.

c. Wada retirement ends long political career which began as prewar bureaucrat in Cabinet Planning Bureau. In 1947 he became Agriculture-Forestry Minister in first Yoshida cabinet. Elected to Diet in 1949 on Socialist ticket,

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from Tokyo

Wada was re-elected six times. He served successively as JSP Secretary-General, Director of Policy Board, International Bureau Director, and Vice Chairman, but failed to make Chairman. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Although apparently lacking in will and capacity to engage in rough and tumble of factional politics, Wada exerted considerable influence in party councils as voice of reason and moderation. However, in addition to poor health, those close to him in party have reported he had grown increasingly disgusted with JSP's inability to shed its leftist dogma and unrealistic ideology. Wada's departure from active scene will deprive party moderates of influential voice, but younger successors are already well in evidence. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. ROK Fishing Boat Seizure Stirs Political and Press Controversy -
(Weeka No. 11, Item 3)

a. ROK seizure of Japanese fishing boat No. 53 Kaiyo Maru given heavy publicity during past week with vivid descriptions by rescued crewmen of boarding incident which included their being hit with rifle butts and having shots fired at their feet, and finally jumping overboard to be rescued by a Japanese Maritime Safety Agency patrol vessel. Editorials and columns deplored Korean actions and general attitude but hoped incident could be settled amicably. In response to Diet questions FonMin Shiina said matter being discussed through diplomatic channels and that care being taken maintain friendly relations with ROK while obtaining rapid release of boat and crew. Former Lower House Speaker Naka FUNADA and five other LDP Diet members went to Seoul March 23 on invitation of DRP Chairman Kim Chong-pil to discuss business and political matters. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Shiina's replies, while upholding GOJ position on case, were not provocative and appeared designed reduce public emotions. Not only opposition parties but also LDP right wing indicated unhappiness over GOJ's "weak-kneed" diplomacy on issue, but no one suggested more promising course of action. Funada delegation likely to discuss incident with ROK leaders while in Seoul. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. JCP-Sponsored Demonstration Draws 100,000

a. JCP-sponsored "March 20 National United Action" drew in excess of 100,000 participants (according police figures) at central rally in Tokyo. Rally was ostensibly JCP opener in spring wage struggle, but was liberally sprinkled with anti-U.S., anti-Sato cabinet slogans and placards. Mass rally at which JCP SecGen Sanzo NOSAKA spoke was followed by three demonstration parades in downtown Tokyo which carried out quietly. JCP chartered some 600 buses to bring participants from surrounding prefectures. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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 from Tokyo

b. Comment: March 20 rally is first big JCP effort since September 12, 1965 when JCP mobilized 60,000, and again demonstrates that with careful advance planning, all-out effort by party workers, sufficient advance publicity and good weather, JCP capable of outdoing JSP-Sohyo in mobilizing large numbers of people (Week 9, Item 3). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. Asian FonMin Conference

a. Chief Cabinet Secretary HASHIMOTO told press March 22 that GOJ would participate in FE FonMin preliminary conference in Bangkok April 14-17. FonOff in press backgrounder said that, since Koreans first broached subject in 1964, Japan had established relations with ROK and that ROK explanations had led GOJ to believe that conference would not become "mere anti-Communist forum". (UNCLASSIFIED)


b. Comment: FonOff has not publicly committed itself to attend Seoul meeting, but ground is being prepared. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

9. Ryukyus Riots Draw Little Attention

a. Rioting over contested local election results, leading to some injuries and property damage, which took place this week on Ishigaki Island in the Ryukyus, received only inside page, scattered reporting in Japanese press and excited no editorial comment. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

For the Ambassador:



Thomas W. Ainsworth
 First Secretary of Embassy

POL:TW Ainsworth
 W. Greer
 T. G. Kahira
 W. H. Mans
 J. M. H. Mor

USIS: H. Burleson
 NAVA: A. Spiro

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKO-
 HAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT,
 CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, RANGOON,
 BANGKOK, SAIGON, TAIPEI, SEOUL

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE April 1, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 13

REF :

CONTENTS

1. GOJ Vetoes Entry Chicom Delegation
2. Budget Expected to Pass on April 2
3. JSP Mission to Cambodia and North Vietnam Returns
4. Anti-JCP Communist Groups Move to Form New Party
5. JCP Joins Chicoms in Boycott of CPSU Conference
6. JSP-Komeito Attacked in GSDF Publication
7. Koreans Return Seized Fishing Boat
8. Japan-Soviet Groups Sign Cultural Agreement
9. HMS Devonshire Visit Scheduled

POLITICAL

1. GOJ Vetoes Entry Chicom Delegation (Weeka 12, Item 2)

a. GOJ March 29 officially rejected application for entry into Japan of eight-man delegation of Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs invited by JSP for joint talks, on grounds that purpose of Chicom visit political and likely to harm Japan's national interests. Decision announced to JSP by Justice Ministry after Cabinet delegated final decision to Chief Cabinet Secretary, Justice Minister and FonMin.

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

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from Tokyo

GOJ statement explaining decision said Chicom purpose was to "accuse and attack GOJ policies on basis of political stand that American imperialism is common enemy of Japan and U.S. "

b. JSP immediately issued counter statement attacking GOJ action as manifestation of Sato Government's "hostile attitude" toward Communist China and of "humiliating capitulation to pressures of American imperialism and Taiwan. " JSP also charged GOJ action would precipitate crisis in Sino-Japanese relations, pledged all-out fight in and out of Diet for admission Chicom delegation.

c. On March 30 JSP interpellators questioned Justice and Foreign Ministers in Diet on issue and on March 31 JSP Chairman SASAKI demanded opportunity to conduct emergency interpellation of GOJ before plenary session of Lower House. LDP majority on Lower House Steering Committee initially resisted Sasaki urgent-question demand, but finally agreed, on basis Foreign Affairs Committee would not also ask to question Prime Minister. Sasaki used occasion to demand immediate reversal GOJ decision and for bitter attack on GOJ China policy and charges of U.S. "intervention" in Japanese affairs. PriMin Sato in reply made clear GOJ had no intention of changing its decision, which based/adequate evidence and principle of resisting foreign intervention in domestic affairs. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Japanese press initial treatment of pending issue of Chicom mission entry tended to accept negative GOJ decision as inevitable. Actual decision prompted mixed press comment including back-biting complaints. Press editorials in Asahi and Mainichi took position that entire mission need not have been rejected, that this way of handling issue was against Japan's national interests and that it caused chance for possibly valuable contact (not necessarily through this particular mission) with Peking to be lost. Press columns employed rather sharp language to attack GOJ decision and suggest it would give JSP and Peking further issue on which to stir up trouble. Sankei April 1 criticized both GOJ and JSP for undue caution and subservience, respectively, toward Communist China. Issue has thrown spotlight on question overall China policy, which likely to become subject continued debate. While discounting JSP position as propagandistic, press interest focused quickly on reaction of those LDP and conservative elements which favor expanded relations with Peking. Consensus anticipates general hardening of Chicom line toward Japan as result of visit rejection. LDP resistance to Sasaki interpellation apparently stemmed from reluctance to air full-scale Asia policy debate with domestic opposition at this juncture; change of heart probably reflected concern that JSP would tie up Diet proceedings and seek to make China policy issue for dissolution of Lower House, for which GOJ/LDP not yet ready. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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from Tokyo

2. Budget Expected to Pass on April 2

a. LDP, JSP and Komeito representatives agreed March 30 on timetable for Upper House passage of JFY 1966 budget. Budget, which passed Lower House March 5 (Week 10, Item 2), scheduled for passage April 2 following summary interpellations and passage of related bills April 1. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Agreement reflects desire of Upper House members, including opposition, to take positive action on measure rather than allow budget automatically to become law April 3 (30 days after Lower House passage). (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. JSP Mission to Cambodia and North Vietnam Returns

a. JSP mission, headed by International Bureau Chief Koichi YAMAMOTO, returned March 29 from two-week trip to Cambodia and North Vietnam (Week 10, Item 3; Week 12, Item 3). In press conference following return Yamamoto said mission exchanged views on Vietnam war and discussed Asian People's Conference with Cambodian leaders who, according to Yamamoto, were in complete agreement with JSP views that Asian peoples must unite to achieve solution of Vietnam problem and that solution requires U.S. cessation of bombing of North and withdrawal of bases. Yamamoto admitted Cambodia refused sponsor Asian People's Conference but said Phnom Penh agreed to send delegation if one held.

b. Yamamoto also told press that mission impressed during Hanoi visit March 23-26 with high morale and solidarity North Vietnamese people and their confidence in ultimate victory. Said mission met with leaders Vietnam Fatherland Front and with Pham Van Dong, who invited JSP Chairman SASAKI to make visit. At conclusion Hanoi visit Yamamoto issued statement proclaiming full JSP support for North Vietnam cause. Statement made public for first time on March 30 by Hanoi after Yamamoto group returned to Japan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: As anticipated, Yamamoto mission did not succeed in getting Cambodia to share sponsorship of Asian People's Conference, which now likely to be quietly shelved. Yamamoto's Hanoi statement (FBIS) received very sparse coverage in Japanese press, which virtually ignored entire trip. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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from Tokyo

4. Anti-JCP Communist Groups Move to Form New Party

a. Former Japan Communist Party (JCP) members Yoshio SHIGA and Tomokane NAITO at press conference March 24 announced intention to push forward preparations to form "pure" Marxist-Leninist party which would unite three anti-JCP Communist groups - Shiga's Nihon Kyosanto-Nihon no Koe (JCP-Voice of Japan), Naito's Shakaishugi Kakushin Undo (Socialist Renovation Movement) and Shoichiro KASUGA's Shakaishugi Toitsu Yushi Kai (United Socialist Union). Committee has been formed to work out details with Shiga as chairman and Naito as secretary-general. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Dissident Communists have been striving for some time for unity and this is first concrete sign of progress toward stronger organization. Sponsors obviously intended convey impression their party would be pro-Soviet, but it is uncertain whether there was Soviet sponsorship or encouragement, particularly at moment when CPSU presumably hoped JCP would come to Moscow Congress. Total number of dissidents in three groups is estimated at about 1000 (FonOff source). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. JCP Joins Chicoms in Boycott of CPSU Conference

a. Japan Communist Party (JCP) announced late Friday, March 25, refusal send delegation to CPSU 23rd party congress on grounds CPSU had destroyed fraternal relationship by supporting ex-JCP "traitor" Yoshio SHIGA and publishing criticism of JCP.

b. Following announcement, JCP SecGen Kenji MIYAMOTO and party given delayed welcoming rally in Peking at which, according to JCP organ Akahata, Miyamoto and CCP presidium member PENG Cheng exchanged compliments and vows of solidarity and unity. On March 27 Miyamoto party lavishly entertained at farewell dinner hosted by CCP Central committee and attended by CHOU En-lai, CHU Teh, PENG Cheng and LIAO Cheng-chih.

c. Miyamoto party departed March 28 for Canton, presumably on return to Japan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: JCP boycott of CPSU congress came as surprise to many observers here who had detected in Miyamoto joint statements with North Vietnam and Korean Workers Parties slight divergences from Chicom line. Lack of joint communique with Chicoms, however, suggests that talks in Peking failed to settle outstanding differences with CCP. Possibility exists that JCP decision affected by dissident Japanese Communists' announcement March 24 of intention to form a new party (See Item 4) which would presumably be pro-Soviet. Decision to boycott congress appears to be setback for Miyamoto line of international "united actions"; consequences will not become clear until after Miyamoto returns to Japan and reports to JCP central committee. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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from Tokyo

6. JSP-Komeito Attacked in GSDF Publication

a. March 28 Upper House budget committee session interrupted by JSP charges that a JSDF magazine Acacia, published by GSDF Northern Corps, had carried derogatory remarks about JSP and Komeito. JDA DirGen Raizo MATSUNO apologized for publication and said that those responsible would be properly dealt with. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Incident illustrates JSP attention and sensitivity to SDF activities, particularly anything which smacks of political indoctrination. Main effect of this case, however, was probably to draw more attention to SDF criticism of JSP policies as "anti-parliamentary." As with other recent opposition charges against SDF (e.g., "Mitsuya case," charges of "spying" on USSR), little press or public reaction was evident. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Koreans Return Seized Fishing Boat

a. Koreans released No. 53 Kaiyo Maru and its four crewmen, seized March 14 (Week 11, Item 3; Week 12, Item 6) to return to Japan on March 30. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Vessel returned as result of negotiation and repeated appeals to ROK through Ambassador KIMURA and former Speaker of Lower House FUNADA, who visited Korea on goodwill trip. There has been no settlement of point of principle involving Korean patrol vessel's pursuing Japanese vessel suspected of violating Korean exclusive fisheries zone and arresting ship outside that zone. (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. Japan-Soviet Groups Sign Cultural Agreement

a. Non-governmental Japan-Soviet cultural agreement was signed in Tokyo on March 29 by Yoshichika TOKUGAWA, head of Japan-Soviet Interchange Society, and M. V. NESTEROV, Chairman of Soviet-Japan Friendship Society and President of Soviet Chamber of Commerce. Agreement calls for exhibition of works of TOLSTOI in Tokyo sometime this fall, opening of Soviet Japanese libraries in Tokyo and Moscow in future, and interchanges of cultural and academic leaders. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Similar agreement was signed on February 2, 1966, between Soviets and JSP-dominated Japan-Soviet Friendship Society. (Week 5, Item 9) (UNCLASSIFIED)

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from Tokyo


MILITARY

9. HMS Devonshire Visit Scheduled

a. HMS Devonshire, with RADM C. P. MILLS, Flag Officer Second in Command, Far East Fleet, embarked, scheduled visit Yokosuka April 4 - 7. Devonshire making visit as member U. N. command COMUSKOREA. Heavy schedule of athletic and social events planned. SEA SLUG surface-to-air guided missile system will be exhibited to "selected guests." (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

For the Ambassador:


Thomas W. Ainsworth
First Secretary of Embassy

POL: TGTsukahira
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TESawyer

USIS: HLBurleson
ARMA: MajJRMars

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PRIORITY

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FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE: APRIL 8, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 14

REF :

CONTENTS

1. SE Asia Ministerial Conference
2. Budget Passes; Diet Attention Shifts to Health Insurance, etc.
3. Sohyo Chairman Ota May Run for Tokyo Governorship
4. JCP SecGen Kenji Miyamoto Returns from Communist China
5. Okinawa Chief Executive in Tokyo
6. Media Reaction to Vietnam Political Crisis

POLITICAL

1. SE Asia Ministerial Conference

a. Nine-nation ministerial conference for economic development of SE Asia, held in Tokyo April 6-7, was attended by representatives of Laos (Premier Souvanna PHOUMA), Malaysia (Dep. PriMin RAZAK), Thailand (Minister of National Development Pote SARASIN), Philippines (Chairman of National Economic Committee RODRIGUEZ), Singapore (Finance Minister LIM), South Vietnam (Minister for National Economy and Finance Au Truong THANH), and Japan (FonMin SHIINA), and by observers from Indonesia (newly appointed Ambassador Rukmito HENDRANINGRAT) and Cambodia (Charge d' Affaires Iat BOUNTHENG). (UNCLASSIFIED)

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from Tokyo

b. In opening speech PriMin SATO urged Asian unity and initiative, called for economic development of region and promised Japan's "positive cooperation". Responses from visiting representatives were receptive. Joint communique stressed need of economic development, especially in agriculture, emphasized importance of close cooperation and noted agreement to reconvene in Manila next year. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Conference, initiated and managed by GOJ, represents major move toward Japan's assuming more effective role in Asian development and leadership. GOJ and other interested circles in Tokyo obviously highly pleased by way conference went, including late decision of Indonesia and Cambodia to be represented by observers at least, leaving only Burma missing from invited list. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Budget Passes; Diet Attention Shifts to Health Insurance and Other Measures

a. Upper House passed JFY 1966 budget April 2 by party-line vote of 122 to 93, with JSP, DSP, JCP and Komeito voting against. ¥ 4,314,270 million (\$11.9 billion) budget is largest in history and is first regular post-war budget to incorporate bond issuance for deficit financing. Budget provides substantial increases in expenditures for public works, housing and social security.

b. Following budget passage Diet attention shifted to bills for revision of health insurance laws (increase in insurance rates), revival of Kigensetsu (National Foundation Day) as national holiday and other measures.

c. Because SEA Ministers' meeting (see Item 1) preempted attention of important cabinet ministers, Diet deliberations relatively quiet during week, although JSP did use physical obstruction tactics (for first time in current session) to block committee action on health insurance bill at Lower House Social and Labor Committee April 7. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: This first time in five years budget failed to pass Diet by start of Japan Fiscal Year which begins on April 1. Budget passage winds up issue on which GOJ under greatest time pressure, and consequently reduces likelihood of serious clashes between Government and opposition. Socialist opposition to health insurance revision not likely do more than delay passage of bill briefly; deficits in health insurance account have been substantial embarrassment to GOJ for several years. It is by no means certain that GOJ intends to press "National Foundation Day" measure, perennial red flag to opposition which may be dropped as "concession" on LDP's part even though LDP right-wingers campaigning eagerly for it. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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 from Tokyo

3. Tohyo Chairman Ota May Run for Tokyo Governorship

a. At press conference April 2, Sohyo Chairman Kaoru OTA reportedly said he willing to be 1967 JSP candidate for Governor of Tokyo provided he could obtain broad general support. JSP SecGen Tomomi NARITA reportedly told press April 6 that JSP Chairman Kozo SASAKI would support Ota's bid for governorship but would make no moves until after Sohyo convention in August. JCP Chairman Sanzo NOSAKA April 7 gave carefully equivocal reply to press query about possible joint support for Ota.

b. Press reported LDP SecGen Kakuei TANAKA as saying April 4 that present LDP governor, Ryutaro AZUMA, would be most likely conservative candidate for 1967. Next day, however, press said Azuma had expressed considerable degree of reluctance to run. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Ota would make strong opposition candidate for governor, even though he would in sense appear as "second choice" since JSP tried and failed to get Hitotsubashi University professor Shigeto TSURU to be candidate. Current flurry of speculation illustrates problems both parties face in selecting suitable candidates and persuading them to run for thankless job which, in present chaotic state of Tokyo administration, is quite likely prove political dead end. In order to win, either candidate must obtain support of Komeito which thus far has not tipped its hand. Azuma candidacy seems unlikely at moment and Tanaka's comment appears reflect absence of LDP decision on candidate rather than positive support for Azuma. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. JCP SecGen Kenji Miyamoto returns from Communist China (Week 13, Item 5)

a. JCP SecGen Kenji MIYAMOTO and most of his party (Masayoshi OKA returned earlier) returned April 4 from two-month tour of Communist China, North Vietnam and North Korea, and were met at airport by JCP Chairman Sanzo NOSAKA and other party leaders. In arrival statement and at press conference April 5, Miyamoto, according to JCP daily Akahata, stressed solidarity of four Asian Communist parties as important element in combatting both "American imperialism" and "modern revisionism," and called for strengthening of "united front."

b. Akahata has carried factual reports of Miyamoto travels and texts of Miyamoto's speeches in Hanoi, Pyongyang and Peking and of joint communiques in Hanoi and Pyongyang. It has not yet carried any commentary on significance of Miyamoto's meetings. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Until Miyamoto reports to JCP Central Committee and discussions are held within Party there is little information on which to base analysis of content of his talks with Chicom leaders. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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 from Tokyo

5. Okinawa Chief Executive in Tokyo

a. Chief Executive, Government of the Ryukyu Islands, Seiho MATSUOKA, arrived Tokyo evening April 5 for ten-day round of formal calls on GOJ leaders following inauguration as first CE elected by Legislature. Press coverage of visit has been moderate, stressing Matsuoka's statements that he asking GOJ to put expansion of Ryukyuan autonomy on agenda next U.S. -Japan Consultative Committee meeting. Other topics reportedly raised by Matsuoka during 20 minute calls on PriMin and DirGen YASUI of PriMin's Office include expansion of Japanese assistance to Okinawan education and welfare facilities as well as GOJ assistance in making contact with prospective Asian Development Bank. Tokyo office GRI informed Embassy that Matsuoka's schedule filled out with appointments with LDP leaders. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Matsuoka's post-election visit to LDP Headquarters observes political etiquette and provides him with opportunity to strengthen connections in Japan. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

6. Media Reaction to Vietnam Political Crisis

a. Past week's political crisis in South Vietnam was heavily covered by all Japanese news media. Bulk of coverage was straight play of news.

b. Interpretive dispatches from Washington and Saigon correspondents generally saw South Vietnamese war weariness and economic distress as main sources of current unrest, with U.S. presence and concomitant inflation also sparking resentments. Correspondents concluded that, whatever immediate outcome may be, prestige of GVN and of KY personally had been considerably damaged, and that through them U.S. prestige also had suffered. At same time, many reports gave cognizance to complexity of whole Vietnam situation and to essential disunity of South Vietnamese.

c. Commentary, in strong contrast to that of Spring of 1965, generally avoided theme of grave regional crisis and directed suggestions for reform at South Vietnamese, rather than at U.S. April 5 Asahi editorial said incorporation of popular voice into military regime would be important step toward stability, and that establishing politics worthy of popular trust is most effective policy against Communism. It suggested South Vietnam concentrate on "difficult task" of reinstating constitutional government.

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
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from Tokyo

d. April 5 Mainichi editorial said political situation had worsened since escalated U.S. intervention had proved ineffective in reversing war's tide and since failure of peace offensive. Also said that, in backing ouster of Thi, U.S. apparently did not fully comprehend feelings of general public. Concluded that political unrest could only hurt prosecution of war and might render U.S. objectives meaningless. "This in turn could endanger political situation of all Asia," Mainichi editorial ended. (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. Comment: Contrast with prevailing Japanese press attitude of year ago emerged in fact that Asahi editorial implies recognition that struggle in South Vietnam is struggle against Communism, while Mainichi's conclusion, if not buying "domino theory" whole hog, accepts idea that Vietnam crisis affects security of whole area. (UNCLASSIFIED)

For the Ambassador:



Thomas W. Ainsworth
First Secretary of Embassy

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FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO
SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 15
REF :
Date: April 15, 1966

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1. Rumors of Cabinet Reshuffle and General Election
2. Diet Committee Passes Controversial Health Insurance Bill
3. Kyoto Governor Ninagawa Wins Fifth Term
4. Matsuoka Has Active Week
5. Lapan Premier Calls for Asian Federation
6. Comments by Malaysian Delegate in Japan
7. Philippine Vice President to Make Visit
8. Japan Prepares for Indonesian Economic Aid
9. GOC May Encourage Indonesia's Return to UN
10. Japan-Mongolian Relations
11. ~~Govt~~ Rejects Soviet Kidnap Allegation
12. Pol. Finds Public Remains Negative on S. Vietnam Policy

POLITICAL

1. Rumors of Cabinet Reshuffle and General Election

a. Prime Minister SATO and other LDP leaders intensified efforts during week to dissipate growing impression in political circles, especially LDP, that general election is likely late in fall of 1966. Sato, most specifically in April 12 Lower House Committee and April 13 meeting with LDP Diet first-termers, party Vice President KAWASHIMA and Secretary-General TANAKA all found occasion for public denials that dissolution of Lower House within 1966 was contemplated. As may be

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inevitable in such situations, rumor proved hard to stamp out and younger LDP Lower House members in particular continued devoting as much time as they could to cultivating election districts, to detriment of Diet attendance. Press political articles helped keep "pre-election mood" alive by pointing out advantages to LDP in late 1966 election (assuming economy continues upturn); or more often problems in holding elections later.

b. Coupled with pre-election atmosphere was growing speculation on extent and nature of cabinet reshuffle which Kawashima publicly predicted for early June and all observers seemed anticipate would take place at time of election LDP SecGen and Chairmen Policy Board and Executive Board, whose terms expire June 1. Sato and other party officials declined comment on nature of expected reshuffle but did not deny its likelihood.

c. JSP leaders, while stumping country ostensibly for local elections and other purposes, continue to call for early dissolution and act very much as though they were "pre-campaigning" for general election. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Sato and Tanaka in particular have worked hard to secure acceptance of their statements that LDP intends avoid dissolution until near end of term of present Lower House, November 1967. Reason cited publicly for this stance is government must continue efforts for economic prosperity and stability through this period without interruption of general election. GOJ/LDP leading officials reportedly agreed on this policy at March 29 meeting. Equally cogent reason cited privately by some LDP conservatives is fact Lower House elected in late 1967 could remain in office until after what they consider crucial period regarding post-1970 security arrangements with U.S. These elements in LDP believe assurance of retaining conservative control in Diet is greater in near future than it may be closer to 1970. On other hand, it would in any case be in Sato's interest and in accordance with practice of his predecessors to deny intention to dissolve Lower House until favorable occasion presented itself and essential economic upturn was more firmly guaranteed. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Diet Committee Passes Controversial Health Insurance Bill
 (Week 14, Item 2)

a. At midnight session April 14, Lower House Social and Labor Committee passed modified versions of Government bills to revise three health insurance laws, paving way for passage by Lower House plenary session April 15. Compromise measure provides for .5% increase in health insurance rates from 60 yen per 1000 yen of income to 65 yen. LDP had originally called for 1% raise to 70 yen in order to put insurance system on better financial footing but compromise appears satisfactory in view of fact that LDP-sponsored study committee had proposed .5% increase. Revised rates will still require government subsidy of some

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\$41 million annually. LDP also agreed to future "reconsideration" on opposition proposed to legislate fixed percentage for government subsidy of health insurance account.

b. No other major business taken up in Diet this week. Outstanding business remaining this session includes revision of postal rates, revision of broadcasting law and national holidays bill. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Compromise reached after week of deadlock over issue and represents minor victory for opposition in "protecting people's livelihood" and at same time will help somewhat toward solving problem of deficits in health insurance system. LDP reportedly agreed to relatively large concession on this bill out of concern that firmer stand would lead to impasse on other bills. Moreover, JSP holds chairmanship of Upper House committee having cognizance over bill, making it difficult if not impossible to over-ride opposition there even if strong tactics used in Lower House. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Kyoto Governor

3. Ninagawa Wins Fifth Term

a. In April 13 Kyoto gubernatorial elections JCP/JSP-backed incumbent Torazo NINAGAWA won fifth consecutive term over LDP/DSP-backed Tadashi HAMADA by vote of 409,916 to 362,973. Both candidates were given strong support by their respective parties, including campaign speeches by top-ranking party officials.

b. Victory, though conclusive, marks further decline in Ninagawa's percentage of popular vote from high of 78% in 1954 to 54%, probably largely due to DSP which previously had supported Ninagawa.

c. Comment: Ninagawa victory came as no surprise to most observers in view of his personal popularity and fact that his opponent, former chief of Kyoto Prefecture Agriculture Bureau, relatively unknown. Ninagawa is perennial thorn in side of central government, however, and LDP appeared genuinely disappointed at failure of most determined effort to date to unseat him.

4. Matsuoka Has Active Week

a. GRI Chief Executive Seiho MATSUOKA concluded his round of consultations with governmental and LDP leaders last week (see Week 14, Item #5). Interviews with press on April 9 were given considerable media attention. Matsuoka's remarks conveyed general impression he dissatisfied with U. S. administration of Ryukyus and included some criticism of GOJ for "diffidence" in supporting Okinawan demands. CE's other activities drew less press attention.

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 from Tokyo

His requests for increased GOJ assistance in wide variety of fields were reported. These ranged from television for Yaeyama Island to assistance in getting loans from the prospective Asian Development Bank. On April 12, Matsuoka reportedly negotiated agreement with LDP leaders permitting Okinawan Democratic Party representatives and representatives of Okinawan opinion to participate in monthly meetings of LDP Special Committee on Okinawan Question. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Matsuoka has tried to use his visit to attract greater Japanese public and governmental attention to ~~Okinawan~~ issues. In his enthusiasm he has made some remarks which put U.S. administration in poor light. Agreement for Okinawan representation in LDP committee meetings as of now appears represent only modest tactical victory for Matsuoka. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Laotian Premier Calls for Asian Federation

a. At press conference April 8 Laotian Premier SOUVANNA Phouma said that two or three Asian states should take initiative in forming grouping to which other Asian nations would be attracted, just as EEC is nucleus for future European federation. He said he regarded Japanese-sponsored SEA Ministerial Economic Development Conference as first step toward foundation such organization, said he hoped Japan would take initiative in its formation and added he would be discussing subject with PriMin Sato on April 15.

b. Souvanna also blamed Hanoi for violating 1964 promises and using Laotian territory for transporting military supplies. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Souvanna failed introduce federation idea during conference; Fonoff source speculated he feared adverse reaction. He is being given complete VIP treatment including April 15 meeting with PriMin Sato which expected take up federation proposal, but it is not yet known whether he will obtain anything concrete. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. Comments by Malaysian Delegate in Japan

a. Malaysian Deputy Premier Tun RAZAK told press conference April 8 that SEA Economic Development Conference was first time SEA nations had occasion pledge united efforts for coordinated development program and praised Japan for taking initiative. In response to question, he denied any significance to fact Malaysian and Indonesian representatives sitting at same meeting. He said recent developments in Indonesia encouraging but said future of relations with Malaysia depends upon Indonesia. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: According FonMin source Razak applauded Indo delegate's speech (which emphasized economic development, not politics), and junior members of both delegations fraternized during coffee breaks. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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from Tokyo

7. Philippine Vice President to Make Visit

a. Philippine President MARCOS has declined Premier Sato's invitation visit Japan pleading press of domestic business but Vice President LOPEZ tentatively scheduled make visit in mid-May. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

b. Comment: Philippine Embassy here has expressed hope that relations with Japan will further improve with appointment Ambassador LAUREL. LDP conservatives have expressed belief appointment will improve ties between two countries, commenting on Laurel's activity in Asian Parliamentary Union backed by ex-PrMin KISHI. Lopez visit should also give relations much needed boost. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. Japan Prepares for Indonesian Economic Aid

a. Ambassador to Indonesia Shizuo SAITO arrived April 14 to consult with GOJ on political situation in Indonesia and help prepare Japanese positions for negotiations with Indo mission anticipated in late April. Indonesians expected request immediate relief-type assistance and help with longer range problems of Indo debt servicing and development assistance. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: GOJ feels need to support non-Communist leadership in Indonesia and is consulting with like-minded nations on what can be done. Fonoff has problem of overcoming reluctance within GOJ to make outlays which will be necessary to protect Japanese financial stake. (CONFIDENTIAL)

9. GOJ May Encourage Indonesia's Return to UN

a. In response newsman's question, Prime Minister Sato April 9 said it would be "natural" for GOJ assist Indonesia's reentry into UN, especially since Japan had tried dissuade Indonesia from leaving organization. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

10. Japan-Mongolian Relations

a. Aiichiro FUJIYAMA, Chairman of Council on Problems of Unrepatriated, asked Premier TSENDEMBAL to permit party of about ten Japanese to visit graves of Japanese in Mongolia and to assist in tracing twenty-seven Japanese missing since World War II. Request conveyed in letter delivered by Japanese Ambassador Toru NAKAGAWA in Moscow to his Mongolian colleague on April 11. Nakagawa also asked officially for GOM's sympathetic consideration this request.

b. FonMin Shiina April 12 in reply to Diet interpellator said GOJ not

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in any haste establish diplomatic relations with Mongolia, but it is unnecessary to consult third nations, including GRC, before taking such step. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Request for graves visit apparently has official backing and inspiration, since Fujiyama is cabinet member and one of principal LDP leaders. GOJ considers that its vote for Mongolian entry into UN was act of recognition; question of establishing diplomatic relations has been under consideration for some years, with anticipated GRC opposition as principal deterrent. Despite Shiina's statement about not consulting third powers, GOJ has been keeping US informed of its thinking and is communicating informally with GRC. (CONFIDENTIAL)

11. FonOff Rejects Soviet Kidnap Allegation

a. Vice FonMin SHIMODA April 14 told newsmen that there was no attempt by Americans to kidnap Soviet First Secretary Georgy POKROVSKY on March 17 as alleged by Soviet Union. He said that thorough police investigation found there was quarrel between Pokrovsky and Americans based on misunderstanding and that GOJ has dropped case. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Story reported prominently in local press without editorial comment. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

12. Poll Finds Public Remains Negative on U.S. Vietnam Policy

a. USIS-sponsored poll conducted April 1-5 with nationwide random sample of Japanese adults (age 20 and over) on opinions on Vietnam situation found almost no significant difference from results of similar poll in May, 1965.

b. While over 80% of pollees had heard of fighting in Vietnam, almost 60% could not say which side they thought would win in end. Also, half of respondents said Japan should not help South Vietnamese Government (GVN), as against about one tenth who said Japan should help. Thirty-four percent disapproved of U.S. actions in Vietnam, as against five percent approving. Similar percentages said U.S. should be more conciliatory toward anti-GVN forces, rather than tougher.

c. Single area of marked improvement was in overall Japanese impression of what U.S. has recently been doing in international affairs. Here, May 1965 poll found total of 39% unfavorably impressed and only 13% favorably impressed; whereas latest poll found equal numbers on each side -- i.e., about 3 out of 10 favorable and 3 out of 10 unfavorable. Also, where general pattern throughout this April poll was for larger number of "Don't know" answers than in May, 1965, there was significant drop in "Don't know" replies to this one question. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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
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d. Comment: Totally different periodic poll conducted in Tokyo area by GOJ research institute has found peak public interest in Vietnam situation in May, 1965, and sharp drop in interest last fall. Finding coincides with rough observations by Embassy officers, and probably accounts for more "Don't know" answers in USIS April poll.

At same time, lessened attention to Vietnam, which is U.S. policy question on which Japanese are most negative, would help explain improved overall impression of U.S. handling of international affairs -- although such other factors as impact of December-January peace offensive and bombing suspension are believed also to have affected replies to this question.

Findings also suggest that Japanese opinion on Vietnam was set in strongly negative mould by Japanese news treatment last spring hostile to U.S. positions and policies on Vietnam, and has remained generally unchanged despite lessened interest, or because lessened interest has meant public has paid little heed to more factual and less biased Japanese media treatment of Vietnam issue during past eight months. Additional factors of pervasive Japanese pacifism, antipathy to use of armed force and fear that major-power involvement in Vietnam endangers whole Far East also certainly tend to block improvement in Japanese popular attitudes toward U.S. Vietnam policy. (CONFIDENTIAL)

For the Ambassador:



Thomas W. Ainsworth
 First Secretary of Embassy

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CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, RANGOON,

BANGKOK, TAIPEI, SEOUL, VIENTIANE, DJAKARTA, MOSCOW

DATE: April 22, 1966

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 16

REF :

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2. Lower House Approves Health Insurance Postal Rate Bills

3. LDP Seeking Tokyo Gubernatorial Candidate

4. Ambassador Saito Reports on Indonesia

5. Sato Meets Souvanna Phouma

6. Gromyko Visit Postponed

7. Chicom Stowaways Defect

8. Scheduled JSDF Command Changes

9. Asahi Poll Shows Falling Support for Cabinet

POLITICAL

1. Security Debate Continues

a. Fonoff April 16 summarized present GOJ thinking on

Security Treaty question in document entitled "Points in Question Re-

garding U.S. -Japan Security Treaty", which made strong case for con-

tinuation of present arrangements. JSP immediately issued statement

that Fonoff line meant introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan inev-

itable. DSP, reasserting view that Security Treaty should be revised

to provide for stationing U.S. forces in Japan only in times of emergency,

rejected Fonoff position. Three major newspapers dealt editorially with

subject generally pointing to need for more searching analysis of relation

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 from Tokyo

between Security Treaty and changing international situation and commenting that Fonoff statement is insufficient basis to evoke national consensus on issue.

b. Vice FonMin SHIMODA, at press conference April 18 denied that Fonoff document and his call for increased Japanese effort to achieve disarmament were contradictory. Although on April 20 Fonoff was interpreted as having launched "new view" on question of "emergency stationing" (i.e., support of DSP idea), FonMin SHIINA, April 20, commented that while withdrawal of foreign troops was desirable objective, realization in foreseeable future was impossible. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Apparent moderation of Fonoff opposition to "emergency stationing" theory appears founded on two considerations -- 1) to reduce intensity of DSP reaction to Fonoff position and 2) to create atmosphere which will permit strengthening of GOJ defense establishment. However, Fonoff still firmly maintains necessity of present U.S. -Japan defense relationship. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Lower House Approves Health Insurance, Postal Rate Bills

a. Following Lower House passage April 16 of controversial health insurance legislation (Week 14, Item 2), Lower House took up and passed April 21 Government bill to revise postal rates. Most painful aspect of postal rates bill is 50% raise in first class letter rates to fifteen yen (four cents). (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: With passage these two measures Diet now faces problem of revision national holidays bill which seeks reestablishment "National Foundation Day", February 11. Though LDP has not yet indicated final position on issue, opposition is planning all-out battle against revival. If LDP pushes bill, it likely embroil Diet in sharp controversy at end relatively quiet session, which has had its share of problems, but nevertheless adopted large share of GOJ program. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. LDP Seeking Tokyo Gubernatorial Candidate

a. As it appears more likely Sohyo Chairman Kaoru OTA will be JSP candidate for 1967 Tokyo gubernatorial race, LDP becoming increasingly concerned to find candidate to beat him. According press, PriMin SATO and Tokyo LDP Chairman Okinori KAYA, at April 21 meeting decided LDP candidate should be selected by summer in order to give ample time for campaign. Press also speculates that present leading contenders for LDP nomination are PriMin Office Director Ken YASUI and former LabMin Hirohide ISHIDA. Other names mentioned are Education Minister Umekichi NAKAMURA, State Minister Aichiro FUJITYAMA, LDP Diet member Yasuhiro NAKASONE, Rikkyo University president, Masatachi MATSUSHITA, and former Tokyo police chief Bumpei HARA. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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from Tokyo

b. Comment: Heightened LDP interest in question undoubtedly prompted by increased momentum behind Ota's candidacy and fact that LDP late start in Kyoto gubernatorial election (Weeks 15, Item 3) probably contributed to defeat. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Ambassador Saito Reports on Indonesia

a. Japanese Ambassador to Indonesia Shizuo SAITO returned to Japan for consultations on April 15. His comments on situation in Indonesia have received extensive coverage, especially those following April 18 briefing of PriMin Sato; during which Saito reportedly said that Indonesia moving toward political ~~change~~, that new leaders will deal with problems in fair and moderate manner, and that Japan should provide more economic aid. He thought that Indonesia would move toward reestablishment friendly relations with U.S. and consider return to UN and adjustment of relations with Malaysia. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Discussions within GOJ concerning Japanese aid to Indonesia are continuing. Japanese public opinion being prepared, in part by Saito statement, for more active Japanese role in economic assistance to Indonesia. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Souvanna

5. Sato Meets/Phouma (Weeks 15, Item 5)

a. Laotian Premier SOUVANNA Phouma, in Japan as delegate to SEA Ministerial Conference on Economic Development, wound up week's visit as state guest at lunch with PriMin Sato April 15. Joint Communique issued April 18 upon Souvanna's departure said (1) both governments would attempt to bring peace to Vietnam, (2) Sato expressed interest in Souvanna's idea for Asian association of states, (3) Souvanna expressed gratitude for past Japanese assistance, (4) Sato promised more assistance, (5) both agreed consult on common problems in future. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Though GOJ made no new commitments on economic assistance, Souvanna's trip went off very well. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. Gromyko Visit Postponed

a. Fonoff announced April 21 that Soviet FonMin GROMYKO visit scheduled for May will probably be postponed until after June. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Fonoff has confidentially informed us that Gromyko will not come until late September at earliest, if at all. Soviets cited press of other ~~things~~.

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from Tokyo

other business for request for postponement. Negotiations for consular treaty also moving slowly and may be further slowed by postponement Gromyko visit.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

7. Chicom Stowaways Defect

a. Two Chinese student stowaways, CHOU Yung-hsing and CHIN Chung-tien, were arrested by Japanese immigration authorities upon arrival April 19 of Japanese freighter, Daiei Maru, which they had boarded April 13 at Tientsin. According to one press report, ~~several~~ ^{several} dissatisfied with life on mainland and wished go to Taiwan to study. Press reported April 22 that, following investigation by Japanese authorities, defectors proceeded to Taiwan April 21 where they were given warm welcome. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Case has attracted little attention thus far. Fonoff obviously hopes avoid publicity and problems attending similar case eighteen months ago. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. Scheduled JSDF Command Changes

a. On April 22, Cabinet expected to confirm the following changes in defense staff effective April 30. Adm. SUGIE (Chairman Joint Staff Council), Adm. NISHIMURA (Chief of Maritime Staff) and Gen. URA (Chief of Air Staff) all retire. Gen. AMANO replaces Sugie and Lt. Gen. YOSHIE receives fourth star and becomes Chief of Ground Staff. Vice-Adm. ITAYA and Lt. Gen. MUTA promoted and become Chiefs of Maritime and Air Staffs, respectively.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Sugie and Nishimura were due for statutory retirement in September and July, respectively, and Ura, in February 1967. JDA DirGen MATSUNO has probably arranged these changes early so they can be approved before Cabinet reshuffle likely take place in June. Matsuno probably not certain he will be retained in present post though some observers give him at least 50-50 chance. (CONFIDENTIAL)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

9. Asahi Poll Shows Falling Support for Cabinet

a. April 22 Asahi Shimbun published results of nationwide opinion poll conducted April 1 and 2 which showed apparent drop in public support for Sato Cabinet to 30%. Results, and comparison with earlier Asahi polls:

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 from Tokyo


"Do you support Sato Cabinet? Or, don't you support it?"

	<u>11/64</u>	<u>8/65</u>	<u>4/66</u>
Support	47%	37%	30%
Don't support	14	25	26
Other	10	9	8
Don't know	29	29	36
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Poll found support for LDP was 46%, as against 31% for JSP. Asahi editorial same date said that while Sato has achieved some goals, such as Japan-ROK treaty ratification and government bond flotation, these are not achievements with great public appeal; rising prices seem to be major factor in falling support for Cabinet. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Monthly Jiji Press poll showed substantial drop in Cabinet support in mid-March (to 36%) but substantial increase in mid-April (to 41%). Japanese polling experts unable to explain apparently contradictory findings, but did suggest that great caution needed in interpreting results of either poll. Interviewer attitude and mood of respondents could make significant difference in way answers were recorded. Asahi and Jiji polls produced similar findings on Cabinet support in November, 1964 and August, 1965. (UNCLASSIFIED)

For the Ambassador:


 Toshio G. Tsukahira
 First Secretary of Embassy

POL:W Greer
 T. Tsukahira
 J. Warrior
 R. R. R. R.

USIS: H. H. H. H.
 NAVA: S. S. S. S.

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1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 278: 1039-1044.

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AIRGRAM

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKO-
HAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT,
Hickman CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, RANGOON,
BANGKOK, MOSCOW, TAIPEI, SEOUL

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: April 28 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKKA NO. 17

REF :

CONTENTS

1. Spring Wage Offensive Climaxed by Railroad Strike
2. Diet Activities
3. LDP Wins Kyoto Upper House By-Election
4. Soviet-Japan Relations

POLITICAL

- ## 1. Spring Wage Offensive Climaxed by Rail Strike

a. Peak of Sohyo's annual spring wage offensive was reached midnight April 25, when Private Railway Workers Union (Shitetsu Soren) struck 10 major privately-owned railway companies for 24 hours, and at same time nine public service workers unions (including National Railway Workers Union) scheduled (and some actually started) strikes which were called off in early hours of April 26. Shitetsu Soren began scheduled strike after marathon sessions of crisis bargaining under auspices Central Labor Relations Commission failed to bridge remaining gap of about ¥ 300 (\$0.83) between management and union positions on size of monthly wage increase. According to close observer, private railway management had hinted willingness to grant ¥ 3000 (\$8.33), and union let it be known that settlement price was around ¥3,300 (\$9.17).

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from Tokyo

b. Accepting early morning April 26 promise from public service management that ultimate wage settlement figure for private workers will be reflected in awards for public service workers, public corporations and public enterprise unions called end to their strikes, but not in time to avert illegal strike actions already under way which GOJ spokesmen had said would be subject to disciplinary measures. Although millions of commuters and travellers affected by stoppages on both public and private lines, there was no significant violence despite prevalent confusion. About 40 unionists arrested in minor incidents. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

c. Comment: Observers expect that after another series of prolonged crisis bargaining, settlement will be reached before Shitetsu Soren second strike wave scheduled for April 30. Embassy estimates that settlement will call for monthly increase of about ¥ 3,300 (\$9.17). Although inconveniences caused by strike led to customary criticism of GOJ for failing to avoid stoppages and charges of irresponsibility against management and unions, criticism of Shitetsu Soren appeared muted by feeling that high cost of living, which affects all, somehow justified union in strong effort for pay rise. Increase of financial burden to National Railway Union to compensate members who likely be disciplined for illegal strike action and National Railway Union's isolated position among Sohyo public service unions (others in this category were saved by early hour decision to call off strike) certain to renew inter-union squabbles and recriminations over spring struggle tactics. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Diet Activities

a. With large share of cabinet members' time consumed by efforts avert rail strike (Item 1), Diet was relatively quiet during week. Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee passed Japan-Soviet Air Pact April 26 with resolution attached by three major parties calling for government to bring about Japanese flag flights to Moscow within two years. Resolution also stipulated GOJ should be prepared to suspend flights if Soviets rejected entry Japanese aircraft.

b. Health Insurance bill (Week 16, Item 2) approved by Upper House Committee April 27 and passage by plenary session expected April 28. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Diet has yet to take up controversial issue of "National Foundation Day" bill and, as next week punctuated by holidays, Diet activities settling into doldrums until second week in May. Possibility of Diet extension has been raised, but appears depend on whether LDP intends seriously to push National Holidays bill. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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from Tokyo

3. LDP Wins Kyoto Upper House By-Election

a. Partial vote tabulation showed LDP candidate Yukio HAYASHIDA, former Agricultural Ministry bureaucrat, won Upper House by-election in Kyoto district April 27 by wide margin over Socialist runner-up, with JCP candidate in respectable third place. (UNCLASSIFIED)


b. Comment: Contrast with results of Kyoto gubernatorial election (Weeks 15, Item 3) suggests that Governor NINAGAWA's personal popularity is major factor in his tenure of power; also implies, however, that JCP support for him may have been decisive element. (UNCLASSIFIED)

4. Soviet-Japan Relations





a. Press reported that informed sources in GOJ announced that PriMin Sato has decided against visit to Soviet Union this year in view of certainty that Soviet FonMin Gromyko's visit to Japan will be delayed until next autumn. (CONFIDENTIAL)



b. Comment: FonOff told us this report not accurate and that no decision made concerning Sato visit, but that Sato will not visit Moscow unless Soviet FonMin makes prior visit Tokyo. FonOff added it not pegging Gromyko visit to consular convention, but would be pleased if negotiation of convention can be completed in time to permit Gromyko signing in Tokyo. If this not possible, will want convention signed in Moscow. (CONFIDENTIAL)

For the Ambassador:



Thomas W. Ainsworth
First Secretary of Embassy

POL: TGT: 
TW: 
WT: 
WH: 

LABATT: LS: 
NAVA: PBS: 

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, ^{ROMAN}YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, ^{ANALYSIS & DISSEM}CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, RANGOON, ^{BRANCH}BANGKOK, MOSCOW, TAIPEI, SEOUL, DJAKARTA, KUALA LUMPUR

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: May 6, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKKA NO. 18

REF :

CONTENTS

1. 37th May Day Held in Festival Atmosphere
2. Defense Dissension Continues
3. JSP on Defense
4. LDP Secretary General Predicts Diet Extension
5. Interest in Indonesia
6. Fishing Dispute with ROK Simmers
7. Provincial Communities Request Self-Defense Force

POLITICAL

1. 37th May Day Held in Festival Atmosphere
- a. 37th May Day rallies sponsored by Sohyo, Domei, Churitsu, and Shinsanbetsu Labor Federations attracted nationwide turnout of 1,998,720 participants in 887 locations (police figures), although sponsors claimed estimated 6.5 million total. Both police and sponsors' figures roughly identical last year's tallies. Except for minor scuffles between leftist students and police, no violence reported.
- b. Central rally in Tokyo (attended by 246,000 persons according police, 600,000 according sponsors) addressed by Sohyo President OTA, JSP Chairman SASAKI, DSP SecGen NISHIMURA and JCP Chairman

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from Tokyo

NOZAKA. Parades through city following rally were orderly. Slogans and banners stressed opposition to rise in prices and to American "aggression" in Vietnam. Although rival labor federations, Sohyo and Domei, joined forces in Tokyo rally, each reportedly held separate May Day observances in several prefectures. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: 1966 May Day, following pattern of last few years, more holiday observance with families in attendance than demonstration. Good weather, coincidence of May Day with Sunday, and triumphant mood induced by wage raise concession won by private railway workers' unions April 30 (Week 17, Item 1) contributed to pervasive holiday atmosphere. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. Defense Dissension Continues

a. LDP's Security Research Council May 4 published Interim Report summarizing findings of hearings conducted from last September. Report emphasized continuing and real nature of Sino-Soviet threat and recommended: 1) U.S. - Japan Security Treaty, in its present form, be extended for 10-year period from 1970; 2) dissolution of National Defense Council and establishment of new National Security Council; and 3) establishment of integrated information agency and enactment of legislation to protect information dealing with national security. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Security Research Council's report reflects views of LDP conservative wing headed by former PriMin Nobusuke KISHI and Okinori KAYA. However, certain elements within the LDP, such as Yasuhiro NAKASONE, oppose Council's conclusions, and argue that ten-year extension of Treaty is "nonsense" in light of rapidly changing international situation. Defense debate expected to continue active and may further heighten differences between groups within LDP, in addition to intensifying friction between LDP and leftist opposition parties. (cf. Item 3) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. JSP on Defense

a. On May 2, JSP's Foreign Policy and Defense Committee released draft report on party's phased program to realize its long-range objective of unarmed neutrality for Japan. Of note in report were following points: 1) admission that immediate dissolution of Self Defense Force not feasible and call for its conversion into National Police Force and Peace Construction Force; 2) if impossible to block extension of Security Treaty, JSP, upon assumption of power, would "make dead letter of Treaty" by signing non-aggression pacts with Soviet Union and China; 3) suggestion that Japanese participation in UN Police Force possible after realization of nuclear test ban and complete disarmament; and 4) advocacy of Four Power Non-Aggression Pact (Japan, United States, China and Soviet Union) to guarantee Japan's security. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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from Tokyo

b. Comment: Report received prominent coverage in press which noted its highly hypothetical nature; in effect it made major changes in Japan's defense setup contingent on realization of Utopia. Report reflects aim of moderate JSP elements to relate JSP's policy aims to real world and increase popular appeal in preparation for next general elections. However, modification of earlier stand on Self Defense Forces and Security Treaty likely to become subject of intra-party controversy. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. LDP Secretary-General Predicts Diet Extension

a. LDP SecGen Kakuei TANAKA May 4 told Tokyo press that extension of current Diet session was unavoidable to permit consideration of pending legislation. Tanaka declined specific prediction concerning length of extension but said it must be fairly long. JSP Central Executive Committee in special meeting at Niigata (where JSP leaders stumping in gubernatorial campaign) following day announced it would fight LDP move for extension. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Cabinet and LDP executives expect to take formal action to introduce extension move about May 10. Session presently due to end May 18. While there had been plentiful speculation on extension (Weeks 17, Item 2) Tanaka's announcement was first authoritative indication of LDP intentions and strengthened optimism within conservative wing of LDP that controversial bills with nationalistic overtones, notably National Holidays Establishment bill, likely receive serious attention in this session. (UNCLASSIFIED)

5. Interest in Indonesia

a. Number of speculative stories have appeared in press during past week concerning possibility of Japanese mediation or lending good offices in settlement of Indonesia-Malaysia dispute. Stories apparently originated from fact that Japanese Ambassador to Malaysia, Fumihiko KAI, in Bangkok during Indo-Philippine discussions, had met Malik, and, in response to reporter's question, had expressed view that GOJ would be happy to do whatever possible to assist in settlement of dispute. Vice-FonMin SHIMODA May 4 told press conference that Kai had not been instructed see Malik and that GOJ would be willing mediate if both sides so requested and if time ripe. FonOff sources told reporters that GOJ would not take any positive initiatives because domestic situation in Indonesia did not make it appear time is ripe. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Flurry of press comment appears be result of Kai's initiatives and over-eager interpretations by Japanese reporters of expressions of normal interest in peaceful settlement of Malaysian dispute. Speculation on implications of prospective visits by Indonesian officials in connection with trade and financial arrangements has added to press interest. So far as we know, GOJ has no plans for diplomatic initiative in Indonesia-Malaysia affair. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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from Tokyo

5. Fishing Dispute with ROK Simmers

a. FonOff announced April 30 that it had sent to ROK on April 26 a note verbale protesting the seizure of a Japanese fishing vessel March 14 (Week 12, Item 6, and Week 11, Item 3), reserving the right to claim damages and demanding Korean action to prevent recurrence of similar incidents. GOJ also announced that talks on this matter expected take place in Seoul in mid-May. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Principal problem involved is dispute between Koreans and Japanese over question of whether Koreans have right pursue Japanese vessels from Korean exclusive fishing zone (within 12-mile line) and arrest them outside that line. (Japanese have not conceded that vessel was within 12-mile limit.) FonOff sources have informed us they expect negotiations on this question will take some time and encounter difficult but not overwhelming obstacles. (CONFIDENTIAL)


MILITARY

6. Provincial Communities Request Self-Defense Force Camps

a. The Defense Agency has announced that since 1953 ninety-six cities, towns and villages have requested that SDF units be stationed in their locality. Reason for request is said to be expectation that such camps would boost local economies. Of ninety-six communities requesting units, thirty asked for GSDF engineer troops who could render aid during natural disasters. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

For the Ambassador:



Thomas W. Ainsworth
First Secretary of Embassy

POL: TGTsukahira
WTBree
TWAinsworth
JMFarrion
RMRuenitz

USIS: HLBurleson
ARMA: MajDDHarris

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, Naha SAPPORO, YOKO-
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CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, RANGOON,
BANGKOK, MOSCOW, TAIPEI, SEOUL, MANILA, GEORGETOWN,
NAIROBI, BLANTYRE

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE: May 13, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 19

REF :

CONTENTS

1. LDP Proposes Diet Extension
2. Electoral Reform Proposal
3. Tokyo Gubernatorial Race
4. Sohyo Chairman Ota Announces Intention to Resign
5. Okinawa Consultative Committee
6. Reaction to Chicom Nuclear Test
7. GOJ Temporizing on North Korean Entry
8. Matsumura Visits Peking
9. Philippine Vice-Presidential Visit
10. Recognition of Guiana
11. New Embassy in Africa

POLITICAL

1. LDP Proposes Diet Extension (Weeka 18, Item 4)

a. LDP proposal for 60-day extension of current Diet session formally taken up at Lower House Steering Committee Director's meeting May 12. LDP said extension needed to ensure passage of some

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from Tokyo

70 pending bills including controversial National Holidays Law. JSP and DSP replied that two-month extension unreasonably long, and Steering Committee made no progress toward agreement on handling of issue.

b. JSP and DSP both oppose extension but press said JSP indicated willingness to extend for up to 30 days (which would permit JSP Chairman Kozo SASAKI to depart on scheduled trip to Communist China, North Vietnam and Cambodia) while LDP hinted it would compromise on about 45 days. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Call for 60-day extension appears be LDP tactical maneuver aimed at obtaining minimum requirements of four or five weeks. One press source made cynical comment that JSP basically opposed to extension but willing compromise as extension would permit JSP Diet members obtain June allowances and also, by occupying Diet members' time, would help divert their attention from inevitable intra-party squabbles on such questions as defense and party leadership. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Electoral Reform Proposal

a. On May 9 Fourth Election System Deliberation Council sub-committee announced proposal for reform of Lower House election system. Proposal calls for combination of single-seat constituencies and proportional representation system (in contrast to present system in which several members are elected from each "medium-sized" district). Lower House would be increased to 488 members (now 467, but law already passed raising to 486 in next general election). Each prefecture would be allotted fixed number of seats on basis of population. Seventy percent of seats would be determined in single constituency districts and thirty percent by modified proportional representation system applied on prefectural scale. Any party failing to gain five percent of vote would be dropped from consideration in distribution of proportional representation seats. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Proposal, which resembles present West German system, appears deliberately designed appeal to number two party (JSP) which would stand excellent chance of at least maintaining present strength in Lower House. It would, however, effectively shut out minor parties and independent candidates in all but few instances, thereby minimizing representation of Communists and Komeito, another factor expected to have some appeal for JSP. Though LDP appears take seriously question of election reform, there remain several more steps of Deliberation Council deliberations and difficult tasks such as determining boundaries of single-seat districts. It appears unlikely (partly because LDP thinks it tactically untimely to alienate Komeito) that system will be changed in near future. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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3. Tokyo Gubernatorial Race

a. At May 12 press conference Komeito SecGen Hiroshi HOJO said that party would not support incumbent Governor Ryutaro AZUMA if he should be LDP candidate in April 1967 Tokyo gubernatorial election and hinted that Komeito considering running own candidate, though admitting that party had not yet held substantive discussions on the question. Hojo said that Komeito disagreed with LDP on election system revision but it also at odds with JSP in Tokyo Assembly, and therefore would have problem supporting either party's candidate. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Press comments that Komeito decision on gubernatorial candidate depends on leadership judgment as to advantageous posture to take in view next Lower House election. Hojo announcement appears be tactical move; Komeito probably holds decisive balance of votes in Tokyo but at present party would have difficulty producing own candidate with sufficient popular appeal to make impressive show. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Sohyo Chairman Ota Announces Intention to Resign

a. Sohyo Chairman Kaoru OTA formally announced to executive meeting of Sohyo May 12 that he would not run for reelection as chairman at next convention this summer. Ota at press conference in Kyushu earlier in week had indicated his desire to relinquish his Sohyo job and at same time had made known his willingness stand as candidate for Governor of Tokyo in next year's elections, provided he assured of combined support of all opposition parties. (See Item 3) Sohyo executive meeting accepted Ota decision and agreed in principle to choose his successor by June 2. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Ota's decision to resign chairmanship likely to bring to head factional rivalry in Sohyo. Leading candidates to succeed Ota are Toshikatsu HORII, Chairman of Private Railway Workers' Union (Shitetsu Soren), and Yukitaka HARAGUCHI, chairman of All Japan Metal Mine Workers' Unions (Zenko). Horii, who is candidate of anti-Ota/Iwai leadership in Sohyo, appears at present to have inside track as Ota's successor. (UNCLASSIFIED)

5. Okinawa Consultative Committee

a. Ninth Meeting of Japan-United States Consultative Committee (ConCom) on Okinawa, May 9, went smoothly. Principal achievement was agreement that henceforth GOJ, without disturbing US control over exit from and re-entry to the Ryukyus, would assume primary responsibility for documentation and protection of Okinawan travelers abroad. Other topics included question of modifying flag flown by Ryukyuan vessels to incorporate Japanese-flag features, and delegation of authority to GRI. Press coverage of meeting was relatively light. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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 from Tokyo

b. Comment: Meeting, which followed detailed scenario negotiated in advance, demonstrated GOJ eagerness to use ConCom for discussion of matters in addition to economic assistance to Okinawa and ability two governments develop controlled agenda for low-key discussion such topics. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Reaction to Chicom Nuclear Test

a. Reaction to third ChiCom test ran in predictable directions. GOJ, which previously had issued warnings that test likely take place, publicized strongly worded protest and announced measures to measure contamination in sea and air. Press also condemned test. Political parties issued statements, all condemning test except JCP, which upheld Chinese line; JSP asserted that US containment policy responsible for ChiCom development of bomb and reiterated standing line that Japan should sever defense ties with US. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: This test is already contributing to lively discussion within Japan of ChiCom intentions and role Japan should play in face of growing ChiCom military power. Current rectification campaign in China has also served make Japanese more aware of disturbing rigidities of Peking regime. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. GOJ Temporizing on North Korean Entry

a. Press May 12 stated that GOJ had informed ROK Ambassador KIM Dong Jo it was prepared in principle to admit North Korean technicians into Japan on case-by-case basis following principle of "separation of trade and politics." Technicians' entry is connected with export of synthetic textile plant.

b. Ambassador Kim informed EmbOff May 11 he was "pulling out all stops" to prevent sale of plant and entry of North Koreans. FonOff official informed EmbOff May 12 that final decision to admit North Koreans still pending but that he personally did not believe entry could be refused indefinitely and thought it preferable for GOJ to make decision admit technicians this year rather than wait till next year, when ROK will hold elections. (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. Comment: GOJ appears to be working toward North Korea policy similar to that for Communist China, i.e., separation of trade and politics. FonOff official has informed us that some LDP conservatives not objecting strenuously to trade with North Korea or admission of North Koreans to Japan, because they regard this as area in which they can engage in politically profitable bargaining with JSP at little cost to themselves. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALPage 5 A-1350
from Tokyo8. Matsumura Visits Peking

a. LDP "old China hand" Kenzo MATSUMURA left Japan May 10 for Peking to discuss next year's trade plan under Liao-Takasaki formula. He hopes to see Premier CHOU En-lai and other high-ranking Chinese officials. Before leaving Tokyo, he had private conversation with PriMin Sato. According press, Matsumura reached Peking May 12 where he was greeted by LIAO Cheng-chih. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: We understand that Sato refused to authorize Matsumura to tell Chinese that GOJ prepared scrap YOSHIDA letter and provide Ex-Im Bank guarantees for loans. While Matsumura will probably seek to obtain better ChiCom appreciation of Japan's political position, it is unlikely that he can accomplish much without being able to give assurances of easier Japanese economic policy toward China in future. On other hand, good many Japanese interested in mainland China trade question currently seem convinced ChiComs need Japan trade for economic reasons and total trade likely increase (or at least hold present level) without major Japanese concessions. (CONFIDENTIAL)

9. Philippine Vice-Presidential Visit

a. Philippine Vice-President Ferdinando LOPEZ and party of ten arrived May 8 in Osaka from Taipei for week's goodwill visit to Japan. After visit to Kyoto Lopez was met at train station in Tokyo May 9 by PriMin SATO, who also attended Philippine Embassy reception. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Both Japanese and Filipinos here hopeful that Lopez visit, together with recent appointment Ambassador Jose S. LAUREL, will lead to further improvement in GOJ-GOP relations, though FonOff official noted privately no indication Philippines might ratify FCN treaty signed three years ago. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

10. Recognition of Guiana

a. Press reported that GOJ May 12 decided recognize Guiana when it declares independence May 26 and to send Yonosuke SATO, LDP member of Diet Lower House, as special envoy at independence ceremonies. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

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from Tokyo

11. New Embassy in Africa

a. FonOff confirmed to us press report that Japan will establish embassy in Malawi May 20. Ambassador in Kenya will be accredited to GOM.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

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ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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AIR PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKO-HAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, LONDON, HONG KONG, MOSCOW, TAIPEI, SEOUL, DJAKARTA, SAIGON

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: May 20, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 20

REF :

CONTENTS

1. Diet Extended for 40 Days
2. Sato on China Policy
3. DSP on Defense
4. Wandering Peacemaker Returns
5. Indonesia Economic Mission
6. ROK-Japan Relations Increase
7. Matsumura in China
8. ChiComs Return Fishing Boat
9. Soviets Blamed in Sinking of Japanese Fishing Vessel
10. ChiCom and North Vietnamese Groups Denied Entry
11. North Koreans Entry Finessed
12. Graves Visit to Iwo Jima and Bonins
13. Graves Visit to Mongolia

POLITICAL

1. Diet Extended for 40 Days (Weeka 19, Item 1)
 - a. Lower House May 17 voted 40-day extension of current session. LDP supported motion with JSP and DSP voting against, JCP abstaining. Action came in typical late evening session after seven days abortive negotiations between LDP and opposition since former first

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from Tokyo

proposed 60-day extension. Forty-day duration proposed by Lower House Speaker Kikuichiro YAMAGUCHI in accordance with generally recognized, although not formally admitted, LDP compromise concept. LDP and JSP May 16 reportedly came within one day of agreement on 34- or 35-day extension provided JSP would also agree cooperate in expediting legislation, but both sides apparently had second thoughts on morning after. (Embtel 3990).

b. Approval of Diet extension by Upper House hung up one full day May 18 as JSP, joined by Komeito, decided to dramatize disapproval of LDP action in "forcing" vote in Lower House by boycotting all Diet deliberations. Upper House plenary session finally convened in late evening without JSP, Komeito and JCP members and passed extension. JSP boycott of all Diet proceedings continued and no agreement reached as of evening May 19. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

c. Comment: As previously reported, LDP determination to extend session reflects necessity of passing substantial part of pending legislation.

Manner in which issue handled, including Yamaguchi role therein, appears to undermine tacit working agreement between major parties on Diet procedure reached after resignation of former Speaker FUNADA following ROK Treaty Ratification. Possible effect on Yamaguchi position not yet clear but at minimum it appears likely reduce his optimism about (and leverage towards) establishing long-term basis for smooth Diet operation. More clashes between LDP and JSP appear likely during extended session. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Sato on China Policy

a. In hour-long interview with Japan Times editor Kazushige HIRASAWA on national TV network (NHK) May 13, PriMin SATO said that Chicom leaders should talk to visiting LDP leader MATSUMURA (Item 7) on political subjects, because Chicoms need to understand outside world just as much as outside world needs to understand China. He said that he does not consider present Chicom-Japan relationship, which he termed an unnatural one characterized by lack of diplomatic ties, would continue forever. Sato said solution of China problem impossible without settlement of Taiwan question, but GOJ would not support any formula which disregarded existence of Nationalist China. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Sato's carefully phrased statement should please those Japanese who wish to maintain ties with Taiwan as well as those who want diplomatic relations with Peking and as such is representative of Japanese policy goals. Means of achieving goals, however, not really touched on in telecast, and this too is accurate reflection of dilemma GOJ now faces. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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from Tokyo

3. DSP on Defense

a. Democratic Socialist Party Chairman Suehiro NISHIO at May 14 news conference in Sapporo explained to press DSP's new "Basic Policy on Defense and Security." Paper stresses development of Japan's independent defense capabilities and promotion of multilateral peace diplomacy with U.S., Soviet Union and Communist China, and describes nuclear armament of Communist China as no more than "psychological threat" so long as U.S. nuclear deterrent continues to function. According to Nishio explanation, DSP position on independent defense posture calls for building up Japan's defense capacity by improving quality of Self Defense Forces and reduction of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to subsidiary or supplementary role. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Third in current series of Japanese political parties' position papers on defense issue (cf. Weeka 18, Items 2 & 3), DSP's new statement on defense policy marks noteworthy shift away from previous DSP stand advocating immediate revision of Security Treaty to permit stationing of U.S. forces in Japan only in event of imminent threat to Japan's security, presumably as determined by Japan, although ultimate revision of Treaty in this direction is still envisaged. According to observers, deemphasis of "emergency stationing" reflects criticism that this position unrealistic and unlikely to be acceptable to U.S. DSP clearly seeking establish middle position between LDP champions of extension and strengthening of Security Treaty and Socialist advocates of unarmed neutrality. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Wandering Peacemaker Returns (Weeka 5, Item 6)

a. Special envoy Masayuki YOKOYAMA, who left Japan February 18 on mission to Europe, Middle East, South and Southeast Asia to explore possibilities for peaceful settlement Vietnam, returned May 16 and reported results to PriMin Sato May 17. According to press, Yokoyama reported that all with whom he talked agreed cessation of hostilities desirable, but all also agreed efforts move toward peaceful settlement now premature. All hoped Japan would work for peaceful solution when appropriate. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Results were much as FonOff expected, i.e., nothing. However, Yokoyama's trip was useful domestically, since GOJ can now point to his trip as evidence Japanese efforts to achieve peace. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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from Tokyo

5. Indonesian Economic Mission (Week 18, Item 5)

a. Indonesian economic mission led by Vice FinMin UMARJADI met with GOJ working level officials to discuss what aid Japan might be able to provide to help meet Indonesia's pressing economic problems. No progress achieved by weekend and Japanese disappointed at Indonesians' lack of ability to explain present situation and future plans. GOJ now discussing what can be done to provide Sultan of Jogjakarta, who arrives next week, with some kind of present to take home. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. Comment: None

6. ROK-Japan Relations Increase

a. A number of developments, mostly in economic field, during past week illustrated growth of closer over-all relations between ROK and Japan despite problems such as that concerning entry of North Koreans (Item 11).

(1) ROK Embassy announced May 13 plans establish consulates in Shimonoseki, Yokohama and Kobe in May and in Sendai, Nagoya and Sapporo soon thereafter (consulates already exist in Osaka and Fukuoka).

(2) Vice-Premier CHONG Ki-Yong, stopping over May 14-15 en route London, conferred with PriMin Sato, MITI Minister MIKI, FinMin FUKUDA and Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund director YANAGIDA and reached agreement to hold ministerial talks on economic matters once or twice a year to work out plans for economic cooperation; first meeting tentatively scheduled for August with Miki and Fukuda reportedly planning to attend.

(3) Joint Fisheries Committee May 14 reached agreement on sea area to be included in fisheries resources survey (west of Shimane Prefecture in Japan and north of Taiwan).

(4) PriMin Sato promised consider establishment joint Japanese-Korean shipping line between Shimonoseki and Pusan, and setting up of agricultural technical center in Korea as recommended by former Transportation Minister Shutaro MATSUURA following talks with Premier CHONG in Seoul.

(5) Koreans informed GOJ May 17 that certain Japanese banks would be designated as foreign exchange banks. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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 from Tokyo

b. Comment: None

7. Matsumura in China (Week 19, Item 8)

a. Kenzo MATSUMURA, LDP faction leader, and confreres Yutaro TAKEYAMA and Shunichi MATSUMOTO, who arrived Peking May 12, spent busy week there seeing Japan-China Friendship Association president LIAO Cheng-chih (who agreed to discuss next year's trade agreement and reportedly agreed to negotiate on next five-year L-T trade plan), FonMin CHEN Yi, Premier CHOU En-lai, NPC vice-presidents KUO Mo-jo, HO Hsiang-ning, and Vice-Chairman CHU Teh. Matsumura quoted in press as telling ChiCom hosts that, since U.S. and U.S.S.R. already have nuclear weapons, Communist China should not be singled out for criticism for its nuclear tests. Kuo, whom Japanese visitors found in his usual comfortable residence, reportedly told Matsumura that his recent remarks of self-criticism were misinterpreted by foreign press and that he never meant to imply he would give up his work. According to press he said, "I do not believe one's activities will be stopped or position changed each time a person engages in self-criticism," leaving impression Kuo believes prospects for continued employment are good. There has actually been little speculation in Japan that Kuo would lose job, but much criticism of his recantation.

b. FonMin Shiina May 13, alluding to Matsumura statement, told Diet that, if Communist China sincerely desired to do away with nuclear weapons, it should stop producing them. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: None

8. ChiComs Return Fishing Boat

a. Forty-ton fishing boat No. 8 Ebisu Maru and eight crewmen returned to Nagasaki May 15 after 16 months in mainland China. Fishermen were arrested in January, 1965 on grounds of violating ChiCom territorial waters and charged with espionage. Captain reportedly committed suicide August 7, 1965, but rest of crew not informed of this until 10 days later. Crew told press upon return they had been arrested because they had twice disregarded ChiCom warning to leave Chinese waters and were suspected of espionage because ship carried no Japanese flag. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Return of vessel prominently reported in Japanese press but has not been subject of editorial comment. However, Yomiuri exhibited skepticism of crew's statements when in headline it characterized them as "brainwashed." (UNCLASSIFIED)

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from Tokyo

9. Soviets Blamed in Sinking of Japanese Fishing Vessel

a. Fishing vessel, No. 11 Shinyo Maru, sank May 8 off Kunashiri Island following collision with pursuing Soviet patrol craft. Six members of eight-man Japanese crew perished; remaining two survivors taken into temporary Soviet custody for alleged violation Soviet waters. Soviets belatedly informed GOJ of incident May 13.

b. Soviets contend sinking caused by storm. Preliminary Japanese investigation indicates vessel did not violate Soviet coastal waters and that sinking direct result of collision. Incident receiving widespread critical attention in Japanese press.

c. FonOff annoyed over Soviet delay in notifying GOJ of tragedy and will soon file official protest in Moscow. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: According to FonOff officials, incident represents serious obstacle in present Soviet-GOJ consular treaty negotiations since protection Japanese fishermen operating off northern islands vital part these negotiations. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

10. ChiCom and North Vietnamese Groups Denied Entry

a. Ministry of Justice announced May 18 that decision taken to forbid entry of ChiCom youth delegation on grounds that Japanese sponsors refused to present written guarantee that members of group would not engage in political activities while in Japan. Japanese sponsors include Japan-China Friendship Association and Japan Youth Council, which opposed written pledge on grounds that entry permits specified purpose of visit and visitors would not go beyond that specification. Justice Ministry's requirement for written guarantee from sponsors also called unprecedented.

b. GOJ also decided May 16 to deny entry to North Vietnamese dancing troupe, invited by JSP International Bureau Director Koichi YAMAMOTO, on grounds visit would have strong political overtones. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: None

11. North Koreans Entry Finessed (Week 19, Item 7)

a. Following strong protests by ROK, including letter from PriMin Chong to PriMin Sato, GOJ officials privately persuaded Japanese firms

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from Tokyo

sponsoring entry of North Korean technicians, who were to come for purpose concluding plant purchases, to withdraw entry applications. Move made formal GOJ ruling unnecessary. During Diet debate on matter Justice Minister Ishii said that in principle GOJ would not object to entry of nationals of unrecognized regimes provided their entry would not impair nation's political, economic or social interests or its established international relations. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Appears that GOJ misjudged extent of ROK reaction to Japanese attempt separate politics from economics and backed down because of desire not embarrass Pak government and also from fear of what might happen at FE ForMin Conference in Seoul next month. (CONFIDENTIAL)

12. Graves Visit to Iwo Jima and Bonins

a. Under GOJ sponsorship ten former residents visited Iwo Jima May 18 and held ceremonies at grave sites of ancestors. Twenty former Bonin residents departed Tokyo May 20 for similar visit to Chichi Jima and Haha Jima. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: First reports indicate that Iwo Jima visit proceeded smoothly. (UNCLASSIFIED)

13. Graves Visit to Mongolia

a. Press has reported that, following favorable reply to feelers put out to Mongolian Embassy in Moscow, Japan Embassy Moscow has been instructed make arrangements for Japanese graves visit to Mongolia in July. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: If visit goes well, appears next step may be GOJ assessment of GRC reaction to Japanese establishment diplomatic relations with Mongolia. If GRC reaction judged not too severe, exchange of diplomatic representatives likely although timing still indefinite.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKO-HAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUS-ARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, MOSCOW, TAIPEI, SEOUL, DJAKARTA, MONROVIA, TEHRAN

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE: May 27, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 21

REF :

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1. Diet Enters Extended Session
2. JSP Factions Begin Intra-Party Struggle
3. Matsumura Returns from Peking
4. Sato Invited to Korea
5. Indonesian Debt Talks
6. Liberian Visitor
7. Iranian Visitor
8. Asian Communist Visitors - Some Can, Some Can't
9. Air-Self-Defense Force Grounds Aircraft

POLITICAL

1. Diet Enters Extended Session

a. Following struggle over extension of Diet session (Week 20, Item 1), first week of extended session produced virtually no tangible accomplishments. Committee sessions took up such non-controversial questions as revision of law to improve conditions around

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From Tokyo

military bases and automobile insurance law, and made no visible progress on pending important legislation. JSP, continuing stalling tactics, tripped up LDP in one committee when in midst of interpellations JSP member noted that due to LDP members' absenteeism there was no quorum and demanded immediate suspension of committee hearings.

b. Highlight of week was FonMin SHIINA answer to JSP question in Lower House FonAff Committee May 25 concerning calls of U.S. nuclear warships at Japanese ports. Shiina said that under Security Treaty nuclear ships allowed to call and may do so in future. He added that even should such ships call at Japanese ports for supplies and subsequently engage in "military operations," calls would not be subject to "prior consultation" provisions of treaty.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Shiina's remarks have highlighted continued speculation in Japan concerning future calls by U.S. nuclear-powered ships at Yokosuka and have further sparked drive by opposition to organize protest movement. Pace of progress in Diet deliberations thus far holds little promise that Diet business will be conducted with despatch or in cooperative spirit, although LDP will probably secure passage of major share of pending legislation prior to end of session.
(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. JSP Factions Begin Intra-Party Struggle

a. JSP left-wing Sasaki faction at meeting of its "theory research" group May 22 at Hakone unleashed sharp attack on ideology and outlook of rival right-wing factions. Attack took form of renewed criticism of "structural reform" and "peaceful coexistence" ideas, which are identified with right wing and which have been perennial focus of inter-factional debate. Sasaki group also reaffirmed its view that JSP should consider possibility of conducting united actions with Communists, eventually including JCP in Socialist-led coalition government. Sasaki faction charged that peaceful coexistence championed by right wing falsifies true state of world situation which left wing asserts is basically characterized by struggle of "forces of socialism and national liberation" against "American imperialism."

b. Left wing's "Hakone Declaration" elicited immediate rebuttals from Eda and Wada factions. Spokesmen for both right wing factions denounced Sasaki leadership for its "backward looking" attitude in dredging up controversial ideological issues which not helpful to party at this stage. Wada faction leader Seiichi KATSUMATA particularly deplored talk of cooperation with Communists. Eda faction convened meeting of its own theory study group at Atami May 25-26 and issued counterblast questioning political motives of Sasaki leadership in beating dead ideological horse of "structural reform" and deliberately misrepresenting right-wing position on peaceful coexistence as betrayal of

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 from Tokyo

anti-imperialist struggle. Eda group also declared party leadership's call for collaboration with Communists harmful to JSP image and gave positive endorsement to "Ishibashi concept" on long-range JSP defense policy (Weeka 18, Item 3). (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Although inter-factional debate ostensibly concerned only with ideological issues, Sasaki faction's attack on right wing actually marks beginning of annual pre-convention factional struggle for power in Socialist party. Bitterness of this year's struggle at this early stage reflects widening cleavage between right and left in JSP and determination of each wing to win control of party at next convention in November. Sasaki faction is seeking to reelect Chairman Sasaki and recapture dominance in Central Executive Committee which it lost in January (Weeka 4, Item 2), while right wing hopes to win chairmanship for Saburo EDA and move party decisively toward more moderate position. Contest this year may be particularly intense since prize under new party rules is two-year tenure for each party office. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Matsumura Returns from Peking (Weeka 20, Item 7)

a. LDP Diet member Kenzo MATSUMURA returned May 24 from week's visit to Peking, accompanied by LDP Diet member Yutaro TAKEYAMA and former FonOff official Shunichi MATSUMOTO. Matsumura said at airport he had obtained agreement on extension of Liao-Takasaka trade agreement, details of which to be decided when L-T Trade Liaison officials visit Peking next spring; plant sales and Yoshida letter not discussed; and agreement reached that Upper House Vice President Kenzo KONO will visit mainland China in his capacity as President of Japan Amateur Athletic Association. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: No details on political aspects of Matsumura talks, if any, are yet available. Kono's interest in China visit may possibly presage difficulties over future Chinese representation in international sports events. However, Japanese and Chicom sports teams have already exchanged visits on several occasions, so that visit if limited to bilateral sports relations would not necessarily upset GRC too much. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Sato Invited to Korea

a. Korean PriMin Chong Il-Kwon made brief call on PriMin SATO May 26 during stop-over on return from Taipei visit and invited Sato visit Seoul. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Sato's fall visits not yet decided, but visits to USSR and SEA also under consideration. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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 from Tokyo

5. Indonesian Debt Talks

a. Indonesian Deputy Premier Sultan Hamengku BUWONO arrived May 24 for talks on Indonesian debts and economic situation. His busy schedule included calls on various Japanese leaders including LDP Vice-President KAWASHIMA, Economic Planning Agency Director FUJIYAMA, FonMin Shiina and PriMin Sato, whom he is scheduled see again before departure. During meetings Buwono, in addition to discussion economic subjects, said GOI not "anti-Sukarno," according press account. He also said he expected great improvement Indonesian-Malaysian relations result from Bangkok talks and he expected Indonesia would soon return to UN. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Sultan's visit receiving prominent coverage. No concrete results announced yet. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. Liberian Visitor

a. Liberian Secretary of State J. Rudolph Grimes made goodwill visit May 25-27 as guest of Foreign Ministry. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Visit received little public attention but, according to FonOff, constituted step in closer relations with Liberia. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. Iranian Visitor

a. Former Premier of Iran, Manuchehr EQBAL, now president of Iranian National Oil Co., arrived Tokyo May 22 for 8-day goodwill visit as guest of Foreign Ministry. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

8. Asian Communist Visitors - Some Can, Some Can't

a. Justice Ministry May 24 announced decision deny entry permits to 55-member North Vietnamese dance troupe on grounds visit diplomatically undesirable and possibility visit might coincide with anti-A and H Bomb rallies in August. Same day Justice Ministry announced permission granted to 7-member Chicom "good will" group headed by Canton mayor TSENG Sheng after Japan-China Friendship Association Chief Director Seimin MIYAZAKI gave oral assurances that group would not engage in political activities in Japan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Justice Ministry previously required written guarantee concerning non-participation in political activity from Chinese Youth Group. Government officials have expressed to us concern at increasing contacts

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from Tokyo

between Chicoms and Japanese youth. We believe that difference in treatment reflects desire to reduce youth contacts while permitting some others that may have more domestic political backing in Japan and are considered potentially less dangerous in propaganda impact. (CONFIDENTIAL)

MILITARY

9. Air-Self-Defense Force Grounds Aircraft

a. Following several non-related accidents at different locations involving F-86 and F-104 aircraft, JASDF ordered 48-hour grounding of all fighter aircraft, May 21-22. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Despite this series of crashes JASDF overall accident rate remains low. High-ranking JASDF source told U.S. officer that grounding primarily aimed at reassuring public that every safety precaution being taken. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAGASAKI, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, DJAKARTA

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO
 SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 22

DATE: June 8, 1966

REF :

CONTENTS

1. First Nuclear Submarine Visits Yokosuka
2. Defense Debate in Diet
3. Diet Clash Over National Holidays Bill
4. Indonesian Deputy Premier Leaves
5. Far East Ambassadors Conference Concludes
6. Asian Parliamentary Union
7. Visitors Return From Bonins Grave Visit
8. Chilean Naval Training Ship Visits Japan

POLITICAL

1. First Nuclear Submarine Visits Yokosuka

a. USS Snook, first nuclear-powered ship to visit Eastern Japan, entered Yokosuka harbor shortly after 8 a.m. May 30. Arrival of SSN was greeted by US Navy officials and by Japanese group headed by LDP Diet member and former Defense Agency Director-General Junya KOIZUMI. Snook Commanding Officer, Commander J. D. WATKINS, held press conference May 30 and paid courtesy calls on Yokosuka officials. Groups of Japanese press and government officials toured vessel. Arrival given live television coverage and front-paged in all major dailies.

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b. Joint JSP-JCP sponsored rallies and demonstrations in opposition to SSN call drew total of about 55,000 participants in Yokosuka over five-day period (largest single crowd 14,600 evening June 1) and were carried off without major incident. Demonstration turnout substantially below sponsors' predictions, although JSP Chairman Sasaki and JCP Chairman Nosaka put in appearances June 1. On other hand, Trotskyite student demonstrators repeatedly clashed with police producing number of minor casualties and property damage. Student extremism elicited criticism from JSP-JCP organizers as well as from townspeople. Total of about 40 students arrested during port call. Local residents and businessmen generally critical of demonstrations which created disorder and disrupted business.

c. Snook visit and leftist protest demonstrations given prominent attention by Japanese media. Whereas previous week's scattered comment on rumor of forthcoming port call had tended to decry demonstrations as illogical and uncalled for, comment on actual visit of Snook reflected journalists' usual sympathy toward demonstrations and accused U.S. of ignoring and needlessly irritating Japanese national sentiment. Press, radio and TV commentary stressed potential danger of bringing nuclear reactor through crowded ship lanes of Tokyo Bay into area of dense population, noting Edward Teller view that such port call should only take place when absolutely necessary, and quoting implied Science and Technology Agency dissatisfaction with data available on reactor's safety. Comment (and opposition protests) also treated Snook visit to Yokosuka as prelude to Enterprise visit and asserted it established even closer link between Yokosuka and Vietnam war. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Media and other comment, though divided, generally left impression that attitude toward nuclear-ship port calls was reluctant acquiescence, at best. However, demonstrations were much smaller than sponsors planned for, partly because of heavy rain June 1 when biggest effort scheduled, and comment was not inflammatory. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Defense Debate in Diet (Week 21, Item 1)

a. Opposition, already seeking grounds for paralyzing legislative action in extended Diet session, took occasion of USS Snook visit (Item 1) to launch emergency questioning of government on defense policy and treaty relations with U.S. GOJ spokesmen led by FonMin Shiina responded with most positive presentation to date of support for U.S. actions in Vietnam and general defense policy in the Far East.

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b. JSP May 30th monopolized Diet committee session with attacks on SSN visit. In May 31st Upper House Foreign Affairs Committee FonMin Shiina, in response to Socialist question, stated that although Japan was not "positively cooperating" in Vietnam war and did not regard North Vietnam as "enemy country" it had special relationship with U.S. because of security treaty and was consequently not "completely neutral" country, as between U.S. and North Vietnam. Shiina continued that U.S. actions in Vietnam constituted defense of "peace and security of Far East" within meaning of article 6 of mutual security treaty and consequently Japan had obligation under treaty to furnish facilities and areas for U.S. Forces. Shiina responded along similar lines to questioning at Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee June 1. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Not yet possible ascertain from Foreign Office whether Shiina statements reflected previously planned government initiative to move defense debate ahead or whether they were Shiina's own formulation on spur of moment. Position on Vietnam war is logical development from de facto attitude of PriMin Sato and most of GOJ. However, opposition and much of "intellectual community" are certain to find Shiina statements extremely distasteful once they have chance to consider them after excitement of SSN visit has died away. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Diet Clash Over National Holidays Bill

a. PriMin Sato June 1 told leading ministers and other LDP faction leaders he wanted decisive action on controversial National Holidays Bill and other pending legislation. House of Representatives committee on Cabinet Affairs, chaired by close Sato supporter, accordingly called session June 2 to take up Holidays bill despite Socialist threat to boycott. Committee met off and on during day amid uproar and physical obstruction efforts as both JSP and LDP packed meeting room with all available Diet members regardless of committee membership. In pre-dawn hours June 3, Lower House Speaker YAMAGUCHI secured agreement of LDP, JSP and DSP on compromise plan calling for deletion of Feb. 11 date from provision for establishment of "National Foundation Day". Yamaguchi plan called for passage of bill by June 7, with National Foundation Day date to be decided later by special advisory council. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Feb 11 is date of pre-1946 Kigensetsu, traditional date first Emperor ascended throne. LDP conservatives and other traditionalists regard restoration of this holiday as key factor in reviving Japanese patriotism. Opposition assert it would threaten revival of militarism. Moderates on both sides and most of public apparently feel question is not worth big political scrap. Opinions of political observers are divided as to Sato's reason for pushing substantively marginal issue so hard at this time. General view is that (a) he feels

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political debt to right wing; (b) desire to clean up this issue, which is in Diet for eighth time, follows Sato's earlier pattern of settling questions his predecessors found too difficult; (c) shelving controversial element of Feb. 11 date was planned from beginning and is expected ^{Obtain} smooth sailing for other legislation. Non-Sato-faction LDP Diet member offered view June 3 that Sato in taking hard line implied he did not mind dissolving Lower House if right issue, complete with extreme Socialist obstructionist tactics, came to head in current session. Holidays Bill, source added, had been found lacking in necessary public interest for this purpose and consequently compromise was reached. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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4. Indonesian Deputy Premier Leaves (Week 21, Item 5)

a. Indonesian Deputy Premier Sultan Buwono left Japan for Philippines May 30 after week of economic talks in which GOJ agreed to extend \$30 million loan (in yen), terms of which still under negotiation. Sultan said that new Indonesian government will adopt policies based on realities not on sentiment as in past, and that efforts would be made to end confrontation. His visit received prominent press coverage throughout entire week. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: FonOff wishes to help new government to extent possible, but political decision by PriMin Sato was required to overcome objections of Finance Ministry on pending loan. Finance Ministry reportedly succeeded in attaching unhelpful conditions concerning preferential payment of current Indonesian debts to Japan. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. FE Ambassadors Conference Concluded

a. Annual conference of Japanese chiefs of mission in Asian countries ended May 27 after reviewing Asian developments, with emphasis on China, Vietnam and Indonesia. As in past years, ambassadors criticized predominantly commercial character of Japan's role in Asia and urged more vigorous leadership on part of GOJ, particularly in field of economic assistance. Ambassadors seconded GOJ idea for increasing aid funds to one per cent of GNP and easing terms of aid. They also urged PriMin Sato visit SEA this year. In other fields ambassadors agreed on desirability of "important question" tactic during next Chirep debate at UN and (with exception Charge in Taipei) favored establishment diplomatic relations with Mongolia. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. Comment: Foreign Ministry uses ambassadors' recommendations to help obtain support for its policies from both public and government agencies. Finance Ministry is likely, as in past, prevent FonOff from pursuing objectives as rapidly as FonOff (and we) would like. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Asian Parliamentary Union

a. Preparatory Committee meetings took place at Tokyo May 30-31 for second Asian Parliamentary Union Conference, scheduled begin September 2 in Seoul. Delegates from GRC, ROK, Laos and Thailand attended and Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia sent observers. Committee, according public announcement, agreed that Seoul meeting will discuss exclusion Chicoms from UN, regional economic cooperation, Asian Development Bank, modernization of Asian agriculture and SEA telecommunications net. Also agreed invite to Seoul meeting, in addition to above-named countries, reps from Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Singapore. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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b. Comment: These plans represent continuation of movement initiated by former Prime Minister Kishi to increase regional understanding by establishing means for closer contact and consultation among parliamentarians of the area. Japanese APU source said conference would also take up question of improving liaison on aid to South Vietnam. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Visitors Return From Bonins Grave Visit (Week 20, Item 12)

a. Twenty representatives of former Japanese residents of Bonin Islands, together with accompanying press and GOJ representatives, returned June 2 from two-week, GOJ-sponsored visit to ancestral graves in islands. Visitors and GOJ officials expressed deep appreciation for US cooperation in arranging smoothly executed visit, expressing particular gratitude for islanders' and local US Navy assistance in clearing entryways into cemeteries. Feature stories, carried inside pages June 2 evening editions, gave extensive picture of islanders' current way of life and interpreted islanders' current mood as one of increasing interest in contact with Japan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

MILITARY

8. Chilean Naval Training Ship Visits Japan

From May 27 to June 2 the

a. / Chilean Navy four-masted sailing ship Esmeralda with 278 officers and cadets aboard visited Tokyo. Visit went smoothly, official highlight being formal visit of cadet detachment to Yasukuni Shrine, memorial to Japanese war dead, where ship's captain and Chilean ambassador laid wreath. Esmeralda had previously called in Tahiti and Hawaii, and will visit Hong Kong, Sidney and Oakland. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

9. Return of World War II Cannon from Okinawa

a. Ceremony May 29 at Yasukuni Shrine marked return of howitzer used by Japan's 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment in Battle of Okinawa. Return of cannon was requested by ex-Prince Higashikuni, President of 1st Artillery's veterans organization. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: This is first World War II Japanese weapon to be enshrined at Yasukuni. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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PRIORITY

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1966 JUN 13 AM 9 22

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMNAVSTA CINCPACFLT, CINCUS-ARPA, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: June 10, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 23

REF :

CONTENTS

1. Matsumura Heats Up China Debate
2. Shiina Presents GOJ Attitude Toward "Yoshida Letter"
3. Holidays Bill Compromise Clears Air in Diet
4. Political Controversy Looms as Deliberation Council Cannot Agree on Labor Law Revision
5. JSP Defense Debate Continues
6. JSP and Komeito Leaders Meet
7. Chicom Correspondents Win Round
8. Korean Vice-Speaker Calls for Japanese Sincerity

POLITICAL

1. Matsumura Heats Up China Debate

a. LDP elder statesman and Sinophile Kenzo MATSUMURA June 3 gave report on recent trip to China to A-A Study Group, an association of LDP members favoring closer ties with Communist China. In speech he recommended (1) increase in travel to Communist China, especially of Diet members, (2) expansion of trade, (3) repudiation of 1964 Yoshida letter promising to avoid use of official facilities to finance long-term credit trade with Chicoms, and (4) conclusion of agreement for Tokyo-Shanghai air route. He has also spoken to other groups urging greater pressure on government to adopt more positive posture toward Communist China including early "normalization" of

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relations in place of current policy based on "separation of politics from economics". Laying blame for present state of relations on PriMin Sato, Matsumura reportedly told MITI Minister Takeo MIKI, who had proposed meeting with Sato, that such meeting useless unless Sato prepared change China policy; he said hopeless to try to change Sato's mind and advocated splitting LDP into two parties since present party so deeply divided over foreign policy. LDP Executive Board chairman Shigesaburo MAEO at June 7 Board meeting was asked to consult party leaders as to what disciplinary action, if any, should be taken against Matsumura. Economic Planning Agency director and LDP faction leader Aiichiro FUJIYAMA currently considered advocate of more "forward-looking" China policy and possible rival to Sato, told press June 8 that he did not favor split of LDP but preferred to work within it for change of policy. Other GOJ and LDP leaders, including SecGen Tanaka and Miki, have started counterattacks against party-split suggestion. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Matsumura clearly appears to be utilizing press and political interest in his latest mainland visit to start public campaign to force GOJ abandon Yoshida Letter and adopt other policies which would facilitate closer relations with Peking. His call for "one stroke" normalization of relations with Peking implies reversal of Japan's position on Chirep, among other elements. Matsumura's open advocacy of split in conservative party, like his call for closer relations with Chicoms, reflects position which he has long held as spokesman for very small minority in LDP. His efforts will succeed in increasing tempo of debate in Japan on China policy, already subject of controversy among conservatives as well as between them and opposition. Possible desirability of two conservative parties has for several months been muted theme among number of LDP politicians largely from faction of late Ichiro KONO and others who in past opposed Sato. Matsumura may have surfaced this suggestion prematurely and his tactics in linking it with his ideas on China policy, which go beyond LDP consensus, may in effect serve to weaken rather than strengthen any organizational efforts toward splitting LDP. In particular it has forced Miki and Fujiyama to back off publicly from support for split, in which they reportedly have been considered potential leaders or figureheads. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).

2. Shiina Presents GOJ Attitude Toward "Yoshida Letter"

a. At June 9 Upper House Foreign Affairs Committee FonMin Etsusaburo SHIINA described "Yoshida Letter" as not official document but one that signified certain government course of action when it was written. Shiina added that policy represented by letter "not necessarily unchangeable". (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Shiina's remarks do not constitute new departure as GOJ has previously said that "Yoshida Letter" not official document. (Limited OFFICIAL USE)

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3. Holidays Bill Compromise Clears Air in Diet

a. Following June 3 three-party compromise (Week 22, Item 3) and June 7 Lower House passage of National Holidays Bill, Diet turned briskly to task of considering and passing large backlog of pending legislation. Among bills passed either by committee or plenary sessions during week were amendment to ports and harbors law, which is aimed at exercise of greater control over stevedore and lighter system, and amendment to public acquisition of land law which should facilitate public works projects. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Major cloud hanging over Diet is pending implementation of ILO domestic legislation (Item 4) which, even though not subject to Diet action, opposition and Sohyo are likely to use to obstruct Diet proceedings. Holidays bill may stir further controversy when Upper House takes it up actively, since JSP appears to be having second thoughts to effect they should have sought firmer guarantees that Deliberation Council (Week 22, Item 3) will not come up with recommendation unacceptable to party. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Political Controversy Looms as Deliberation Council Cannot Agree on Labor Law Revision

a. Tri-partite Deliberation Council, which was established in 1965 as part of legislative package to assure Diet passage of bill to ratify ILO Convention 87 (freedom of association), has been unable to reach any agreement concerning domestic labor law amendments which were passed last spring but were not to become effective until after study by Council. June 14, anniversary date of ILO 87 ratification, viewed by GOJ sources as deadline by which amendments should become law by issuance of Cabinet ordinances. Sohyo's major unions in public sector (Teachers, Municipal Government Workers) have warned that they will "struggle" both in and outside of Diet if GOJ adopts controversial amendments in absence of unanimous recommendations by Council. According press, public members of Council issued "unified views" June 9 urging further delay on one controversial point (limiting activities of public service employees working as full-time union officials) while rest of proposed amendments put into force. Labor representatives took firm stand that they could not accept such recommendation, and Sohyo announced calling of 20,000-strong protest rally for June 10.

b. Comment: Appears certain that Council will be unable to reach unanimous agreements including labor members by June 14. At most, public members of Council may agree among themselves to issue opinion pointing in direction of adoption of amendments with proviso for some further consideration. In their present mood, Sohyo unions can be expected to follow through on their threats to demonstrate and to press JSP to boycott Diet. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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5. JSP Defense Debate Continues

a. JSP left-wing Sasaki faction group June 3 issued sharp criticism of defense policy proposal published last month by Masashi ISHIBASHI, Chairman JSP Policy Board's Committee on Foreign Policy and Defense (Weeka 18, Item 3), charging that Ishibashi proposal outlining modification of JSP's present position on U. S. Security Treaty and Self-Defense Forces was "revisionist" and contrary to party's established position of unarmed neutrality. Ishibashi group, which controlled by moderate right-wing Wada faction, promptly issued counter-statement defending its view that party should take more realistic approach toward security and defense problems, and accusing Sasaki forces of advocating "diplomatic nonsense." As right-wing faction leaders Saburo EDA and Seiichi KATSUMATA (Wada faction) entered fray with statements supporting Ishibashi committee's proposal, defense issue threatened to become open intra-party brawl.

b. On June 6 JSP Foreign Affairs Committee chaired by Sasaki faction leader Koichi YAMAMOTO issued draft statement on JSP foreign and defense policy which reaffirmed present JSP stands on Security Treaty and SDF, implicitly rejecting Ishibashi draft. Responding to recommendations by Kawakami faction and others that public airing of differences cease and that matter be handled by regular party organs, JSP Central Executive Committee June 8 decided (1) Ishibashi policy draft, not having had approval of proper party authorities, would be treated as mere tentative proposal and (2) production of official draft on defense and security would be entrusted to Planning Board after deliberations by International Bureau and Policy Board. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: CEC decision has effect of taking dispute out of public view and into regular party councils. Bitter confrontation over defense issue can, however, be expected to continue inside party and to exacerbate already strained relations between right and left. Defense issue along with "peaceful coexistence" and "united front with JCP" issues, recently revived by left wing (Weeka 21, Item 2), likely to be major focus of debate in struggle for control of JSP at November party convention. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. JSP and Komeito Leaders Meet

a. JSP SecGen Tomomi NARITA and Komeito SecGen Hiroshi HOJO held formal meeting in Diet June 9 to discuss tactics for opposition efforts against revision of electoral system and attitudes toward Tokyo administration. As result of meeting, parties agreed that: (1) JSP would shortly present to Komeito a Tokyo gubernatorial election policy agreement which Komeito would study; (2) parties would continue discussions concerning cooperation in Tokyo Assembly; and (3) parties would strengthen efforts in opposition to revision of the election system. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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b. Comment: Meeting is significant in that it is first time for these two parties formally to discuss questions of next Tokyo gubernatorial election (party leaders have previously met on election system question) and is obvious continuation of JSP effort secure backing of Komeito for possible candidacy of Sohyo Chairman Kaoru OTA who has previously stated he would not run unless he obtained Komeito support (Weeka 14, Item 3 and Weeka 19, Item 4). Komeito had publicly indicated it would cooperate with Ota backers only, but not necessarily, if clear agreement reached in advance on Tokyo administrative policy in event Ota elected. JSP bid for Komeito support dictated by fact that Komeito probably holds balance of power in Tokyo and any candidate would have difficulty winning without it. LDP has not yet made formal pitch for Komeito cooperation but will probably do so when it settles on candidate. Emb has heard from both Komeito and JSP sources that Komeito unlikely to support Ota and will probably refrain from officially supporting any candidate, unless it decides to run its own. Komeito Diet member has indicated to Emb that party would prefer conservative. One newsman, who specializes in Upper House coverage, has described Narita-Hojo meeting as Komeito's probing for reason not to cooperate with JSP. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).

7. Chicom Correspondents Win Round.

a. Home Affairs Minister and Public Safety Commission Chairman Tadanori NAGAYAMA informed Cabinet June 3 that two Chicom reporters had participated in demonstrations in Yokosuka against visit of USS Snook, and Justice Minister Mitsujiro ISHII instructed Immigration Bureau to investigate. Two reporters, CHEN Po-wei and KAO Ti, while not denying they were present at June 1 Yokosuka demonstration, denied they had violated any part of agreement under which they operated in Japan and, in typical Chicom language, said GOJ's charges concerning their activities in Yokosuka were "utterly unfounded and viciously slanderous." They accused GOJ of "constantly interfering in news-gathering activities of Chinese Communist newsmen." Chief Cabinet Secretary HASHIMOTO stated June 8 that no punitive action would be taken against correspondents but they would be warned against taking actions which could be interpreted as violating terms of agreement. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: GOJ hesitancy appears due in large part to fear of retaliation against Japanese newsmen in Peking. Fairly clear, however, that Chinese won this round. (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. Korean Vice-Speaker Calls for Japanese Sincerity

a. Vice-Speaker of Korean National Assembly Kyung Soon CHANG in address June 6 to Tokyo Foreign Correspondents Club said that many Koreans still remember wounds inflicted by Japanese "occupation" and that only "sincerity manifested by deeds, not words," could clear away obstacles to true friendship.

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
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He indicated refusal to admit North Korean technicians would be one manifestation of sincerity. He stressed that ROK troops sent to Vietnam because battleground of fight against Communism has only shifted from Korea to Vietnam and, in pointed reference to Japan, said Koreans could not stand by as if it were fire on other side of river. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Chang's useful reminders to Japanese came at opportune time when pressures for admission North Korean technicians to buy textile plant from Toko Bussan is increasing. Korean pressures, including vigorous efforts by Ambassador Kim, have so far prevented favorable decision to which GOJ generally inclined. Though Chang's remarks undoubtedly reached Japanese officialdom, they received no coverage in Japanese-language press, which may be just as well for sake of public attitudes. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKO-
 HAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUS-
 ARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL
 FROM: AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 24

REF

DATE: June 17, 1966

CONTENTS

1. Diet Hung Up on ILO Question - Holiday Bill
2. GOJ Enforces Controversial Labor Law Amendments
3. Press Reports on South Vietnam
4. FonOff Seeking Send FonOff Officials to Mainland China and East Germany
5. Mainichi Shimbun Opinion Poll

POLITICAL

1. Diet Hung Up on ILO Question - Holiday Bill

a. Following implementation June 14 by Cabinet ordinance of shelved portions of ILO-related domestic legislation (Item 2) Diet activities came to complete halt June 14 and 15. Impasse continued until evening of 16th when LDP moved to force issue by calling meeting of Upper House Education Committee for consideration of National Holidays bill which passed Lower House last week (Weeka 23, Item 4). Committee session was immediately adjourned when Socialist members resorted to physical obstruction to prevent chairman from taking his seat. Reason for LDP insistence on holding deliberations stems from very practical fact that there remain about sixty bills to be passed before end of session June 28. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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b. Comment: Although JSP acts determined block not only Holidays Bill but also other legislation as well, appears likely that, as in past cases, deliberations will be resumed and most of remainder of legislative program will be acted upon, although JSP can be expected continue stalling tactics. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. GOJ Enforces Controversial Labor Law Amendments (Weeka No. 23, Item 4)

a. Cabinet June 13 issued ordinance enforcing all but one of shelved amendments of domestic labor laws related to ratification ILO 87, as recommended same day by Deliberation Council during session boycotted by labor members. GOJ action evoked sharp criticism from JSP, DSP, Sohyo and Domei. Sohyo staged 10,000-member rally in Tokyo June 14, while JSP and DSP started boycott Diet and brought proceedings to standstill (Item 1). (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Extent and nature of amendments' impact not immediately discernible and will depend on policies of enforcement adopted by GOJ and local governments. It is certain that Sohyo will be on alert to file complaints with ILO against government's actions pursuant amendments. Sohyo can be expected to step up long-standing program to recover strike rights for public workers. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Press Reports on South Vietnam

a. Early in week attention paid by Japanese press to South Vietnam situation was less than in previous week. Tam Chau reported regaining authority. Papers noted all factions, including even militant Buddhist groups, recognized need for United States Forces in South Vietnam, and reported their aim seemed to be to win US support for their respective stands.

b. Later in week note of uneasiness crept into reports, as militant Buddhists started demonstrations in Saigon again. Uneasiness in press stemmed from fact that Tam Chau seemed to be losing control and that demonstrations seemed defy Tam Chau's moderate leadership. Uneasiness deepened with National Leadership Council's endorsement of the Ky plan to remain in power for another year, completely rejecting Buddhist demands. It was also noted that new demonstrations had strong undercurrent of hostility toward US because of support for Ky Government. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: None

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FonOff Seeking Send FonOff Officials to Mainland China and East Germany

a. According press June 12 GOJ planning to send FonOff officials to mainland China and East Germany. Press reports stressed purpose of visits to have knowledgeable official visit and report on internal conditions and denied visits were preparatory to diplomatic contact.

b. Kinya NIISEKI, Director Foreign Office Information Bureau, told press conference official visiting Germany would have only tourist status.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: FonOff section official told EmbOff FonOff has tried obtain Chicom agreement to visits by FonOff officials several times in past but without success. He indicated GOJ did not anticipate any change in Peking attitude toward preventing entry of FonOff officials. Embassy has previously reported visit of one FonOff career officer to Mainland China in 1965 (A-1210; April 15, 1966). (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Mainichi Shimbun Opinion Poll

a. Mainichi Shimbun June 13 published results of public opinion poll conducted May 14-16, 1966, on random nation-wide sample of adults, completing 2,902 interviews on political questions. According poll, 28.8 percent affirmed support for Sato Government while 28.5 percent denied support, compared to 29.6 percent and 23.1 percent respectively in survey of June 1965. Mainichi interpreted results as indicating loss of support by Sato, because of rise in percent denying support.

b. Support for political parties according to poll distributed 41.0 percent LDP, 26.4 percent JSP, 4.0 percent DSP, 1.0 percent JCP, 3.2 percent Komeito, and remainder "none" or "don't know". To question "What do you think is best way to protect Japan's peace and freedom?" 9.6 percent chose alternative "Security Treaty adequate," 22.5 percent "Independently strengthen defense capacity under security treaty," 11.5 percent "Abrogate Security Treaty and have armed neutrality," 10.8 percent "Abrogate Treaty and have unarmed neutrality," 14.0 percent "Non-aggression pact among Japan, U.S., Soviet Union and Communist China". Mainichi reported that sub-total of about 32 percent affirming Security Treaty slightly higher than sub-total of 27 percent in June 1965, while other alternatives have shown very little change, except for decrease in "don't know" replies, which paper credited to Sato's stress on defense matters.

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 from Tokyo

c. Question "What foreign policy matters should Sato Government put more effort into?" drew following responses: 56.9 percent "Complete prohibition of nuclear tests," 50.7 percent "Return of Okinawa and Bonins to Japan," 38.5 percent "Promote solution of Vietnam problem," 23.6 percent "Problem of exchanges with Communist China," 22.2 percent "Return of northern island territories," 13.9 percent "Promotion of economic cooperation with Southeast Asia," 8.6 percent "Strengthen partnership with U.S." and 8.1 percent "Promote cooperation with United Nations." (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Mainichi editorial attributed drop in popularity of Sato administration to dissatisfaction, especially among women, with domestic policies and failure to arrest rising prices. Poll results on support of Sato Government roughly similar to those of April Asahi Poll (Week 16, Item 9). Jiji poll for May 1966, however, shows 37 percent supporting Cabinet and 29 percent denying support. Differences between Mainichi and Jiji results may be attributed to interviewers, effect of sponsor's name, and other factors of methodology. (UNCLASSIFIED)

REISCHAUER

POL:W. Breer:mb
 T. Tsukahira
 J. Harrier

LabAtt:L. Verberg

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By W72 NARA Date 8/19/97

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKO-
HAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUS-
ARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: June 24, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 25

REF

CONTENTS

1. Diet Deliberations Proceeding Apace as JSP Ends Boycott
2. LDP, Komeito Leaders Meet
3. Horii and Iwai Slated for Top Sohyo Posts
4. US-Japan Policy Planning Talks
5. ASPAC Accepted, But With Reservations
6. Okinawa Court Cases in News
7. Soviet Fisheries Min Visits Japan
8. Japanese Press on South Vietnam
9. Four North Koreans Granted Entry
10. Chicom Youth Group Entry Granted

POLITICAL1. Diet Deliberations Proceeding Apace as JSP Ends Boycott

a. In abrupt turnabout Monday, June 20, JSP accepted Upper House President Yuzo SHIGEMUNE's compromise proposal for resuming Diet deliberations which Socialists had been boycotting since June 14 (Weeka 24, Item 1). JSP move, which included agreement to complete deliberations on Holidays bill, paved way for Diet consideration remainder of pending legislation prior to end of session June 27.

Comment:

(UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Sudden JSP decision to drop boycott despite Party Chairman Kozo SASAKI's public threat to block all deliberations dictated in large part, we believe, by intra-party pressures. Chairman Sasaki and his Group 3

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POL: TGTsukamira

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By	WMD NARA Date 8/19/97

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from Tokyo

faction had based strong stand on objective of bringing about resignation of Cabinet, but more moderate elements, particularly in Upper House, rebelled against leadership dictation on issue and voted to accept Shigemune proposal. JSP Diet tacticians apparently decided continued boycott would not only fail to block Holidays bill which LDP was ready to push through June 20 but would give GOJ/LDP justification for resorting to forceful measures on other legislations which JSP opposed. Further, media, during course of boycott, took increasingly unsympathetic attitude toward JSP cause. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

c. ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Appears that Diet session will wind up on schedule with substantial portion of GOJ program approved, including Holidays bill, and that last week's struggle will serve only to increase JSP intra-party, anti-Sasaki struggle. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. LDP, Komeito Leaders Meet

a. LDP SecGen Kakuei TANAKA and Komeito SecGen Hiroshi HOJO held one hour meeting June 23 to discuss attitudes toward 1967 Tokyo gubernatorial election. According press, Tanaka proposed tentative list of candidates which included Ken YASUI, Director General of Prime Minister's Office; Tokuyasu FUKUDA, Director of Administrative Management Agency; Yoshinori MAEDA, President of NHK; Fujiro FURUTA, Chairman of Nihon University Board of Trustees; and former Education Minister Kiichi AICHI. Hojo was non-committal but agreed to meet again. He told press conference later, however, that JSP had already made approach with specific candidate and he expected LDP to do same. In reply to question about electoral reform prospects (single seat constituency system), Tanaka reportedly expressed personal opinion that, as practical problem, adoption of small constituency system appeared "difficult". (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: This is first SecGen level meeting between LDP and Komeito and follows similar meeting with JSP earlier in month (Week 23, Item 6). Komeito unlikely make any commitments prior its July convention at which there still remains very slight possibility it will elect to run own candidate. We still of opinion that in long run LDP will be able make more attractive offer to Komeito which very conscious of where power resides. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Horii and Iwai Slated for Top Sohyo Posts

a. Sohyo's Council of JSP Members announced June 21 it would support Private Railway Workers Federation President Toshikatsu HORII for Chairman and incumbent Akira IWAI, for secretary-general at next

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from Tokyo

Sohyo Convention slated for early August. Nomination by Council is considered tantamount to election because its membership includes nearly all important Sohyo leaders, Council action followed acceptance by Sohyo Executive Board of Chairman Kaoru OTA'S decision not to stand for re-election (Week 19, Item 4). (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Replacement of Ota by Horii will be victory for Sohyo factions most critical of Ota-Iwai leadership. Although full effect on Sohyo policy remains to be seen, at minimum, change will considerably weaken Ota-Iwai line which sought to push Sohyo into cooperation with JCP in political demonstrations. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. U. S. -Japan Policy Planning Talks

a. Three-day conference led by Ambassador Reischauer, Acting Policy Planning Council Chairman Owen and Deputy Assistant Secretary Berger for American side and Deputy Vice-Fonmin Ushiba for Japanese concluded June 20 three days' discussion of developments in China, Vietnam and other areas. No agreed positions were upheld by either side and no conclusions reached. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

5. ASPAC Accepted, But With Reservations

a. Fonmin Shiina June 17 returned from Seoul and told press he hoped other countries would be attracted to Council if it continued adopt moderate policies. He emphasized that no permanent secretariat established and that he considered that Council did not represent new formal regional organization. He also stressed his role as moderating influence during conference. Press generally applauded Japanese performance in Seoul but also warned against permitting Council develop into anti-Communist instrument which would heighten level of confrontation with China and therefore increase tensions in Far East. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Conference results in general conformed to hopes of FonOff, which believes that non-Communist Asian states should develop greater community of interests and hopes that with slow, moderate development ASPAC will prove useful vehicle. FonOff thinking sees ASPAC as device for eventual strengthening of Asia against Communism, but this purpose not stated publicly and in fact would be severely and almost universally criticized if publicized. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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By V/M2 NARA Date 8/1997

CONFIDENTIALPage 4, A-1586
from Tokyo6. Okinawa Court Cases in News

a. Transfer by order of High Commissioner of two cases from GRI Court of Appeals to USCAR Court on grounds GRI Courts not authorized controvert validity HICOM-Ordinances made public in Naha June 16. Press coverage Okinawan and Japanese reaction has been full and steady but carried inside pages. In press conference June 18, Director-General Prime Minister's Office Ken YASUI said Government would not state any opinion on transfer since it was done within scope U. S. powers as administering authority. GRI Legislature's unanimous resolution of opposition to transfer and activities of individual legislators received full coverage, as did also Civil Administrator Warner's June 22 statement, in which he pointed out that since GRI Courts had never had power to pass on validity HICOM Ordinances it could not be said that powers of GRI Court system had in any way been diminished by transfer. Sole editorial to date, appearing in June 23 Asahi, did not argue HICOM's authority to effect transfer, but questioned judgment that cases sufficiently important to require such action and ended with mild expression of hope for amicable settlement. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Crest of reaction in Japan seems to have passed with generally milder results than might have been expected. HICOM's action in extending deadline for certain land acquisitions - which had been other cloud of controversy on Okinawa scene - did much to reduce size of headlines since Japanese papers tend to group Okinawa stories and comment editorially upon what are seen as "trends" more than upon individual issues. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Soviet Fisheries Min Visits Japan

a. Soviet Fisheries Min A. A. ISHKOV arrived Japan June 19 for ten-day official visit. He has met with leading GOJ officials, including PriMin Sato and FonMin Shiina. Talks have primarily concerned safe fishing guarantees for Japanese fishermen operating off Northern Islands. FonOff has, however, indicated that over-all aspects Soviet-Japanese relations are to be covered with Ishkov in effort determine beforehand probable results forthcoming GROMYKO visit Japan late July and obtain preliminary sounding on desirability SATO visit Moscow in September. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. With regard fisheries question, Ishkov rejected Japanese so-called AKAGI (former Japanese Agriculture Min) Plan, which demanded safe fishing operations for Japanese fishermen within three miles Northern Islands, on grounds that as Soviets recognize twelve-mile territorial demarcation principle Japanese proposal would be infringement Soviet territorial waters. (Japanese proposal based on position that Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands inherently Japanese possessions and latter two islands included in talks with Ishkov per instructions from Sato on June 16.) Ishkov also remarked that Soviets

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from Tokyo

will continue present policy of not allowing Japanese fishermen access to Sea of Okhotsk.

c. As result of Ishkov's visit, Soviets have recently released 35 captured Japanese fishermen; 36 still remain in Soviet custody. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: It is apparent that both the Soviets and Japanese are taking a hard line in discussing fisheries problems and that little, if any, progress will result from Ishkov's visit. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. Japanese Press on South Vietnam

a. Sense of relief reflected in Japanese press as tentative agreement to end anti-government movement was reached between police and Buddhists, partly due to strong government pressure. Press reported government had re-stored control in Hue and Saigon, at least on surface, and that Ky showed signs of compromise, having started full-scale negotiations with the moderate faction of Buddhists, including Tam Chau, who had been continuing efforts to save situation. Some papers, however, remained doubtful that turmoil ended.

b. All papers hailed anniversary of the Ky Government on June 19, but thought Ky losing people's support because of recent political unrest. Some papers attributed his adamant stand to US backing. Press reported US bombings and noted that Viet Cong took offensive toward end of week. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: None

9. Four North Koreans Granted Entry

a. Justice Ministry announced June 21 entry granted to four North Korean gymnastic instructors to attend training course sponsored by International Gymnastics Federation. ROK reportedly sending three participants. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: This is third group of North Korean sportsmen granted entry, others being participants in 1963 world speed skating competition and competitors in 1964 Olympics. FonOff justified GOJ action to ROK Embassy on grounds that (1) training course is sponsored by international organization to which North Koreans belong and (2) that because of great popularity of gymnastics in Japan widespread political criticism would result from denial. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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By VMD NARA Date 8/19/97CONFIDENTIALPage 6, A-1586
from Tokyo10. Chicom Youth Group Entry Granted

a. Justice Ministry June 22 announced entry granted to seven-member Chicom youth group for June 24-July 11 goodwill and sightseeing tour, on basis of sponsoring Japan Youth Council's signed pledge that entrants would not participate in politics during visit. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Permits for another group (Weeka 20, Item 10) still held up because sponsors refuse make pledge, arguing that it not necessary since standard entry application form has applicant (or sponsor) state he will not engage in any activities not specified on entry application. (UNCLASSIFIED)

REISCHAUER

POL: TGTsukana: mfd
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TSawyer
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LabAtt: RPFetter

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PRIORITY

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FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAPEI, SEOUL, RANGOON, MOSCOW, SAIGON

FROM :

AMEMBASSY, TOKYO

DATE: July 1, 1966

SUBJECT :

JOINT WEEKA NO. 20

REF :

CONTENTS

1. Regular Diet Closes; Extraordinary Session Opens July 11
2. GOJ Supports US Vietnam Policy
3. Japan, USSR Sign Fisheries Agreement
4. USFJ Niihima Island Proposal Announced
5. Hanoi-Haiphong Bombing Reaction
6. Japanese Press on South Vietnam

POLITICAL

1. Regular Diet Closes; Extraordinary Session Opens July 11 (Weeka 25, Item 1)

a. As time ran out midnight June 27, 51st Diet ended extended 190-day session after enacting bulk (136 out of 155 bills) of GOJ/LDP legislative program, but with several key bills aborted or stranded in committee as result of Socialist delaying tactics. Among

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4-62 DS-323

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By	MDA Date 8/1997

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from Tokyo

important legislative items which failed of enactment were bills related to Japan's participation in Asian Development Bank which JSP managed to tie up in Upper House Budget Committee.

b. Failure of ADB legislation (ratification of agreement and domestic statutes) to pass this session places GOJ in embarrassing position internationally in view Japan's large commitment to bank project. Embarrassment will grow in proportion to length of time bills remain stalled; timing particularly important to avoid damage to candidacy of Takeshi WATANABE for first president of ADB.

c. To retrieve situation LDP Diet leadership met with opposition party representatives June 28 and negotiated agreement to convene special 3-week session of Diet on July 11 to complete deliberations on ADB legislation. JSP expected continue delaying tactics during special session in order maximize discomfiture Sato government but odds are that Asian Bank legislation will be passed by end of session.

d. Convening of special session will necessitate postponing projected cabinet reshuffle until early August at earliest. (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. Comment: Although formal reason for JSP opposition to ADB is that project, by excluding Communist China, is related to U.S. containment policy, motivation for JSP's intransigence on ADB bills was clearly to embarrass Sato government on conspicuous issue. According to some observers, understanding had been reached between LDP and JSP that ADB bills would pass with only token opposition by Socialists, but hard-liners in JSP upset agreement at last minute, too late for LDP counter-action. LDP SecGen TANAKA is reportedly being held responsible by critics in LDP for fiasco. He is blamed for failure anticipate Socialist maneuvers. Press commentary in evaluating strife-ridden 51st Diet has been critical of behavior of both LDP and JSP. Socialists, however, have received brunt of criticism on ADB issue. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. GOJ Supports US Vietnam Policy

a. FonMin Shiina at Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee June 24 said Hanoi's demand of US withdrawal as precondition for talks not justified and said question is whether Hanoi would respond to US peace offers. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hashimoto June 30 gave official reaction to Hanoi area bombing when he told press that bombing of oil depots did not mean escalation of war but was within limit of minimum military operations

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By VMD NARA Date 8/1997

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from Tokyo

in North Vietnam. FonOff Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau Director NIISEKI told press June 30 that attacks on oil depots were to cut off source of supply for intensified military activity in South Vietnam. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: FonOff support for US position contrasts with large majority of press, which believed new bombings would reduce chances of negotiated peace, widen US-USSR confrontation, and strengthen determination of North Vietnamese to continue fight. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. Japan, USSR Sign Fisheries Agreement (Weeka 25, Item 7)

a. With approval of FonMin Shiina, Agriculture and Forestry Minister SAKATA and Soviet Fishery Minister Alexander A. ISHKOV, subordinate officials June 28 signed three-year fisheries agreement for increasing catch in inland waters, conducting research program and exchanging scientific information. Problems of fishing operations in northern waters and return of shipwrecked sailors have been postponed for future discussion. Pertinence these problems illustrated by Soviet seizure June 27 of 10-ton Japanese trawler No. 3 Chikara Maru and crew of six for violation Soviet territorial waters off Sakhalin. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Question of safety Japanese fishermen of great importance to Japanese, but no progress reached on this during Ishkov talks. Japanese will raise question with FonMin GROMYKO during visit starting July 24. Soviets here have claimed they annoyed over Japanese tactics and that Soviets had never considered Ishkov visit to be for negotiating purposes. Japanese annoyed, too; Ambassador VINOGRADOV turned down PriMin Sato's invitation to formal dinner for Ishkov in order to accompany higher ranking (within CPSU hierarchy) labor leader Victor GRISHIN, who was here as guest of Sohyo. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

MILITARY

4. USFJ Niijima Island Proposal Announced

a. Japan Defense Agency and United States Forces Japan June 27 announced USFJ proposal which would allow release of Mito air-to-ground range upon completion of new facility on Niijima Island. Newspaper treatment was extensive because of long history of problems resulting from use of Mito and concern over nearby JAEC atomic reactor; comment generally welcomed announcement, though opposition of islanders prospectively affected was noted also. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: The USFJ proposal was by General Preston's (Commander USFJ) direction based on "rock-bottom" requirements for

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By: VMD NARA Date: 8/19/97CONFIDENTIALPage 4 A-6
from Tokyo

new range; details of agreement remain to be worked out, and GOJ must undertake to prepare substitute facility. Effective release of Mito Range is at minimum three years in future, and may well be considerably longer. In meantime, location of Niijima Island within Tokyo Metropolitan area, though some 150 kms south of city itself, may present GOJ with some political problems. Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly has already passed protest resolution. Another possible factor is ornithologists' interest in Niijima, which may result in protests to US Government as well as to GOJ. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL5. Hanoi-Haiphong Bombing Reaction

a. June 29 bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong environs given full treatment in all papers. Most headlines declared U. S. had bombed Hanoi-Haiphong, but articles gave rather more detailed reports of exact location of targets and U. S. rationale for carrying out raids. Editorial reaction generally negative and, although professing understanding of U. S. position, regretted what is widely described here as further "escalation."

b. Emb besieged by protest groups June 30. EmbOffs met with JCP Diet groups and delegations representing JSP and Sohyo which delivered pro forma protests. Large number of protest messages received by Emb, mainly from JCP front organizations, but including labor unions and individuals as well. JSP-Sohyo, JCP and student groups are reportedly organizing demonstrations and street parades for next several days and protest activity at Emb - telegrams, letters, requests for appointments - likely continue. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong environs has been anticipated by left for some time with hope of breathing new life into mass demonstration movement. Police do not anticipate, however, that left will achieve more than moderate success, except for anti-JCP Trotskyite students which are primary disturbing element in demonstration. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Japanese Press on South Vietnam

a. Press reports on South Vietnam for past week received less prominence, compared with previous week, as three-month-old Buddhist rebellion finally appeared under control. Press reported moderate and radical Buddhist factions seem to have agreed on need to reunify themselves, following Tam Chau's visit with Tri Quang. Tam Chau seemed have greater authority as he vested with over-all power negotiate with Government. However, some papers reported negotiations between Government and Tam Chau had failed because Ky refused compromise with Tam Chau, especially re treatment toward arrested Buddhists.

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

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from Tokyo

b. With Tam Chau still holding to policy of boycotting September election, papers predicted any further Government pressure against Buddhists would hinder smooth operation of slated election in view of the ratio of the Buddhist populace.

c. While sense of relief appeared in cities, press noted war situation was intensifying toward end of week. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: None

REISCHAUER

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PRIORITY

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, RANGOON, MOSCOW, SAIGON

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: July 8, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 27

REF :

CONTENTS

1. Kyoto Conference
2. Okinawa Court Cases Continue in News
3. LDP and JSP Continue to Woo Komeito Support for Tokyo Gubernatorial Election
4. GOJ Protests to Soviets
5. North Korean Repatriation
6. Soviet Visitors Hit U.S. Vietnam Policy
7. Reaction to Oil Dump Bombing
8. Japanese Press on South Vietnam
9. Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) Training Squadron Sails

POLITICAL1. Kyoto Conference

a. Joint US-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs held in Kyoto July 5-7 with Secretaries Rusk, Udall, Freeman, Connor, and Wirtz, Treasury Undersecretary Barr and A. M. Okun of Council of Economic Advisers on American side and Shiina, Fukuda (Finance), Sakata (Agriculture and Forestry), Miki (International Trade and Industry), Nakamura (Transportation), Kodaira (Labor), and Fujiyama (Economic Planning) on Japanese side. Conference held in pleasant atmosphere of ancient capitol city at magnificent newly-completed Kyoto International Conference Hall which is said to be third largest

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from Tokyo

in world. Counterpart discussions on second day carried on at various hotels and restaurants in Kyoto in relaxed and informal atmosphere. Host government arrangements excellent in every respect.

b. Press gave extensive coverage to conference throughout week and noted political matters, particularly questions of China and Vietnam, dominated conference. Reporting on meetings between Secretary Rusk and FonMin Shiina and PriMin Sato on those questions given heavy play. Editorials praised frankness of exchange but generally took view that US policy of escalation will not achieve peace in Vietnam and that Japan should trade with China as more effective way than containment to achieve relaxation Chicom foreign policy. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: US principals considered conference success and best of series to date. General impression given man in street by conference was that Japan and US conferring as equals; that over-all objectives same although differences exist over means achieve those goals; that bilateral economic problems exist but that good will and determination to reach agreement exist on both sides; and that from now on Japan has greater responsibility for solutions Asian problems and may take line more independent from US in seeking them. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. Okinawa Court Cases Continue in News

a. Activities of three-man protest delegation from Okinawa Legislature who came to Tokyo this week have kept spotlight on issue of High Commissioner's recent transfer (Week 25, Item 6) of two cases from Ryukyu Appeals Court to US Civil Administration court. Delegation is headed by Speaker of the Legislature, Akio NAGAMINE. Other members are principal opposition party leader, Tsumichiyo ASATO, Chairman, Okinawa Social Masses Party, and Democratic Party representative, Teruaki NAKAMURA. Okinawan delegation brought resolution passed unanimously by Legislature June 27, protesting transfer as "infringement judicial rights and debasement dignity" of Ryukyuan Courts, and requests GOJ to enter into "forceful negotiations" with USG to achieve withdrawal of transfer order and expansion judicial "autonomy" (to include elimination HICOM appointment Ryukyuan judges). The delegation got rather cool reception during first appointment with Director-General of Prime Minister's Office, Ken YASUI, who told them that problem should be solved in Okinawa. Subsequently, however, delegation saw Vice-Foreign Minister SHIMODA and Prime Minister SATO, both

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Authority <u>NND 959666</u>
By <u>VMD</u> NARA Date <u>8/19/97</u>

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from Tokyo

of whom promised to raise matter in this week's Kyoto US-Japan Cabinet talks. Press gave considerable play to brief and generalized discussions of matter that took place in course Secretary Rusk's meetings with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

b. Comment: None

3. LDP and JSP Continue to Woo Komeito Support for Tokyo Gubernatorial Election (Weeks 23, Item 6; Weeks 25, Item 2)

a. In continuation of efforts to obtain Komeito backing for their respective candidates in 1967 Tokyo gubernatorial election, JSP and LDP leaders held successive meetings July 6 with Komeito SecGen Hiroshi HOJO. At morning meeting JSP SecGen Tomomi NARITA reportedly outlined JSP platform for coming election and asked Komeito to make its stand known as soon as possible. Hojo replied that his party would attempt to comply with this request. At afternoon meeting LDP SecGen Kakuei TANAKA reportedly stated LDP hoped to select its candidate prior to Komeito's convention scheduled for July 25. Hojo responded that this would be desirable and press reported both parties agreed to meet periodically to deepen mutual understanding. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: July 6 meeting is continuation of consultations begun last month, when Hojo met with Narita June 9 and with Tanaka on June 23, in effort by both parties obtain Komeito support which appears essential to victory in election. Press speculates that LDP believes Komeito will ultimately support LDP candidate and present indications are that this may be final result, provided that LDP does not run incumbent Ryotaro Azuma again. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. GOJ Protests to Soviets

a. Vice-FonMin Shimoda called in Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov July 2 and protested against action of Soviet UN delegation, which June 6 distributed Tass article attacking Japan for signing normalization treaty with Korea and for participating in Southeast Asian Regional Economic Conference in Tokyo and ASPAC conference in Seoul. Tass article stated that Japan participating in aggressive scheme at American direction. Shimoda also protested against statement signed June 24 by visiting labor leader Viktor V. Grishin and Sohyo officials in which Grishin expressed

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from Tokyo

admiration for struggles of Japanese labor unionists against US SSN visits and for withdrawal US bases. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Shimoda's protests were in order to make certain Gromyko fully aware Japanese feelings before visit scheduled end of July. (UNCLASSIFIED)

5. North Korean Repatriation

a. Health and Welfare Minister Zenko SUZUKI informed Cabinet July 4 that North Koreans had proposed to Japanese Red Cross that repatriation agreement (covering repatriation of Koreans to N. Korea) be extended for one year. He said he would undertake study of this request. ROK Ambassador Kim July 7 protested to Vice-FonMin Shimoda against extension of agreement, and Shimoda asked for memorandum of ROK position. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Agreement expires in November, and there has been some press speculation it will not be renewed this year, largely because mass repatriation has ended and Chosen Soren (N. Korean federation in Japan) has monopolized processing of applications for propaganda purposes instead of Japan Red Cross as agreement stipulates. There is also speculation that agreement will be renewed, but with tighter restrictions, designed to reduce influence of Chosen Soren. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. Soviet Visitors Hit U.S. Vietnam Policy

a. Sergei PAVLOV, First Secretary of Komsomol and CPSU Central Committee member, arrived July 4 as head of 107-member Soviet delegation to Japan-Soviet Youth Friendship Festival July 9-23. Included in delegation was Lt. Col. Vladimir KOMAROV, who piloted three-man Voskhod I in 1964. Pavlov told press conference that Soviet youths ready serve as volunteers in Vietnam war if asked by Hanoi and said President Johnson's policy would eventually lead world to catastrophe. (UNCLASSIFIED)


b. Comment: Pavlov added nothing new to Soviet line, and press gave statement routine treatment, as newspages full of US-GOJ Kyoto conference. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. Reaction to Oil Dump Bombing (Weeks 26, Item 5)

a. Press reported that FonMin Shiina at press conference July 1 said bombing of oil depots unavoidable but expressed some doubt it could

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from Tokyo

bring Hanoi to conference table. He said GOJ did not plan bring matter up with US at Kyoto conference.

b. According press reports, A-A Study Group, composed of LDP Diet members critical of PriMin Sato's China policy, issued statement July 1 calling bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong oil dumps "limitless escalation of war" and urged government establish contacts with Hanoi and Viet Cong to block expansion of war by means of negotiation.

c. JSP announced July 2 that it would (1) conduct nationwide struggle July 20 with Sohyo and other "democratic" forces, (2) collect funds and relief goods to be sent to Hanoi through foreign embassies having relations with Hanoi, and (3) would stage demonstrations in Kyoto during conference. Estimated 12,000 Communists, Socialists and members of leftist student groups demonstrated in Kyoto July 6 against Secretary Rusk and US Vietnam policy. Embassy has received large number of protest telegrams, but only few delegations, mostly from Communist front groups. Five well-known scholars, led by Hosei University President TANIGAWA, visited PriMin Sato July 6 and petitioned him request US halt bombing in his meeting with Secretary Rusk. Embassy also received protest from group of 13 intellectuals led by Tokyo University professor Rokuro HIDAKA.


d. Comment: Protests have come from known leftist groups. General tenor of press comment has been more sorrowful than condemnatory and has expressed hope peace could be achieved through negotiation. Leftists have maintained such high pitch of protest for so long now that modest impact of most recent events may be attributable in part to boredom with subject.
 (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. Japanese Press on South Vietnam (Week 26, Item 6)

a. At beginning of week, bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong area received heavy frontpage coverage in all papers. Editorials noted that "sanctuary" bombing was matter for regret (Yomiuri); predicted further escalation could lead to estranging even people of South Vietnam from US (Asahi); urged US to explain its justification of bombing (Sankei) and study situation deliberately before taking further steps (Tokyo Shimbun); and recommended efforts for peaceful settlement in accordance with 1954 Geneva Agreement (Mainichi). Press reported that bombings against North as well as battles in South

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from Tokyo

allowed optimism on part of US Forces and South Vietnamese troops. However, press also noted Viet Cong plan to mobilize increased number of young men in North and observed that VC may resume guerrilla warfare in order prolong war. Most papers, referring to Joint Japan-US Conference in Kyoto, stressed need to seize opportunity sound out Johnson Administration's real intentions behind bombing offensive.

b. Press reported relations between Ky and Buddhists seem to have improved somewhat as two hundred Buddhists released and National Congress of Military and Civil Leaders established. But press alleged no Buddhist leaders included in Congress and noted importance of Buddhists' attitude toward September elections, which will sway fate of Ky Government. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: None

MILITARY9. Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) Training Squadron Sails

a. MSDF squadron of four destroyers and 1,050 officers and men departed July 28 on annual training cruise to provide post-graduation training for 131 newly commissioned ensigns. Cruise will include visits to Guam, Noumea, Wellington, Auckland, Sidney, Canberra, Melbourne, Suva, Manila, Keelung, Taipei, and Naha. Rear Admiral Hidesumi MIZUTANI is in command. Also aboard are 19 Japanese newspaper correspondents and Japan Defense Agency civilians of roughly commander or junior equivalency of rank.

b. Comment: None

REISCHAUER

POL: WT Breer
TO: Tsukahira
JMI: prior
REAR: strong

NAVA: Cmdr Shepard

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NND 959066

By: VMD NARA Date: 8/19/97

ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-67
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA,
HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC,
CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, RANGOON,
MOSCOW, SAIGON, BANGKOK

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: July 15, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 28

REF : RSR HOKU, 77-1

CONTENTS

1. Extraordinary Diet Opens
2. Shiina Downgrades Yoshida Letter
3. FonMin Speaks on Chirep
4. Increased Coverage of Okinawa Court Cases Problem
5. Japanese Politician Meets Chou, Arranges Athletic Contests
6. ROK-Japan Ministerial Talks Scheduled
7. Chicom Youth Group Refused Entry
8. Press Reports on South Vietnam

POLITICAL1. Extraordinary Diet Opens (Weeka 26, Item 1)

a. 52nd Extraordinary Diet opened 20-day session July 11 to consider and pass legislation related to Japan's participation in Asian Development Bank. Following opening ceremonies July 12, PriMin Sato gave brief policy speech which glossed over most problems now confronting GOJ. He cited success of GOJ economic policies as cause for economic upswing; mentioned GOJ moves to cope with price problems; emphasized Japan's foreign policy objectives were attainment of peaceful, affluent international society. Sato expressed desire that North Vietnam would participate in discussions for peaceful solution of conflict. Reaction to speech was lukewarm, with many critics deploring lack of specifics.

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified

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Drafted by:

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Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:TGTsuka

Clearances:

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Authority	NM 959666
By	VMD NARA Date 8/19/97

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from Tokyo

b. Interpellations on Sato speech began July 13 with JSP International Bureau Chief Koichi YAMAMOTO using occasion to level familiar attacks on Sato Government concerning its support of US Asian policy. Sato replied with firm statement defending US presence in Vietnam and refuting Socialist charges Japan endangered by security ties with US. Interpellations continued along similar lines in both Houses July 14.

c. With Upper House Finance and FonAff Committees scheduled take up ADB legislation July 15, JSP on evening of 14th made first tactical move designed impede legislative process this session by insisting on convening Lower House Budget Committee on 18th and 19th and Upper House Budget Committee on 20th and 21st in order further its attack on GOJ policy in familiar surroundings (much of substantive debate in Diet takes place in Budget Committees). LDP replied affirmatively to JSP proposal on condition that ADB legislation had cleared Upper House by July 20. JSP insisted on deliberations lasting until 22nd to which LDP replied that if JSP agreed to Upper House passage by the 20th, it would agree to 4-day budget committee sessions; if not, it would unilaterally commence hearings. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: JSP appears determined to delay ADB deliberations in order to gain maximum time to air its criticisms of Sato government and to prevent GOJ from taking action on other pending bills which JSP opposes. JSP last ditch effort stall Diet proceedings may gain some time but it not likely to seriously impede or prevent passage of ADB measures. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Shiina Downgrades Yoshida Letter

a. According to press reports, FonMin Shiina in July 8 press conference denied that Japanese participants had expressed desire extend long-term credits to Chicoms at EconCom in Kyoto but said some Japanese delegates wanted to relax restrictions on government-financed trade credit terms to level of European countries; i.e., seven to eight years. He added that it would be "quite natural" to assume that Yoshida Letter has no permanent influence over GOJ decisions. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: This is second recent downgrading of Yoshida letter (Week 23, Item 2), apparently indicating that GOJ is favorably considering relaxation of restrictions on ExIm Bank financing of plant sales to Communist China. Such relaxation, if and when it comes, likely be slow, gradual and on case-by-case basis in order reduce chances Chicoms (and others) will regard it as evidence of effectiveness of hard Chicom line. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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from Tokyo

3. FonMin Speaks on Chirep

a. FonMin Shiina, in reply to JSP question on GOJ position on Chirep, in Lower House July 14 reaffirmed GOJ position on important question, stating that expulsion of GRC would have important bearing on world peace and therefore any change in Chirep should require two-thirds majority. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: This reaffirms GOJ standard position. (UNCLASSIFIED)

4. Increased Coverage of Okinawa Court Cases Problem

a. This week's political news pages of Japanese papers carried increased volume of interpretive material (all critical of US policy) on controversy over transfer two cases from Ryukyuan to US Civil Administration courts (Week 27, Item 2), while back pages carried considerable coverage of prolonged disappearance Okinawa legislator Teruaki NAKA-MURA, who came to Tokyo with protest delegation and then disappeared to reappear week later with story he had been confined to dental hospital. (He has since resigned). New delegation of Okinawan private reversionist leaders has been in Tokyo this week, but got off to a slow start with GOJ leaders who occupied with Diet session. Their first meeting with major GOJ figure (DirGen PriMin's Office YASUI) took place July 13. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None


5. Japanese Politician Meets Chou, Arranges Athletic Contests

a. Asahi reported from Peking that Vice-President Upper House of Diet and Japan Amateur Athletic Federation Chairman Kenzo KONO saw Chicom Premier CHOU En-lai in Shanghai July 13. Chou reportedly criticized attitude of Sato government during Kyoto Joint EconCom conference. Kono is said to have told Chou that Japan's policies determined by Japanese people and to have stated that Chou should not believe that Japanese press completely supports Washington or considers Peking Japan's enemy. Kono also arranged with CHANG Lien-hua, SecGen of Physical Culture and Sports Commission, for simultaneous athletic meets where contests will be held simultaneously in China and Japan, with results to be determined by correspondence. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: While difficult to judge from press accounts what Chou actually said, Asahi account indicates Chicom consider press and public opinion in Japan have moved far toward US and away from China. We concur in this analysis, though we would not agree that the swing

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from Tokyo

has gone as far as Chou seems to believe. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. ROK-Japan Ministerial Talks Scheduled

a. At ROK initiative, economic ministers of two governments planning August meet in Seoul. Precise dates and names of Japanese participants not yet determined, though invitations have been received for MITI Minister Miki, Finance Minister Fukuda, and Economic Planning Agency Director Fujiyama. FonMin Shiina in July 12 press conference said he hoped meeting would be informal. Press quoted GOJ sources as hoping this would not become first in series similar to US-Japan EconCom and that no undue emphasis would be placed on politics. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Japanese going along with conference somewhat reluctantly, partly because chances are reasonably good that Koreans will propose some projects for which Japan will have to pay the bill. Reluctance to discuss political matters attributable to desire avoid appearance of moving closer to eventual NEATO and also to avoid ROK pressure on GOJ policies toward North Korea. (CONFIDENTIAL)

7. Chicom Youth Group Refused Entry

a. Justice Ministry July 11 denied permission 12-man Chicom Youth Group enter Japan on grounds sponsors refused sign special pledge guaranteeing group would not engage in political activity in Japan (see Weeka 25, Item 10, and Weeka 20, Item 10). (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

8. Press Reports on South Vietnam

a. US bombings against North Vietnam remained on front pages. Editorials regretted that Japan did not seek more information at Kyoto EconCom about US intentions behind bombings; noted extremely positive attitude toward bombings assumed by Secretary Rusk at conference (Mainichi and Sankei); urged that such an attitude should be re-examined (Yomiuri); warned that it will cause Communist China to stiffen (Nihon Keizai); and regretted that Japan did not have strong alternative plan in dealing with issue at conference (Tokyo Shimbun).

b. Papers continued to report intensifying battles in South, noting that South Vietnamese Government troops, which have been used to control anti-Ky rebellion since March, finally rejoined US forces on battle line. With five military officers court-martialed and radical Buddhist leaders


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from Tokyo

held, three-month-old rebellion seemed to have virtually ended, but threat of political turmoil returned as an all-religion citizens' group called for boycott of September elections. Court martial was criticized as Ky Government's weakening itself by dismissing influential military men and losing power at same time US strength increasing. Press regarded Ky's preparations for elections as belated and candidates' registration formula as inadequate; papers remained unable to make any clear-cut prediction. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: NoneREISCHAUER


POL:WTBree
TGTsukimira
JMFarr
REArmstrong

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Authority NM 959066
By WJD NARA Date 8/19/97

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OSD	USIA	NSA
46	11	3
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NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, SAIGON, BANGKOK

HOCKMAN

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 29

REF :

CONTENTS

Office Symbol

1. Upper House Passes Asian Development Bank Legislation
2. Sohyo - JSP-JCP Joint Demonstration Against Hanoi Bombing
3. PriMin Supports US on Vietnam
4. GOJ Permits Entry Three North Koreans
5. Okinawan Court Cases Problem
6. Japanese Press on Vietnam
7. GOJ Aid to Mongolia
8. Malagasy FonMin Arrives
9. Approval of 3d Defense Buildup Plan Postponed

POLITICAL

1. Upper House Passes Asian Development Bank Legislation

a. Following passage of ADB accession bill July 18, Upper House completed consideration of ADB legislation by passing related domestic bills July 21. JSP voted against bills. Legislation now goes to Lower House where passage expected July 26. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Diet activity past week has been routine with government spokesmen fielding leading questions in committee sessions but with no opposition attempts at disruption of proceedings. Although Lower House may not meet July 26 deadline, passage of ADB legislation by close of session on

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CONFIDENTIAL

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See last page

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Authority: <u>NM 959666</u>
By: <u>VMD</u> NARA Date: <u>8/19/97</u>

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from Tokyo

July 30 appears assured. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Sohyo-JSP-JCP Joint Demonstration Against Hanoi Bombing

a. Sohyo, JSP and JCP staged nationwide joint demonstrations on July 20, twelfth anniversary of Geneva Agreement, to protest US bombing of POL depots near Haiphong and Hanoi. First such joint action since Japan-ROK Treaty ratification in November, 1965, was intended by sponsors to mobilize 50,000 people in Tokyo, but actual turnout, according to police estimates, was 16,000. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Abstention from demonstration of key (243,000 members) Sohyo Postal Workers Union (Zentei) because of opposition to cooperation with JCP, indicates long-standing debate within Sohyo on this issue will be continued at and after Sohyo annual convention scheduled to open in Tokyo July 31. Organizers had three weeks to plan demo and turnout probably somewhat disappointing. Possible that JCP did not make maximum effort. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. PriMin Supports US on Vietnam

a. PriMin Sato told Diet interpellators July 18 that he hoped combatants in Vietnam would gather around the peace table; that basic problem is infiltration into South from North; and that US actions in accord with UN Charter. He also praised recent signs of US flexibility on relations with China. On July 21 Sato said Japan would be willing to host peace conference at opportune time and will ask Soviet FonMin Gromyko next week to use Soviet influence obtain peace. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: FonOff has pointed out that GOJ has no plans at present for taking initiative in calling peace conference since time not ripe. (UNCLASSIFIED)

4. GOJ Decides Permit Entry Three North Koreans

a. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hashimoto announced July 15 GOJ decision permit three North Korean technicians enter Japan in connection with proposed export of synthetic textile plant by Toko Bussan Company. Hashimoto said entry would be exceptional case and would not affect basic GOJ policy to foster friendly relations with ROK. Korean Ambassador Kim lodged protest same day and returned Seoul July 18 to consult Government, returning July 20 again to protest Japanese action. PriMin Sato sent PriMin Chong message July 17 explaining Japanese position, stating that

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from Tokyo

his action required to honor LDP commitment to opposition made three years ago, and expressing hope relations would not deteriorate. Korean threats of drastic action have not modified Japanese stand. Japanese have warned fishing boats near Korean waters to be alert to more aggressive Korean patrolling. Local pressures in Japan to cancel plant contract in order to preserve friendly relations with ROK are being exerted on Japanese businessmen concerned, and Kure Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, one of fabricators of plant, reportedly has withdrawn from contract. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Japanese decision and Korean reaction have been given top play in press during past week and have been subject of questions in Diet. Korean reaction so far has not exceeded estimates, and whole episode may serve useful purpose of bringing home to Japanese businessmen, and also to government, fact that ties with ROK may be damaged by moves, however tenuous, toward North Korea. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Okinawan Court Cases Problem

a. Matter of recent transfer by the High Commissioner of two cases from Okinawan to USCAR courts (Weeks 25, Item 6, and Week 27, Item 2) remained in news this week. An Okinawa protest delegation headed by Okinawa Teachers Association Chairman Kyan, (Week 28, Item 4) on initiative of JSP members, was permitted to testify on matter before Cabinet Committee of House of Representatives on July 15, and Government was questioned on issue by opposition in other committees of Diet. GOJ response to questions was that matter had been raised with Secretary Rusk at Cabinet Talks but must be settled in Okinawa, not through diplomatic channels. Director-General Prime Minister's Office, Ken YASUI, requested interview with Charge on July 21 to discuss problem. Meeting, at which Yasui urged renewed USG efforts to resolve issue, was given considerable publicity and drew editorial in Mainichi urging that fresh look be taken at matter of Government Ryukyu Islands autonomy, including elimination appointment by High Commissioner of GRI court judges. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

b. Comment: None

6. Japanese Press on Vietnam

a. Reports on situation in Vietnam received increased prominence as North Vietnam hinted at trials of US pilots and as President HO Chi Minh and Viet Cong appealed for all-out resistance against US. Editorials on July 18 and 19 expressed opinion that US bombing of Hanoi

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By VMD NARA Date 8/1997CONFIDENTIALPage 4 A-112
from Tokyo

and Haiphong had adverse effects because it caused North Vietnam to stiffen attitude (Asahi and Mainichi); that Ho appeal detrimental to cause of peace (Sankei and Tokyo Shimbun); that danger of global war greater than any time in past (Yomiuri); and that USSR should begin positive efforts for peace negotiations (Nihon Keizai). Some papers said trial of US pilots not justified and would result in serious US retaliation, but nearly all papers said proper way for US to prevent trial would be to suspend bombing of North Vietnam.

b. Re internal situation, press found no particular significance in KY Cabinet reshuffle except that it strengthened military-civilian-police cooperation. After closure of registration of candidates for September elections, press noted no influential names listed and so unable give any clear-cut forecast. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: None

7. GOJ Aid to Mongolia

a. FonOff announced July 20 that it was donating \$3,000 to Mongolia for flood relief. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Japanese decision announced day after FonOff informed of US decision. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. Malagasy FonMin Arrives

a. Malagasy FonMin Albert SYLLA arrived Tokyo July 20 for five-day official visit. He will consult with PriMin Sato and other government officials on economic and UN problems. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

MILITARY

9. Approval of 3d Defense Buildup Plan Postponed

a. PriMin Sato on 19 July announced at Lower House Budget Committee that the SDF's 3d Defense Buildup Plan (scheduled to begin April 1967) cannot be considered separately from other long-range government programs. This, in effect, will postpone approval of plan until after Economic Planning Agency's long-term national economic program has been finalized. Defense Plan probably will not be decided until end of year. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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By VMD ARRA Date 8/1997CONFIDENTIALPage 5 A-112
from Tokyo

b. Comment: Japan Defense Agency had hoped to obtain approval of draft plan by the National Defense Council during August. Sato's announcement on 19th has made it evident that final approval of plan cannot be effected before yearend, to great dissatisfaction of Japanese military services. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

EMMERSON
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WLB
POL:WTBrec:mlb
TGTsub:ura
JMFarr: *WLB*
REArmstro: *WLB*

WLB
LabAtt: RF Reiffer
ARMA: LtCol. J. Marsh *WLB*

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ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, SAIGON, BANGKOK, MOSCOW

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: July 30, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 30

REF :

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1. Cabinet, LDP Personnel Reshuffle
2. Extraordinary Diet Grinds to Close
3. Ota Withdraws from Gubernatorial Candidacy
4. Gromyko Visits Japan
5. ROK-Japan Relations at Low Ebb
6. GOJ Refuses Entry Permit to Chicom Group Leader
7. Press Reports on South Vietnam

POLITICAL1. Cabinet, LDP Personnel Reshuffle

a. LDP headquarters announced late afternoon July 29 election of following new officers: Secretary General, Kakuei TANAKA; Executive Board Chairman, Kenji FUKUNAGA; Policy Board Chairman, Mikio MIZUTA. Cabinet posts will probably be announced July 31, following resignations July 30, with Emperor's attestation ceremonies scheduled August 1. Consensus is that principal economic ministers will remain with factional balance to be adjusted through allocation of remaining slots. Retention ForMin SHIINA has become questionable with factional maneuvering last two days.

b. Comment: Key to personnel reshuffle has been handling of former PriMin Ikeda faction. FUKUNAGA (Ikeda faction) seen as compromise choice as he apparently neutral between faction leaders

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

CONFIDENTIAL

In ☒ Out ☐

Drafted by:

Contents and Classification Approved by:
POL:Jozurnellen

Clearances:

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Authority	NND 959066
By	WJD NARA Date 8/19/97

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from Tokyo

Shigesaburo MAEO and Masayoshi OHIRA. Compromise probably result of decision preserve unity within faction. Selection of Mizuta (Funada faction) aimed at factional balance and indicates that Funada faction will probably not get Cabinet post. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Whatever outcome of reshuffle, Emb believes that, given general framework and considerations within which PriMin must operate, August personnel changes likely have little noticeable effect on basic Japanese positions on questions of interest to US. Principal aim of reshuffle is to strengthen Party unity for next Lower House election. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Extraordinary Diet Grinds to Close (Week 29, Item 1)

a. With July 26 Lower House passage of Asian Development Bank domestic legislation (accession bill was passed July 23), 52nd Extraordinary Diet completed substantive portion of business and will recess officially tomorrow. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Session marked by low degree of usual Opposition delaying tactics and entire 30-day session conducted according to script largely because JSP, though voting against ADB, had no significant political stake in outcome. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Ota Withdraws from Gubernatorial Candidacy

a. JSP Chairman Kozo SASAKI at July 28 meeting of Sohyo-affiliated union chiefs stated that JSP-Sohyo plans to run Sohyo Chairman Kaoru OTA in 1987 Tokyo gubernatorial contest would have to be given up because of JSP failure obtain Komeito support. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Komeito support has been Ota's prime condition since announcing candidacy. In recent weeks Ota's withdrawal has been considered very likely and will probably be confirmed at Sohyo convention scheduled convene July 31. Ota action leaves JSP without candidate.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

4. Gromyko Visits Japan

a. Soviet FonMin GROMYKO, accompanied by Mrs. Gromyko, FE Bureau Director N. G. Sudarikov, Press Bureau Director L. M. Zamiyathin, and others, arrived Tokyo July 24. Gromyko is first Soviet FonMin to visit Japan. He has held two meetings with FonMin Shiina and one with PriMin SATO. During these meetings: (1) it was agreed hold periodic FonMin meetings, the next to be held in Moscow next year; (2) Gromyko turned down requests to consider

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from Tokyo

return of northern territories; (3) Gromyko countered Japanese request for safe fishing arrangements around northern islands with request for use of Japanese ports by Soviet fishing vessels; (4) Gromyko refused requests to use Soviet influence to bring halt to Vietnamese fighting, stating that US should first pull out; (5) Gromyko did not respond to Sato's and Shiina's statement that truly friendly relations must be based on non-interference in internal affairs; (6) Gromyko failed to respond specifically to Shiina's request for details on Siberian development plan, making only general statement that he hoped bilateral trade would increase; (7) they concluded consular agreement; (8) discussed questions of non-proliferation and disarmament along respective lines without coming to any agreement; (9) they agreed on desirability of greater cooperation in economic, scientific, and cultural fields without (at time of writing) agreeing on any specifics; and (10) Gromyko invited Sato to Moscow, which Sato accepted in principle without committing himself on date. Press also reported that Gromyko had suggested exchange of TV programs by Soviet communications satellites, but that Japanese were noncommittal in view Japanese subscription to Comsat. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Gromyko's visit contained no surprises and reinforced his reputation as man who most frequently can say "nyet". He has done nothing to enhance Soviet reputation in Japanese eyes. Press reported two seizures by Soviets of Japanese fishing vessels (29-ton No. 33 Mankyo Maru July 23 and 76-ton No. 5 Soya Maru July 22) during Gromyko's visit, but he did nothing to offset effect of these incidents. Press reported FonOff sources as noting Soviets want periodic FonMin meetings because of their concern with China. This statement in itself, and also coincidental refusal of permission for leader of Chicom group to enter Japan (see Item 6), almost guarantee exacerbated Sino-Soviet relations, result of which FonOff not unaware. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. ROK-Japan Relations at Low Ebb

a. GOJ July 25 decided permit entry Korean volleyball judge to participate in seminar which resulted in immediate ROK protest. This was another, though minor, wound to ROK-Japan relations already ^{smarting} from Japanese decision to admit North Korean technicians (Week 29, Item 4). PriMin Sato sent letter to ROK PriMin CHONG July 26 through Ambassador KIMURA explaining GOJ position on admission of North Korean technicians. In meantime,

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principal fabricator of textile plant for North Korea has withdrawn, and manufacturer of smaller component having difficulty finding financing.
(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

b. Comment: None

6. GOJ Refuses Entry Permit to Chicom Group Leader

a. GOJ announced July 22 that it would grant entry permits to Chicom delegates to World Conference against A- and H-Bombs, to be held in Tokyo in August. Group was to have been led by TANG Ming-chao and WU Hsueh-chien. However, on same day of GOJ announcement, Peking informed Gensuikyo that LIU Ning-yi, chairman of All-China Federation of Labor, had been named leader and CHANG Hsiang-shan, deputy leader of group. Justice Ministry July 26 refused Liu's visa on grounds that Liu had made unfriendly statements when he attended Gensuikyo conference last year. Chicom delegation July 29 sent cable strongly protesting GOJ decision, expressing "unspeakable indignation" and "issuing a most serious warning to the Japanese Government." There have been unconfirmed press reports that Chinese may decide not to attend at all if Liu cannot come. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: GOJ refused entry of North Vietnamese and North Korean delegations to conference, and, if Chicoms do not come, much of conference's raison d'etre will have disappeared. Liu had headed four similar delegations in past and is one of Japan experts in Peking. It has not escaped Chicom attention that GOJ refusal of Liu entry occurred while Soviet FonMin Gromyko visiting Japan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. Press Reports on South Vietnam

a. Reports on US bombings, LIU Shao-chi's statement supporting Hanoi, and speculations on possible trial of US pilots frontpaged. Observation that US bombings of "sanctuary" caused Communist side to stiffen its attitude still further dominated press, and press concern increased when presence of full North Vietnamese Division in South was confirmed, regarding it as materialization of HO promise to assist Viet Cong. Noting intensification of US offensive and strong Communist reaction, press predicted "fateful battle" before end of year. Note of relief seemed to appear when Hanoi announced

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the trials of pilots would be postponed, but papers warned that, since Hanoi still calls them "criminals", tension may again increase.

b. Referring to Buddhist moves, papers noted that when Thien Hoa assumed the rectorship of Buddhist Institute, radical elements were taking over Buddhist leadership and some papers predicted that Buddhists will express non-confidence in KY Government and criticisms of US more openly than before. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: None

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 By *VMD* NARA Date *8/19/97*

ORIGIN/ACTION

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ARA	EUR	FE
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1	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
2	2	
INT	LAB	TAR
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TR	XMB	AIR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	7
OSD	USIA	NSA
46	11	3
PC	NEW	NSC
2	1	6

 SFA-1
 WH/K-3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

19 **AIRGRAM**

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A-196

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1966 AUG 8 AM 11 18

 INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA,
 HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC,
 CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, SAIGON, MOSCOW

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: August 5, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 31

REF :

CONTENTS

1. New Sato Cabinet Launched
2. Gensuikyo Congress
3. Sohyo Annual Convention
4. Gromyko Leaves
5. Justice Ministry Decides Not to Censure Sun Ping-hua
6. ROK-Japan Relations
7. Socialist Group Visits China
8. Press Reports on South Vietnam

POLITICAL1. New Sato Cabinet Launched (Weeka 30, Item 1)

a. PriMin Sato reorganized his cabinet with unusual celerity and smoothness during weekend following close of extended Diet and selection of new LDP top leadership. New Cabinet appointments announced July 31 and formally inaugurated August 1. In addition to Sato -- Ishii (Justice), Fukuda (Finance), Shiina (Foreign Affairs), Suzuki (Welfare), Miki (MITI), and Fujiyama (Economic Planning), remain in former positions. Matsuno moved from Defense Agency to Agriculture-Forestry and faction leader Shigesaburo MAEO moved from LDP post to Cabinet as Director of Hokkaido Development. Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Tomisaburo HASHIMOTO given Construction portfolio. His replacement is Kiichi AICHI,

(Group 3)

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Clearances:

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By NND NARA.Dzie 8/1997CONFIDENTIALPage 2 A-196
from Tokyo

Former EdMin and very close to PriMin. Eikichi KAMBAYASHIYAMA, new DirGen of Defense Agency is relatively unknown quantity but as member of Sato faction should operate as trusted lieutenant. Other minor posts filled to attain factional balance. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Continued presence of potential rivals Miki and Fujiyama in Cabinet will tend to blunt any possible challenges to Sato from them. This fact, plus factional balance, indicates that Cabinet has been put together with careful attention to election this fall for president of LDP, which Sato expected to win hands down, and general election, which will probably be called next spring but which must take place by next fall. (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. Reshuffle of Cabinet has actually been restricted to less important posts and there is no discernible change in policy as result. PriMin in August 3 press conference placed stress on domestic questions, and renewed promises to deal with prices, housing, education, roads, etc. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Gensuikyo Congress

a. Five days of preliminary meetings prior to opening of twelfth Gensuikyo (JCP)-sponsored world congress against A and H-bombs, which scheduled begin August 5, ended August 3 with walkout of sixteen of twenty foreign delegations scheduled to participate. Walkout following 14-nation boycott August 2 and Gensuikyo mediatory efforts at extended session August 3, prompted by Japan Gensuikyo insistence on seating representative of Soviet-backed World Democratic Youth League, another representative of which intends to participate in JSP-Sohyo backed Gensuikin convention which scheduled simultaneously. Four delegations remaining in congress are Danish, French, Rumanian and most American delegates. Group of sixteen, generally representing pro-Chicom faction in movement and including New Zealand, Sudan, Malaya, etc., has stated that it will not participate in Gensuikyo activities scheduled for Hiroshima and Nagasaki and gave as reason for pullout fact that Soviets were responsible for disruption in Anti-A bomb movement and inclusion of youth rep in congress would open door to future participation by Soviet "revisionists".

b. Press reports that Japan Gensuikyo organizers of congress, in taking insistent stand on participation of youth federation delegate, had fully expected five or six countries to balk but that they were completely taken by surprise by sixteen nation boycott.

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By: MMD MAA Date: 8/1997CONFIDENTIALPage 3 A-196
from Tokyo

c. With GOJ refusal of entry visa for Chicom delegation leader LIU Ning-i, Chicom delegation turned back from Hong Kong July 30 and not represented at congress. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

d. Comment: Gensuikyo leadership stand prompted by recent JCP attitude toward Chicoms and JCP efforts to mend fences with Soviets. Although boycott of Congress by sixteen nations will certainly reduce scale of Gensuikyo movement, JCP may find boycott satisfactory solution to problem of curtailing ChiCom influence in world movement and in Gensuikyo itself. With Gensuikyo Congress suddenly reduced in importance, added interest will be centered on JSP-Sohyo's Gensuikin conference, which likely substantially exceed Gensuikyo activities in scale. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Sohyo Annual Convention

a. Election of Private Railway Workers' Union Toshikatsu HORII as President, reelection of Akira IWAI as Secretary General, and strong resolution on Vietnam most significant events at five-day Sohyo annual convention which ended August 4. Resolution calls for unions to stage protest action on VJ day, intensification of 40 million signature campaign to protest Vietnam war, per capita contribution of ¥ 100 (\$.28) to aid North Vietnam, and for Sohyo headquarters committee to coordinate strike action protesting Hanoi-Haiphong bombing sometime in October. Swansong of retiring President Ota consisted of emotional appeal for militant response to resolution.

b. Horii in maiden speech also pledged himself to Vietnam resolution, but stressed Sohyo need to face alleged threat of new Sato cabinet and rationalization, to strengthen organization, raise wages and establish minimum wage standards. Most significant new element was his declaration of "group leadership" for Sohyo in contrast to Ota's often criticized arbitrary leadership. Action policy calls for "return to trade unionism" designed to strengthen Sohyo organization vis-a-vis rival trade union groups, to increase influence in JSP and to build machine capable of toppling Security Treaty in 1970. Policy of ad hoc cooperation with JCP, although subjected to heavy criticism, was not stricken from action policy. Wage struggles and other economic goals given more emphasis than in last year's action policy. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Vietnam resolution will be first test of militancy of Horii's leadership and he can be expected to attempt protest demonstration

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from Tokyo

in October, although significant strike action not likely. Horii concept of "group leadership" significant in that it will give anti-Communist elements greater say in Sohyo leadership, especially regarding continuing debate on cooperation with JCP. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Gromyko Leaves (Week 30, Item 4)

a. Soviet FonMin Gromyko left Tokyo for home July 30 after signing consular treaty July 29. Treaty provides, among other things, for notification within three days of arrests or detention of nationals, or within ten days if arrest in territorial waters. Final communique issued July 30 was bland, calling for increased contact, stating world moving toward co-existence of different social systems, and agreeing to strengthen UN and promote disarmament. No agreement on SEA. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Gromyko visit produced no surprises. FonOff believes visit was useful educational experience for Gromyko. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Justice Ministry Decides Not to Censure Sun Ping-hua

a. Sun Ping-hua, chief representative in Tokyo ChiCom Trade Office, announced July 18 that GOJ decision to refuse entry to Liu Ning-i as head of ChiCom delegation to Gensuikyo Anti-A and H Bomb Conference was "outrageous" (Week 30, Item 6). FonMin considered case July 29 and decided ask Justice Ministry issue reprimand since Sun had been admitted on condition he not engage in political activity. FonMin Shiina reportedly said Government could not remain silent if such action repeated. FonOff quoted as saying Sun in Japan through "kindness" of GOJ and that Sun's "slander" was "serious breach of code of international ethics." On August 1, however, Justice Ministry announced it would not give Sun reprimand because (1) Sun's statement issued in compliance with his government's instructions; (2) he was not present at press conference when statement released; and (3) his conduct up to then had been discreet. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Justice Ministry apparently bowed to domestic pressures to which FonOff less exposed. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. ROK-Japan Relations

a. Korean Ambassador Kim made calls on FonMin, PriMin, and other leading party and government officials during past week in effort to prevent entry of three North Korean technicians (Week 30, Item 5, and Week 29, Item 4), and Ambassador Kimura returned from Seoul August 3

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to consult with FonOff. As of weekend there has been no change in GOJ decision to admit technicians if manufacturers could be found for plants which technicians could inspect and perhaps buy. However, there were some press reports that FonOff was trying to persuade Justice Ministry postpone for time being granting of permission to enter. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

7. Socialist Group Visits China

a. Six Socialist Diet members belonging to JSP Chairman Sasaki faction and led by Kanejiro TATE left for Peking August 1 for three-week visit during which time they expect see Mao, Chou En-lai and others. They plan to discuss Vietnam and Japan-China relations. Group hopes visit North Vietnam before returning to Japan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: In view JCP estrangement from CCP, Sasaki faction of JSP may be only friends Communist China has left in Japan. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. Press Reports on South Vietnam

a. Early in week, reports on continued U. S. bombings, Viet Cong's opposition to September elections, and Ky's statement that there will be no choice but to attack North if allied nations seek an early settlement, remained on inside pages. Press opinions on Ky's statement varied, with uncertainty as to whether it intended to correct his previous call for attacking North or was mere political maneuver since South Vietnamese troops' moving alone is unimaginable.

b. U. S. planes' bombing DMZ received frontpage coverage. Press noted the psychological, rather than military, impact of this action was great, because it negated significance of 17th parallel.

c. Yomiuri July 29 editorial found Hanoi's attitude toward captured American pilots flexible and suggested that U. S. take measures, such as suspension of bombing or discontinuance of reinforcing troops in South, so as to bring Hanoi to conference table. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: None

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TGT:Kahira
JMP:MM

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Authority: NND 959066

By: MTD NARA Date: 8/19/97

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Pol: 2-1 Japan

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AGR	COM	FRB
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INT	LAB	TAR
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TR	XMB	AIR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	7
OSD	USIA	NSA
46	11	3
HEW	NSC	
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W.H.K. 3

A-233

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, SAIGON

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: AUGUST 12, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 32

REF :

CONTENTS

1. Politics in Doldrums
2. Japan Backs Thanat Peace Proposal
3. Korean Repatriation
4. "Americans Want to Know" Arrive in Tokyo
5. Japanese Press Reports on South Vietnam

POLITICAL1. Politics in Doldrums

a. With Diet in recess, new Cabinet Ministers getting adjusted to new jobs and most politicians either escaping August heat and/or mending fences in electoral districts, political activity slowed to snail's pace during week August 5. Arrest of LDP Dietman Shoji TANAKA for embezzlement and related crimes and capture of teen-age rifleman in Yokohama provided some headline excitement. At same time various new (and old) ministers were gradually outlining their plans and hopes -- control of consumer prices (Miki, MITT) and improving sanitation and housing and abolishing slums (Hashimoto, construction).

b. Gensuikyo (JCP) and Gensuikin (JSP) conferences carried out on schedule in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and passed into (Group 3)

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By

NARA

Date

8/19/97

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from Tokyo

history. Press coverage moderate and critical of both for allowing ideology to interfere in essentially peace movement. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Beach resorts and highways jammed on weekends with record toll of drownings on Sunday, August 7, due largely to defiance of "no-swimming" warnings. Government has promised to take "countermeasures". (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: None

2. Japan Backs Thanat Peace Proposal

a. Press reported that Japanese cabinet August 10 decided to back Thanat's proposal that Vietnam problem be settled by Asians and has called for Asian peace conference. JSP denounced proposal as justification of U.S. aggression in Vietnam. Press has taken cautious attitude noting that there is little chance, if any, that any Communist countries would agree to come to peace conference. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: FonOff officials privately doubt that peace conference will have any practical effect in view of Communist attitude. However, they are willing to back Thanat for whatever psychological and political advantage may be derived from such conference. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Korean Repatriation

a. No final decision has yet been reached concerning renewal of agreement between Japan and Korean Red Cross societies for repatriation to North Korea of Korean residents in Japan wanting to go. Korean Embassy has been exerting pressure to halt program and FonOff has been considering possibility of authorizing Japan Red Cross renew repatriation agreement for one-year period with clear understanding that it would then be terminated. Socialists and other groups, however, are pressing government to continue agreement indefinitely. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

4. "Americans Want to Know" Arrive in Tokyo

a. A 7-man group of Americans who call themselves "Americans Want to Know" arrived in Tokyo August 9 from recent 12-day visit to Cambodian-Vietnamese border. They told press upon arrival that they found no evidence that Viet Cong were using Cambodia as charged by U.S.

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By: VTD NARA Date: 8/19/97CONFIDENTIALPage 3 A-233
from Tokyo

They said they were given every opportunity to go any place they wished and see and talk to anyone.

b. Picture of Group's arrival and airport arrival statement given moderately prominent front page treatment with no editorials so far.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: None

5. Japanese Press Reports on South Vietnam

a. Reports, mainly straight news stories, on the war situation in South Vietnam continued to receive considerable prominence.

b. Reporting emphasized that operations in central plateau region and around North Vietnamese infiltration routes were favorable to U.S. but it was noted that North Vietnamese anti-air craft batteries seemed increasingly effective in view of increasing number of planes lost by U.S. and that evacuation of industrial facilities indicates Hanoi's firm determination to resist to very end.

c. Only Asahi commented on Secretary Rusk's hint at possibility of entering DMZ and warned that ignoring zone will wash away grounds for international law and agreements for restoration of peace. General predictions were that U.S. attacks against North will intensify with U.S. elections near. Referring to U.S. newspaper's report on Defense Department's long-range estimate of eight more years to restore peace, press tended to conclude that U.S. war policy is again running into an impasse.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: None

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By: VMD NARA Date: 8/19/97

ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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RM/R	REP	AF
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INT	LAB	TAR
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TR	XMB	AIR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
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HEW	WH-K	NSC
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PRIORITY
HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1966 AUG 22 AM 11 51

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, SAIGON

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

DATE: August 19, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 33

REF :

CONTENTS

1. Ambassador Departs
2. NPA Recommends Wage Increase for Government Employees
3. Entry of North Korean Technicians
4. New Director General Prime Minister's Office Visits Okinawa
5. Japanese Press Reports on South Vietnam

POLITICAL

1. Ambassador Departs

a. Major event of week is August 19 departure of Ambassador Reischauer. During past several weeks Ambassador has paid departure calls on major public figures and the Imperial Family and has been feted by major organizations. He has been interviewed by every major newspaper and television network and has been the subject of discussion in numerous periodicals. Final press conference August 18 given front-page treatment by all dailies. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None

Action: R.F.G. 100

Action: Nt. 1

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Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL-JO Zurhellen, Jr.

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By	MDA Date 8/19/97

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2. NPA Recommends Wage Increase for Government Employees

a. On August 12 the National Personnel Authority (NPA) recommended a 6% increase in basic wages of government employees effective retroactive to May 1, 1966. When recommended changes in allowances are added, the average increase would come to ¥2,820 (\$7.83) and bring the average public employee's monthly wage to ¥43,050 (\$119.58). If increases are implemented as recommended retroactive to May 1, the cost to the GOJ, including concomitant increases for local public employees would come to ¥100 million (\$227,777,778).

b. Public reaction to NPA announcement followed usual pattern: Nikkeiren attacked it as too high and inflationary; labor, JSP and DSP spokesmen said it was too low. Privately, some public sector unionists said 6% figure was acceptable if recommendation were made effective as of May 1. Finance Minister Fukuda said he felt inadequate government revenues and probable inflationary effect on prices call for implementation of NPA recommendation later than last year's date (September 1). (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Lack of strong criticism makes it likely GOJ will implement all of NPA recommendations, with exception of effective date. Latter likely be changed, and past two years' precedent makes September 1 strong probability. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. Entry of North Korean Technicians

a. Toho Beslon, one of the Japanese companies involved in consortium of firms hoping to export acryl fiber plant to North Korea (Weeka No. 31, Item 6), announced August 16 its withdrawal from participation (another firm, Kure Shipbuilding had withdrawn earlier). Japanese press commented that it would be extremely difficult to find another acryl maker to replace Toho, since other Japanese manufacturers are either involved in commitments for trade with South Korea, or rely on technological agreements with U.S. firms which would prevent their export of techniques to North Korea. Japanese press also reported this week that CHANG Ki-yong, Deputy Prime Minister of ROK, announced August 15 that South Korea intends to buy from Toho Beslon an acryl plant of same size as that proposed for export to North Korea. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: ROKG has pulled out all stops in effort to prevent export of plant and reverse GOJ permit for entry of technicians. At this point, effort seems to be meeting with success although there remains considerable concern about Korean techniques as evidenced by FonMin SHIINA's public statements that he has had to warn Korean Ambassador KIM Dong-jō against exertion of pressures on private firms in opposing acryl plant deal. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USEPage 3
A-276 from Tokyo4. New Director General Prime Minister's Office Visits Okinawa

a. New Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office, Kiyoshi MORI, in his capacity as GOJ official responsible for Okinawan affairs made his first visit of inspection to Ryukyus August 16 through 19. Mori reportedly told press he would raise in his August 19 interview with the High Commissioner the full range of outstanding issues concerning Okinawa but focusing upon the size of next year's GOJ aid program for the Ryukyus. Mori was also reported as having said that he may want to visit Washington to discuss Okinawa. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: None5. Japanese Press Reports on South Vietnam

a. In early part of week attention focused on ASA proposal for peace conference. Editorially, Asahi said that Japan should be prudent about deciding its attitude; Yomiuri warned that Hanoi's stiff reaction should not be overlooked; Tokyo Shimbun and Mainichi called for forward looking attitude; and Nihon Keizai stated hope that conference will maintain spirit of original approach with regard participation communist countries. After GOJ decision to welcome conference was announced, feeling of anxiety arose that results would be limited if communist side refuses to attend conference, and it was noted that Cambodia apparently thinks that conference plan reflects new U.S. diplomatic offensive.

b. In latter part of week, reports on war situation again received frontpage coverage, as Hanoi protested that U.S. planes had bombed dams and levees along Red River, and as press noted that if true, reports reflect qualitative escalation of war. Following JOHNSON-WESTMORELAND conference, press predicted that U.S. Forces in Vietnam will be reinforced and war will thereby be intensified. Press was critical of recent mistaken bombings by U.S. planes. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: NoneREISCHAUER POL:WTB  :jk
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By *VMD* NARA Date *8/19/97*

ACTION/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM*ROL 2-1 JAPAN*

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NO.

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30 PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, SAIGON

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 34

REF :

DATE:

August 26, 1966

CONTENTS

1. Okinawa and "Functional" Reversion
2. Korean Repatriation
3. Roundup of Japanese-Language Papers Reports on South Vietnam Situation (August 18-24, 1966)
4. Nuclear Submarine Visit to Sasebo

POLITICAL1. Okinawa and "Functional" Reversion

a. Both Japanese and American observers of Okinawa problem were somewhat startled when new Director-General of Prime Minister's Office Kiyoshi MORI, in reporting to Cabinet August 24 on his first official visit to Okinawa (Weeka 33, Item 4), gave his endorsement to concept of "functional reversion" and recommended GOJ seek return to Japan of administrative rights with respect to Okinawan education. After Cabinet meeting, Mori told press that his recommendation had been accepted and that an advisory committee had been established to consider ways and means to implement concept. Concept of "functional reversion," i.e., return to GOJ on gradual basis of functional areas of Okinawan administration, unrelated to immediate military mission of bases, was endorsed in June in an "interim report" by LDP's Special Committee on Okinawa Problems, but other views on

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By	MM NARA Date 8/19/97

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from Tokyo

most practical way for GOJ to proceed are still extant within Party and Government circles, and Special Committee report has not yet been adopted by LDP's higher policy-making organs.

b. Morning press August 25 was full of criticism of Mori's recommendations, most of which was labeled as being based on comments by "Foreign Ministry sources". Criticism focused on vagueness concept "functional reversion", need to concentrate on substance of improvement Okinawans' educational opportunities, and inconsistency proposal with high-level US-GOJ agreements that US presence necessary until conditions of tension in Far East subside. Later in day, Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi, after conferring with Mori, clarified for press "unified" GOJ position to effect "functional reversion" would be studied for Mori's benefit by new committee but had not been approved by Cabinet as new GOJ approach to Okinawa problems. Mori himself, however, refused to back down and said he would continue to push idea and would sound out Ambassador Johnson on it after his arrival. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

c. Comment: There are those in Government and LDP (and particularly in Foreign Office) who feel "functional reversion" to be a deceptively simple phrase which neglects realities of hard choices GOJ has to make on Okinawa policies. They appear to have won in last week's controversy. But, while Director-General Mori may have received his introduction to complexities which beset Okinawa policy for GOJ in this week's fracas, he is by all accounts an individualistic and vigorous man who will continue to seek role in development GOJ initiatives on Okinawa. Of course, mere fact Okinawa was once more on front pages increases pressures on GOJ to "do something". (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Korean Repatriation

a. Cabinet on August 23 approved one-year extension from November 13 of agreement between the Japanese and North Korean Red Cross Societies for repatriation of Koreans who want to go to North Korea (Week 32, Item 3). Cabinet decision included directive that agreement be terminated after this extension and that GOJ agencies "consult" after expiration of program upon ways to handle problem. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: FonOff officials state present thinking on future of repatriation program, now running at rate of approximately two

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from Tokyo

hundred persons per month, is that it could be handled by private organizations which could arrange ad hoc passages to Hong Kong or Nakhodka. Cabinet decision seemingly represents another success for ROK program of pressures upon GOJ to narrow its range of contacts with North Korea, following hard upon heels of last week's apparent collapse of deal for plant export to North Korea (Weeks 33, Item 3). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Roundup of Japanese-Language Papers' Reports on South Vietnam Situation (August 18-24, 1966)

a. Reports on the situation in Vietnam received less prominence than during preceding few weeks. Emphasis was on increase in tension, with US Senate passage of bill empowering President to mobilize reserves, Kosygin-Russell letter and Defense Minister Malinovsky's hints which raised possibility of dispatch of Soviet air forces to Vietnam. Editorially, only Sankei commented on these Soviet moves, taking them as a serious warning against further "aggression" by US. Press also noted these moves might have been intended to serve as farewell souvenir for North Vietnamese mission which visited Moscow and whose purpose, the press presumed, was to request more modern ground-to-air weapons. Noting that total of US Forces in South Vietnam has reached nearly 300,000 and predicting that US is likely to deploy forces into the Mekong Delta to replace GVN troops, it was noted that US must have judged that it will be impossible to take the initiative in the war unless it brings the "heart" of South Vietnam under control.

b. As for long-range outlook, dominant press opinion appeared to be US Forces will be steadily reinforced and will open a large-scale offensive next year so as to test possibility of victory before US Presidential elections of 1968. (UNCLASSIFIED)

4. Nuclear Submarine Visit to Sasebo

a. USS Snook arrived Sasebo August 22 for 15-day visit. Although scheduled visit and its unusual length (15 days compared with usual 5) made public on 21st, only about 40 hard core demonstrators on hand when SSN arrived. Opposition pushing line that visit indicates Sasebo has become SSN repair base. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: So far neither Sasebo nor Japanese public show noticeable reaction to visit. JSP-Sohyo and JCP planning major rally

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on August 28 but turnout likely be small. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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ACTION/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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OSD	USIA	NSA
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	HEW	NSC
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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1006 SEP 5 11 55a

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, SAIGON

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: September 2, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 35

REF : CONTENTS

1. JSP Central Executive Committee Approves National Security Policy
2. Eda Throws Hat in Ring
3. New Advisory Committee on Okinawa Has First Meeting
4. GOJ to Go Slow on Mongolia Ties
5. LDP Diet Members Visit China
6. Visit of USS Snook (SSN 592) to Sasebo

POLITICAL

1. JSP Central Executive Committee Approves National Security Policy

a. According press, Japan Socialist Party (JSP) Central Executive Committee approved new national security policy on August 31. Policy includes familiar principles of unarmed "positive neutrality" and "peaceful coexistence" and says basic cause of tension in Far East is United States strategy and "militaristic, imperialistic" policy of Sato Government under U.S. atomic umbrella. Policy would commit a JSP Government first to abrogation of Security Treaty with United States, Japan-Nationalist China and Japan-ROK Treaties, then to signing of peace and non-aggression treaties with Chicoms, Soviet Union, and unified Korea and to proposing of non-aggression pact with United States. JSP Government would expect above treaty realignment to bring about return of Habomai, Shikotan and Japanese Kuriles from (Group 3)

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from Tokyo

Soviets, and Bonins and Ryukyus from United States, and to be sufficient external guarantee of Japanese security to allow disbanding of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) with popular approval, transferring SDF personnel to police auxiliary, domestic construction corps and domestic peace corps type units. CEC policy would also commit JSP to establishment of Pacific area free of nuclear weapons, and to active support of United Nations.

b. Press criticized new policy as theoretical and unrealistic backward step from plan advocated in May by JSP Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ishibashi, which made abrogation of Security Treaty and dissolution of SDF dependent on international situation and signing of non-aggression pacts with Chicom and Soviets (see A-1373). Almost all newspapers paralleled Asahi plea that JSP emphasis on people's movements be accompanied by more persuasive arguments. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: CEC has retreated from more realistic Ishibashi line into doctrinaire theoretical area so that JSP mass movements and Party unity will not be affected by realistic debate on security issue. Possibility remains, however, that issue will not be suppressed during Eda-Sasaki struggle for Party leadership. Fact that CEC policy inspired by internal Party considerations and offers nothing new at a time when public interest in security problem increasing, does not enhance image of JSP as effective opposition party. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Eda Throws Hat in Ring

a. Saburo EDA, in what mass media interpreted as tantamount to announcement of his candidacy for chairmanship of Japan Socialist Party (JSP) at convention to be held in December, told meeting of his faction on August 28 that JSP cannot challenge Sato Government by relying on political weakness of LDP or by following Chicom line of united front. He said latter tactic greatly damaged "renovationist forces" in Japan and that visits to China of "private" groups of JSP members circumvent Party organization and hinder mutual understanding and normalization of relations between Japan and Communist China. Eda said he was determined to lead whole Party as real opposition party serving people's immediate interests and needs.

b. Kenjiro TATE, leader of 5 man Sasaki faction group which visited China and North Vietnam (Week 31, Item 7) told press on return August 27, that "Cultural Revolution" is not power struggle but attempt to build "unprecedented socialist culture" by Chicom leadership on stable political and economic base. Tate also said peace negotiation not preceded by American withdrawal from Vietnam was unimaginable.

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c. Comment: Eda's remarks implicitly attacking Sasaki's leadership of JSP parallel statements made four days before by Seichi KATSUMATA to meeting of WADA faction. These statements indicate beginning of Eda-Katsumata campaign to unite JSP anti-mainstream factions behind them in effort to topple Sasaki and Secretary General Narita at December convention. Intensification of factional strife prominent at January convention [See A-1064] likely to continue, centering on JSP relations with Chicoms and JCP, and issue of whether Soviet or Chinese line on Vietnam should be followed. Eda candidacy backed by Sohyo faction headed by Postal Workers (Zentei) Chairman Takaragi, who was instrumental in replacement of Sohyo Chairman Ota by politically milder Toshikatsu HORII at recent Sohyo convention (See Embtel 962). Takaragi, chief Sohyo opponent of cooperation with JCP, stated that privately conducted poll shows Eda certain to be elected chairman. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. New Advisory Committee on Okinawa Has First Meeting

a. New advisory committee which is to advise Director-General Prime Minister's Office Kiyoshi MORI on Okinawa policy (See Weeka 34, Item 1) held its first meeting September 1. Committee, whose membership has now been expanded to ten, in accordance with expectations elected as its chairman Nobumoto OHAMA, who heads quasi-governmental relief association, Southern Areas Benevolent Association, involved in various programs in Okinawa. Committee reportedly has agreed upon following: (a) "functional reversion" of administrative rights in Okinawa is theoretically possible; (b) "functional reversion" of selected rights would not block the eventual reversion of complete administrative control to Japan; and (c) since education occupies a strategic role in human development and process of economic development, there is a need for swift realization of "functional reversion" to Japan of control over Okinawan education.

b. Director-General Mori was reported as having said in press interviews before and after the inaugural meeting that he hopes committee will come up with practical proposals by November, when he hopes to visit US to negotiate with Washington authorities on Okinawan issues. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Meeting, and Mori interviews, given only moderate press coverage, with as yet no editorials. Committee seems to be setting leisurely pace for itself, with next meeting scheduled for September 14. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. GOJ to Go Slow on Mongolia Ties

a. Fonoff Asian Bureau Director Ogawa at press conference

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from Tokyo

August 31 said Japan in no hurry to establish diplomatic relations with Mongolia. He said that Mongolian officials indicated to Fonoff officials who accompanied graves visit mission, which returned August 30, desire to have diplomatic relations but also indicated it reserved right demand reparations from Japan for damages incurred in 1939 Nomonhan incident. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Mongolia Government October 18, 1946, notified Far Eastern Commission that it would seek \$80,495,750 for property damage during incident, in addition to indemnification for 2,039 persons killed in incident. Fonoff officials have previously told us that, if Mongolians demanded reparations, GOJ interest in establishing relations would diminish. There are also some in Fonoff who question advisability of establishing relations at certain cost of difficulties with GRC. GOJ considers that it recognized Mongolia when it approved Mongolia's entry into UN. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. LDP Diet Members Visit China

✓ a. Eight LDP Diet members, including former Foreign Minister Kosaka, left August 28 for month's tour of Communist China. They expect to see Chou En-lai, Chen Yi, Liao Cheng-chih, and others and return September 26. Group expect discuss Sino-Japanese relations, Asian situation, Vietnam, and trade relations with Chicom leaders. They hope form judgment of current cultural revolution and its implications. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Kosaka, before his departure, discussed trip with Ambassador Reischauer and will seek opportunity persuade Chicom leaders that US serious and sincere in desire to achieve peaceful situation in Asia. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. Visit of USS Snook (SSN 592) to Sasebo

✓ a. After mild initial adverse reaction to 15 day length of Snook's visit, starting August 22, press attention has been nil. Neither Amcon Fukuoka nor Embassy Tokyo has received a single protest. Major protest took place Sunday, August 28, at Sasebo, with orderly demonstration of 4,200; no incidents reported and no apparent effect on uninterested public. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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By: VMD NARA Date: 8/19/97

OPTION/ACTION

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, SAIGON, MOSCOW

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 36

REF :

Action DATE: September 9, 1966

Action Assigned to

Action Taken

CONTENTS

1. SSN SNOOK, SEA DRAGON Visits End
2. Ch'en I Talks to LDP Diet Members
3. LDP Internal Differences on China Policy Continue
4. Domestic Political Atmosphere
5. JCP Expulsions and Financial Problems
6. Defense Agency Personnel Ordered to Wear Uniform

POLITICAL

1. SSN Snook, Sea Dragon Visits End

a. Eleventh and twelfth visits of American nuclear submarines to Japan ports successfully completed with departure of SSN Snook from Sasebo on September 6 and of Sea Dragon from Yokosuka on September 9. Snook visit, which lasted 15 days, uneventful although denounced by opposition parties. (Weeka 34, Item 4 and Weeka 35, Item 6)

b. Sea Dragon Yokosuka call also uneventful except for September 7 JSP/Sohyo-JCP sponsored demonstration at Yokosuka where some 800 left-of-JCP (Trotskyite) student demonstrators burned police jeep and staged stone-throwing brawl with police, injuring some 230 riot policemen, three or four seriously, as well as small number of by-standers. JSP/Sohyo and JCP leadership, including Chairmen Sasaki and Nosaka, disclaimed (Group 3)

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from Tokyo

responsibility for student behavior. When Emboffs quizzed JSP-Sohyo-JCP protest group September 8 on this matter, latter seemed somewhat chagrined.

c. Press coverage of Sea Dragon visit generally factual and tone of commentary to effect that SSN visits have almost become routine. Press (Asahi) bent over backward to apologize for "over-zealous" students but couldn't avoid conclusion they had gone too far. Press also commented that JSP having increasing difficulty meeting financial and organizational burdens of mass rallies. For example, Sasebo rallies for September 1-3 called off. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Except for outbursts from left-of-JCP student elements, which always possible in Tokyo-Yokosuka area, active opposition to further SSN visits likely to decline further, provided that opposition groups remain unable link SSNs directly with Vietnam war. (CONFIDENTIAL)


2. Ch'en I Talks to LDP Diet Members

a. Chicom Fonmin Ch'en I on September 6 gave interview to visiting group of LDP Diet members headed by former Fonmin Kosaka and former Health Minister Furui. (Weeka 35, Item 5). Diet members, according Japanese newsmen in Peking, disclosed that Ch'en said China has always respected Bandung principles of coexistence, accepts fact other countries may adopt other political systems, but cannot accept US and Soviet attempts to force capitalism or revisionism on China. Ch'en further reportedly stated that "Great Cultural Revolution" designed strengthen China against US and Soviets by weeding out potential quislings, that China has no intention of provoking war with US, and that Ch'en did not believe US would attack China in near future, or that present tension between US and China would last forever. However, China preparing for the worst by undertaking cultural revolution. Ch'en quoted as citing continuing Warsaw talks to show China continues seek settlement with US through talks.

b. Ch'en added Vietnam war is matter for Vietnamese to settle; until US withdraws, no negotiations possible, and after US withdraws Vietnamese people themselves will settle matter. He called Red Guard movement "correct" but added that not every proposal of Red Guards necessarily becomes government policy. Cultural revolution is long-range program aimed at increasing production, improving technology, and building new culture to safeguard socialism. China trying to eliminate differences between urban and rural areas, between manual and mental

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from Tokyo

labor, and between workers and farmers.

c. Diet delegation September 8 issued supplementary account, clarifying that (1) Chicoms fully supported and would aid NVN/Viet Cong war against US and "in present circumstances" would not discuss with US; (2) Chicoms while "following coexistence policy respecting Bandung spirit, decisively opposed US imperialism", and no duality in their diplomacy (sic); (3) Peking attitude toward Sato Government unchanged. Press stories said "clarification" made because Chinese thought earlier account might give false impression of Chicom attitude. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Fonoff took cautious approach to some of Ch'en statements, particularly those concerning Chinese-US relations, noting that his remarks have passed through several translations and that press obtained comments from Japanese sources who may have added some of their own interpretations. September 8 "clarification" indicated caution well-advised. Fonoff believes Ch'en statement indicates no change in Chinese policy toward Japan and that trade will continue as before. Some conservative politicians initially voiced belief that Sato's policy toward China shown to be correct, since Ch'en did not make accustomed Peking attack on GOJ actions. Number of papers commented that China taking soft attitude toward Japan because former has isolated itself from rest of world, including Soviet Union, and is looking to Japan for trade.

e. Embassy believes that Ch'en's remarks may indeed have been more temperate than those we have been accustomed to hearing. He undoubtedly tailored his words to his audience. Chicoms have lost allegiance of JCP (Weeka Item 5), its supporters within JSP have strong opposition ---- in any case JSP unlikely be able change Japanese policy for foreseeable future, so LDP is logical target for practical influence on Japanese policy. By taking reasonable pose with friendly LDP Diet members, Chen may hope to deepen divisions within LDP on China policy (Weeka Item 3) and make some progress toward objective of separating Japan from US. With further LDP debate on Chirep policy to take place this month when government position expected to be severely attacked by LDP pro-Chicom group, and China-Japan trade talks to be held in Peking in October, Ch'en's timing seems excellent. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. LDP Internal Differences on China Policy Continue

a. LDP Foreign Affairs Study Committee September 6 was scene of new LDP Internal debate on China policy. Foreign Minister Shiina told meeting of committee officials that day that GOJ expected co-sponsor

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"important question" resolution on Chirep at forthcoming UNGA. Committee Vice-Chairman Yasuhiro NAKASONE challenged Shiina position, urging postponement of decision on co-sponsorship until LDP Diet delegation visiting mainland (Week 2) returns. Conservative stalwart Okinori KAYA reportedly took strong issue with Nakasone and majority of committee officials came down in favor of GOJ stand. At same session, committee chairman (and LDP Vice-President) Kawashima adopted unique measure of designating two "first vice chairmen", former Foreign Ministers Masayoshi OHIRA and Zentaro KOSAKA, since respective proponents of "firm" and "flexible" policies toward Communist China unable agree on either as first vice chairman. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Nakasone and Kosaka are among influential younger LDP Diet members increasingly interested in seeking better relations with mainland China within realistic limits. Nakasone proposal to delay decision on "important question" activity, however, overwhelmed by majority which conservative side of LDP holds in Foreign Policy Study Committee, and in any event weakened by fact delegation to China not returning until September 26th, while Foreign Minister Shiina and GOJ delegation plan leave September 20th for UNGA. China issue can be expected continue one of most divisive questions in LDP. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Domestic Political Atmospherics

a. Following end of traditional August political hiatus, LDP and opposition parties prepared to step up appeals to public, LDP in effort to boost popular appeal of Prime Minister Sato and his administration, opposition in avowed expectation of early general election.

b. Sato plans domestic travels -- PriMin's entourage revealed first part of schedule for series of Sato visits to schools, factories, welfare facilities, rural areas, etc., throughout country beginning September 14 and reportedly scheduled to last until November. LDP described purpose as "Sounding out real voice of the people". Tokyo press less charitably interpreted plan as thinly veiled campaign tour.

c. Leaders hint at fall political agenda. LDP Vice-President Kawashima September 5 told press at Fukuoka that any special Diet session impossible until after Cabinet ministers complete scheduled travels in October, there no need or reason for dissolution of Diet, and PriMin not thinking of dissolving Diet within 1966. LDP SecGen Tanaka September 7 similarly told press during stumping trip in Gifu that Diet could not be opened until mid-November because of ministerial travels. DSP Chairman Nishio September 8 expressed intention to propose "agreed dissolution" of Lower House for October. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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d. Comment: Apart from practical questions of ministers' schedules, LDP clearly reluctant to face early Diet session. Opposition and press continue to belabor ruling party with series of scandals involving Diet members, notably Lower House member Shoji Tanaka, who still detained on charges of extortion and fraud, and new Transportation Minister Arafune who under fire for pressuring National Railways to schedule express-train stop at extra station in his electoral district. Rumors in Tokyo political circles say Tanaka scandal could involve ranking LDP members if Tanaka talks. Ex-Kono faction leader Shigemasa also allegedly involved in questionable land transactions now coming to light. LDP leadership reportedly thinks it wise to minimize Diet debate opportunities and avoid early election campaign in hope these clouds will blow over without too much fallout. Sato's domestic inspection travels designed by his intimate supporters, notably new Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi, mainly in hope of getting elusive "Sato boom" under way. There is now talk of possible Lower House dissolution at end of 1966 and election in January, 1967, although this would require expeditious action on at least part of the budget process, something Sato Cabinet had little success with in previous efforts. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. JCP Expulsions and Financial Problems

a. JCP Central Committee September 7 approved expulsion of five members in Yamaguchi prefecture for anti-party activities. Central Committee also used opportunity to call for "complete crushing of anti-party activities". Five members expelled, headed by Yamaguchi City Assemblyman, announced same day they forming new "Yamaguchi Prefecture JCP Committee-Left Faction". Regular JCP prefectural central committee brought law suit against "Left Faction" for expropriation of property.

b. Japanese press on September 6 reported Chicom expulsion of three pro-JCP, "friendly" trading firms. Press indicated there would be little effect on Japan-Chicom trade. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: GOJ Public Security source believes that JCP Central Committee will continue to move against open opposition to its new "independent" line, but that a measure of dissatisfaction within hierarchy will be tolerated. He described Chicom expulsion of pro-JCP "friendly firms" as great financial blow to JCP, as their prime purpose was transfer of money to JCP. He surmised most of this money would now go to JSP-Sasaki faction, forcing JCP to curtail

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election and rally expenditures. Embassy believes present estranged relationship between CCP and JCP likely to continue with both sides avoiding direct exchange of insults or more open break. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. Defense Agency Personnel Ordered to Wear Uniform


a. To improve Self Defense Force image, Eikichi KAMBAYASHI-YAMA, Director General of JDA, has ordered Agency Headquarters military personnel to wear uniform to and from work. In past, most military wore civilian clothes to work, changing into uniform after arrival. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Kamabayashiyama's order is extremely unpopular with many of military who work at Agency, who claim that new policy will cause them undue hardships (e.g., increased laundry bills) and arouse public opposition to seeing so many military uniforms in the streets. Wives of military may be expected to welcome directive, however, as now their husbands can be expected to come directly home from work, rather than returning via the local pubs. (UNCLASSIFIED)



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Authority NM 959666By VMD NARA Date 8/19/97

ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAMNA
TOL 2-1 JAPAN

RM/R	REP	AF
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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

126 SEP 19 1966

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, SAIGON, BELGRADE, BUENOS AIRES, KARACHI, KATMANDU, BUCHAREST, SOFIA, MOSCOW

FROM : MOSCOW
Ambassy TOKYO

DATE: September 16, 1966

SUBJECT :

REF : JOINT WEEKA NO. 37

CONTENTS

1. PriMin Sato Begins Domestic Tour
2. Lower House Speaker Accepts Diet Member Resignation
3. Socialist Party Convention Timing Uncertain
4. JSP's Sasaki Faction Replacing JCP as Beneficiary of Communist China's Largesse
5. Kawashima to Visit Eastern Europe
6. JCP-Communist China Tensions Continue
7. GOJ to Deny Passports to Youth Visiting China
8. Foreign Office Discusses African Visitors
9. Visitors
10. Japanese Comment on Vietnamese Elections

POLITICAL1. PriMin Sato Begins Domestic Tour

a. PriMin Sato began September 14 his highly publicized domestic inspection tour by visits to a primary school and home for the aged. The press maintained its uncharitable attitude toward the tour. Comments to the effect that the PriMin had visited only facilities where conditions were good provoked the PriMin into saying that the press is "free to criticize" but shouldn't judge the results of the tour before it began. He added that he "didn't want to go around with so much fanfare". Nevertheless, visits to Chiba, Gotemba and Kyushu this month and next

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Drafted by:

See last page

Contents and Classification Approved by:
POL:TWainsworth

Clearances:

ARMA:MajHarris (in draft)

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By	WMD NARA Date 8/19/97

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from Tokyo

will proceed as scheduled. (Weeka 36, Item 4). (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Despite press carping, the PriMin apparently plans to push on with his domestic tour. One newspaper columnist speculated that the PriMin would probably emerge from his travels with greater confidence in his own popularity. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. Lower House Speaker Accepts Diet Member Tanaka's Resignation

a. Despite strong protests by Diet leaders of the opposition parties, Lower House Speaker Kikuichiro YAMAGUCHI accepted the resignation of LDP member Shoji TANAKA, who stands accused of numerous crimes of fraud, intimidation and abuse of public office. The JSP and DSP had demanded the Lower House expel Tanaka rather than permit him simply to resign. However, after numerous conferences, the Speaker pointed out Diet regulations currently in effect did not permit kind of action envisaged by opposition parties and that although these Diet regulations should be revised in order to permit effective action against errant Diet members, there was no alternative in the present circumstances but to accept Tanaka's resignation. (Weeka 36, Item 4). (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: The Tanaka scandal and more recently, Transportation Minister Arafune's express train blunder, have not helped the LDP's popularity but there are indications that the LDP's efforts to disassociate itself from Tanaka have borne some fruit. A JSP source told Emboff reports from the hustings indicated LDP had not suffered terribly from the Tanaka case despite the JSP's hopes in this regard. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Socialist Party Convention Timing Uncertain

a. Recent efforts on part Sasaki supporters (including statements by JSP SecGen Narita) to postpone JSP General Convention scheduled for December until after Lower House general election culminated in decision by JSP Election Policy Committee headed by Isamu AKAMATSU (Sasaki faction) to request Central Executive Committee (CEC) officially postpone convention. CEC meeting today to discuss issue. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Ostensible reason for postponement is to permit party to focus entire efforts on election struggle. While this has certain validity, real reason apparently lack of confidence on part Sasaki supporters that he can retain chairmanship of party in face strong challenge raised by "anti-mainstream" leader Saburo EDA. "Anti-mainstream" source told Emboff everyone in party agreed convention should be postponed in event general election held late this year, but since this by no means certain CEC meeting would probably leave question open for time being. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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4. JSP's Sasaki Faction Replacing JSP as Beneficiary of Communist China's Largesse?

a. Anti-Sasaki source in JSP told Emboff it was his strong belief that Sasaki faction had actually taken place of JCP as beneficiary of "friendly firms" system of doing business with Communist China. He thought Sasaki faction and Sasaki personally now receiving financial support from Chinese Communists. Some speculation along these lines extending even to veiled hints in the press had occurred previously but this is first time JSP source has so stated (see Weeka 36, Item 5). (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. Comment: Embassy views these reports as plausible; however, no hard evidence is yet available (see Item 6). (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Kawashima to Visit Eastern Europe

a. Press reported that LDP vice-President Kawashima planning leave October 1 for visits to Yugoslavia (October 3-7), Bulgaria (October 7-8), Romania (October 8-11), and return to Tokyo October 19 via France and US. Kawashima expects discuss Vietnam, Communist China, nuclear disarmament, and cultural exchange with Tito and invite him, on behalf of PriMin Sato, to visit Japan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Kawashima is second highest ranking individual in ruling party. His visit is part of Japanese effort tap all possible sources of information and judgment on Communist China and marks beginning effort to extend Japanese influence and prestige to area which is relatively remote but important to Japan primarily because of Japanese interest in China and USSR. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. JCP-Communist China Tensions Continue

a. September 12 JCP daily Akahata announced September 10 decision of Central Committee to expel Akahata staff member, Choji HARADA, from party membership for anti-party activities. Harada allegedly collaborated with the Yamaguchi Prefecture "Leftist Faction" (Weeka 36, Item 5) in the publication of their pro-Chicom Choshu Shimbun, which accused national and prefectural JCP leadership of "revisionism". September 11 morning Yomiuri, quoting "police authorities" (probably PSIA), reported that JCP membership rights of two prominent Osaka members of Japan-China Friendship Association (JCFA) suspended. One of the two punished, Ariakira OTSUKA, was standing director and vice chairman of Osaka Prefectural JCFA and Communist of long standing. He allegedly took part in pre-war bank holdup, which added a considerable sum to depleted party treasury. Reizo AMAMIYA, Osaka

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from Tokyo

JCFA standing committee member and secretary general, was other member punished. Both men urged better relations with Communist China. All three of those punished during past week were critical of the JCP Central Committee decision to prohibit participation of JCP-affiliated youth groups in Sino-Japanese youth assembly.

b. In long-winded September 13 editorial JCP daily Akahata charged a "certain socialist country" (unmistakably Communist China) with imposing its political line on Japanese trading firms to the detriment of Japan-China trade. Referred to were recent Chicom expulsion of three pro-JCP trading firms (see Weeka 36, Item 5) and Chicom demand that two pro-JCP leaders of Japan-China Trade Promotion Association be expelled for their "uncooperative" attitude toward upcoming Chicom trade fair to be held in Kita-Kyushu and Nagoya. Only hours after appearance of Akahata editorial, Trade Promotion Association directors ousted "uncooperative" managing director Masanori SUMII and standing director Saburo OKAMOTO. For good measure, Association also fired Secretary General Hiromoto SEKI, indicating a complete capitulation to Peking's demand that pro-JCP elements be thrown out. In separate but related actions, Chicoms expelled Trade Promotion Association Peking representative Masahiro NOGUCHI (morning Nihon Keizai September 11) and postponed scheduled Japan tours of six Chicom technical groups (morning Asahi September 10).

c. According press reports, Japanese language editions of People's China and Peking Weekly have disappeared from JCP-run bookstores although available elsewhere. JCP daily Akahata also has reportedly refused accept advertisement Chicom movie "Eastern Star". (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Facing Tenth JCP Congress in October, party continues to deal harshly with open criticism of its new "independent line". Further suspensions of membership rights and outright expulsions are probable.

e. With ousting of pro-JCP Japan-China Trade Promotion Association leaders, it seems reasonably clear that JCP and JCP-affiliated firms have lost their previous dominant position in "friendly firm" structure and, more important, the money the JCP derived from this trade (see Weeka 36, Item 5 and this Weeka, Item 4). The thoroughness and unseemly haste of the Trade Promotion Association's compliance with Chicom demands is undoubtedly a source of considerable concern to the JCP.

f. Relations continue to deteriorate between the JCP and Communist China. However, JCP still not criticizing Chicoms by name. (CONFIDENTIAL)

7. GOJ To Deny Passports to Youth Visiting China

a. Fonmin Shiina, Justice Minister Ishii, Home Minister Shiomi, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi agreed September 14 to refuse passports to

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Japanese who wished to travel to Communist China to participate in youth exchange program, because Chicom program aimed at political indoctrination of Japanese youth. Press reported more than 600 applications received and representatives of Socialist Youth League, Japan-China Friendship Assn., and Sohyo have urged GOJ permit their travel.' (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: While Shiina reportedly strongly supported this decision, press has reported that some in Fonoff thought there was no harm in letting youth go because they would be repelled by what they saw. Perhaps the GOJ took into consideration in its decision pro-Chicom activities by returnees from last year's youth delegations which travelled to Peking. Responding to JCP direction, some 11 JCP-related youth organizations refused to participate in this year's exchange program, leaving mainly JSP oriented youth as would be travelers. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. Foreign Office Discusses Africa

a. Japanese chiefs of Mission in Africa met in Tokyo Sept. 12-14. In addition to general review of situation, subjects discussed included African influence in UN, especially on Chirep, UNCTAD, Japanese economic assistance and trade balance. Ambassadors hoped Japan could increase economic assistance and in any case hoped Japan could provide more technical assistance by bringing trainees to Japan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Fonoff is especially concerned over effect Rhodesian and South African situations may have upon Chirep vote. Japan also disturbed over imbalance of trade with African countries. Fact Japanese trade with South Africa overshadows trade with other African countries also complicates Japanese relations with them. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

9. Visitors

a. Pakistan's Minister of Communications Abunsabut KHAN arrived September 11 for ten-day visit, during which time he called on PriMin Sato and other appropriate government ministers to request increased cooperation in telecommunications field. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Nepal's Deputy Premier and FonMin Kirutinidhi BISTA arrived September 14 and will depart for New York and UNGA September 18.

c. Argentine special envoy and Ambassador-designate to U.S. Alvaro ALSOGARAY arrived September 12 and left September 16. He saw PriMin Sato, FonMin Shiina and FinMin Fukuda to explain policy of new government. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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CONFIDENTIALPage 6, A-394
from Tokyo10. Japanese Comment on Vietnamese Elections

a. Fonoff September 12 told newsmen that high voting rate of over 80 per cent in South Vietnamese September 10 elections indicated GVN strength despite VC terrorism and Buddhist boycotts and demonstrated that Government has large areas under its control. Fonoff deferred detailed comment until receipt of analysis from Embassy Saigon.

b. Japanese reporters' dispatches from Saigon just prior to elections predicted low voter turnout and post election reports initially reflected surprise and skepticism over announced results. Subsequently general tone of media comment swung toward grudging admission that - irregularities notwithstanding - elections constituted significant achievement for GVN, important indicator of real limits of VC power, and useful step toward democratic, civilian regime.

c. Japanese correspondents observed at first hand polling in various parts of South Vietnam and conveyed in general impression of politically naive electorate voting "because Government said to" and because of fear of GVN reprisals against non-voters. However, reporting also stressed ineffectiveness of VC obstructionism and Buddhist boycott. Finally Japanese reports from Washington were carried under headlines indicating doubts over "unreserved" USG jubilation at election outcome. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Despite emphasis on suspected irregularities, news media comment generally accorded passing grade to GVN conduct of elections and concluded election results were favorable development in Vietnam situation, possibly advancing country step closer to stable political situation. Embassy sees long-term impact here on public opinion because election results tend to destroy persuasiveness of sweeping Viet Cong claims of popular support. Fairly widespread Japanese acceptance of general validity of these claims forms basis for much of recent Japanese criticism of US policy in Vietnam. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)


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Authority *NM 95966*
By *VMD* NARA Date *8/19/97*

ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM*NA*
*POL 2-1 JAPAN**NA*

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NSC	HEW	
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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, SAIGON, MOSCOW, RANGOON

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

DATE: September 22, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 38

REF :

CONTENTS

1. North Korean Mutineers Seek Refuge
2. Ne Win Visit
3. Gifu Defeat Highlights LDP Disunity
4. Fujiyama Prolongs LDP Rumblings on Chirep
5. Sohyo Kicks Off Fall Struggle
6. Cabinet Confirms Refusal of Passports for Chicom Youth Festival
7. Socialist Youth Give JSP Headaches
8. "Friendly Firm" Trade Structure Switch
9. Maritime Self Defense Force Exercise
10. Japan Defense Agency Group to Visit South Vietnam and Thailand

POLITICAL**1. North Korean Mutineers Seek Refuge**

a. According to press reports, North Korean dragnet fishing boat Pyong Sin No. Z4-034, 146 tons, entered Shimonoseki September 17, manned by four North Korean crewmen, including first engineer, who sought political asylum from Japan, saying they had killed captain and six other crewmen on high seas. Nine other crewmen were imprisoned during voyage to Japan. Mutiny occurred September 14 after leaving home port of Sinuiji.

(Group 3)

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Drafted by:

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Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:TWAINSWORTH

Clearances:

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from Tokyo

b. Japanese police have arrested crewmen for illegal entry, seized arms aboard ship and are investigating case. North Korean authorities have demanded return of ship and crew. South Koreans have offered take those crewmen who want to go there. ROK consul has seen crewmen and reported that four mutineers want to go to South Korea. Japanese leftist lawyers have interviewed two of nine who did not participate in mutiny.

c. Two ROK patrol craft entered Japanese territorial waters September 20, apparently en route Shimonoseki in expectation of being able to embark would-be defectors. As of September 21 press reported these ROK craft still off west coast of Kyushu. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Many questions remain unclear, e.g., why did mutineers put in at Shimonoseki if they wanted to go to ROK? Nevertheless, inability of GOJ to come to quick decision provides leftists and Korean authorities on both sides with opportunity exert pressure on GOJ and seamen with possibility of complications reminiscent of Chinese "defector" Chon Hung-ching several years ago. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Ne Win Visit

a. General Ne Win of Burma arrived September 19 for state visit during which he saw Emperor, PriMin Sato and other GOJ officials. He and Sato discussed problems of economic development and possibility Burma's attending Asian agricultural development conference in Tokyo. Questions concerning Communist China and Vietnam not taken up. Ne Win will visit places outside of Tokyo and leave September 26. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Japanese recognize that Ne Win visit marks opportunity to increase Free World presence and influence in Burma and hope that careful exploitation this situation will yield beneficial results. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Gifu Defeat Highlights LDP Disunity

a. Incumbent Governor Yukiyasu MATSUNO suffered upset in September 18 election try for third term as Governor of Gifu Prefecture. Former LDP Diet member Saburo HIRANO, backed by dissident LDP elements and JSP, outpolled official LDP candidate Matsuno 452,000 to 383,000.

b. LDP, visibly shaken by upset, promptly blamed it on local party disunity and called meetings of top officers in Tokyo to study disciplinary problems involved. Spotlight fell on three LDP Diet members from Gifu who conspicuously avoided campaigning for Matsuno, although top party brass made speeches on his behalf in prefecture in latter stages of campaign. JSP claimed that its support was key factor in Matsuno defeat and said it would follow similar tactics in other local elections. Winner Hirano frankly told mass media that he

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believed protest vote against Matsuno administration was key to his victory.

c. Press during rest of week called attention to similar situations of LDP internal disunity developing in other prefectures, notably Yamagata and Yamanashi. In Yamagata 15 prefectural assembly members bolted regular LDP September 20 in protest against nomination of incumbent Governor Tokichi ABIKO for fourth term, while Yamanashi conservatives still unable to agree on new candidate for governor after LDP headquarters turned down decision of prefectural chapter to back incumbent Governor Hisashi AMANO for fifth term. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Internal LDP dissension over prefectural governor posts typically involves jealousy on part of LDP Diet members from same prefecture concerning long-term governor's threat to Diet members' political base. Situation further complicated by factional rivalries at national level and in turn contributes to these rivalries. In at least some cases reluctance to stick with incumbent governor reportedly strengthened by fear he susceptible to charges of corruption or malfeasance which could redound on LDP in next general elections. In Gifu case, disciplinary problem is tough one for LDP headquarters since two of recalcitrant Diet members are prominent in former Ikeda faction, while third is son of late party vice president Bamboku OHNO. Sato administration leadership cannot lightly undertake strong disciplinary measures against this line-up. Successful candidate Hirano reportedly still listed as member of LDP "Doshikai," ancillary organ of party, but promised Socialists he would not rejoin LDP if elected with their support. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)


4. Fujiyama Prolongs LDP Rumblings on Chirep

a. After LDP Foreign Policy Study Committee formally disposed of proposal by Yasuhiro NAKASONE and others (Week 36, Item 3) to delay decision on cosponsoring "important question" resolution on Chirep at UNGA, Cabinet officially took up question of GOJ position at September 16 session. Foreign Minister Shiina in introductory statement strongly advocated continuing Japan's role as cosponsor. According press accounts, only Economic Planning Agency Director Fujiyama openly questioned policy, saying that Japan should look forward to possibility of acting as intermediary between US and Chicoms and accordingly should maintain "flexibility" on "important question" tactics, rather than tying Foreign Minister's hands in advance. Fujiyama apparently satisfied in form, if not in substance, by Cabinet decision to entrust handling of issue to Foreign Minister Shiina. Latter promptly told press his views on Japan cosponsorship unchanged. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: LDP sources privately expressed view that Fujiyama primarily interested in possible gains in terms of domestic popularity which he might derive from appearance of "flexible" posture on policy toward Chicoms.

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from Tokyo

Fujiyama also reported to have made comment after Cabinet meeting to effect that he regretted MITI Minister Miki not present at session, a clear attempt to imply that Miki agreed with him. At same time, Fujiyama at pains to make clear that he did not intend Chirep gambit as "anti-US move." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Sohyo Kicks off Fall Struggle

a. Sohyo rally in Tokyo September 20 to begin fall struggle called for mobilization 20,000 people, actually turned out only 6,500 (police estimate). Resolutions passed by acclamation protested "United States aggression in Vietnam," opposed GOJ rationalization plan for coal industry, and called for large wage increase for public employees and establishment of uniform minimum wage. Sohyo President Horii urged support of anti-war strikes planned for October 21. JSP Central Executive Committee September 22 formally approved party's participation in October 14 "joint one-day struggle" with Sohyo and JCP against war in Vietnam. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Unimpressive turnout, first under new President Horii's leadership, sets stage for Sohyo Special Convention, scheduled for October 5-6, to whip up greater enthusiasm in rank and file for objectives of fall struggle, and for joint political demonstration with JSP and JCP on October 14 as well as strikes on October 21. (See Embtel 2123) (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. Cabinet Confirms Refusal of Passports for Chicom Youth Festival

a. Cabinet September 20 confirmed decision previously made by concerned ministers (Weeka 37, Item 7) to refuse passports to 639 Japanese youths who had applied to participate in Chicom youth program and rally October 1. Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi told press passports refused on grounds (allegedly quoted from Chicom press stories on proposed October 1 events) that Chicom youth program would be aggressive and revolutionary in nature, and that youth would not be on pleasure trip but would be indoctrinated in Mao's version of Communism. JSP SecGen NARITA protested GOJ decision, as did Peking. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: As Justice Minister Ishii reportedly pointed out in Cabinet meeting, GOJ has no effective legal authority to deny passports. Applicants can eventually get passports by going to court, according to past precedents. What Government's decision does is to keep youths from going at this time, since court cases can be dragged out. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Socialist Youth Give JSP Headaches

a. Japan Socialist Youth League (Shaseido) Central Committee meeting at Omuta, Fukuoka Prefecture, September 18 decided to dissolve and reorganize

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By: WMD NARA Date: 8/19/97

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from Tokyo

Shaseido Tokyo Municipality District Headquarters as result of donnybrook between rival Shaseido factions at September 31 Tokyo Headquarters convention in which some 36 people suffered serious injuries and over 100 others left with assorted bruises. One student was paralyzed and another will probably lose ^{the} sight of one eye. Press at first paid scant attention to the fracas, although stating JSP leadership worried about "Red Guards" in party's midst. This week JSP evidently decided to take action against Shaseido's "Liberation Faction" which was responsible for the affair. JSP magazine put out September 21 supplement explaining necessity for disciplinary action against "Trotskyites" in Shaseido, criticizing excesses at recent Yokosuka SSN demonstration (Weeka 36, Item 1), and asking for contributions to aid injured. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Object of "Liberation Faction" ire was Shaseido "Association Faction" which has parental ties with JSP's Sasaki Faction. Apparently even Sasaki is not left wing enough for "Liberation Faction", many of whom were reportedly shut out of JCP's Minseido youth movement as "Trotskyites". JSP Chairman Sasaki's handling of affair is being closely watched by "anti-mainstream" factions supporting Saburo EDA in hope of finding ammunition to use against Sasaki at next party convention. Already JSP Youth Bureau Chief Yanosuke NARAZAKI (Sasaki faction) has come under fire for not exercising adequate control. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. "Friendly Firm" Trade Structure Switch

a. Trade mission of Japan International Trade Promotion Association (JITPA), whose membership reportedly ranges from liberal LDP to left-wing JSP, returned September 21 from one-month visit to Communist China with praise for "Red Guards" and "stable" economy, and with Chicom promise that JITPA would play predominant role in Japan-Chicom "friendly firm" trade. Press surmises JITPA will replace Japan-China Trade Promotion Association, whose pro-JCP leaders were recently expelled (Weeka 37, Item 6). (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: This development would amount to shutting out completely pro-JCP elements in Japan-Chicom "friendly firm" trade structure. (CONFIDENTIAL)

MILITARY

9. Maritime Self Defense Forces Exercise

a. Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) announced it will conduct training exercise during week of October 3 aimed at protection of shipping and coastal defenses. Along with units of Ground and Air Self Defense Forces, about 150 ships, 150 aircraft, and 25,000 officers and men of MSDF will participate. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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from Tokyo

b. Comment: This will be largest exercise yet undertaken by MSDF. Purpose of exercise is to test MSDF ability to operate in high readiness state for extended periods. In past, MSDF has not had this capability. At present, only limited protection can be afforded ocean or coastal shipping. (CONFIDENTIAL)

10. Japan Defense Agency Group to Visit South Vietnam and Thailand

a. Three-member JDA group left Japan September 22 for approximately ten-day visit to South Vietnam and Thailand. Group made up of Hisao ARIYOSHI (JDA Counselor), Major General TABATA (Ground Staff Office G2), and Colonel TAKEDA (Air Staff Office A2). Group will visit GVN and US military and installations in Saigon until September 28. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: First official visit by uniformed personnel is evidence of continued interest in Vietnam by JDF members. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

None.


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ARMA:LtCol Marsh

NAVA:LCdr Walker

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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A-460

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA,
HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC,
CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, SAIGON, MANILA,
KUALA LUMPUR, DJAKARTA

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 39

REF :

DATE: September 31, 1966

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2. Typhoons Slam Japan
3. Korean Mutineers Sent to ROK
4. Okinawa in Headlines
5. LDP "Parliamentary Diplomacy" with Chicoms Continues
6. Sato Meets Labor Leaders
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9. Prime Minister and Defense Agency Director General Address Senior Self Defense Force Officers
10. Press Comment on 7-Nation Manila Conference
11. Tour Groups Back From Communist China Excite Attention

POLITICAL1. Marcos Visit

a. Philippine President Marcos and party arrived September 28 for five-day state visit. He was met at airport by Emperor and Empress, PriMin and Mrs. Sato, and other dignitaries and has been entertained by Emperor, PriMin and others. Press September 30 reported that, in two-hour meeting with Sato, two leaders agreed form joint commission to study how best to use Japanese economic aid to Philippines, and Japan agreed transfer \$40 million loan from Marikina Dam project to Cagayan railway. According press, Sato also explained

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POL (see last page)

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:TWAINSWORTH

Clearances:

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By	MD NARA Date 8/19/97

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that GOJ did not wish take part in Manila conference because no Japanese troops in Vietnam, Constitution forbids sending troops there, and Japan desired help try bring about peaceful settlement in Vietnam by not taking sides. At Sept. 29 luncheon with Japanese business leaders, Marcos said he would seek to obtain Senate ratification of FCN treaty ratified by Diet in 1961. In press conference September 29, Marcos said that Asian countries irrespective of political system should join in common political forum, just as Africa and Europe have their own regional organizations. With respect to Manila conference he said he hoped it could determine what steps should be taken to achieve peace in Vietnam and also consider problems of civic action and social reform. Marcos reportedly agreed that there might be grounds for speculating on second conference which other Asian nations not militarily involved in Vietnam would attend and said that such meeting would not necessarily have to be held in Manila. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Visit so far has been given prominent front-page treatment. Interest intensified by announcement of Manila conference. According one GOJ Cabinet Minister, Japanese had expected Marcos extend them some form of invitation to conference but he did not do so, leaving Sato in position of protesting too much. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Typhoons Slam Japan

a. Shortly after midnight on September 25, typhoon with winds up to 70 mph struck central Japan, causing considerable loss of life and damage. Hardest hit was Yamanashi Prefecture, where two small hamlets in foothills of Mt. Fuji were demolished by landslides. Shizuoka, Saitama and Gumma Prefectures also suffered heavily. Press reported 211 killed, 103 missing, and 813 injured. Damage to public utilities, private homes and crops was estimated upwards of \$72,000,000. U. S. installations were also hit, particularly Tachikawa Air Base complex, where damage was roughly estimated at \$5,000,000.

b. GOJ quickly set up "disaster headquarters" headed by Kiyoshi MORI (Director of Administrative Affairs in PriMin's Office) and promised financial assistance. SDF units joined local groups in rescue efforts, while survey teams quickly fanned out to disaster areas, but Cabinet meeting September 26 rejected JSP demand that special Diet session convene immediately to study countermeasures.

c. On September 28 LDP SecGen Kakuei TANAKA stated that Special Diet session would probably be convened around November 25 to take up supplementary budget, and additional disaster relief if necessary. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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d. Comment: Newspaper coverage of disaster, worst in 7 years, spotlighted prominent role that JSDF personnel played in relief efforts, and focussed on the need for preventive measures to minimize future loss of life and property damage. Opposition parties' efforts to exploit disaster to attack Sato Cabinet were too obviously self-serving to make much public impact, but PriMin (who sweated out storm at his seaside Kamakura villa) reportedly chided some Ministers for laxity of agencies responsible for disaster warnings.

3. Korean Mutineers Sent to ROK

(UNCLASSIFIED)

a. Four North Korean fishermen who seized fishing vessel (Weeka 33, Item 1) left Itazuke by plane for Pusan afternoon September 28, prosecutors having decided not to indict them. Nine other crewmen still in Immigration Bureau office at Shimonoseki, scheduled to be returned to North Korea via Soviet liner Baikal, leaving Yokohama Oct. 3.

b. Fishing boat belongs to Fisheries Training Institute of Sinuiju. GOJ does not recognize it as public vessel because GOJ does not recognize North Korea as state. GOJ spokesman termed question of disposition of vessel extremely complicated, said no decision had yet been made.

c. Soviet Chargé Rozanov Sept. 24 called on Vice-Minister Shimoda on instructions of Soviet Government to transmit, on behalf of North Korea, request for return of boat and personnel to North Korea. Shimoda told Rozanov that matter would be settled in accordance with international law, domestic legal procedures, and sense of fair play. (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. Comment: This is first time Soviets have represented North Korean interests in Japan. ROK Embassy not entirely happy over publicity treatment given by Japanese press to four. Press claimed they went to ROK as second choice, really desiring to stay in Japan, whereas ROK Embassy said their first choice had been Korea all along. Japanese solution of crew member problem appears reasonable. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Okinawa in Headlines

a. Simultaneous announcement in Naha of U.S. Civil Administration's decision to go ahead with transfer of two controversial cases to its own courts and release in Washington of news that High Commissioner Watson is retiring, received considerable play in the Japanese press. Although press expressed some concern about possible Okinawan reaction to court cases transfer and extensive coverage was given to critical statements of Okinawa opposition leaders, GOJ sources were quoted as saying transfer was not something which by its nature is open to criticism from GOJ since actual administration in Okinawa is in hands U.S. Exception to generally moderate coverage court

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cases issue was Sept. 30 Yomiuri editorial which regretted "one of General Watson's last acts should be a blow against democratization of administration" and asserted action not justifiable in terms US "vital interests". Most attention focussed on retirement of General Watson, with Government sources quoted as expressing regret at loss his background on current problems and press commentary recalling his extensive efforts on behalf economic betterment of Okinawa people and advancement local self-government. There was considerable commentary which expressed concern as to whether change in High Commissioner might not portend increased U.S. emphasis on military side its administration of Okinawa, but both Washington and GOJ sources were quoted as saying that change had no such inner meaning. Director General Mori of Prime Minister's office, GOJ official responsible for day-to-day conduct Okinawa policy, was quoted as saying that change would not deter GOJ from pressing ahead with its policy goals - such as functional reversion of administration Okinawan education. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Although developments in Okinawa were given considerable space, Japanese press was obviously caught by surprise. Further editorial comment and speculation seems certain. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. LDP "Parliamentary Diplomacy" with Chicoms Continues

a. Eight-member LDP Diet delegation including former FonMin Kosaka, former Health Minister Furui, former JDA DirGen Esaki returned September 26th from 4 week visit to mainland China (Weeks 35, Item 5, Weeks 36, Item 2). Members of delegation promptly spread accounts of journey and interviews with FonMin Chen I and Premier Chou En-lai through Tokyo press (see Psychological). Group, minus Kosaka, also presented report to receptive Asia-Africa Problems Study Group of LDP September 26 and to regular party organ, Foreign Policy Study Committee, Sept. 28. Latter group adjourned as soon as reports completed, forestalling anticipated clash with right-wingers present. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Kosaka called on Chargé September 27 to describe visit (Embtel 2411). (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. 4 LDP freshmen Diet members left September 28 to visit mainland, including presence in Peking for October 1 Chicom regime anniversary celebration, at invitation of China-Japan Friendship Association. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Most of Kosaka delegation members are responsibly concerned with Japan-Chicom and broader international problems and have thus far avoided obvious temptation to cash in on visit through sensational

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accounts. Staffer who accompanied mission says group in fact had very little freedom to travel and talk privately with persons in mainland. Leading members of delegation clearly hope to derive benefits in terms of their own political careers but evidently believe this can best be accomplished by avoiding immediate involvement in LDP factional controversy over Japan-China policy.

e. Two members of freshman delegation told Emboff September 23 that they planned keep eyes open and mouths shut during trip. However, reports from Japanese correspondents in Peking to effect that very few prominent foreign guests likely attend Oct. 1st celebration this year suggest that this LDP group may possibly become embarrassingly conspicuous. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. Sato Meets Labor Leaders

a. Press reported Prime Minister Sato on September 29 met separately with top leaders of Sohyo and Domei labor federations, which he had not done since periodic discussion meetings suspended in January 1966. In addition to such subjects as minimum wage, public sector wage hike, and retirement benefits, Sohyo leaders presented standard political demands for stronger line against Vietnam war, elimination of Okinawa bases, and refusal of SSN port calls. Sato replied that non-attendance at upcoming Manila conference stemmed from thought Japan might be able play peace-making role in Vietnam in future, but riposted with warning to labor moguls that October 21 strike planned by Sohyo to oppose Vietnam war (Weeka 38, Item 5) would involve illegal strike action by public workers.

b. Highlight of exchange with Domei leaders came when Domei spokesman urged early general election and Sato reportedly acknowledged that two years without election to permit people to pass judgment on his administration was inconsistent for democratic politician. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Press said Sato advisers viewed this meeting with labor leaders as linked with domestic inspection program (Weeka 37, Item 1) GOJ need to make position clearer on proposed October 21 strike probably contributed to timing. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. JSP Resuscitates International Conference Proposal

a. Press reported that Tomomi NARITA, JSP SecGen, said September 28th that JSP hopes to sponsor "Asian conference of socialist parties" next spring to seek peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war. Narita

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asserted that Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and North Korea have endorsed proposal and that Communist China has also received invitation. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: JSP seems to have resuscitated AA Peoples' Conference idea in new dress. Poor response to International Bureau Chief Koichi YAMAMOTO's mission to Cambodia last March forced JSP to shelve its AA Peoples' Conference scheme. There is no indication that JSP will have any better luck now. (Tokyo 3427 of March 31). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. Japan Fails First Satellite Launching Attempt

a. Japan attempted to launch its first satellite on September 26 but failed. Although all four stages of rocket were ignited, rocket apparently went off course when third stage was fired. Preliminary analysis indicated that the spinning mechanism failed to operate satisfactorily. Initial public reaction has been to urge greater unification of Japan's divided space program. (UNCLASSIFIED)

MILITARY

9. Prime Minister and Defense Agency Director General Address Senior Self Defense Force Officers

a. On 28 September, Prime Minister Sato and JDA Director General Kanbayashiyama addressed annual conference of senior officers of Japan Self Defense Forces. PriMin said Forces must become "fully conscious of their responsibilities" as best way to win confidence of people. He said he thought people were becoming more appreciative of Defense Forces because of their conduct in emergencies (such as recent typhoon) and because of Asian situation. Sato added that government must work harder to develop defense forces since "nation's defense power is by no means satisfactory".

b. Director General Kanbayashiyama discussed need to improve training, discipline, and equipment. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: PriMin continued his practice of addressing annual Senior Defense Force Officers' Conference. Real discussions on defense are going on behind scenes in Defense Force struggle to get larger budget for next fiscal year, which starts Third Five-Year Defense Buildup Program. Finance Ministry opposition and other political pressures make success unlikely. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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CONFIDENTIALPage 7, A-460
from TokyoPSYCHOLOGICAL10. Press Comment on 7-Nation Manila Conference

a. President Marcos' proposed 7-nation conference on Vietnam and President Johnson's announced participation therein attracted widespread attention and received prominent coverage in Japanese news media. However, early comment was decidedly unsanguine about prospects for conference bringing progress toward peaceful Vietnam settlement and suggested that in some circumstances it could further harden positions.

b. September 29 Asahi editorial described upcoming conference as one-sided lineup of combatants and predicted only result would be to give conference's blessing on GVN and U.S. Vietnam policy and to strengthen war effort politically. Asahi charged President Johnson participating only for purpose of external propaganda and domestic political gain, and predicted conference would further incite Communist antagonism.

c. Editorials same date in Mainichi, Yomiuri, Tokyo Shimbun and Sankei all adopted similar line on conference, though Sankei and Yomiuri tended to reserve judgment somewhat. NHK radio and TV commentators have been cool toward meeting and have predicted emphasis will be on military operations in Vietnam. All comment has supported GOJ position on Japan's non-participation.

d. Sole warmth in this frigid atmosphere was lead story in September 29 Sankei from Washington correspondent Sakai, who detailed new forward-looking peace proposals which he said "it seems" President Johnson will present at Manila. (Joint USIS/Embassy telegram 2438) (UNCLASSIFIED)

11. Tour Groups Back From Communist China Excite Attention

a. Return of two groups of prominent Japanese from tours of Communist China excited considerable public attention. LDP Dietmen's group headed by former Foreign Minister Zentaro KOSAKA (Item 4) took considerable space in newspapers with accounts of interviews with Chinese notables, especially Sept. 6 interview with Chen I. The Diet men were quite guarded in their public comment concerning trip, confining themselves largely to accounts of what was said to them. 7-man group of commentators headed by widely read critic Soichi OYA complained bitterly in Hong Kong press conference and in Tokyo next day about denial of access to any important Chicom figure during their 7 day tour, and about "insulting" attitude of Chicom officials they dealt with. Oya labelled current turmoil caused by the Red Guards "brats' revolution", "painted revolution" and "revolution of quacking ducks".

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Oya group compared current ideological straitjacketing of China to that of Japan from 1940 - 45, and criticized Japanese who went on invited tours to the mainland (including by implication the Kosaka mission) for their uncritical approach, saying they acted like "invited beggars". (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: While Kosaka delegation has been chary of public comment, at least some of members' statements have implied that Japan must make greater efforts to serve as bridge between China and U.S. in order to avoid general war in Far East. They had thought so before going to China, but now presumably can attract more attention for their thesis. Oya and his group of popular commentators are not accorded highest respect in Japan -- popular weekly magazines tagged them "mass communication Viet-Cong" and "7 Samurai" -- but they are widely read by man in street. Forthright public criticism of Communist China has been rare in Japan but "great cultural revolution" has created sufficient misgivings here, especially among "men of culture", to embolden commentators and editors to stronger criticism. Nevertheless, some comment is still seen to effect that Chicoms' actions result from U.S. "encirclement", and that in any case Japan must try to make friends with Chicoms. (CONFIDENTIAL)


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By: MJD NARA Date: 8/19/97

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

A-507
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, SAIGON, MANILA

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 40

REF :

DATE: October 7, 1966

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1. JSP Central Executive Sets Stage for Eda-Sasaki Confrontation
2. Sohyo Special Convention Considers Fall Struggle
3. JCP Target of ChiCom Criticism and More Expulsions Occur
4. Philippine President Concludes Visit to Japan
5. Okinawa Court Cases
6. PriMin Sato Hospitalized
7. Scandals Continue to Plague the LDP
8. Soka Gakkai Changes Overseas Name
9. Japan Defense Agency Director General to Visit U.S.

POLITICAL

1. JSP Central Executive Sets Stage for Eda-Sasaki Confrontation

a. JSP Central Executive Committee (CEC) on October 4 formally decided to hold the party's 28th annual convention on schedule from December 6 - 9 in Tokyo, so long as there is no Diet dissolution this year. (JSP no longer seems to believe there is much possibility of dissolution this year, even though they continue to make noises about the LDP's "duty" to do so.) This decision sets the stage for re-enactment of the Eda-Sasaki confrontation over JSP Chairmanship -- now more

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By WMD NARA Date 8/19/97

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important because from this year party executives get two-year terms. In January Chairman Kozo SASAKI won re-election by slim margin of 21 votes out of a total of 571. Factional maneuvering, long underway, bids fair to reach a fever pitch between now and December as the hopefuls struggle for control of district conventions which elect convention delegates.

b. Left wing "mainstream" Sasaki faction and its allies are pitted against the challenging forces of Saburo Eda, whose backing comes from Eda, Wada and Kawakami factions. JSP SecGen Tomomi NARITA has deserted his old comrade Eda to support Sasaki, ostensibly in the interests of party harmony. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

c. Comment: The issues, real and otherwise, are rather tortuous. (Despite the JSP's claim to being an "ideological party" issues probably do not take precedence over questions of power and factional advancement.) Eda has raised again the banner of "structural reform" and the Sasaki forces are attacking him as a "rightist", a label which can be applied accurately -- even in socialist terms -- only to Wada and Kawakami forces. To combat this, Eda seems to be moving leftward, as exemplified by the Eda faction's rather unexpected criticism of Ishibashi defense plan (Tokyo 1748). Perhaps the principal issue now is Communist China. In the measure that Sasaki forces fortify their intimacy with the ChiComs, the Eda forces already healthy reservations regarding the ChiComs seem to grow. Stories that Sasaki faction or portions thereof have received blessing of Chinese as beneficiaries of largesse obtained from "friendly firm" trade structure are heard with increasing frequency (WEEKA No. 37, Item 4). Anti-mainstream JSP officials told Embassy Eda forces categorically oppose a sellout to the ChiComs. They also attack the sending of Sasaki faction missions such as the recent one led by Kanijiro TATE to China as ill-advised (WEEKA No. 31, Item 7). Stories circulate to effect that within Sasaki forces, as in the "anti-mainstream", there are internal dissensions and that a "Revolutionary Committee" -- among whose principal figures are Diet members Yanosuke NARAZAKI (JSP Youth Bureau Chief) and Shigeo OSHIBA -- has been formed to steer Japanese left into revolutionary activities on Chinese model. Some of Narazaki's youthful "Red Guard" followers reportedly caused the donnybrook at the Shaseido convention in Tokyo (WEEKA 38, Item 7). While there may be efforts again this year try to find formula to avoid show down, fight to finish seems almost inevitable. At this juncture contest seems tossup although some observers tend to think Eda is gaining slightly on his rival. Control of so-called floating vote in the convention should be decisive. Last time Sasaki got it as much out of sympathy -- he had only been in office a short time -- as for any other reason. Where it will go this time is anybody's guess. For several reasons, including hope that Eda's election might be start of long term modernizing movement in the JSP, Eda seems preferable to Sasaki but in absolute terms Eda, whose structural reform theory was borrowed from Italian communist

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Palmiro TOGLIATTI, is rather far to the left. Press is paying more attention to the Eda-Sasaki confrontation as the convention draws nearer. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Sohyo Special Convention Considers Fall Struggle

a. Two-day convention in Tokyo designed to build up rank and file support for Sohyo's fall struggle ended October 6 (see WEEKA 38, Item 5). Horii-Iwai leadership made strong pitch for delegates' support of strike action planned for October 21 to protest Vietnam war. Delegates not very responsive (representatives of unions in major industries -- chemical, steel, communications-- did not speak at all), and statements from floor indicated some doubt about value of overall strategy proposed by leadership. President Horii and SecGen Iwai admitted need to convince rank and file of worth of strike action.

b. "Four pillars" of fall struggle are protest against Vietnam war, establishment of national minimum wage system, full implementation by GOJ of National Personnel Authority (NPA) recommendations for wage increases for public workers, and opposition to projected dismissals of coal miners under Government's rationalization program. Sohyo leadership advocates participation in "one-day joint struggle" on Vietnam issue with JCP on October 14, and strike action in support of "four pillars" on October 21. Unions will draw up individual strike plans next week. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Sparse participation and delegates' questioning of leadership's strategy indicate delegates' evaluation of Vietnam as a strike issue lower than that of leadership. Government's announcement that Cabinet would formally approve October 14 -- well before strike date -- implementation of NPA recommendation was cleverly timed to take away from Sohyo the major economic reason for striking. Horii's first sole performance as Sohyo President was not forceful, and all this leaves the impression that fall struggle may fizzle. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. JCP Target of ChiCom Criticism and More Expulsions Occur

a. At October 3 China-Japan Friendship Association meeting in Peking, CJFA Chief KUO Mo-Jo reportedly strongly criticized JCP's new "anti-China" policy line. He stated "some people" have taken action to undermine Sino-Japanese friendship, having joined "US and Japanese reactionaries and Soviet revisionists".

b. On October 2, JCP Central Committee expelled from party four Japanese students, studying in Peking, who allegedly beat up Akahata reporter there on evening of September 19. October 6, JCP Central Committee reportedly expelled Akahata's correspondent in East Berlin for "anti-party activities". (UNCLASSIFIED)

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c. Comment: Kuo's is first publicized high-level criticism of JCP by ChiComs. Although JCP not mentioned by name, Japanese reporters in Peking stated remarks in context were obviously aimed at JCP and their stories referred to incident as "strong attack" on JCP.

d. Peking Akahata reporter is an advisor to pro-JCP students studying in Peking. His beating was at hands of pro-ChiCom faction, who apparently took leaf from Red Guard notebook. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Philippine President Concludes Visit to Japan

a. Philippine President Marcos, Mrs. Marcos and party of twelve including Foreign Minister Ramos and Finance Minister Romualdez departed October 3 after state visit which began September 28. In joint communique two leaders expressed hopes for early peace in Vietnam and satisfaction over progress of regional cooperation. They welcomed the formation of Asian Development Bank (ADB) and recognized the importance of the Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast Asia. Communique noted Sato asked for early ratification of the long pending FCN treaty and Marcos promised to exert every effort to secure ratification. Communique also stated that Marcos stressed need for an increase in Japan's economic and technical aid to Philippines and proposed a joint commission to study requirements for a \$250 million loan first agreed on in 1956. Sato endorsed this proposal.

b. In a speech at Foreign Correspondents Club September 30 Marcos said seven-nation conference would seek common position on Vietnam as a first step toward peace. Marcos said Communist China is a reality which must be faced and expressed the belief that it will be admitted to the UN as soon as it adopts policy of peaceful coexistence. He stressed that Japan should play a vital role in economic development of Asia and reiterated belief it was desirable for Asians to establish political forum where they can discuss common problems.

c. Japanese press gave visit prominent place on front page but editorial comment was sparse. Yomiuri said October 3 the visit was welcome and expressed hope that FCN treaty would be ratified soon. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Visit went off very well and Sato and Marcos seem to have impressed each other favorably. Lack of comment in press, despite best efforts of GOJ to treat Marcos well, probably attributable to lack of contact between two countries and consequent lack of interest of Japanese media in relations with Philippines. Papers perhaps thought they had already used up their quota of space concerning Marcos when they commented coolly and unfavorably upon his proposal for seven-nation conference made just before his arrival. (WEEKA 39, Item 10) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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CONFIDENTIALPage 5, A-507
from Tokyo5. Okinawa Court Cases

Newspapers this week gave heavy front page coverage to October 5 opening of US Civil Administration Court hearings on two controversial cases transferred from Ryukyuan courts. Outside of inside page "backgrounders", however, there was no editorial or other comment. All papers were apparently willing to stand on their relatively mild comments made at time of announcement of final decision to transfer cases (WEEKKA 39, Item 4). (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. PriMin Sato Hospitalized

a. PriMin Sato was hospitalized October 3 for treatment of influenza and pyelitis. October 6 physician's report stated PriMin recovering nicely and would be discharged from hospital within a few days (Tokyo's 2540). (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: PriMin's illness not serious, but did force postponement of scheduled Kyushu stumping tour. Postponement of tour is further setback to hoped for Sato boom, which press has treated coolly from the outset. (see WEEKKA 37, Item 1) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Scandals Continue to Plague the LDP

a. JSP Lower House Audit Committee members at September 30 meeting raised question of some \$30 million in loans from semi-governmental Forestry and Agriculture Bank to Kyowa Seito sugar refining company. Point at issue was whether false receipts (and, by implication, political pressure) were used by company in obtaining loans. Socialists called for receipts; LDP said matter would be handled within the party. October 3, press reported suicide of a high company official's wife. The leading Socialist critic announced October 5 that company officials had tried to bribe him on September 30.

b. Asahi of October 6 carried cluster of articles outlining in some detail nefarious activities of one of Japan's principal gangster organizations, the Kobe-based Yamaguchi Gumi. The articles alleged tie-ups between the gang and conservative political circles and mentioned specifically Kobe LDP Dietman Shigetami SUNADA as one of the gang's protectors.

d. Comment: Full story of sugar company loans is not out, but rumors charge ex-Kono faction leader Seishi SHIGEMASA may be implicated. Newspaper articles alleging LDP-gangster tie-ups appear from time to time. Both matters contribute to keeping scandal issue prominently in public eye. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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By	MDA Date 8/19/97

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from Tokyo8. Soka Gakkai Changes Overseas Name

a. Soka Gakkai announced October 5 that name of overseas movement would be changed to "Nichiren Shoshu". Soka Gakkai is lay organization of Nichiren Shoshu sect of Buddhism. Reportedly, name was changed to "dispel prevalent fear that Soka Gakkai may engage in politics overseas as well as in Japan". (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Soka Gakkai leaders have been extremely sensitive on this point. Although Soka Gakkai has denied overseas entry into politics, fear remains prevalent in many Asian countries. This also obvious attempt to dis-associate themselves from "fascist" and "militarist" tags sometimes used by western reporters. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

9. Japan Defense Agency Director General to Visit U.S.

New Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director General, Eikichi KAMBAYASHI-YAMA, departs October 7 on three-week inspection tour of U.S. with side trip to Mexico. During course of visit he will meet with CINCPAC, pay call on Secretary McNamara, and visit installations at Colorado Springs, Norfolk, New York, Fort Benning, Cape Kennedy, etc. Mr. Kambayashiyama will be accompanied by his wife, Chief of MAAG/Japan, Brigadier General Kyle L. Riddle, and several JDA officials. (UNCLASSIFIED)

MILITARY - NegativePSYCHOLOGICAL - Negative

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By: MJD NARA Date: 8/19/97

OPTIONAL ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE OCT 17 1966

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, TAIPEI, SEOUL, SAIGON, MANILA, MOSCOW, DJAKARTA, CANBERRA, AUCKLAND

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 41

REF :

Action Taken: Noted

Date of Action: Oct 21, 1966

CONTENTS: Office Symbol: INR/RSFE/124

1. LDP Scandals Bring Demands for Cabinet Resignation or Early Election
2. JCP Expels Pro-Chicom Central Committee Member
3. Malik Visits Japan
4. Japanese and Koreans Move to Moderate Fishing Boat Frictions
5. JMSDF Cruise Returns
6. Extreme Leftists Gear Up for Bertrand Russell's "War Crimes Trial"

POLITICAL

1. LDP scandals Bring Demands for Cabinet Resignation or Early Election

a. Diet committee hearing October 11 revealed Transportation Minister Arafune, in addition to previous questionable conduct (Weeks 37, Item 2) had taken two businessmen with him to ROK at time of Japan-ROK Cabinet Conference early September although their purpose was strictly private business. Later same day, Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi announced Sato had accepted Arafune resignation and chosen another Kawashima faction member, Sensuke FUJIEDA, to replace him.

b. October 12 JSP, DSP and Komeito presented to Sato through Aichi separate demands that Cabinet resign en bloc or Sato dissolve Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by:

POL (see last page)

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:TWAINSWORTH

Clearances:

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from Tokyo

Lower House and call general election. Press, partly because of Arafune's impenitent attitude in farewell press conference, continue to attack Sato for appointing Arafune to Cabinet in first place and then taking so long to get rid of him. Opposition parties maneuvered toward joint action to exploit criticism of Sato administration, as JSP SecGen Narita and Komeito SecGen Hojo October 13 agreed on "joint struggle" to overthrow Cabinet and Hojo urged inclusion of DSP and perhaps JCP in alliance. JSP Chairman Sasaki same day, however, stopped short of delivering decisive thrust, calling on LDP Diet members to resign en masse and promising Socialists would do same.

c. LDP SecGen Tanaka October 13 said Diet dissolution not appropriate way of dealing with political crisis of this nature, and PriMin Sato promised action to clean up LDP. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. LDP Sources expressed view that party could surmount crisis for present but some thought likelihood of early general election considerably increased by these developments. (CONFIDENTIAL)

e. Comment: Sasaki had been rumored prepared at October 13 press conference to announce mass resignation of Socialist Diet members which would have practical effect of forcing early election. Reasons for his waffling not yet clear but JSP leadership in past has failed persuade its Diet members to sacrifice their own tenure for uncertainties of new election. Present factional situation within JSP, where moderate Eda supporters looking forward to December effort to unseat radical Sasaki, may have made former group unwilling go along with general resignation tactics.

f. Intensity and duration of press attacks on Sato administration, which are key element in situation, depend to large extent how much more dirt opposition can dig up concerning LDP members in near future. Some LDP factions appear to be attempting exploit situation in hope of strengthening anti-Sato sentiment at December 1 party convention. Present indications nevertheless are that Sato will hold out against both intraparty opposition and external criticism (barring further sensational disclosures) and probably postpone general election until more favorable circumstances in latter half 1967 (Tokyo 2777). (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. JCP Expels Pro-Chicom Central Committee Member

a. Press reports Japan Communist Party (JCP) expelled 41 pro-Chicom dissidents and suspended "members rights" of "fairly large number" since early September as result of continuing controversy over SecGen Kenji MIYAMOTO's new "independent" line. (Week 40, Item 3). Most prominent member expelled to date is Ryuji NISHIZAWA, member JCP Central Committee until October 13 expulsion.

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By	MDA Date 8/19/97

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He is also son-in-law of late Kyuichi TOKUDA, former JCP Secretary General who died in China in 1953 but remains one of great figures, along with Chairman Nozaka, in JCP hagiography. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: JCP disciplinary measures are apparently aimed at tightening up party in preparation for 10th National Convention beginning October 24 and paving way for Miyamoto to attain unopposed ratification of new JCP line at convention. Nishizawa incurred expulsion by writing article entitled "I Criticize the Miyamoto Line of the JCP" for projected publication "Study of Mao Tse-tung's Thought". His stature within the party and his family connections lend opposition to new Miyamoto line somewhat more serious proportions. However, GOJ public safety officials reportedly do not believe expulsions will lead to anything like problems within JCP encountered when pro-CPSU Shiga faction was expelled two years ago. Interest centers on whether Chinese will endorse dissidents as new "pure" communist party. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Malik Visits Japan

a. Indo FonMin Adam MALIK arrived in Tokyo October 7 from United States and left for Indonesia October 12 after seeing PriMin Sato, who was in hospital, and FonMin Shiina, who flew in from Canada previous day. At press conference October 8, Malik said he came to Japan at invitation of GOJ and that his purpose was to explain Indo policy. In response to questions, he said he favored UN representation for all countries, including Chicoms, but declined to comment on whether Indonesia favored membership for Republic of China as well. He denied differences with Sukarno, stating that both Sukarno and government are following policies adopted by MPRS. Malik also said Indonesia had been asked by both Communist and Free World countries to play role in seeking solution to Vietnam war, but declined to say which countries had requested Indonesia's help or give any other details. Malik indicated he planned to go to Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in late October and would discuss with Soviet leaders possibility of deferring loan payments. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Malik's visit coincided with that of Indo Vice-Premier Buwono, who arrived in Japan somewhat unexpectedly a few days before Malik. Malik's visit provided occasion for useful exchange of views and opportunity for GOJ keep abreast of current Indonesian thinking. So far as we now know, there were no substantive decisions made on problems concerning two countries. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIALPage 4
A-539
from Tokyo4. Japanese and Koreans Move to Moderate Fishing Boat Frictions

a. GOJ and ROK according press are moving toward early implementation of side agreement-in-principle, made during last year's normalization talks, for institution of joint patrols in joint fisheries area. Arrangement designed to lower incidence of fishing boat seizures (mostly by Korean side) and to facilitate handling of any incidents by having official representatives of each nation on board patrol vessels of other nation. Official representatives would have right to communicate with own authorities but no control over vessel. According to press, implementation of joint patrol arrangements has been delayed by occurrence of bilateral controversies such as North Korean technicians entry problem and arrival in Japan of North Korean vessel seized by defectors (Weeka 39, Item 3, Weeka 38, Item 3). (UNCLASSIFIED)

MILITARY5. JMSDF Cruise Returns

a. Four JMSDF destroyers returned to Yokosuka on October 11 after completing 96-day training cruise to Australia, New Zealand, Guam, Philippines, Taiwan and Okinawa. Fleet, under the command of RADM Hidesumi MIZUTANI, brought back from Manila and Guam remains and belongings of some Japanese WW II dead. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Reports from all ports of call indicate training squadron got impressive reception and, in turn, made distinctly favorable impression on their hosts. JMSDF officials have expressed satisfaction with results of port calls and relief that visit passed without incident in countries where memories of WW II still presumably linger. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL6. Extreme Leftists Gear Up for Bertrand Russell's "War Crimes Trial"

a. Press reports leftwing sponsors said that some 50 people attended first meeting on October 13th of "Japan Committee to Investigate War Crimes in Vietnam". JCP organ Akahata for October 13 reported that committee was being established to support Bertrand Russell Foundation's plans to stage public trial of US leaders for Vietnam "war crimes". Akahata identified as organizers well-known extreme leftists Hiroshi SUEKAWA, President of Ritsumeikan University, Hajime MATSUURA, Hokkaido University professor; and lawyer Shinkichi UNNO of Human Rights Association and also reported that 70 "scholars and men of culture" have signed up as charter members.

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By	MM AARA Date 8/19/97

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



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b. Earlier, Akahata had reported that far-left Sinologist Yoshitaro HIRANO received telegram from Bertrand Russell Foundation asking him to join on-scene investigation in North Vietnam of U.S. "war crimes".
(UNCLASSIFIED)



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Authority *NM 959066*By *MM* NARA Date *8/19/97*

ORIGIN/ACTION

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AIRGRAM*POL 2-1 Japan*

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A-590
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, NAHA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, BANGKOK, KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, LONDON, DJAKARTA, PARIS, MADRID, MOSCOW, GAMBERA, SAIGON

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: **October 22, 1966**

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 42

REF :

CONTENTS

1. Political Atmospherics--Storm Warnings Still Up for Sato Cabinet
2. Sohyo Protest Strike Against Vietnam War
3. Consultative Committee Meeting on Okinawa
4. PonMin Departs on SEA Tour
5. Kawashima Returns from Eastern Europe
6. Soviet Culture Minister Visits Japan
7. USSR Aircraft Exhibit at Osaka
8. Australian Naval Ships Visit Japan

POLITICALPolitical Atmospherics--Storm Warnings Still Up for Sato Cabinet

a. Storm clouds again dominated political horizon this week. Prospects for fair weather still seemed remote but Sato government appeared prepared for the time being to try to ride out storm generated by JSP-led opposition pressures on scandal prone LDP administration (Tokyo's 2975).

Group 3

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
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Contents and Classification Approved by

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b. Opposition interpellators in Lower House Committee raked Government witnesses over the coals on variety of charges of corruption and abuse of office. First to feel their ire was AgMin Matsuno who was charged with having planned to visit at government expense Las Vegas and Mexican fleshpots and with having taken, also at government expense, personal friend as "interpreter" on official visit to Canada. JSP also renewed accusations unnamed LDP politicians had received portion of exorbitant profits made from Taiwan banana imports. By mid-week questioning of Matsuno had abated and JSP interpellators were voicing doubts about PriMin Sato's tax returns. However, opposition turned with vengeance to Defense DirGen Kambayashiyama's latest escapade, the taking with him on JSDF aircraft on his now notorious "inspection" visit to Kagoshima a convicted extortionist out on bail pending appeal. Kambayashiyama's return from official visit to U. S. now moved up to October 22 and opposition expected concentrate on trying to topple him from Cabinet.

c. PriMin Sato October 20 expressed at Lower House Budget Committee session his regret for "recent incidents that invited the nation's suspicion about politicians' morality and discipline." He stated he had responsibility for action to cure ills causing present popular dissatisfaction and emphasized reform of LDP and achievement goal inexpensive public elections. In response JSP questioning PriMin asserted he had no intention comply with opposition demands for mass Cabinet resignation or Diet dissolution.

d. All week LDP leaders and would-be leaders conducted discussions on current crisis. Press reports and LDP sources indicated fluid situation had provoked variety of responses. Young Turks among LDP Diet members talked of opposing Sato at December 1 LDP convention by supporting Economic Planning Agency Director Fujiyama for party presidency or by casting blank ballots. Fujiyama--under pressure from party leaders not to rock the boat in LDP's hour of crisis--has not made any public announcement, but family source told Embassy Fujiyama had confided to close relatives his decision to run against PriMin. (CONFIDENTIAL)

e. Comment: Intra-party maneuvering in LDP reflected recognition by all sectors of party that LDP and Sato in particular faced real crisis--by far the most serious in Sato's two years of office. By week's end, dominant LDP mood still seemed to favor sticking with Sato and attempting to ride out the storm with present Cabinet until after December 1 convention. In return Sato would be expected to take decisive action in form of post-convention full scale revamping of Cabinet and Party Executive. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIALPage 3, A-590
from Tokyo2. Sohyo Protest Strike Against Vietnam War

a. Unexpectedly weak showing by Private Railway Workers (Shitetsu Soren) and settlement of Postal Workers (Zentei) work hours dispute left early phase of Sohyo strike in protest of Vietnam war and three other "pillars" of fall struggle (WEEKA 40, Item 2) with almost no effect on general public. Main burden of strike now falls on Local Government Employees (Jichiro) and Teachers Union (Nikkyoso), both of whom plan strike action in morning and afternoon. Rival trade union federation, Domei (170,000 members) issued statement condemning strike as mistaken tactic which threatens parliamentary democracy in Japan and, because of one-sided support of Hanoi, does not help restoration of peace in Vietnam. Domei statement received minor coverage in vernacular press. Spokesmen for various GOJ ministries repeated warnings that public workers would be punished for strike activity and urged them abandon strike plans. Mass media critical of strike as inappropriate form of protest. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

b. Comment: With exception of Coal Miners (Tanro), who are striking against dismissals anticipated under GOJ coal industry rationalization program, no significant strike activity expected in private sector. Jichiro and Nikkyoso are anxious not to repeat last year's fall struggle strike cancellation. However, both unions are likely to tone down some of planned strike action to legal forms of protest. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Consultative Committee Meeting on Okinawa

a. Tenth meeting of US-Japan Consultative Committee on Okinawa was held October 18. Main agenda item was formal presentation of US proposals for Japanese assistance to Okinawa over coming year which totalled \$25.8 million for regular JFY 1967 aid program and \$4.23 million for typhoon rehabilitation assistance (distributed between JFY 1966 and JFY 1967). Only other agenda item covered GOJ request for reply to its request for change in Okinawan vessel flag; US replied matter still under study. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: GOJ appears pleased with overall scale of US aid proposals, but apparently has some suggestions for revision of project list. Low-key press coverage this ConCom reflected general satisfaction that US side had apparently already taken into account in its proposal well-known GOJ priorities, particularly in field welfare programs. Press handling of flag issue was more relaxed than might have been expected. GOJ gave US representatives designs illustrative of their flag proposal consisting of Japanese flag as bottom element and several variations of pennants symbolizing Okinawa fluttering separately above (Tokyo's 2900). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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By	MBD NARA Date 8/19/97

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4. FonMin Departs on SEA Tour

a. FonMin Etsusaburo SHIINA departed October 19 for scheduled ten-day tour to Thailand, Malayasia, Singapore and Indonesia. Press reports that Shiina hopes to reach agreement with SEA countries on questions of reparations and increased aid, and that visits are prelude to regional agricultural conference scheduled for December in Tokyo.

b. Following SEA visit Shiina is slated to proceed to London and Paris where he will participate in regular bilateral meetings and Ambassadorial conference, respectively, and to Madrid for essentially goodwill visit. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: FonMin's SEA visit further indication of Japanese initiative in SEA economic matters and will mark step forward in Japan's activities in area. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Kawashima Returns from Eastern Europe

a. LDP Vice President Kawashima returned to Tokyo October 19 from Eastern Europe where he visited Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania. While in Eastern Europe, Kawashima conferred with Yugoslav President Tito, who is expected to visit Japan late March 1967, and with high-ranking Bulgarian and Romanian officials. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Kawashima probably had other things on his mind besides Eastern Europe. His position as LDP Vice President is rumored to be in jeopardy as a result of his role in protecting Kawashima faction member, ex-Transportation Minister Arafune of "express train" fame. Kawashima's Tokyo Airport press conference was monopolized by press inquiries concerning scandals, Diet dissolution, Cabinet reshuffle, et al (see Item 1). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Soviet Culture Minister Visits Japan

Soviet Culture Minister E. A. FURTSEVA arrived Japan October 20 for ten-day stay. During her visit Furtseva will attend opening Tokyo exhibit modern Russian art paintings and also will visit Kyoto and Nara. (UNCLASSIFIED)

MILITARY

7. USSR Aircraft Exhibit at Osaka

a. Early week press reports indicated USSR would exhibit M1-6, M1-8, KA-26 helicopters and flight demonstration of TU-134, short-haul jet transport,

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from Tokyo

at Osaka during second Soviet Commerce and Industry Fair (October 15-26).
 (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: M1-4, M1-6 and M1-8 type helicopters arrived aboard Soviet merchant ship in Niigata on evening October 18 for assembly and flight to Osaka. Substitution of older M1-4 for KA-26 probably related to Soviet efforts to sell helicopters. Maintenance support on M1-4 would be easier than for KA-26. The TU-134 arrived Tokyo International Airport October 20. Demonstration flights will be conducted from Tokyo to Osaka and back on 22 and 24 October.
 (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. Australian Naval Ships Visit Japan

a. Two Australian anti-submarine frigates, HMAS STUART and HMAS PARRAMATTA, arrived Tokyo October 17 for informal five-day goodwill visit. Prior to Tokyo arrival, HMAS STUART made portcall at Kagoshima and HMAS PARRAMATTA visited Beppu. The ships with 33 officers and 482 enlisted men departed Tokyo October 21 bound for Singapore. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: During an onboard reception, RAN officers effusively praised IKARA Weapons System (an Australian designed and manufactured anti-submarine missile) utilized by ships and subjected JMSDF officers to hard-sell approach. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

c. Unlike previous naval visitors from Peru, West Germany and France, the Australian crews did not parade at Yasukuni Shrine for Japanese military war dead. (CONFIDENTIAL)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Negative.

EMMERSON

POL:FJMcNeil

WTBreer

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LabA:RFPfeiffer

NavA:Maj Spiro

LtCmdr Strickland

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Authority NM 959666
By WMD NARA Date 8/19/97

ACTION/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

42 **AIRGRAM**

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PRIORITY

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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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NSA	REC	NSC
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A-611
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 31 1966

INFO : FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, NAHA, HICOMRY, COMUS/J, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSAR-PAC, CINCPACAF, HONG KONG, SEOUL, MOSCOW, MANILA, SAIGON, TAIPEI

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: October 29, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 43

REF :

CONTENTS

1. LDP Fends Off Opposition Attacks
2. DSP's Nishio Blames Both LDP and JSP for Political "Black Mist"
3. JCP 10th Party Congress; Further JCP Expulsions
4. Japan-China Group Splits, Another Founders
5. Supreme Court Ruling on Public Enterprise Workers Workshop Rally
6. Sohyo Strike Against Vietnam Unimpressive
7. Japanese Return North Korean Boat to Russians
8. Kambayashiyama Under Fire
9. Reaction to CCNE-4
10. Press Reaction to Manila Conference

POLITICAL1. LDP Fends Off Opposition Attacks

a. PriMin Sato and LDP colleagues spent busy week defending selves against multi-pronged opposition attacks on scandal and neglect-of-duty charges of varying degrees of seriousness involving JDA Director General Kambayashiyama, Agriculture Minister Matsuno, Labor Minister Yamate, and other prominent party figures. As of October 28 opposition

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Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:TWainsworth

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from Tokyo

had failed win decisive additional ground and LDP sources were making cautiously optimistic noises for first time in two weeks.

b. Kambayashiyama got back from US October 22 and ran head-on into press barrage at airport where he unable do more than blame troubles on his secretaries. Meeting with Sato next day apparently bolstered his confidence somewhat, as PriMin revealed he did not intend oust him on spot. JDA chief remained on low-postured defensive throughout long grilling by House of Representatives Cabinet Committee October 27 but came off without further visible damage. He faces further committee questioning October 29. JSP spokesmen during week had threatened new "bombshell" charges against Kambayashiyama but did not deliver during October 27 session.

c. Upper House Agriculture and Forestry Committee October 25 and 26 was scene of another opposition offensive. Matsuno got off relatively easily October 25 with confession of sins of omission related to excessive government loans to Kyowa Seito sugar refining combine. Komeito in same committee next day attempted charge former Lower House Speaker Funada, former JDA DirGen Koizumi, Representative Matsuhei MORI, Councillor Heihachiro OTAKE, and relatives of late Ichiro KONO with involvement in alleged rake-off from importing Taiwan bananas under GOJ allocations. LDP chairman of committee cut session off in mid-charge, provoking opposition wrath but postponing issue for which LDP apparently not fully prepared.

d. LDP made tentative start at counter-offensive with demand for removal from chairmanship of Upper House Science and Technology Committee of Socialist Sozo OMORI who reportedly suffered "nervous breakdown" on recent Kyushu trip aimed at digging up new anti-LDP dirt. LDP also set up new Party Discipline Investigation Committee, headed by former Lower House Speaker Ichiro KIYOSE, as evidence of intention to set own house in order. Finance Minister Fukuda, Administration Agency Director Shigeho TANAKA and other LDP figures brought suit against several of rumor-mongering tabloids which had carried scandalous accusations against them. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

e. Comment: Net impression of week's activities was that opposition trying desperately but unsuccessfully to land knock-out blow against Cabinet in form of new disclosure which would force resignation of at least one more minister. Matsuno and Kambayashiyama priority targets not only because of available charges but also because they are Sato faction members. JSP itself probably weakened impact of October 27 Kambayashiyama hearings by excessive build-up for "bombshell" which not yet produced. Impression is spreading that JSP has shot bolt and now forced to resort to relatively trivial charges against Cabinet

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from Tokyo

members, e.g., criticism of Labor Minister Yamate for flamboyant visit to constituency, with no allegation of actual improprieties. LDP sources seem optimistic that barring genuinely sensational new disclosures by opposition, Cabinet can tide over present difficulties. Predictions of Cabinet reshuffle after December 1 LDP convention are multiplying. At same time recognition of need for real housecleaning and tightening of standards within LDP has been effectively brought home to party members and public. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. DSP's Nishio Blames Both LDP and JSP for Political "Black Mist"

a. In October 27 address to DSP Central Committee, Chairman Suehiro NISHIO predictably laced into LDP for its role in creating "black mist" of scandal enveloping Japanese political scene. Nishio also apportioned generous share of blame to JSP for having permitted ideology and factionalism to impede it from playing proper role in parliamentary system. Nishio foresaw golden opportunity for DSP to take lead in proposing concrete measures for political housecleaning and to make significant gains in next Lower House election. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Press, which has tended to attach more significance than probably warranted to four-party (JSP, DSP, Komeito, JCP) opposition alliance, grumbled that Nishio's remarks about JSP ran counter to reported opposition agreement not to attack one another. Truth is DSP and Komeito have made unmistakably clear their intention confine "opposition alliance" to activities within Diet on issues of LDP corruption and maladministration (WEEKA 41, Item 1). Mutual interest permits marriage of convenience for purpose of attacking "black mist", but electoral and policy considerations do not allow opposition parties to lose sight of their fundamental differences. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. JCP 10th Party Congress; Further JCP Expulsions

a. JCP's 10th Party Congress opened in Tokyo October 24, scheduled two years after 9th Congress. According press reports, only four of some 1,000 delegates absent. Due to GOJ refusal to grant entry visas, foreign delegates not present. First day given over to opening address by Chairman Sanzo NOZAKA, unanimous approval of expulsion of former JCP Central Committee member Ryuji NISHIZAWA (see WEEKA 41, Item 2), and Central Committee report by SecGen Kenji MIYAMOTO (see Tokyo's 3088). Akahata reported second, third, and fourth days saw laudatory discussion of Central Committee draft report. Congress scheduled to run approximately one week.

b. October 26 Akahata announced October 23 JCP Central Committee Control and Audit Committee decision to expel Asia-Africa Solidarity Committee

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Administrative Affairs Chief Shosaku ITAI for "anti-party activities". October 27 Akahata revealed same day decision to expel six more party members, resident in Peking, for "violent anti-party actions". (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Congress taking quiet course predicted. PSIA source told us there no significant opposition to Miyamoto line, but if trouble occurs, it will probably center around Central Committee member Kuraji ANZAI.

d. Itai small fish compared to Nishizawa, but number of those leaving JCP rising. According PSIA source, some 60 pro-Chicom JCP members expelled, membership rights of about 50 suspended, and approximately 100 members have left voluntarily to date. Source predicted this number would double during first few months after Congress, eventually totaling 500 to 600, but saw little impact on "independent" line, 200,000-member (his figure) JCP. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Japan-China Group Splits, Another Founders

a. Press October 25 reported split of 16-year-old Japan-(Communist) China Friendship Association (membership around 50,000). Immediate cause of split reportedly was permanent directors' failure to agree on approval of joint communique which JCFA vice-president signed in Peking October 12. Pro-JCP association officer objected strongly to part of communique which "indirectly blamed JCP for obstructing friendly relations". After several hours of heated debate, Managing Director Seimin MIYAZAKI led walkout of nearly half of JCFA's 73 permanent directors, including Chairman and JSP Adviser Shichiro MATSUMOTO. Following day, Miyazaki group formed "Japan-China Friendship Association-Legitimate Headquarters" organization, while pro-JCP members of original association, according Akahata, hurriedly filled in gaps produced by walkout.

b. October 26 Japan-China Trade Promotion Association, one of two large associations which handle "friendly firm" trade, voted to disband. Dissolution came after failure of attempts to reorganize organization in wake of late July Chicom demands to remove "uncooperative", i.e., pro-JCP, elements (see WEEKA 38, Item 8). Some 160 of 400 member firms agreed same day to set up new "Japan-China Trade Promotion Reform League" to continue "friendly firm" trade. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: PSIA source states that Miyazaki is secret member of JCP and that "Legitimate Headquarters" group includes both JSP and pro-Chicom JCP-oriented members. Miyazaki himself may be secretly expelled from JCP according PSIA. Since friendship group cannot be meaningful without Chicom friendship, "Legitimate Headquarters" is expected over time to attract vast majority of members.

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from Tokyo

d. Trade Promotion Association's operations had been paralyzed since first Chicom criticism. When it became clear that group could not be re-organized to Chicom satisfaction, establishment of "Reform League" was inevitable. Since numerous technical trade details must be worked out, new group will probably not be in operation before Spring of 1967. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Supreme Court Ruling on Public Enterprise Workers Workshop Rally

a. Supreme Court plenary session handed down 8-to-4 decision October 26, stating that public enterprise employees whose actions stemming from labor-management disputes, which are not per se illegal (e.g., acts of violence), are not liable to criminal action, but fall under those provisions of Public Enterprise Labor Relations Law which authorize disciplinary measures, including dismissal. Court decision involves case of eight officials of Postal Workers (Zentei) who led workshop rally at Tokyo Central Post Office during 1958 spring struggle which delayed processing of mail. Case will now be returned to appellate court. Zentei and Sohyo spokesmen hailed Court decision as step forward in their campaign to "recover strike right" for both public enterprise and civil service workers. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Many leaders of public enterprise unions have already been discharged for illegal acts, and are not subject to further disciplinary action under Public Enterprise Labor Relations Law. Court's action is setback to those elements in GOJ who advocate use of criminal punishments under other laws to inhibit public enterprise unions' actions. Decision will encourage Sohyo's long-standing campaign to recover strike right for public workers. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Sohyo Strike Against Vietnam Unimpressive

a. Spotty strike action by Teachers Union (Nikkyoso) and Municipal Workers (Jichiro) left overall impression that Sohyo's October 21 "general strike" to protest Vietnam war and support other three "pillars" of fall struggle was strike in name only (WEEKA 42, Item 2). Only noteworthy strike action taken by National Railway Workers (Kokuro), Nikkyoso, Jichiro, Municipal Transport Workers (Toshikotsu) and, in private sector, Coal Miners (Tanro). Conspicuous was spotty and ineffective performance of Sohyo President Horii's Private Railway Workers (Shitetsu Soren), and failure to strike by usually militant Chemical Workers (Goka Roren), Postal Workers (Zentei) and Communication Workers (Zen Dentsu). Only union concentrating on Vietnam issue was militant Kokuro, home union of Sohyo SecGen Iwai. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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By	MD NARA Date 8/19/97

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from Tokyo

b. Comment: Sohyo now plans shift focus of political action from Vietnam issue to more popular issues of LDP scandals, Diet dissolution, and price inflation, in form of demonstrations and petition campaigns. Political strikes in near future not likely and October 21 performance clearly showed rank and file feeling Vietnam is not suitable strike issue. Barring drastic change in course of war, Sohyo likely to use Vietnam as supporting issue, rather than focal point, in demonstrations and to spur on campaign to collect 40 million signatures protesting Vietnam war. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Japanese Return North Korean Boat to Russians

a. According press, Japanese Maritime Agency had appointment to return to Russians North Korean fishing boat Pyong Sin (WEEKA 39, Item 3) in international waters October 21, but Soviets failed to turn up. According FonMin spokesman, Russians resented publicity. FonMin has informed ROK Embassy confidentially, however, that transfer was effected successfully October 24 in international waters off Suruga Bay "sometime in the middle of the night when photography was impossible".

b. Comment: ROK's were just as happy that transfer took place quietly (assuming GOJ would not make over vessel to them). Interesting, however, that Soviets were so reluctant to be associated publicly with their new role as North Korean diplomatic agents in Japan. (CONFIDENTIAL)

MILITARY

8. Kambayashiyama Under Fire

Cutting short his official tour of the US, JDA DirGen Eikichi Kambayashiyama returned October 22 to answer opposition party charges of mixing private business with his public duties. Kambayashiyama was reprimanded by PriMin Sato, but the latter evidently decided to retain the DirGen in Cabinet. October 27 Kambayashiyama was questioned for 9 hours in Lower House Cabinet Committee and admitted to being thoughtless in his conduct. Grilling is scheduled to continue on 29th with Socialists promising to drop "bombshell" charge in hearings (see Item 1 above). (UNCLASSIFIED) Comment: Further trouble for DirGen could be doubly embarrassing now, as on Oct 30 he is scheduled to accompany Sato in reviewing troops at 16th anniversary parade of Self Defense Forces. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

9. Reaction to CCNE-4

a. News from Peking of Chicom missile N-test was given heavy and prominent play in all October 28 Japanese news media, with extensive space

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By: VMD NARA Date: 8/19/97CONFIDENTIALPage 7, A-611
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accorded wide range of official and unofficial comment. Opinions varied widely with commentator's attitude toward Chicoms. Point in common was view that Chicoms had moved surprisingly far toward operational nuclear missile, and several commentators said immediate effect might be to deter any trend toward Sino-US clash.


b. Opinion ranged from statement of Rikkyo University President Matsushita (reported in Sankei newspaper) that intense Chicom political military made nuclear missile "like knife in crazy man's hands" and meant Japan must strengthen security ties with U. S. to comment of Asahi editorial writer Okuda (on TBS radio news show) that "it is widely known that Chicoms developing N-arms to break US-Soviet monopoly" and that from long-range view Chicom's successful drive for N-arms was elevating China's standing. He concluded that so long as Japan had no N-weapons Chicoms would not attack Japan, so that anxiety unwarranted.


c. Official GOJ reaction in Chief Cabinet Secretary's statement: Japan's official policy is to oppose any nation's N-tests, and this fourth CCNE is very regrettable. Peking's position that its N-arms program is for peace runs counter to humanitarian principles. Japan will protest, requesting Chicom's "serious self-reflection".

10. Press Reaction to Manila Conference

Initial October 26 extensive press play expressed disappointment at conference outcome, suggesting that end result of conference might be intensification of Vietnam war. Although six-month withdrawal pledge noted, press felt conference communiqués confirmed earlier predictions that no dramatic proposals would emerge. Moderate play was given "unofficial" FonMin release stating its disappointment at absence of new peace formula. Next day press reported FonMin's "new appraisal" which called six-month pledge "a substantial result". Reports that Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi commented that Japan's non-participation enhanced Japan's prestige also received moderate play. October 27 editorials in general expressed disappointment at conference's military emphasis and lack of strong peace moves. (See Tokyo's 3120, 3136 and 3153.) (UNCLASSIFIED)


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ArmA:Maj Harris
LabAtt:RFPfeiffer
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By: VMD NARA Date: 8/1997

ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 Japan

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 3
 INFO: CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT,
 COMUS/J, FUKUOKA, HICOMRY, HONG KONG, KOBE-OSAKA,
 NAGOYA, NAHA, NEW DELHI, SAPPORO, TAIPEI, YOKOHAMA.

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: November 5, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 44

REF :

CONTENTS

1. Fujiyama to Run for LDP Presidency
2. January General Election Rumor
3. JSP Resumes Internal Debate
4. Defense Council Meets on Third Defense Buildup
5. New Ryukyus High Commissioner Visits Tokyo
6. Kishi Returns from Taipei
7. Japan-Indian Consultations Held
8. Taiwanese Independence Leader Returns to Taiwan
9. Self-Defense Forces Parade
10. Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) Aircraft Depart for Hawaii

POLITICAL1. Fujiyama to Run for LDP Presidency

a. Economic Planning Agency DirGen Aiichiro FUJIYAMA November 4 offered resignation from Cabinet in order run against PriMin SATO in December 1 contest for LDP presidency. Sato promptly accepted, amid press reports he would announce own candidacy at November 5 "one-day Cabinet meeting" at Sapporo. Two days before Fujiyama quit Cabinet press headlined reports he had made up mind to enter race. Sato met separately with LDP faction leaders Shojiro KAWASHIMA (LDP Vice President),

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Contents and Classification Approved by:

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Isamu MURAKAMI (part of ex-OHNO faction), and Takeo MIKI (MITI) November 3 and Mitsujiro ISHII (Justice Minister) November 4, and received pledges of their backing. On other side, LDP veteran Kenzo MATSUMURA and ex-Kono faction figure Yasuhiro NAKASONE gathered about 25 followers for November 1 meeting which made clear their opposition to Sato. Ex-Ikeda faction leader Shigesaburo MAEO (DirGen of Hokkaido Development Agency) at Sapporo November 3 made carefully non-committal statement saying that it "inevitable" there should be intra-LDP opposition to Sato in present circumstances but his group would await Sato November 5 policy declaration before taking position. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: There is virtually no question but what Sato will win reelection, and Sato backers are clearly worried less, at this point, about contest as such than about subsequent effect on Sato's control of LDP. Ikeda faction holds key to whether Fujiyama can win more than 100 votes which LDP and press regard as minimum to tag him as continuing intra-LDP opposition standard-bearer; if he falls short of this mark he is likely to find himself relegated to status of perennial also-ran. Fujiyama faction spokesman intimated, after chief's resignation from Cabinet, that Sato had warned him to quit now. Spokesman contrasted this with PriMin's infinite tolerance for errors of own factional followers such as JDA DirGen KAMBAYAHYAMA. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. January General Election Rumor

a. This week saw sharp stepup of speculations on timing of Diet dissolution and general election. Sato faction lieutenants LDP SecGen Tanaka, Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi, Construction Minister Hashimoto and Shigeru Hori met October 30 and reportedly recommended early dissolution and election to PriMin. Sato, according unconfirmed press reports, took position that his re-election as LDP President (Item 1 above) was first order of business and it was still too early for firm decision on timing of general election. PriMin also strictly forbade his immediate advisers to talk with outsiders about timing of dissolution and elections.

b. November 4 press reported PriMin as saying that after the December 1 LDP Convention he would carry out "personnel renovation" with suggestion that large scale Cabinet reorganization and perhaps shuffle of LDP functionaries was contemplated. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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By	WMD NARA Date 8/19/97

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c. Sato faction member of former Cabinet rank November 2 told Embassy PriMin would reshuffle Cabinet after LDP Convention and if opposition proved "unreasonably intractable" he would dissolve Lower House early in special session which would convene early December. Otherwise dissolution would come in subsequent regular session, probably before end of December. In either case elections would follow in latter half of January. (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. Comment: Most of current press analyses and political observers accept this timing in general although some predict early January election, others post-New Year dissolution. Some LDP conservatives, reportedly including former PriMin Kishi, are said to fear that early elections will bring LDP substantial losses. Most of party, however, seems to have swung to view that situation unlikely get much better from LDP standpoint before November 1967 election deadline and decisive stroke is best policy. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. JSP Resumes Internal Debate


a. After JSP attacks on LDP "Black mist" dominated news from socialist camp for several weeks, normalcy returned with Eda-Sasaki confrontation and arguments over JSP's relations to Red China taking spotlight. Most JSP leaders spent week stumping provinces, reportedly devoting much of attention to lining up support of delegations to scheduled JSP Congress.

b. JSP Chairman Kozo SASAKI told press conference after special central executive committee meeting at Nagoya October 31 that once 4 party opposition alliance (JSP, DSP, Komeito, JCP) succeeded in forcing en bloc resignation of Sato cabinet it would be natural for JSP take lead in forming "caretaker cabinet" until elections. JSP SecGen Narita next day told press at Yokkaichi that 4 opposition party coalition cabinet had questionable features which made him regard idea as impossible.

c. Saburo EDA, Sasaki's challenger for JSP Chairmanship at JSP general convention scheduled for December 6, took opportunity to proclaim himself against sin by saying October 30 that JSP should investigate rigorously rumors than unnamed JSP members also touched by "black mist" of scandals.

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d. Press reported that Sasaki faction's Socialism Research Institute now translating and publishing Japanese edition of "Mao Tse-Tung's analects" and observed that Sasaki faction would find some use for proceeds from sale. "Anti-Mainstream" factions attacked publication as yet another instance of "mainstream" subservience to Chicoms.

e. Sankei Shimbun article November 2 carried in considerable detail differences between Sasaki and Eda supporters over treatment of Communist China's Great Cultural Revolution in draft of policy statement scheduled to be presented at December convention.

f. In Yamagata November 3, Sasaki said he intended announce his candidacy for reelection as JSP Chairman in mid-November. He felt it was his duty to run again "as I have a lot more to do". Same day unidentified Sasaki faction leader was quoted as saying announcement would come "around November 20". (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

g. Comment: Informed observers continue to believe Eda-Sasaki convention showdown almost inevitable. JSP source states that unless PriMin actually dissolves Diet prior to convention it will be held on schedule because JSP cannot afford appearance of being play-thing of each new report of early Diet dissolution emanating from LDP camp. Sasaki's off-the-cuff remarks about "caretaker Cabinet" were greeted by considerable press amusement. JSP source indicated it was another of Sasaki's off-cuff brainstorms being relegated to deserved obscurity. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Defense Council Meets on Third Defense Buildup

a. National Defense Council meeting November decided to push forward with coordination of related ministries' views on Third Defense Buildup Plan (covering five years) in order to complete plan and incorporate it into JFY 1967 budget. According press reports, JDA DirGen Kambayashiyama retracted his earlier suggestion that plan be stretched to six years, but stressed need for increased expenditures on Research and Development and for greater domestic production of equipment. MITI Minister Miki reportedly urged increased domestic procurement to correct present underdevelopment of Japan's defense-related industries. PriMin reportedly expressed hope for early December resolution of ministerial differences. Conference concluded with decision to continue discussions at vice ministerial level, under supervision of Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi, and set initial meeting for November 4. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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b. Foreign Ministry source told EmbOff that one cause of delay is fact that, since formation of new Cabinet in August, there have been virtually no substantive inter-ministry discussions of plan, November 1 meeting being only second one since then. He also said that, even in unlikely event long-term plan fails to gain approval in time for 1967 budget, JDA 1967 budget itself will probably include most of requests incorporated in plan. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

c. Comment: Granting inadequate liaison, problem continues to be basically one of money, with MinFin holding out for substantial cuts in Third Buildup Plan and in 1967 budget. Even after LDP reaches agreement on form of plan, problem of domestic versus foreign production of major pieces of hardware will remain one in which some politicians as well as big enterprises have large stake. However PriMin's urging of early resolution of differences and Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi's assumption of coordinating responsibility may result in more rapid progress. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. New Ryukyus High Commissioner Visits Tokyo

a. Lt. Gen F. T. UNGER, newly-appointed High Commissioner of Ryukyu Islands, passed through Tokyo early this week on way to assume his new duties in Okinawa on November 2. General Unger, in addition to consultations with Embassy, paid courtesy calls on PriMin, Director General Mori of PriMin's office and Vice FonMin Shimoda. Although visit received only moderate press coverage, some papers used High Commissioner's courtesy call on Mr. Mori as point departure for speculative stories on possibility GOJ may take up Mr. Mori's ideas about "functional reversion" with U.S. officially. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Visit went smoothly and contacts High Commissioner established should form excellent basis for future relations with GOJ. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).

6. Kishi Returns from Taipei

a. Former PriMin KISHI returned from Taipei November 1 together with Tadashi ADACHI, president of Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and other delegates to Japan-China Cooperative Committee meeting held in Taipei October 27-9. Kishi doubled as chief Japanese well-wisher for President Chiang's 88th birthday. Chinese reportedly expressed dissatisfaction at not receiving invitation to Japanese sponsored

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By	MM NARA Date 8/19/97

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SEA Agricultural Development Conference. Meeting agreed that Japan and GRC should cooperate to help settle Asian problems, including Vietnam war. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. Japan-Indian Consultations Held

a. Second session of annual sub-ministerial level consultations between India and Japan was held in Tokyo October 29-November 1 with Deputy Vice FonMin USHIBA heading Japanese delegation and Vice FonMin C.S. Jha leading Indians. According press, agreement reached that only complete disarmament can provide safety in nuclear age. Indians re-affirmed policy of non-alignment and stressed need for preventing nuclear proliferation, which Japanese also emphasized. Indians said that Chicoms are threat to India but India has not given up all hope of peaceful co-existence with China. India expressed belief bombing halt is prerequisite to negotiations in Vietnam and Japanese reiterated stand for unconditional ceasefire. Both sides applauded U.S. pledge to withdraw troops from Vietnam made at Manila. Next meeting scheduled for Autumn, 1967 in New Delhi. (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. Taiwanese Independence Leader Returns to Taiwan

a. Vice President Provisional Govt. of Republic of Taiwan WU Chen-nan to return to Taipei October 28, after 16 years as leading advocate of independence for Taiwan. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Wu's surrender, following that of (Thomas) LIAO Wen-yi last year, just about finishes Provisional Govt. which in any case had little following or influence. Remaining Taiwanese organization advocating independence is Taiwan Chingnien, which more active and vigorous in Japan than Provisional Government. (UNCLASSIFIED)

MILITARY

9. Self-Defense Forces Parade

a. The 16th SDF anniversary was commemorated by some 4,500 Self-Defense Forces personnel, with tanks, missiles and armored personnel carriers, parading at National Stadium October 30 in Tokyo. Hawk missiles and over 100 jet fighters were also on display. PriMin Eisaku Sato and JDA DirGen Eikichi Kambayashiyama reviewed the parade. (Week 43, Item 8). (UNCLASSIFIED)

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b. Comment: Attendance of the PriMin and DirGen at parade caused no further embarrassment to Prime Minister, although press cartoonists had field day at Dir Gen's expense. By time of JMSDF review in Hakata Bay, Fukuoka, on November 3, Kambayashiyama appeared (from TV coverage) to have recovered large measure of self-assurance. (UNCLASSIFIED)

10. Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) Aircraft Depart for Hawaii



a. On 2 and 3 November, six P2V anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, with 72 men aboard, left Japan for Hawaii. During the next three weeks, these aircraft will participate in combined ASW training with U.S. Navy ships and aircraft. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: This is first deployment of MSDF aircraft to the U.S. for combined training, although previously ships and submarines have participated. Training will enhance ASW capability of MSDF. (UNCLASSIFIED)




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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT,
COMUS/J, FUKUOKA, HICOMRY, HONG KONG, KOBE-OSAKA,
NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, TAIPEI, YOKOHAMA.

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: November 11, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 45

REF :

CONTENTS

1. LDP Prepares for Party Elections
2. JSP Squabbles on Convention Timing
3. More Leftist Splits over Chicom Relations
4. Assistant Secretary Bundy Visit
5. Sino-Japanese Trade
6. Annual JMSDF Ship Review

POLITICAL1. LDP Prepares for Party Elections

a. Following resignation of Aiichiro FUJUYAMA from Cabinet November 4 (Weeka 44, Item 1), which universally taken as sign he running against Sato for LDP presidency at December 1 convention, Sato supporters launched efforts to line up maximum support behind PriMin. At same time press, political commentators, and some voices within LDP emphasized that cleanness, avoidance of further suspicion of corruption, must receive top priority in party election. Sato in November 5 Sapporo press conference and subsequent statements, including formal pledge to LDP disciplinary-group leaders November 9, promised to keep presidency campaign spotless. Fujiyama as of November 10 still had not formally announced candidacy. However, his faction met November 7 to plan strategy. Same day Sato warned his own supporters to avoid factional activity which

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
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might suggest that other LDP members being pressured or unfairly persuaded to back PriMin for reelection. Miki faction met November 8 and pledged support to Sato, expressing confidence that PriMin meant what he said about cleaning up political mess. Ishii faction made similar move November 9. However, former Ikeda faction in November 9 meeting continued to reserve position in absence of formal Fujiyama entry into race. Elements of "neutral" Ikeda, Funada and Murakami factions, according press, began urging that party electors be permitted cast votes freely without factional discipline in presidential election.


b. Opposition parties attempted to revive attack against LDP political morals in Lower House Finance Committee November 8, pressing questions concerning 20 million yen political donation made in Sato's name (which amounted to three times his reported taxable income in 1965) and distribution of political literature backing Parliamentary Vice Minister of Finance Tatsuo OZAWA in form of imitation 10 million yen bills bearing Ozawa's picture. Both charges fizzled although opposition members walked out of committee session when LDP rejected demand that Sato appear personally; Sato sent word he was home with a cold.

c. Government and LDP November 9 announced intention of convening special Diet session November 30 and regular session December 27. Press backgrounders reported that GOJ/LDP anticipated special session would merely hold formal opening before LDP convention, with substantive business beginning after scheduled JSP convention December 6-9. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Sato supporters continue determined to assure overwhelming reelection for PriMin, primarily to avoid weakness in his subsequent position which would follow if Fujiyama gained much over 100 votes. Prominent political commentator who doubles as advisor to Fujiyama told Embassy November 9 that Fujiyama had not yet firmly decided to run, his faction was divided on question, and he might yet forego candidacy. Political staff member of Asahi, which usually critical of Sato and inclined give benefit of doubt to his opponents, said same day that he thought it unlikely Fujiyama could muster 100 votes. Calls for spotless election tactics apparently have not reached some of right-wing LDP who busily spreading word that Fujiyama supporters are receiving indirect Chicom financial assistance, and even that Fujiyama candidacy inspired by pro-Chicom elements. If such unsupported charges continue, or Sato backers are caught at other questionable activities, intra-LDP anti-Sato sentiment may build up at least to point where considerable number of blank ballots will be cast in addition to whatever direct support Fujiyama can muster. Blank ballots would equally imply subsequent problems for Sato's control of LDP. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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CONFIDENTIALPage 3, A-657
from Tokyo2. JSP Squabbles on Convention Timing

a. Until this week, JSP seemed committed to hold convention as scheduled, December 6-9. However, Sohyo-JSP Member Conference November 7 discussed possible desirability of postponing convention to concentrate on expected general election. Conference failed to agree on recommendation to postpone -- this would constitute "interference in internal JSP affairs" -- and advised only that JSP avoid convention show of "ugly factionalism". JSP Chairman SASAKI stated November 7 that convention should be held as scheduled. Evening newspapers November 7 reported Sasaki's rival for JSP chairmanship, Saburo EDA, as "seeing some reason for postponement of convention". Next day press hastened to "clarify" Eda statement, saying this did not mean Eda did not favor December 6 convention, but rather emphasized his belief that Socialists should unite to topple Sato cabinet. November 10 press reported JSP Central Executive Committee's (CEC) "reaffirmation" that convention should begin on schedule. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: There have been reports from within JSP that Sohyo SecGen IWAI and former Chairman OTA would pressure the JSP -- possibly even threaten to cut off funds -- if they didn't forget their factional quarrels and get down to the business of winning elections. Eda's somewhat surprising statement on postponement may have been designed to curry favor with this group, at the same time letting Sasaki in for some criticism. But it is not certain that Sohyo itself is united behind the convention postponement bid (nothing has been heard from Chairman HORII, for example), and with the CEC's November 9 "reaffirmation", odds appear once again that JSP convention will be held as scheduled. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. More Leftist Splits Over Chicom Relations

a. November 4 Akahata reported November 3 Standing Committee meeting of Asia-Africa Solidarity Committee ended in walkout of DirGen Tokumatsu SAKAMOTO, along with 12 of some 50 standing directors of organization. Immediate cause of the walkout was dispute over support of joint Japan-Chicom declaration signed by Japanese AA representatives in Peking October 9. Among those who walked out with Sakamoto was Shosaku ITAI, who was expelled from JCP October 23 (See Week 43, Item 3). At post-meeting press conference Sakamoto stated intention to form new organization. Akahata stated JCP will work to strengthen parent body.

b. Press reported Yuichi KOBAYASHI, chairman of Japan Congress of Journalists, pulled out of October 27 council meeting, along with two representatives from Toho News Agency and Asahi Shimbun. Walkout concerned

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organization's failure to support Japan-China Friendship Association joint declaration signed in Peking October 12 (See Weeka 43, Item 4).

c. JCP presidium member Masayoshi OKA reportedly stated October 29 that it "quite natural" for Peking to develop nuclear weapons given "prevailing realities of the world". Same day Akahata published NCNA report on test, but deleted references describing success as "victory of Mao Tse-tung ideology" and those critical of Soviet "nuclear monopoly and blackmail".

d. According press reports, former JCP Central Committee member Ryuji NISHIZAWA, expelled from party October 13, (See Weeka 41, Item 2) and his wife left for Peking November 7. (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. Comment: Public Security Agency source indicated there would be trouble in AA Solidarity Committee and journalists' group; although likely neither organization receiving Peking financial support, both included number of members strongly sympathetic to Chicom policy line.

f. JCP statements on Chicom nuclear test imply new JCP stand which strives to credit Chicom nuclear progress (although not Mao Tse-tung ideology) and at same time avoid statements critical of Soviets.

g. Public Security Agency source stated fact that Nishizawa children still in Communist China provides plausible explanation for Nishizawa's trip to Peking. However due Nishizawa's close relationship with CCP, source suggested Nishizawa might be attempting to arrange financial support for pro-Chicom splinter groups in Japan. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Assistant Secretary Bundy Visit

a. At President Johnson's request, Assistant Secretary Bundy arrived in Tokyo November 4 to brief Japanese officials on Manila Conference results. Main foci of visit were November 4 FonOff briefing session with Vice FonMin SHIMODA and November 5 briefing of Chief Cabinet Secretary AICHI and press conference held November 5. FonOff called briefing "very detailed and highly informative" and Mr. Aichi stated Japan's appreciation of six month withdrawal pledge. Press conference went smoothly and press coverage of visit was good. (UNCLASSIFIED)

5. Sino-Japanese Trade

a. Negotiations for 1967 trade schedule under private Liao-Takasaka agreement opened in Peking on November 4 (see Emb A-503, October 12), with 40-member Japanese delegation headed by Kaheita OKAZAKI, president

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of All-Japan Airways. Although initial reports have given no details on actual proposals -- in particular on key question of Japanese rice imports -- both sides reportedly are predicting an overall increase in L-T trade. There has been no mention of prospects for negotiating a new L-T agreement to replace current one which expires at end of 1967.

b. Kyodo reported from Canton on November 8 that there is some concern among the Japanese that contracts at current Canton Trade Fair (which started October 15) will fall below \$120 million mark set at last year's Fair. (UNCLASSIFIED)




c. Comment: Japanese are closely watching developments at Canton Fair and L-T negotiations for clues as to future developments in Sino-Japanese trade. (UNCLASSIFIED)

MILITARY6. Annual JMSDF Ship Review

a. November 3 JMSDF Annual Ship Review was held in Hakata Bay, Northern Kyushu. Fleet was reviewed by DirGen KAMBAYASHIYAMA and Chief of Maritime Staff Office, ADM ITAYA. The units consisted of 11 Destroyers, 4 Destroyer Escorts, 3 Submarines and Auxiliaries, a total of 37 ships. Fifty-nine aircraft also participated. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Review was well executed, JMSDF personnel, ships aircraft and equipment presenting faultless appearance.

c. This occasion marked first time since initial naval review of 1867 that the affair was held in Kyushu. However, location of Hakata Bay was decided long in advance of Kambayashiyama's appointment as DirGen. Consequently, there was no adverse publicity concerning Kambayashiyama taking the review to his native island. (UNCLASSIFIED)


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PRIORITY

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NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, TAIPEI, OTTAWA,
ROME, MOSCOW.

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 46

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POLITICAL1. Fujiyama Takes the Plunge

a. LDP faction leader Aichihiro FUJIYAMA November 17 formally announced his candidacy for party presidency at December 1

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convention. His announcement laid at door of PriMin Sato ultimate responsibility for "black mist" scandals which Fujiyama said threatened party's future. He called on Sato to resign, taking responsibility for his August Cabinet appointments, as first step in LDP reform; asserted GOJ hamstrung by scandals and opposition attacks and unable clean own house or carry out policies. Fujiyama also said that if Cabinet reshuffle and dissolution of Lower House take place without Sato's stepping down, political vacuum that has existed for nearly a year will still remain. Aside from brief reference to need for new outlook in state affairs, foreign affairs and economic matters, announcement made no reference to concrete policies. At subsequent press conference Fujiyama indicated party reform most urgent task but that he would speak on policy later. However, in response question, he promised concentrate on price stabilization and advocated Japan taking "flexible" stand on Chirep question since impossible to continue on basis "important question" resolution alone. Fujiyama also said while Lower House dissolution undesirable under present leadership, if he won then he would seek people's judgment through general elections as soon as possible, although some time would be needed to install new order in LDP. To another question, Fujiyama said he did not favor splitting LDP and ^{was} not thinking of "new Fujiyama party."

b. Comment: Japanese observers say that if Fujiyama does not get more than 72 votes he received in 1964 triangular race against PriMin Ikeda and Sato, Fujiyama will have lost his chance at LDP presidency. (Convention votes total 465). Further, they believe that Fujiyama must net 100 votes to really embarrass Sato and that total of 130 or 140 votes against Sato, including blank ballots, would seriously hurt Sato's prestige. Most observers agree Fujiyama will be hard put to gain more than 100 votes. Close attention is being paid to attitudes of several still uncommitted factions, notably Ikeda faction, which apparently intends defer decision on its bloc of 70 votes until last minute. Right now Fujiyama has perhaps 70 votes from his own faction, Matsumura group, and that part of now split Kono faction led by Yasuhiro Nakasone. No one doubts at this juncture Sato's ability to gain re-election but interest focuses on extent of intra-party criticism reflected in vote. Press commentators, and some members of Sato faction, expressed view that Fujiyama's kick-off statement did not challenge Sato in such decisive fashion as to worsen prospects of LDP reconciliation after election.

2. Chirep

a. FonOff was dismayed when it learned Canadians and Italians contemplated presenting study group resolutions on Chirep at current General Assembly and attempted head off these moves with strong high-level representations in Tokyo, New York, and several capitals. Japanese took strong line that any consideration of new moves should be postponed until after "important question" passed and Albanian proposal defeated; otherwise, there was great

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risk "important question" might not pass. GOJ strongly advanced view that, since Asian nations are the ones most directly affected by China, more Asian countries should be consulted on Chirep strategy in UN.

b. Japanese press, which has devoted considerable attention to Chirep in recent days, generally has favored consideration of "two Chinas" proposal although most commentators have noted practical difficulties inherent in securing acceptance by either country. Press also has criticized GOJ for its continuing sponsorship of "important question" resolution. On evening November 16 press began reporting that PriMin that morning had implied approval of Japan's supporting "Italian-type" study group resolution, but only after "important question" adopted. (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. Comment: FonOff for past year has strongly held to view that both procedural and substantive positions less favorable to Chicoms this year than last and has favored strong, concerted public efforts by friendly countries to round up support for vote at this GA. GOJ has held to this position during consultations following submission of Canadian and Italian proposals to friendly countries for consideration. FonOff has stuck to public line that "important question" will pass, but has not commented officially on study group proposals, although in backgrounder FonOff official reportedly expressed view it would be difficult for Japan to oppose Italian resolution. (Tokyo's 3698) (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. FinMin Fukuda Criticizes Aid to Okinawa

a. FinMin Fukuda was quoted in November 15 press as having said in press conference after Cabinet meeting same day that he opposed meeting U. S. proposal for total ¥10.3 billion (\$30.2 million) GOJ aid to Okinawa over coming year tabled at October 18 Consultative Committee meeting. Fukuda reportedly said his Ministry unable approve such GOJ aid "unless Japan and U. S. thoroughly discuss basic problems (regarding Okinawa), including administrative rights, and unless some means is established whereby this Government has contact with Okinawan administration." FinMin also reportedly argued GOJ could not support increasingly large aid programs for Okinawa "without having any knowledge of Okinawan financial and economic policy" and in absence solution such outstanding issues as administration of Okinawan education and Ryukyuan vessel flag. Next day press reported that PriMin Sato, FonMin Shiina and DirGen Mori would meet November 18 with Fukuda to resolve differences of opinion concerning aid to Okinawa. DirGen Mori reportedly said use of GOJ aid programs as counter for bargaining with U. S. about reversion of administrative rights would "incur misunderstanding on part of U. S." (UNCLASSIFIED)

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b. Comment: Ambassador entered protest November 16 with FonMin Shiina concerning Fukuda remarks, which came as quite a shock after all concerned thought U. S. proposal responsive to GOJ ideas had been developed with mutually beneficial results for public image of US-Japanese cooperation on Okinawan affairs. FonMin assured Ambassador matter would be resolved to U. S. satisfaction, and public statement to set record straight would be issued following Cabinet meeting November 18. Fortunately, Japanese press has not given major play to this contretemps, and there has been no comment or editorials. (Tokyo's 3660) (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. LDP "Black Mist" Developments

a. Former Lower House Speaker Ichiro KIIYOSE November 17 submitted report of his LDP Discipline Investigation Committee (WEEKA 43) to Pri Min recommending LDP strengthen political morality and discipline, establish better standards for selection of candidates, and, above all, revise Public Office Election Law with emphasis on reducing election costs. Kiyose also presented report on Kyowa Seito (sugar refinery) case, alleged irregular transactions on state-owned land, and the Taiwan banana import scandals, gist of which was that LDP politicians had done nothing culpable but would be more careful in future. Opposition parties immediately attacked report on scandals as whitewash.

b. Same day GOJ spokesman admitted to Upper House Audit Committee that Kyowa Seito used false receipts to obtain excessive amounts (yen 7,000,000,000) of loans from government banks for expansion facilities. AgMin Matsuno, acknowledging laxity on part of banks, promised GOJ would exert greater control in future. Komeito's Akira KUROYANAGI livened up proceedings by presenting list of alleged contributions from Kyowa Seito to LDP and JSP and to support organizations of LDP, JSP and DSP Dietmen. List included large contributions to support organizations of LDP SecGen Tanaka, former Policy Board Chairman Akagi, and Kono faction leader Shigemasa. In denying JSP wrongdoing, party SecGen Narita promised look into matter thoroughly. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Komeito finally brought out into open most sensitive point in whole Kyowa Seito scandal, allegations that politicians from almost all parties are indebted to firm for substantial political contributions. If accusations are proven true, it will be quite embarrassing for LDP but JSP's alleged large contributions from Kyowa Seito leave that party little room for rejoicing. Doubtless, JSP and DSP will try establish innocence and join with Komeito in clubbing Sato administration with latest developments. Appears at same time that Komeito, confident of own immunity, may have upset tacit agreement among other parties to desist from mutually incriminating disclosures. Effect on "four-party opposition alliance" remains to be seen. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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Page 5, A-690
from Tokyo5. Sasaki Mood Growing Within JSP ?

a. Stories this week in Nihon Keizai and Sankei newspapers suggest backers of JSP Chairman Sasaki may have reason to feel somewhat more confident of their paladin's chances for re-election to party chairmanship. Reports are based largely on results Kagoshima prefectural convention where Sasaki forces reportedly won 6 delegates to challenger Saburo EDA's 5 as compared to last year's 10 to 1 sweep by Eda backers. (Convention votes total approximately 570.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Sasaki leadership's insistence that convention begin on schedule December 6 is attributed by press and party sources to growing confidence in the outcome. However, returns are in from only small number of prefectures and most observers agree shape of outcome, if at all known in advance, will become apparent only at last minute. All still agree race will be close. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. JSP Central Executive Committee Approves Draft Action Program

a. JSP announced its draft 1967 Action Program on November 13. Long and repetitive document, which reportedly received unanimous approval of Central Executive Committee, focused on struggle against Security Treaty to culminate in magic year of 1970, opposition to U. S. policy in Vietnam, and efforts utilize "black mist" to force out Sato cabinet and secure substantial gains in next Lower House general elections. With respect Chicoms' Great Cultural Revolution document confined itself to observation that situation "fluid" and not ripe for evaluation. (Tokyo's A-673) (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Draft action program represents neither opening to the right for JSP nor vindication of Chairman Kozo SASAKI's far leftist views but rather compromise based on relative unimportance of Action Program as compared with factional personnel struggles. Both Eda and Sasaki supporters apparently found it politic to compromise differences on such problems as recent developments in Communist China, get Action Program out of way, and devote full time to race for JSP chairmanship. (See Item 5) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. JCP Splinter Groups: Chicom Support of Left and Maneuverings of Right

a. Press November 15 reported GOJ public security officials' confirmation of Chicom "attacks" on JCP, citing as evidence JCP expellee Yukio KANAZAWA's attendance at November 3 Peking Red Guard rally; People's Daily's support of pro-Chicom Japan-China Friendship Association (Orthodox) group (WEEKKA 43, Item 4); Radio Peking's airing of anti-JCP Choshu Shimbun articles

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(WEEKA 37, Item 6); and fact that former JCP Central Committee member Ryuji NISHIZAWA given seat of honor at Peking centennial celebration of Sun Yat-sen's birth, at which anti-JCP spokesman Seimin MIYAZAWA gave address.

b. November 17 press quoted GOJ public security officials as stating Chicoms extending "full-scale support" to pro-Chicom factions on left of JCP. Factions consist of Yamaguchi Prefecture's Choshu Shimbun group and Shigeo SHIDA's "Liberation Front", in all some 500 - 800 persons.

c. According press, three anti-JCP leadership groups, consisting of people who left JCP (voluntarily or otherwise) because they opposed JCP's earlier pro-Peking line, met in Tokyo November 12-14 to create new united party. Groups participating were Yoshio SHIGA's JCP (Voice of Japan), Tomochika NAITO's "Socialist Renovation Movement", and Shojiro KASUKA's "Socialist Unification Supporters' Association". Shiga, who was scheduled to lead new group, and colleague Shigeo KAMIYAMA walked out after first day, stating it still "premature" to form new group. However, Ichizo SUZUKI, also of "Voice of Japan", remained, prompting rumors of possible JCP (Voice of Japan) group split. Meeting ended without agreement on new group's leadership or name, but "preparatory committee" announced November 17 that new "true Marxist-Leninist" party would be established in January 1967. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Whether Chicom support of anti-JCP leadership leftist dissidents is "full-scale" or not remains to be seen, but little doubt that JCP-CCP relations are steadily worsening. Public Security Agency source states that Chicoms are urging sympathizers to leave JCP and speculates that new pro-Chicom party may be formed during Spring 1967, possibly with Shida as leader and Nishizawa as main financial go-between with Chicoms. Party if formed would not be significant threat to JCP, but push JCP-CCP relations to breaking point.

e. Significance of Shiga-Naito machinations is light it sheds on JCP-CPSU's long-rumored thaw. Shiga's walkout may mean new group will not receive Soviet support, giving credence to JCP 10th Congress report that domestic "revisionists" were isolated. If so, another stumbling block to JCP-CPSU rapprochement would be eliminated. For further clues, observers watching to see whether Shiga himself will continue to lead Voice of Japan group, retire quietly, or attempt reenter mainstream JCP. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. Japan Congress of Journalists Front Group Splits

a. According press, former Japan Congress of Journalists (JCJ) head Yuichi KOBAYASHI, who left Congress on October 27 (WEEKA 43, Item 3), announced formation of "Japan Journalists' League" on November 11. Joining Kobayashi in new "League" were critic Kenzo NAKAJIMA and Kyoto University

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historian Kiyoshi INOUE, among others. November 14, Kobayashi announced League would represent "Japanese journalists" in Japan Chapter of Asia-Africa Journalists' Association (AAJA). Radio Peking November 14-15 carried approving reports of both League formation and AAJA association. On other hand, Akahata November 15 reported shoring up of parent JCJ and selection Iheiei KIMURA as acting JCJ chairman. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Split stemmed from two groups' open difference of opinion on Communist China. The AA group's support of League not surprising as Kobayashi doubles as AAJA head, but it seems likely that main body of JCJ (roughly 1500 members) will remain with JCP-aligned parent group. Unclear whether AAJA-League tieup will create dissension within other AAJA member organizations in Japan. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

MILITARY9. "Anarchists" Raid Second Arms Plant

a. A group of six young Japanese "anarchists", as they were styled by press, entered Howa Manufacturing Co. in Nagoya on November 15 and passed out leaflets protesting against that company's "manufacture and sale of arms to SEA countries, Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF) and U. S. Forces." They were soon apprehended by plant guards and turned over to police who determined that they belong to same group of leftist students who raided Nittoku Metal Industry (machine gun manufacturer) in Tokyo on October 19. October "raid" was a bit more damaging to factory than most recent one since "raiders" raced around company's administrative area and broke a few windows and wooden partitions before astonished workers could get police assistance. Reports from police interrogation state that this is new group (formed about Sept 1966) of about 30 students of Chuo, Tokyo, Hosei, Meiji and Waseda Universities. Interrogation of group involved in first raid revealed they have prepared list of 26 defense manufacturers at which they planned anti-Vietnam war demonstrations. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Neither company sells its products to U. S. forces (Howa makes rifles for Japan's Ground SDF as well as other industrial machinery). Howa has, however, recently concluded licensing agreement with Armalite Corporation to produce AR-18 rifle in Japan for delivery to Armalite (and then probable re-export to SEA countries). SDF Staff Officers do not seem very concerned about this student group, probably because it appears to be rather small, independent group without much political backing. (CONFIDENTIAL)

10. Destroyer Amatsukaze Departs for Missile Training in Ryukyus

a. JMSDF ship Amatsukaze (DD 163) scheduled arrive Naha November 22 for subsequent (November 23 - December 9) Tartar Missile

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firing and related training in Ryukyu Islands U. S. Navy Missile range area. Amatsukaze departed Yokosuka November 19. JSP and Okinawa prefectural Council against Atomic and Hydrogen bombs (Gensuikyo) protested to GOJ concerning "joint U. S. -Japan missile firing practice". (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: MAS Japan will fund U. S. missile range services to Japan's only Tartar-equipped ship. However, Amatsukaze's missile training falls under category Japanese ship training exercise and is certainly not, in the operational sense, "joint U. S. -Japan" exercise. (CONFIDENTIAL)

11. Japanese Press on Vietnam Issue in US Elections

a. Although pre-election Japanese press reporting on US elections noted relative lack of campaign debate on Vietnam, unexpectedly strong GOP showing interpreted after elections as auguring increased pressure on President from bolstered Congressional "hawks" to push war more actively toward early conclusion. For example, Yomiuri evening edition November 11 article from Washington correspondent stated that GOP may be encouraged apply pressures on President to push war effort harder.

b. Many commentators also looked for convergence of GOP pressures for early Vietnam solution and of natural desire President to have war settled before 1968. Asahi two-part feature article of November 15 and 16 foresaw no basic Vietnam policy change but suggested President's "increased freedom of action" following elections "most likely to show up as freedom to escalate". While Vietnam news per se has not been prominently commented upon in recent weeks, this was context in which Saigon correspondents' reports of increased Tay Ninh fighting were received. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: However, same Asahi feature article concluded by pointing out that considerations of military manpower, diplomacy and economic impact of war serve as built-in brake against either side suddenly or dramatically escalating war. This analysis reflects overall improved Japanese news-media perspective on Vietnam situation-- perspective which itself is built-in brake against any latent inclinations of Japanese newsmen to forecast dramatic escalation, or otherwise sensationalize situation. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

12. LDP Vice President Offers Resignation

November 16

a. LDP Vice President Shojiro KAWASHIMA/announced he was submitting resignation from party post to PriMin Sato before December 1 convention. Press and political observers divided between two divergent interpretations of move, one holding that Kawashima felt responsibility for discredit which former Transportation Minister ARAFUNE, member of

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




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Kawashima faction, had brought on Sato cabinet, other speculating Kawashima desired emphasize that Sato had free hand in reshuffling LDP posts as well as cabinet after convention. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: While reasons for Kawashima's announcement not yet clear, he had come under considerable fire in Arafune case and been rumored as likely target of scandal. accusations himself. At same time, his tenure (which would run to January) is closely connected with that of LDP SecGen Kakuei TANAKA, whose removal from this key post is being demanded by conservative wing of LDP. Appears Kawashima may desire get public credit for big hearted gesture whether or not Sato decides to retain him after December 1, and same time may seek to ingratiate self with Tanaka's opponents in party by putting pressure on Tanaka for similar resignation offer. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)



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COMUS/J, FUKUOKA, HICOMRY, HONG KONG, KOBE-OSAKA,
NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, SEOUL, TAIPEI

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE:

November 23, 1966

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKLY NO. 47

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8. JDA Chooses Hawk Sites for Tokyo Defense
9. Japanese News Media Criticize GOJ Position on Chirep

POLITICAL

1. LDP Presidential Election Campaign

a. Prime Minister Sato and former State Minister Fujiyama continued efforts to round up votes for December 1 LDP presidential contest, only minimally affected by November 18 announcement of additional candidacy by Ikeda faction member Uichi NODA. Sato in November 22 press conference shifted spotlight to post-election events, with generalized expression of intention to reshuffle Cabinet and LDP offices extensively after party convention, without regard to factional considerations. While Sato avoided specifics, LDP Vice President Kawashima during week said he would submit formal resignation to Sato November 28. LDP SecGen Tanaka November 24

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predicted reshuffle would be completed December 2 or 3.

b. Fujiyama during week met with ex-Ikeda faction leader Maeo, former House of Representatives Speaker Funada, faction leader Nakasone, and former Labor Minister Ishida, seeking support for his leadership bid. According press reports, only Nakasone unequivocally promised backing. Ikeda faction meeting November 24 produced no announced decision on group's attitude toward rival candidates, although faction leaders had earlier disavowed Noda's candidacy.
 (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Ikeda faction member November 19 told EmbOff all but handful of faction would wind up voting for Sato. If, as all evidence now seems to indicate, Ikeda group at least refrains from backing Fujiyama, latter will be hard pressed to reach 100 votes in December 1 contest. Interest in post-election reshuffle centers on posts of LDP Secretary General and Chief Cabinet Secretary, now occupied by Sato faction stalwarts Kakuei TANAKA and Kiichi AICHI. Reports from inside LDP say Sato hopes keep Tanaka on, although conservative wing of party would like to see him replaced by Finance Minister Fukuda or other holder of views nearer their own. Although Sato has declared that factional considerations will not determine December reshuffle of posts, appears clear he must avoid antagonizing any of major faction leaders in face of threatened opposition trouble making in Diet (Item 2) and possibility early general election might be necessary as result. Perhaps for this reason, in addition to obvious considerations of party election, Sato has given no detectable hint of intentions on specific personnel moves.

d. Motive for Noda candidacy complete mystery to LDP contacts as well as Emb. Most plausible explanation is that he thinks it will help him in next general election. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Opposition Alliance Maneuvers on Special Diet Session

a. LDP/GOJ plans formally to decide special Diet session opening date of November 30 at November 25 Cabinet meeting ran into problems as opposition party representatives boycotted meeting of Diet steering committee directors November 24, and four party (JSP, DSP, Komeito, JCP) opposition alliance scheduled meeting November 25 to decide further strategy. JSP announced it planned boycott special session proceedings ^{from} beginning and to refuse debate on substantive issues in hope of forcing early dissolution of Lower House. SecGen Iwai of Sohyo, JSP's principal bastion of support, told press November 23 Sohyo would ask JSP not to refuse to discuss supplementary budget containing appropriations request for public workers wage increase. Press reported JSP view that delay in implementing these wage increases is unavoidable if opposition is to push vigorously and effectively for Diet dissolution. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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b. Comment: If JSP carries out threat to boycott deliberations early Diet dissolution is highly probable. Sohyo's concern for pocketbook issue makes it doubtful that JSP can hold steadfastly to decision to boycott hearings on supplementary budget issue, since rank and file Sohyo disenchantment would hurt JSP in election. "Opposition alliance" already weakened by Komeito role in publicizing Socialist acceptance of Kyowa Seito handouts (Item 3) and as prospect of general election looms larger increasing differences among opposition parties can be expected. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. JSP Embarrassed by "Sugar Daddy"

a. Revelations by Komeito Upper House member Kuroyanagi (Week 46, Item 4) that Kyowa Seito (sugar refinery) made substantial political contributions to JSP and DSP Diet members as well as LDP were confirmed by Home Minister Shiomi November 18. Disclosure seems up to now to have embarrassed JSP more than LDP, to whom this sort of revelation is old hat. Particularly hard hit was JSP International Bureau head and erstwhile hopeful for Secretary Generalship Koichi YAMAMOTO, who may never wish to hear word "sugar" again. He admitted receiving 1,000,000 yen "on behalf of party". Press sharply criticized JSP for sharing vices of ruling party. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

b. Comment: Business here often contributes to JSP as well as LDP. Sugar combine is alleged to have bought political influence to secure passage of sugar legislation and to secure excessive loans from governmental lending institutions. JSP source states "everyone in party knows" Yamamoto kept half of contribution for his own use and is "through" as party leader, at least for time being. In any event JSP - apparently fearful of further revelations - has lost whatever chaste image it may have had, and probably cannot realistically hope for significant electoral dividends from corruption issue. Real winner appears to be Komeito which derives its substantial financial support from Soka Gakkai faithful and thus is less exposed to this type of temptation. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Eda to Announce Candidacy for JSP Chairmanship

a. Saburo EDA and his backers are going through usual ritual leading up to formal challenge to incumbent Kozo SASAKI for JSP party chairmanship at December 6 convention. Eda announced November 22 he would "formally" announce candidacy prior to month's end. Eda faction meeting November 24 "decided" to support Eda and called for party renovation for general elections. Eda faction also suggested party pay serious attention to question of political contributions (see Item 3). Press predicted Wada and Kawakami factions' announcements of support for Eda would be forthcoming shortly. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Sasaki-Eda battle for delegates continues apace. Press

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notes that three "anti-mainstream" factions still engaged in delicate maneuvering on question of their candidate for Secretary Generalship. Wada faction leader Seiichi KATSUMATA is undeclared candidate for Secretary General but Eda faction still apparently considers him potential liability and is looking for way to kick him upstairs. Idea of Eda-Yamamoto combine has apparently gone by the boards as result Yamamoto's involvement with Kyowa Seito. JSP source suggests Eda faction would be content with Eda-Narita (incumbent SecGen) team. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Left Wing JSP Champion of Eta class dies

a. JSP Upper House veteran Jiichiro MATSUMOTO, who attained economic and political success as champion of pariah Eta class, died November 22 at age 79. Matsumoto in 1922 took lead in forming Leveller's League (Suiheisha Renmei) and plunged into pre-war socialist movement. In post-war era Matsumoto became leading left wing socialist and was once Vice-President of Upper House (1947) to which he was returned four times from national constituency on the strength of Eta votes. As Heiwa Doshikai stalwart he was sharp critic of US and advocate of close relations with Soviets and Chicoms. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Matsumoto's death after protracted illness leaves vacuum in political leadership of Eta class, strong in North Kyushu and some other regions, which other politicians and political groups will try to fill. Matsumoto's son-in-law Yanosuke NARAZAKI, pro-Peiping JSP Lower House member, reportedly has aspirations to take over role. Although 1,000,000 or so Eta still suffer various forms of non-legal discrimination, perhaps Matsumoto's type of personal leadership of Eta no longer possible and future Eta votes will be dispersed among various candidates and parties. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. JCP Expels Peking Students; Ladies Squabble

a. November 22 Akahata announced expulsion of 13 JCP members resident in Peking. Group included Hiromi TAKANO, who was party's man in charge of Japanese students studying in Peking. Next day Akahata announced expulsion of 4 more JCP members in Peking, bringing total to 17. All were accused of "anti-party subversive activities".

b. Sixty thousand member New Japan Womens' Society (Shin Nihon Fujin No Kai) announced November 22 expulsion from society of 4 members of 99 woman central committee, for issuing statement to effect that organization "ignoring Communist China and following JCP blindly". Four expellees later announced they forming new pro-Peking womens group. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: During past few months JCP has been troubled by

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situation of Japanese students in Peking. All are housed in one dormitory, and those supporting new JCP policy at mercy of pro-Peking Japanese students. A kahata has reported that loyal JCP members, subjected to insults in the dining room and that students occasionally roughed up in their rooms by their pro-Chicom fellows. As Chicoms choose to ignore these scuffles, JCP can do little more than expel troublemakers.

d. While womens' group expulsions of little significance in and of themselves, incident does indicate that JCP more than able to hold its own when front group is not directly related to Chicoms. New group, if formed, may well find itself virtually isolated from other leftist womens' activities. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. Students and Police Clash over Dismantling of Student Movement
"Headquarters"

a. November 20, eight hundred riot police, backed by armored cars, removed about 250 students who had barricaded themselves inside Chiyoda Ward Tokyo Student Hall (Tokyo Gakusei Kaikan). Police were enforcing Tokyo District Court order issued in May 1965, for destruction of dilapidated building. Students had refused to move to new ferro-concrete dormitory located in Shinjuku. During one hour melee over 50 were injured, mostly policemen, as students pitched beer bottles and primitive Molotov cocktails from second floor of old student building. Following eviction, students organized protest meetings, and on November 24 some 400 students heading for Shinjuku Students' Assistance Headquarters again clashed with riot police. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Old student hall housed students from many of Tokyo's universities, under virtually complete student autonomy, and was known as unofficial headquarters of ultra-left student movement in Tokyo. By design or otherwise, demolition of this center gave impression of police counter-offensive against perennial student tormenters. (UNCLASSIFIED)

MILITARY

8. JDA Chooses Hawk Sites for Tokyo Defense

a. Japan Defense Agency November 24 announced selection of "Hawk" guided missile sites in and around Tokyo. Four sites selected for defense of capital are Asakamachi in Saitama Prefecture, Kashiwa and Shimoshizu in Chiba Prefecture, and Jujo in Tokyo. Because of local opposition, a previously chosen site at Tama in western Tokyo was dropped in favor of Jujo site. Missiles to be manned by GSDF 2nd Hawk Battalion scheduled

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

to be activated by March 1967, completing 2nd Defense Plan Hawk project.
First Hawk battalion, located at Chitose, Hokkaido, already operational.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Despite JDA's rather surprising announcement that no warheads would be brought onto Jujo site, opposition to location of Hawk sites by local residents and opposition parties expected to continue.
(UNCLASSIFIED)


PSYCHOLOGICAL9. Japanese News Media Criticize GOJ Position on Chirep

a. Since about November 10 Japanese news media have given prominent treatment to Chirep issue developments in UN. Press has tended to favor two-China concept; but, recognizing inevitability of rejection by Taipei and Peking, media have steered clear of urging precise course of action for Japan. For example, NHK commentator Obata said November 14 that Japan should take advantage of fluid situation created by Canadian proposal and "consider basic solution for sake of Japanese and Asian people". Press, however, has not hesitated to offer negative suggestions and has taken GOJ to task for co-sponsorship of important question resolution. November 17 Yomiuri editorial complained of Japan's "merely following US policy lead" on Chirep issue and said Japan should adopt forward looking approach to China question. Taking even harder line, November 23 Mainichi editorial stated "it is not in Japan's interest to continue to follow US lead in UN". Mainichi warned also of danger that Italian special committee plan would be used by other nations to continue bar against Communist China entry into UN. (UNCLASSIFIED)


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USIS:HLBurleson


ARMA:LtColRoach
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[9] **AIRGRAM**

POL 2-1 JAPAN

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT,
COMUS/J, FUKUOKA, HICOMRY, HONG KONG, KOBE-OSAKA,
NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, TAIPEI, WARSAW

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: December 2, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 48

REF :

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2. Cabinet and Conservative Party Reshuffle
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5. Resurgence of Efforts to Postpone or Compromise JSP Leadership Fight
6. Sohyo "Price May Day" Rally
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10. JMSDF Destroyer Launched

POLITICAL

1. Sato Reelected LDP President; Opponents Score More than Expected

a. PriMin Sato, as expected, won reelection to LDP presidency December 1. Sato received 289 votes out of 459 ballots cast. Sato's chief opponent, former Economic Planning DirGen Aiichiro

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

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Drafted by:

POL (See last page)

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:TWainsworth

Clearances:

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FUJIYAMA, received 89 votes while only other declared candidate, Uichi NODA, received 9. Anti-Sato votes, however, also went to Ikeda faction leader Shigesaburo MAEO (47), former Education Minister Hirokichi NADAO (Ishii faction) (11), and various other personalities. Total of 170 anti-Sato votes (including 9 invalid ballots) considerably higher than even anti-Sato leaders had predicted. Sato's post-election statement stressed hope for party cooperation and unity. He termed protest vote against him proof of intraparty democracy and stimulus to him to reflect on conduct of administration. (Tokyo's 4064) (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Sato supporters took line that size supporting vote reflected absence of campaigning by PriMin. However, most observers agreed principal factor was shift in Ikeda faction attitude, spurred in part at least by reports concerning selection old enemy FinMin Fukuda as party SecGen in forthcoming Cabinet reshuffle. Size of opposition vote interpreted by press and most observers as implying problems for Sato in maintaining firm control of party. For example, several Sato advisers told Embassy reconsideration of tentative line-up of new Cabinet and party executive required as result of vote.

c. Size of non-Sato vote points up real dissatisfaction within LDP concerning his administration. As suggested by variety of other personalities receiving votes, however, intra-party opposition is by no means united or even mutually compatible at this stage. Next few months will undoubtedly see stepped-up maneuvering among contenders for leadership of this potential "anti-mainstream". (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Cabinet and Conservative Party Reshuffle

a. PriMin Sato before LDP Convention indicated intention of reshuffling Cabinet and top LDP posts almost completely, as soon as possible following his reelection as Party President. Press November 28 started concentrating on reports FinMin Fukuda would become new LDP SecGen. Other predictions about same time less precise as to specific appointments but forecast that Sato would shift from his previous policy of including all factions in Cabinet and this time would make appointments primarily from conservative side of LDP.

b. Immediately following December 1 Convention, Sato met with Vice President Kawashima and SecGen Tanaka (who had submitted resignations but still exercising old functions) to firm up new personnel line-up, aiming at December 3 announcement and Cabinet attestation. December 2 press continued to predict Fukuda as SecGen but added estimate that unexpectedly high opposition vote in party presidential race (Item 1) had caused PriMin to revise plans for right-wing Cabinet and revert to effort to put together Cabinet of representatives of whole LDP.

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c. Before convention, press speculated Justice Minister Ishii would be only prominent Cabinet member to retain seat; after convention, at which internal revolt in Ishii's faction became apparent, press called MITT Min Miki only one of faction leaders likely stay in top post, and probably not the one he now has at that. December 2 TV news reports said SecGen Tanaka and LDP VP Kawashima agreed to recommend FonMin Shiina as new LDP Policy Board Chairman, Construction Minister Hashimoto as Executive Board Chairman. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Reports of Fukuda choice for SecGen were welcomed by LDP conservatives but drew grim expressions from party liberals in conversations with Embassy officers. Following convention vote, several LDP Diet members, as well as press, indicated that Fukuda's selection contributed significantly to final swing of Ikeda faction away from support of Sato and toward Maeo write-in votes. Sato-Fukuda line-up would be interpreted as significant shift of LDP center of gravity toward right wing of party. Even though Fukuda would be likely to take strong action toward cleaning up LDP "black mist" and tighten discipline in party, it is highly doubtful that predominantly right-wing line-up would have appeal to public, let alone press, which LDP will need in next general election. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Diet Opens in Troubled Atmosphere

a. Fifty-third Extraordinary Diet Session opened November 30 after some delay due to fruitless arguments between LDP and opposition parties over Lower House Speaker Yamaguchi's relations to principal figure in new securities company scandal and questions of length and agenda of session, etc. In evening Lower House session boycotted by all opposition members, LDP took unprecedented step of unilaterally proceeding to set length of session (3 weeks with date of ceremonial opening December 3). Opposition had demanded ten-day session, but LDP's moving up date of ceremonial opening from December 5 and suggesting substantive deliberations might follow immediately were interpreted as minor effort at conciliation. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. JSP, DSP, Komeito and JCP earlier reached some measure of agreement on boycotting Diet substantive deliberation on legislative proposals such as supplementary budget as tactic to force Lower House dissolution (Week 47). Prior to LDP presidential election (Item 1), JSP, DSP and Komeito sources had told Embassy they were not optimistic about success of efforts to force Diet dissolution during Extraordinary Session, feeling it would come later, perhaps early in regular session beginning late December. However, JSP source told Embassy December 1 his party and DSP, who are most adamant on Diet dissolution, felt encouraged by unexpected heavy opposition to Sato in LDP convention. Press and JSP source reported these two parties seriously considering en bloc resignation their Lower House members as tactic for forcing dissolution. (Tokyo 4082) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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c. Comment: If LDP unity does not come apart at seams over leadership problems, GOJ appears in relatively good position to call opposition bluff on boycotting deliberations. Mass resignation tactic has been suggested in other situations by JSP leadership but met cold response from Diet members, who seemed ill-disposed to give up their perquisites without sure reward. If mass resignation became reality it would apply heavy psychological pressure for dissolution.

d. Prospects are for continued squabbling between LDP and opposition parties on manner and timing of Diet proceedings, attempts by opposition to dredge up more "black mist" and a rather uncertain future for legislative proposals. However, LDP internal reactions to leadership question and Cabinet reshuffle likely to be dominant elements of Sato's decision on date for Diet dissolution. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Former Kono Faction Agrees to Split Up

a. Strains long apparent within LDP faction formerly headed by late Ichiro KONO came to head in week preceding LDP Convention. Rival leaders Yasuhiro NAKASONE, who favored vote for Fujiyama, and Seishi SHIGEMASA and Kiyoshi MORI, who advocated backing Sato, managed to put off showdown until after convention through device of agreeing on "free balloting" in convention. Faction directors and advisers met again December 1 following convention and, according press, agreed that faction would be formally dissolved about December 10. Press estimated about 25 of members would follow Nakasone, about 16 would go with Shigemasa and Mori, and 17 Upper House members would form third group led by Kenzo KONO, brother of former faction head. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Ex-Kono faction, with 61 LDP Diet members, has been third largest power block within LDP, following Sato and ex-Ikeda factions. Death of former leader deprived group of cohesion, however, and rival ambitions of Nakasone and Mori paved way for formal split. Nakasone, who perhaps has most personal popular appeal of any politician within LDP, is highly ambitious and reportedly would split LDP if necessary in order to achieve personal advancement. Most of his followers are young Diet members (first or second term) whose prospects in next general election are uncertain. Dissolution of Kono faction nevertheless could be major step toward realignment of forces within Japanese conservative politics. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Resurgence of Efforts to Postpone or Compromise JSP Leadership Fight

a. Supporters of Saburo EDA decided December 1 to have their hero wait until December 6-9 JSP convention is actually under way before making

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"official" announcement of candidacy for JSP Chairman. Incumbent Chairman Koza SASAKI previously declared he would not make announcement until convention. In this situation JSP SecGen Tomomi NARITA told December 1 press conference he was undertaking efforts to avert Eda-Sasaki showdown through retaining Sasaki as Chairman, in effect anointing Sasaki's "natural successor" Eda as Crown Prince, and giving Eda and Wada faction leader Seichi KATSUMATA choice of other party posts, i.e., Vice Chairman or SecGen.

b. In addition, opposition maneuvers to force Diet dissolution could, according JSP source, force postponement of Eda-Sasaki confrontation, especially if Lower House JSP members agree on mass resignation (Item 3).

c. Regardless of efforts to "compromise" or postpone showdown, both sides have redoubled efforts to collect delegate backing for their paladins at prefectural conventions, most important of which now scheduled for December 3 and 4. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

d. Narita at January JSP 1966 convention unsuccessfully proposed "compromise formula" of Sasaki for Chairman and Eda for SecGen. Both men want Chairmanship and most observers doubt Narita has much chance of success this time either, although new formula more subtle in that it offers Eda prospect of becoming heir apparent (Sasaki might find this too bitter a pill) and Katsumata major party post. Prospects are ^{that} maneuverings on compromise and postponement will increase prior to party executive election, but barring real political crisis in Diet confrontation will probably take place. Factional estimates of delegate strength will have bearing on outcome of compromise efforts. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Sohyo "Price May Day" Rally

a. November 27 Sohyo and Churitsuroren sponsored rallies protesting price rises and "black mist" and calling for Diet dissolution drew 260,000 people (according police estimates) at 169 places throughout Japan. In Tokyo 79,000 people attended rally to hear addresses by JSP, JCP, consumer and women's groups. As in similar gathering on February 27 (Week 9, Item 3), orderly parades followed rally. Marchers included sizeable number women and children, giving impression of family outing. Tokyo rally fell below both planned number of 300,000 and the 90,000 turnout in February, but overall national figure exceeded February's by 30,000.

b. Large posters protested rising prices and LDP scandals, called for early general election and ouster of Sato Cabinet. Also featured were fall struggle slogans protesting GOJ coal industry rationalization policy, demanding national

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minimum wage and urging full implementation of National Personnel Authority wage recommendations for public workers. Noticeable was liberal sprinkling of anti-Vietnam posters and complete absence of any reference to Okinawa. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Sizeable turnout indicates strong rank and file interest in inflation issue, but Sohyo leadership was probably disappointed with results of their efforts to turn out more than 100,000 people in Tokyo. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Reaction to Chirep Vote

a. After Chirep vote, FonOff Director of Bureau of Public Information and Culture November 30 told newsmen that increase in support for "important question" indicated increasing number of nations realize importance of this issue, that vote increase result growing criticism against Peking's domestic and foreign policies, that vote on Albanian resolution showed matter could not be solved with simple and unrealistic formula, and that rejection of Italian resolution was result of fears by supporters of each China that it could lead to recommendation for seating of two Chinas. He noted that solution of Chirep problem could not be easily settled by Committee. UN Bureau Director Hattori told newsmen that no major change in Chirep likely in near future but thought that at next UNGA new resolutions would probably be presented and that matter should be handled with great care.

b. In general, press attributed increase in anti-Chicom vote to domestic situation in China and stiff foreign policy posture. However, fact that much of vote against Chicoms result of volatile African vote caused press to recommend caution in assessing next year's balloting. Some papers suggested Chicoms should adopt more moderate policies if they wish to obtain sufficient votes to enter UN. Other papers suggested GOJ should adopt own flexible policy and warned that considerable change could come before next UNGA if Canada should extend recognition. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: FonOff happily surprised at outcome of vote and in its public comments is attempting to hammer home wisdom of continuing to rely on "important question" and difficulty of finding easy solution to Chirep situation. (Tokyo's 4081). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. JSP Ventures into Economics

a. JSP's Policy Board called November 27 for an end to GOJ deficit spending, no increases in publicly fixed prices, and cutbacks in defense outlays. JSP took orthodox conservative approach to government finances in demanding end

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to issuance government bonds and primary reliance on tax revenues, ie., a balanced budget.

b. JSP's Special Committee on Party Finances spurred on by "black mist" proposed November 30 that party, reportedly in red financially as well as ideologically, should refuse donations from big business. Instead, party would rely on dues and contributions campaigns for half its estimated 200 million yen campaign expenses and on bank loans (sic) for other half. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: The unrepentant drunk preaches at a temperance rally.
(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

9. Polish Communist Party Official Postpones Japan Visit

a. Zenon KLISZKO, Vice-Chairman Polish National Parliament (SEJM) and reportedly No. 2 man of Polish Communist Party, has "indefinitely" postponed his scheduled goodwill visit Japan. He was slated arrive Tokyo November 26 for ten-day official visit including personal meetings with FonMin Shiina and other leading GOJ officials. Polish Government advised Japanese Embassy Warsaw that visit postponed because of "health reasons." (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: FonOff officials believe real reason Kliszko not coming Japan at this time is GOJ refusal his earlier request to attend October JCP convention. (CONFIDENTIAL)

MILITARY

10. JMSDF Destroyer Launched

a. JMSDF destroyer ASAGUMO (DD 115) launched November 25 at Maizuru Shipyard as third ship of 2000-ton MAKIGUMO Class. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Primary mission of ASAGUMO will be ASW and, upon 1967 delivery to Defense Agency, ASAGUMO will be assigned to Self Defense Fleet with probable homeport at Sasebo. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Negative.


JOHNSON

POL:TWainsworth:lt
FJMcNeil
JMFarrington
TESawyer
RFPfeiffer

NAVA:Maj Spire, USMC

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By: WJD NARA Date: 8/19/97

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	2	5	FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO			
L	FBO	AID	SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 48			
		12	REF :			
5/5	5/1	6/1	1. New Cabinet and LDP Lineup			
2	3	1	2. Predictions of Early General Election Increase			
AGR	COM	FRB	3. Socialist Convention			
			4. JCP Visited by Romanian Comrades			
INT	LAB	TAR	5. February 11 Restored as National Holiday			
	2		6. Outline of Third Defense Buildup Plan Approved			
TR	XMB	AIR	7. Verdicts in Okinawa Court Cases Draw Attention			
2		10	8. Rusk Meets Sato			
ARMY	CIA	NAVY	9. SEA Agricultural Conference			
10	20	7	10. Japanese Press on South Vietnam			
OSD	USIA	NSA	11. ChiCom People's Diplomacy			
46	11	3	12. Lesotho PriMin Visits Japan of			
	3	6	13. Views of New Director General/JDA			
			14. JMSDF Destroyer Amatsukaze Returns from Missile Training			
			POLITICAL			
			1. New Cabinet and LDP Lineup			
			a. Reshuffle of Sato Cabinet and top LDP posts completed December 3 brought almost entirely new slate to assist Sato at troubled point in his administration. As rumored beforehand, Takeo FUKUDA moved from Finance Minister to LDP SecGen and Takeo MIKI remained in Cabinet, taking over Foreign Ministry. Former FonMin Shiina moved to Executive Board Chairman of LDP, while Sato faction member Group 3			
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By	MD NARA Date 8/19/97

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Naomi NISHIMURA became Policy Board Chairman. In Cabinet, two of economic stars of former PriMin Ikeda's administration returned to old posts, Mikio MIZUTA as FinMin and Kiichi MIYAZAWA as Economic Planning Agency Director. Rest of Cabinet dominated by experienced representatives mainly from conservative wing of LDP. (Cabinet list enclosed with copies to info addressees) (Tokyo 4126)

b. Personnel reshuffle briefly complicated by resignation December 2 of House of Representatives Speaker Kikuichiro YAMAGUCHI, whom press had criticized for acting as go-between at marriage of prominent Tokyo businessman involved in new scandal. Kentaro AYABE, senior figure of Fujiyama faction, was chosen as successor, formally elected at Lower House plenary session morning December 3, and immediately thereafter presided at formal opening ceremony of 53rd extraordinary session in presence of Emperor. JSP and DSP Lower House members walked out of plenary convened for Ayabe's election when they were refused opportunity to probe Yamaguchi connections with scandal figure, and JSP and JCP boycotted formal opening ceremony.

c. Cabinet decided December 6 that 150-day Ordinary Diet Session would be convened December 27, seven days after scheduled close of Special Session. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: New Cabinet consists primarily of capable and experienced figures who, under proper leadership, have potential for carrying out effective administration. However, Miki is only faction leader in Cabinet apart from Sato himself. Mizuta and Miyazawa represent somewhat surprising reemergence of Ikeda-line economic figures in view of choice of Fukuda, sharp critic of Ikeda administration, as party SecGen. Despite general rightward trend new Cabinet drew unexpected private comments from LDP Diet members: Ikeda faction representative called new Cabinet "better than expected", while one of prominent party conservatives gave it "50 per cent" rating because shift to right failed to meet his expectations. Widespread reaction was that new lineup strengthened likelihood of early Lower House dissolution (Item 2). (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Predictions of Early General Election Increase

a. PriMin Sato in nationally televised initial press conference December 5 following Cabinet reshuffle let fly rhetorical question whether opposition parties, pressing for early dissolution, "could not wait ten days or two weeks". Press and political observers immediately seized on this as tip that PriMin definitely thinking in terms of early dissolution of Lower House with ensuing general election. Sato made clear on same occasion, however, that he intended to dissolve House, whenever he might do so, in circumstances which made it clear that initiative was his and he was not yielding to opposition pressure.

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b. JSP, in throes of own convention (Item 3), and DSP stepped up threats to submit resignations of all their Lower House members as most spectacular form of pressure for dissolution. LDP leaders avoided revealing what tactics they would take against such measure, but SecGen Fukuda reminded press that resignation of Diet member not effective until accepted by Speaker and government always had option of filling vacancies through by-elections. Sato faction lieutenants Kakuei TANAKA, Shigeru HORI, Tomisaburo HASHIMOTO, and Kiichi AICHI, however, met December 7 and, according press, discussed dissolution strategy on hypothesis early election would be necessary. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: LDP and press sources almost unanimous in view that combination of internal and opposition pressure make early dissolution and general election unavoidable, adding that if opposition goes through with mass resignation threat, which sources consider about 50-50 chance, Lower House may be dissolved before end of current special Diet session. DSP as well as LDP sees advantages in having general election before JSP recovers from internal animosities expected to result from present convention. In meantime, LDP seems firmly set on passing supplementary budget in current special session even if opposition boycotts all substantive deliberations. Press comment, while continuing habitual critical attitude toward LDP, also took number of swipes at JSP over factionalism highlighted by convention, involvement in "black mist" scandal, and threat of Diet resignation which viewed as resembling pre-war tactics of military leadership. Japanese political observers increasingly speculate that DSP and Komeito likely be principal winners (in comparative terms) if early elections take place. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Socialist Convention

a. Four-day JSP convention, attended by 597 delegates selected by provincial caucuses, opened December 6 with attention focusing on long-heralded chairmanship contest between Kozo SASAKI and Saburo EDA. SecGen Narita's last ditch efforts to avoid confrontation through "discussions" appeared to have little chance of success. Opening debate's shrill tone indicated wide gulf between EDA and Sasaki supporters. Each side has predicted own victory by a slight margin all week, with press December 9 indicating that Sasaki seemed to have slight edge. Seiichi KATSUMATA of Wada faction December 8 gave up candidacy for SecGen, assuring incumbent Tomomi NARITA of reelection. Katsumata, incumbent Mitsu KONO, and International Bureau Director Yamamoto will seek Vice-Chairman posts.

b. Atmosphere of convention was turbulent from start. With far-left Shaseido hecklers shouting from galleries, convention wrangled over issues of Chicom Cultural Revolution, impact of scandals on JSP, and Japanese labor

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union participation in IMF-JC. December 9 convention showed first signs of agreement with unanimous passage of Action Policy (Tokyo A-673), although dissenting views were appended. Finance committee however ran into difficulties on question whether to ban business contributions to party or party members.

c. SecGen Narita December 6 received convention's approval for proposal that JSP leadership determine proper strategy in bringing down Sato cabinet. Central Executive Committee met that evening and, in line with previous day's agreement among JSP, DSP, Komeito and JCP SecGens, decided to begin collecting JSP Diet members' written resignations for submission at "appropriate" time, which SecGen Narita had earlier forecast would be around December 12-13. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Experienced observers, surprised by bitterness of convention debate and intra-factional differences, predicted that regardless of outcome of leadership contest, convention likely leave deep and bitter resentments within JSP. SecGen Narita, although now close to Sasaki, may well emerge as dominant figure in JSP in coming months since he will probably take lead in patching up differences. Eruption of intra-party factional and ideological differences may well handicap JSP in pursuing one of better chances for significant increase in Diet strength. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. JCP Visited by Rumanian Comrades

a. Three member Rumanian communist party delegation, led by party secretary Mihai DALEA, wound up two week visit to Japan December 6. Other delegation members were Central Committee member Vasile POTOP and Alexandru IONESCU. Rumanians exchanged views with JCP leadership and visited provincial party headquarters. Joint communique issued at end of stay stressed "principle of independence, equality, and non-intervention in each other's domestic affairs." Communique also pledged support for North Vietnam's "heroic struggle". (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: This was first visit of Rumanian party representatives to Japan and repays JCP June 1966 visit to Rumania. Rumanians originally planned to attend October JCP 10th Congress, but were prevented from doing so by GOJ refusal to issue visas. Joint communique "independence" statement based on Moscow Declarations of 1957 and 1960 to which both Peking and Moscow subscribed. It perhaps significant, however, that favorite JCP theme of "international communist united front" to aid Vietnam not mentioned. Akahata gave Rumanian visit considerable attention; perhaps reflecting JCP hope of increasing ties with some of East Europe parties. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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Page 5
A-761 from Tokyo5. February 11 Restored as National Holiday

a. Cabinet meeting December 9 approved recommendation preceding day by Study Committee set up in accordance legislative compromise of June 1966 (Weekas 23 & 23) that new National Foundation holiday come on February 11, pre-1946 date of "Kigensetsu", traditional anniversary of founding of Imperial regime. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Issue of restoring pre-1946 holiday had been subject of bitter controversy between conservatives, particularly those with nationalist and traditional-religious inclinations, and opposition parties and some Christian groups which expressed fears that February 11 date would revive militaristic and state-Shinto connotations. Public opinion poll conducted during November indicated public preference for old date over any other and was key factor in decision. It appears unlikely in circumstances that opponents of traditional date will carry open fight on this issue further, but they will probably try to use it as ammunition against Sato administration and will keep wary eye on form of celebration. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Outline of Third Defense Buildup Plan Approved

a. On November 29 the National Defense Council formally decided "outline" for Third Defense Buildup Program (JFY 1967-1971) which was immediately approved by Cabinet. Outline fixes period of program at five years and, emphasizing reliance on Security Treaty with U. S., calls for improved relations with neighboring countries. Also stresses that Japanese defense effort should be geared for less than all-out war and, in general, calls for modernization of Self Defense equipment, with specific emphasis on strengthening air and sea defenses and modest increase in Ground forces. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Adoption of "outline" will provide guidelines for interested ministries to pursue discussions toward agreement on final plan. However, FinMin reportedly remains unconvinced. Therefore appears doubtful whether plan can be finalized for incorporation into JFY-1967 budget, in which case there would be strong likelihood that start of third five-year plan would be postponed until JFY-1968. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Verdicts in Okinawa Court Cases Draw Attention (Tokyo 4124; Weekas 39, 40)

a. Japanese press carried extensive coverage from Naha bureaus on December 2 USCAR Court announcement of verdicts in two Okinawa court cases

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which had been transferred by HICOM order from GRI court system. Attention centered on verdict which seats oppositionist Takatora TOMORI in Legislature on grounds he not disqualified, as alleged by GRI election committee, under HICOM ordinance which makes candidates convicted of felony ineligible to be elected. Decision upholds validity of ordinance itself. Second verdict upholding HICOM ordinance taxing imported mackerel was not accompanied by written opinion and drew almost no comment.

b. Headlines uniformly took line that opinion in Tomori case recognized Ryukyuan courts may "judge" or "examine" HICOM legislation. This conclusion stemmed from USCAR judges' obiter dicta which said GRI courts have right examine HICOM legislation in light Executive Order; results of such examination would not, however, be final, for cases could be reviewed at higher levels in GRI system or transferred to USCAR courts by HICOM at any time. Later in week, HICOM announcement that ordinance provision concerning disqualification of candidates (which occasioned Tomori controversy) had been abolished and that henceforth qualifications would be governed by GRI law also drew considerable coverage.

c. Sole GOJ comment, from Director Yamano of Special Areas Liaison Bureau of Prime Minister's Office, was carried only in English-language press; he reportedly welcomed decision, particularly "recognition power Okinawan courts examine propriety all US administrative decrees and ordinances in Okinawa". Later in week, Asahi and Tokyo Shimbun editorials welcomed solution of controversy in manner favorable to Okinawan interests, but Asahi noted that GRI Legal Affairs Department had taken cautious attitude toward question whether opinion actually recognized that GRI courts have right of judicial review of HICOM legislation, and labeled decision "political concession" in response to public opinion which left "relationship between ordinances and civil (i. e., GRI) legislation unclear." (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: While immediate reaction to Tomori verdict was apparently gratified surprise that US system able produce ingenious solution, closer study of opinion has, as shown by Asahi editorial, led to conclusion that fundamental political goal involved -- i. e., drive for "autonomous" right of judicial review of HICOM legislation by GRI courts -- not realized.
(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. Rusk Meets Sato

a. Secretary Rusk arrived Tokyo December 5 and departed December 7 on way to Paris NATO Conference. During Japan visit he met with PriMin Sato and new FonMin Miki for general discussions on China, ChiRep, Vietnam,

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and other matters. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Visit provided occasion for useful exchange of views on number of problems and again demonstrated compatibility of interests of two countries on basic problems. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

9. SEA Agricultural Conference

a. PriMin Sato December 6 opened three-day conference on SEA Agricultural Development with delegates from Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ADB, ECAFE and FAO sent observers. Conference agreed on establishment of special ADB fund to foster region's agricultural development and to establish fishery development center in SEA. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Conference marks another step ⁱⁿ GOJ effort to spur healthy economic progress in SEA, thus contributing to political stability of area. (UNCLASSIFIED)

10. Japanese Press on South Vietnam

a. Press stepped up attention to Vietnam somewhat, focussing on Constitutional Assembly proposal to prohibit military engagement in politics, Ky government's rejection of CA request for abandonment of veto right over Constitution draft, VC terror around Saigon, and bombing near Hanoi. Sense of uneasiness became stronger, as press inferred that bombing near Hanoi indicated that US had secretly decided to escalate bombing of North. Press generally took line that Christmas and New Year's cease-fire would not lead to peaceful settlement, because basic US policy toward Vietnam unchanged, and that prospects for early end to hostilities less hopeful than last year. (UNCLASSIFIED)

11. ChiCom People's Diplomacy

a. Five-member delegation from All-China Federation of Trade Unions, led by ACFU Vice-Chairman Kang Yung-ho, visited Japan November 24-December 4 at Sohyo invitation. Seven-member ChiCom women's delegation led by Secretary of All-China Women's Federation Yang Lan-yu arrived December 7 for one-month visit at invitation of pro-Peking Japan-China Friendship Association (Orthodox). Stated purpose of visit is to report on Great Cultural Revolution and Red Guards to women's groups in Nagoya, Fukuoka, Osaka, etc. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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b. Comment: Press has speculated that both groups may be seeking re-establish and strengthen contacts broken by JCP's "independence". Labor visit is first in five years. (UNCLASSIFIED)

12. Lesotho PriMin Visits Japan

a. Lesotho PriMin Jonathan visited Japan November 24-December 4 in response Japanese invitation issued past February. He tried to interest GOJ in assisting in economic development of his new country, and Japan has agreed send survey team next year to see what is needed and what Japan might do. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Accredited representatives have not yet been exchanged; this may take place next year. Japan may extend modest amount of assistance, in line with its basic policy of encouraging moderate African elements. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

MILITARY

13. Views of New Director General of JDA

a. In maiden speech to senior JSDF officers, new JDA Director General Kaneshichi MASUDA, reportedly outlined his objectives as follows: (1) Raise Defense Agency to full-fledged ministry; (2) obtain approval for Third Defense Buildup plan in its entirety; (3) revert to pre-1946 rank designations for enlisted men and officers to make them more comprehensible to average Japanese; and (4) improve morale in defense forces in order encourage and retain volunteers. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Most of Mr. Masuda's predecessors stressed same goals, but were unable accomplish them. Whether he will be able to exert stronger influence remains to be seen. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

14. JMSDF Destroyer Amatsukaze Returns from Missile Training

a. JMSDF destroyer Amatsukaze (DD-163) returned to Yokosuka December 4 after completing two weeks missile firing and anti-air warfare training at U. S. Navy's Ryukyu Island missile range. Two Tartar missiles were fired, one was a hit. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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b. Comment: Thus far, Amatsukaze has fired ten Tartar missiles, eight during U. S. shakedown training and two during recent Ryukyu exercise. Out of ten firings, Amatsukaze has achieved enviable record of nine hits. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Encl: Lineup of New Cabinet

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ARMA: Lt Col Roach

NAVA: Maj Harris

USIS: FL Burleson

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By	MDA Date 8/19/97

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from Tokyo

LINEUP OF NEW CABINET
(December 3, 1963)

Prime Minister	Eisaku SATO	(Sato)
Justice Minister	Isaji TANAKA	(Ishii)
Finance Minister	Mikio MIZUTA	(Funada)
Foreign Minister	Takeo MIKI	(Miki)
Education Minister	Toshihiro KENNOKI	(ex-Kono)
Health and Welfare Minister	Hideo BO	(Fukuda)
Agriculture and Forestry Minister	Tadao KURAISHI	(Fukuda)
International Trade and Industry Minister	Wataro KANNO	(Miki)
Transportation Minister	Takeo OHASHI	(Ikeda)
Post and Telecommunications Minister	Takeji KOBAYASHI	(Sato)
Labor Minister	Takashi HAYAKAWA	(Miki)
Construction Minister	Eiichi NISHIMURA	(Sato)
Home Affairs Minister	Sensuke FUJIEDA	(Kawashima)
State Minister (Director, Hokkaido Development Agency, Science and Technology Agency, and Atomic Energy Commission)	Susumu NIKAI DO	(Sato)
State Minister (Director, Administrative Management Agency)	Isao MATSUDAIRA	(Ishii)
State Minister (Director, Economic Planning Agency)	Kiichi MIYAZAWA	(Ikeda)
State Minister (Director, Defense Agency)	Kaneshichi MASUDA	(Sato)
State Minister (Director, Prime Minister's Office)	Toshio TSUKAHARA	(Sato)
State Minister (Chief Cabinet Secretary)	Kenji FUKUNAGA	(Ikeda)

LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY EXECUTIVES

President	Eisaku SATO
Secretary-General	Takeo FUKUDA
Chairman, Board of Executives	Etsusaburo SHIINA
Chairman, Policy Board	Naomi NISHIMURA

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COMUS/J, FUKUOKA, HIC, HONG KONG, KOBE-OSAKA,
NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, YOKOHAMA, TAIPEI, SEOUL

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

ANALYSIS BRANCH

DATE: December 16, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 50

REF :

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5. JCP Organized Protest, Rally Unrepressive
6. Korean Boxer Fails to Get to Japan
7. Chief Executive Matsuoka in Tokyo
8. Press Reaction to Peace-in-Space Treaty

POLITICAL

1. PriMin Makes Policy Speech Despite Opposition Boycott

a. PriMin Sato and FinMin Mizuta made their policy speeches to 53rd Extraordinary Diet December 15. First three days of week spent in futile negotiations with opposition parties, centering on new opposition demand GOJ clarify Mizuta's alleged involvement as go-between in hush money payment to blackmailing publisher Toshihiro KUBO (now appealing his conviction). LDP categorically denied charges against Mizuta. LDP leadership decided begin substantive Diet work without presence of opposition Diet members. LDP accordingly voted Lower House schedule over opposition protests in steering committee and went ahead with one-party plenary sessions in both Houses. Sato in unremarkable speech said nothing about Diet dissolution, focus of current political interest, and in fact offered little more than generalized reaffirmation of present

Group 3

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domestic and foreign policy lines.

b. JSP announced December 14 it had collected resignation letters from all Lower House members except semi-retired faction leader Hiroo WADA. DSP leadership already had resignations in hand. Press, however, stepped up criticism of proposed mass resignation tactics.

c. Press almost unanimously criticized government for resorting to unprecedented measure of delivering policy speeches to Diet totally boycotted by opposition lawmakers. In addition, editorials stressed need for early Diet dissolution.

d. Some LDP members, including Aiichiro FUJIYAMA and Yasuhiro NAKASONE (See Item 2) were also among missing at session.

e. GOJ scheduled first substantive deliberations to begin December 16 with or without presence of opposition who declare intention of persisting in boycott. (UNCLASSIFIED)

f. Comment: Mizuta's speech stressed economic matters including his judgment that "national economy has already overcome business recession and is moving toward course of expansion", a judgment which would normally be of prime public interest. However, observers focussed attention almost exclusively on political questions of Diet dissolution, opposition boycott, and mass resignation threat posed by JSP and LDP.

g. Diet impasse evoked new worries on part of political commentators concerning deepening public distrust of parliamentary politics. Such distrust as exists actually seems directed at tactics of leadership on both sides, which are marked by conspicuous absence of compromise and face-saving essential to preserve semblance of harmony in current Japanese picture. Sato policy speech failed to give sign of any new initiative capable of reversing unfortunate trend to increase of entropy in political situation. Japanese political commentators and party sources share view that dissolution is merely question of time and cannot be put off beyond latter part of January. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Intra-LDP Maneuvers

a. December 13 was busy day for LDP critics of PriMin Sato as Yasuhiro NAKASONE and 25 Lower House members formally split from ex-Kono faction and set up new group under Nakasone's leadership called Shinsei Doshikai. Nakasone same day met about 10 other mid-level LDP legislators critical of Sato and agreed to regularize party reform group, aiming at 50-60 Diet members. Prominent

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participants were Munenori AKAGI (Kawakami faction), Masumi ESAKI (Fujiyama faction), Kenzaburo HARA (Funada faction), Hajime TAMURA (Murakami faction), Hideji KAWASAKI (Matsumura faction); non-faction figures Hirohide ISHIDA and Tokuma UTSUNOMIYA. Masayoshi OHIRA of ex-Ikeda faction was listed in press account among sponsors although he did not attend meeting. Following day Ikeda faction meeting decided not to join new group and Ohira accordingly severed his connection with new organization. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Split in Kono faction merely confirmed divergence of views which had reached peak just before LDP presidential election December 1. (Weeks 48, Item 4) New party reform organization appears to amount to further bid by Nakasone, Esaki and others who supported Fujiyama in presidential race to consolidate "new right" and other LDP elements critical of PriMin Sato. Decision of Ikeda faction not to support move severely limits its potential. Appears doubtful anti-Sato operators now consider Fujiyama as realistic candidate for party leadership. Reform group appears likely to wind up as counterbalance to LDP elements to right of Sato, putting Sato faction and ex-Ikeda faction back into strategic position at center of party spectrum which they occupied during Ikeda administration. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Sasaki Takes All at JSP Convention

a. JSP Chairman Kozo SASAKI's forces swept all contested major races from backers of Saburo EDA at JSP Convention windup December 9. Much heralded confrontation turned into something of rout as Sasaki won by fairly decisive margin (39 votes as compared to 19 at January 1966 Convention). Sasaki sweep of 14 other races left anti-mainstream Eda, Wada, and Kawakami factions with only 4 or 5 persons in top 25 party posts including Mitsu KONO and Seichi KATSUMATA who secured unopposed election to Vice-Chairmanship along with Sasaki's lieutenant Koichi YAMAMOTO of Kyowa Seito fame. (Tokyo A-784, 4309, and Weeks 49). (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Relative unity of purpose in Sasaki camp as compared to disarray in anti-mainstream factional alliance was major factor before and during convention. Eda forces were unsure of themselves, called for convention postponement, couldn't agree on appropriate post for Katsumata (Wada faction leader), and ran uncoordinated campaign marked by some mutual distrust. Display of less than complete sincerity as Eda supporters first righteously castigated Yamamoto for taking dirty money and then agreed to deal essentially clearing him and making him Vice-Chairman to boot probably cost Eda some votes at last minute.

c. Near sweep of CEC posts may reflect deliberate decision on part of Sasaki and friends to abandon interfactional compromise posture obtaining since November 1964 and turn JSP back to uncompromising "class party" line as Sasaki has long advocated. JSP pro-Peiping stance likely solidify as Sasaki now has

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little or no checks upon him. Prospects of anti-mainstream as significant factor in JSP open to question although Katsumata told Embassy anti-mainstream would fight back. Eda's future as JSP leader now appears doubtful and some pundits referring to him as "JSP's Fujiyama". Some JSP right-wingers have privately voiced uncertainty about their future in JSP, but barriers to significant split are still quite formidable. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. New FonMin Discusses China within FonOff

a. Press reported that FonMin Miki had met with top FonOff officials December 14 to discuss China policy and related questions. According one account, Miki said he thought that Japan's China policy should be flexible enough to take advantage of any developments which might result from current fluid situation and that emphasis of Japan's ChiRep policy should not be to keep Peking out of UN but to preserve membership of GRC. FonOff has informed us that these stories speculative and based upon informal and free-wheeling discussions within FonOff; there is no indication of any change of policy toward China, specifically on ChiRep, long-term credits to ChiComs, or recognition of Peking. (Tokyo 4416) (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. Comment: Miki is concerned with presenting image of flexibility and initiative to public prior to elections and infurtherance his Prime Ministerial ambitions. He has in past expressed views on China somewhat at variance with Sato's but number of practical factors and PriMin's own views will prevent any basic shift in GOJ's China position at this time. (CONFIDENTIAL)


5. JCP Organized Protest Rally Unimpressive

a. JCP-affiliated ad hoc group to "Abolish Security Treaty and Fulfill Various Demands" December 11 held demonstrations at 20 locations throughout Japan. Rallies focussed on domestic issues, calling for end to corruption and early Diet dissolution, and only secondarily on US "aggression" in Vietnam. By far largest demonstration held in Tokyo's Meiji park, where police estimated 28,500 protestors on hand, considerably less than half of sponsor's anticipated turnout. After long harangues on domestic issues, demonstrators adopted message expressing "unity" with North Vietnamese people and dispersed.

b. Comment: Trouble-free demonstration was largest in size since less than successful October 21 Sohyo strike (Week 43, Item 6). Perhaps learning from that experience, December 11 rallies switched focus away from Vietnam to domestic issues. But despite extensive Akahata publicity over past two months, size of demonstrations was considerably smaller than usual for major JCP effort. Major dailies further deflated significance by burying brief descriptions of rallies at bottom of local news pages.

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c. Although hundred or so ardent protesters take to streets about twice weekly, recent large-scale protest attempts have been few and unsuccessful despite number of likely domestic issues. Vietnam protest rallies have had even less impact, and protest groups calling on Embassy have been exceptionally few, averaging about three per month since September. Demonstrators have been hampered by growing popular apathy. Also sponsoring organizations may be trying to conserve money for anticipated general elections. In any event, average Tokyoite, enjoying unusually large year-end bonus, is spending his time in department stores and not at protest rallies.

6. Korean Boxer Fails to Get to Japan

a. Korean boxer Kim Kwi Ha, who had gone to Phnom Penh with North Korean athletes, told Japanese Embassy there that he wished to return to Japan. Kim has Japanese wife, two children, and his mother in Japan. Kim was taken into custody by Cambodian police while on way from Japanese Embassy to ROK ConGen, but details of his movements still unclear. Vice-FonMin Shimoda December 15, after learning that Kim had been returned to North Korea, said GOJ had expressed to Cambodian Government its hope that Cambodia would respect free will of North Korean boxer and that anything more than that would have been interference in Cambodia's internal affairs. Korean Embassy officials have expressed to us regret that GOJ was unable effect Kim's return to Japan but have not indicated to us that they feel unfortunate development will have any great adverse effect upon current good state of GOJ-ROK relations. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. Comment: Kim had Japanese name, Japanese wife, and had lived for much of his life in Japan. Conservative elements in Japanese politics followed case closely and had hoped arrange Kim's entry into Japan. Japanese have usually not granted asylum, and GOJ's representations to Cambodians may have been as much as GOJ could do under circumstances. (CONFIDENTIAL)

7. Chief Executive Matsuoka in Tokyo

a. Chief Executive Seiho MATSUOKA of Government of Ryukyu Islands came to Tokyo on December 9 for annual negotiations which set the price at which GOJ will buy Okinawan sugar for disposal in protected mainland market. Price set determines total subsidy to be given Okinawa's major area of non-base economic activity; last year GOJ bought Okinawan sugar at about seven times world price, bringing in something like \$40 million by way of subsidy. While there were press stories during early part of Matsuoka's visit saying he would be pressing in interviews with GOJ leaders for "functional reversion" of Okinawan educational administrative rights, these fell off after his interview with PriMin Sato, who reportedly told him any early conclusion with respect to proposal would be difficult and that matter needed to be handled "prudently".

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Thereafter Mr. Matsuoka apparently went back to his mission of helping Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry persuade Finance Ministry that sugar price should go to ¥82 per kilo (about 23¢, versus world price of about 3¢ per kilo). Mr. Matsuoka, who had been scheduled to leave on December 14, has been offered only ¥78.5 per kilo and is planning to stay on at least until December 17 in effort to get his price. In heat of battle, Mr. Matsuoka found time to make courtesy call upon Ambassador Johnson (Tokyo 4367). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL8. Press Reaction to Peace-in-Space Treaty

a. Major Japanese newspapers prominently reported news of U. S. - Soviet agreement on space treaty, as well as December 12 FonOff announcement that Japan would co-sponsor UN resolution endorsing treaty.

b. Commenting on this agreement, majority of papers (1) echoed President Johnson's evaluation of treaty as most valuable arms reduction measure since 1963 partial test ban, (2) saw agreement especially significant in context unabated Vietnam war and looked for further improvements in U. S. - Soviet relations, (3) expressed hope such progress would be followed by progress toward non-proliferation treaty, full test ban and participation of Communist China in this and other agreements. Several papers attached importance to treaty as first "space law" binding on mankind.

c. December 10 Tokyo Shimbun editorial suggested 28-nation support for treaty reflected their awakened awareness as "global men" and their "sense of solidarity." December 11 Asahi editorial hailed treaty, but stressed incompleteness of bans against military use of space. December 14 Yomiuri editorial complained that it was "only making treaty out of 1963 U. S. - Soviet acceptance of resolution banning launching of N-weapons into orbit." Yomiuri hoped Communist China would be flexible enough "at least to join in space disarmament." December 14 Sankei editorial said treaty is imperfect like partial test ban treaty, but like that treaty also "points in desirable direction." (UNCLASSIFIED)


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FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DATE: DECEMBER 23, 1966

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 51

REF :

1. Diet Dissolution Just Around the Corner?
2. Special Diet Session Ends Without "Normalization"
3. LDP "Party Rectification" Movements Formed
4. Police Arrest Teachers' Union Leaders
5. Japanese Press Reports on Vietnam
6. ChiComs Urge Japanese Businessmen to Oppose Sato
7. Thirteenth SSN Arrives

POLITICAL

1. Diet Dissolution Just Around the Corner

a. Early in week press, quoting "sources close to PriMin Sato", gave prominent play to rumors of mid-January dissolution (after post-holiday reopening of regular Diet session) and mid-February general elections. However, PriMin December 21 told LDP Diet members caucus that "time has come to consider dissolution together with budget compilation". Dissolution forecasts were revised immediately with most predicting dissolution on heels of December 27 regular session start and policy statements, and January 29 as most likely date for general election. LDP SecGen Fukuda's press conference statement

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from Tokyo

later in same day that PriMin's statement was not "hint" at dissolution within year failed to stem tide. Diet members immediately clogged telegraph wires with messages to their backers, and many made arrangements to return to election districts as quickly as possible. Press took occasion to welcome editorially "belated" announcement of Diet dissolution.

b. December 22 PriMin Sato agreed to LDP Diet Policy Committee Chairman Hideyo SASAKI's proposal that LDP, JSP, DSP and Komeito "summit meeting" be arranged for December 24 to normalize Diet proceedings. DSP and Komeito same day agreed "unconditionally" to meeting and, although JSP made noises about demanding firm commitment on Diet dissolution, their Diet Policy Committee Chairman admitted that JSP unlikely refuse to meet. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: There is lingering chance Diet dissolution will not actually occur by end of year as is now forecast, but press enthusiasm for early dissolution, business community's desire to economize by combining traditional New Year's gifts with election campaign expenses, and political implications of FY 1967 budget, which may include consumers' rice price hike, now appear strong influences favoring December date. Sagging public support, reflected in recent public opinion polls, and real concern over public dissatisfaction with politicians' antics probably helped bring Sato to view that quick, decisive dissolution is best policy. Most of younger, relatively liberal LDP Dietmen have urged this course for some time.

d. December 24 "summit meeting" of LDP, JSP, DSP, and Komeito Chairmen in these circumstances appears stand good chance of "normalizing" situation in Diet for start of regular session; opposition refusal would give LDP telling campaign issue. JSP has indicated it will attend regular Diet sessions, scheduled to begin December 27, as have DSP and Komeito. These three parties' cavalier treatment December 22 of JCP request that they seek its inclusion in "summit" appeared foreshadow break up of opposition front as elections loomed ahead. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Special Diet Session Ends Without "Normalization"

a. Fifty-third extraordinary Diet session ended as it began, without presence of opposition. December 20 final session saw Upper House pass 1966 supplementary budget of ¥162,878 million. Mediation efforts by Lower House Speaker Kentaro AYABE, calling for LDP to announce it would give "due consideration" to opposition demand for early dissolution, and opposition in return to resume attendance at sessions, failed in wee hours December 18, as Sato hedged on wording of dissolution commitment and LDP moved unilaterally to convene Upper House plenary session. JSP shelved tactic of mass resignation

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of Lower House Diet members as Chairman Sasaki announced his party would hold resignations for propitious time but must also consider other opposition parties' attitudes.

b. Press deplored "abnormal Diet" and criticized both sides but as usual put burden of cleaning up mess on GOJ and LDP. Sato got large share of blame for over-doing his insistence that he would announce Diet dissolution date only of his own volition, not under opposition pressure. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Cynics observed that Diet worked much more efficiently without opposition, but departure from precedent occasioned much soul-searching among press as to implications for future of Japanese parliamentary institutions. PriMin's seizure of initiative with respect to dissolution (Item 1) has shifted focus away from "unilateral" Diet proceedings and boycott. Fact substantive proceedings centered on essentially non-controversial supplementary budget also tended mitigate damage. Unfortunately, least likely effect appears be JSP reconsideration of advisability of its regular flouting of principles of parliamentary government. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. LDP "Party Rectification" Movements Formed

a. Forty-three LDP Lower House "anti-mainstream" members gathered December 21 to launch "Party Rectification Promotion Council" (Week 50, Item 2). Most members drawn from Fujiyama, Matsumura, and Nakasone factions. Former Agriculture and Forestry Minister Munenori AKAGI chosen to lead council in dispelling "black mist", rectifying party, expanding public control of elections, and rejecting improper campaign contributions. Sponsors expressed hope group would eventually reach 70 members. Evening of same day 18 pro-Sato Diet members, styling themselves "United Dietmen's League" and headed by unsuccessful LDP presidential candidate Uichi NODA, met to urge dissolution of factions, "establishment of moral views", etc. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Akagi group's ultimate membership and true aims remain to be seen. Press compared it to "reform" group led by present LDP SecGen Fukuda which was center of intra-LDP "anti-mainstream" during Ikeda administration. Group's formal launching appears likely be additional thorn in PriMin's side, although one strong Sato supporter told Emb December 22 that Nakasone, generally regarded as sparkplug of group, actually has been cooperating quietly but genuinely with formal LDP reform and discipline committee led by former Lower House Speaker Kiyose. Maeo faction's mid-week decision to boycott group deprived council of number of powerful members, significantly limiting group's potential. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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Page 4, A-848
from Tokyo4. Police Arrest Teachers' Union Leaders

a. Police early a. m. December 21 arrested Teachers' Union (Nikkyoso) President Miyanohara and SecGen Makieda for violating Local Public Service Law by their direction of anti-Vietnam strike on October 21, in which 1700 Tokyo teachers left classes unattended for two hours (Week 43, Item 6). Police action followed earlier announced arrests of 30 Nikkyoso members and imposition of disciplinary measures against 2264 postal and national railway workers. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Detention of Nikkyoso leaders and massive disciplinary actions serve to emphasize determined and continuing stringent policy of GOJ in cracking down on public workers' illegal activities. In contrast to unions' mass demonstrations and violence of only a few years ago, Sohyo and Nikkyoso reactions to much publicized arrests have so far been limited to filing protest with police, march of small delegation on police headquarters, and Sohyo leaders' decision to confer to see how police action can be converted into political election campaign issue. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Japanese Press Reports on Vietnam

Reports on Vietnam received greatly increased prominence during past week. U. S. bombings of Hanoi area widely reported and criticized; Goldberg's request to U Thant to arrange talks on ceasefire also extensively reported. Asahi editorial on Hanoi bombing noted that term "military facilities" given too broad a definition as targets and said U. S. conducting "indiscriminate bombing"; Mainichi commentary expressed anxiety that U. S. would be hurt by international public opinion if it maintained position that a little civilian damage is unavoidable. Mainichi doubted U Thant would respond to Goldberg request immediately. Asahi quoted its UN correspondent as saying that Goldberg's letter will strengthen ChiCom criticism that US and USSR trying make world organization its tool. Correspondent also doubted that Soviet Union would respond to U Thant, should he decide to take up matter, through fear of Chinese criticism. Mainichi criticized "inconsistency" between diplomacy and military operations and urged U. S. "show sincerity" by stopping bombing; Sankei noted situation allows no easy optimism, because communists have refused to bring Vietnam issue into UN; Yomiuri hoped that Hanoi would show more flexible attitude; and Nihon Keizai hoped that U Thant's efforts will progress smoothly. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. ChiComs Urge Japanese Businessmen to Oppose Sato

a. Group of 30 influential Japanese businessmen headed by Yoshinari KAWAI, Board Chairman of Komatsu Manufacturing, visited Communist China

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
December 2-17. According Japanese press stories attributed members of delegation, during visit they were told by FonMin Ch'en Yi that China did not object to Japan's trading with Soviet Union nor did it intend to damage Japan-U.S. relations. Ch'en forecast greatly expanded future for Japan-China trade and referred specifically to possible opening of air routes. Having said all this, however, Ch'en added that one could not expect much development of Sino-Japanese trade without diplomatic relations. He told businessmen that politics and economics are inseparable and that it is task of Japanese businessmen to break GOJ-created deadlock. L-T trade office chief Liao Cheng-chih also told businessmen that he hoped they would play a positive role in promotion of Japan-China trade. Both ChiCom spokesmen singled out PriMin Sato as chief target of their criticism. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: These statements, following earlier statement by Chou En-lai, who hoped former FonMin Kosaka would help improve Sino-Japanese relations, illustrate ChiCom tactic of applying pressure on businessmen and others who might be critical of Sato in apparent hope of putting Japanese conservative leadership into hands more friendly toward Communist China. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

MILITARY7. Thirteenth SSN Arrives

a. USS Sculpin, thirteenth SSN to visit Japan, arrived Sasebo early morning December 20 to commence one week's Christmas shore leave for 102-man crew. Approximately 500 labor unionists and JCP members conducted uneventful demonstrations in city after Sculpin's arrival. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Minimum media coverage devoted to arrival and newspapers commented on general lack of interest concerning SSN visits to Sasebo which have become a rather ho-hum event. Embassy has received protests from JSP and from JCP-affiliated front group, neither of which formally protested last few Sasebo SSN port calls. Explanation may lie in fact that both protests were tied to Diet dissolution and calls for overthrow of Sato cabinet. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)


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MOSCOW, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO, SEOUL, TAIPEI,
YOKOHAMA, SAIGON

FROM : AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 52

DATE: December 30, 1966

REF :

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1. Lower House Dissolved
2. Election Campaign Gets Under Way
3. Government Defers Exit Permit Decision
4. JCP Opposes 1967 Red Line Congress
5. More JCP Expulsions
6. Reaction to ChiCom Nuclear Explosion
7. Media Comment on Fifth ChiCom N-Test
8. Chilly Press Response to Ending of Vietnam Ceasefire

POLITICAL1. Lower House Dissolved

a. Lower House Speaker Ayabe at December 27 opening plenary session of 54th regular Diet session read Imperial message proclaiming dissolution of House of Representatives. Session was attended by all parties following series of meetings among party officials climaxed by meeting of PriMin Sato with JSP Chairman Sasaki, DSP Chairman Nishio and Komeito Chairman Tsuji December 24. Even at this meeting Sato reportedly avoided precise commitment on December 27 dissolution but confirmed date to political commentator Tatsuo MITARAI December 26. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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b. Comment: Opposition, following boycott in 53rd special session, had demanded firm commitment on dissolution as price for attending initial meeting of 54th regular Diet session. LDP decision to meet this condition undercut to some degree Sato hope of regaining political initiative through dissolution, and enabled opposition to claim with semblance of accuracy that it had extracted dissolution through its tactics. Pressures for dissolution not later than January had reached point, however, when PriMin could hardly hope that action would appear as his voluntary political decision, in spite of his earlier assertion he would not dissolve Lower House as result of outside pressure. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Election Campaign Gets Under Way

a. Following Lower House dissolution December 27, Cabinet meeting formalized decision that general election would be proclaimed January 8 and held January 29. Prospective candidates, including virtually all incumbent Lower House members, had already begun campaigning informally, but immediately stepped up pace. Opposition party leaders Sasaki, Nishio, Nosaka and Tsuji made initial campaign speeches on day of dissolution. Sato December 29 announced intention of making extensive campaign tour early January.

b. LDP Election Policy Committee met December 28 under direction of SecGen Fukuda to start process of deciding party nominations. First day's proceedings produced list of 312; seven incumbent Diet members under attack in various scandals, including former Transportation Minister Arafune, former JDA DirGen Kambayashiyama, former Lower House Speaker Yamaguchi, and former Agriculture and Forestry Minister Shigemasa, declined direct party endorsement and decided run as independents but LDP party members. Opposition parties had earlier chosen slates, 209 from JSP, 61 from DSP, 32 from Komeito, and 123 (one in each district) from JCP.

c. As press reported that each formal LDP candidate received initial campaign fund of 300 million yen from party, opposition issued calls for low-spending elections, in apparent effort to attach "black mist" label to LDP campaign as such.

d. Possibility national security, centering on US-Japan security relations, would become significant campaign issue appeared early as Sato in first post-dissolution statement said this election would have important bearing on shape of security structure after 1970. Fifth Chicom nuclear test December 28 (Items 6 and 7) inspired Mainichi Shimbun to predict that security issues would be prominent in campaign. All opposition parties except JCP protested Chicom

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test December 29 but JSP subordinated its condemnation to criticism of "American policy of intimidation" against Chicoms. (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. Comment: General election approaches under difficult conditions for LDP. Apart from continuing press focus on "black mist" and indications in recent polls of declining Sato popularity, entry of Komeito into Lower House, addition of 19 seats in urban districts where opposition strongest, and problem of limiting competing conservative candidacies virtually ensure that LDP margin will decline somewhat in new Diet. At same time JSP, particularly under leftist Sasaki leadership and with its fondness for Peking a doubtful asset, faces problems in seeking expand its strength substantially. Most Tokyo observers at this stage predict JSP likely wind up with about 150 seats (it had 141 in dissolved Lower House) as compared to its announced goal of 170. Komeito virtually conceded at least 25 of its 32 races. DSP says it hopes reach 40; its failure increase holdings in present circumstances might mark end of road for DSP as separate party. JCP, with increased membership and new "independent line", appears likely pick up two or three seats. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Government Defers Exit Permit Decision

a. JusMin Tanaka, FonMin Miki and Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukunaga met December 28 to consider government's attitude toward passport requests by 119 Japanese youths to visit Communist China and small number of Korean residents in Japan seeking to visit graves in North Korea and return. Consensus was to put off decision until after January 29 general election. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Youths are part of 671 JSP-affiliated group barred from attending "Second Great Japan-China Youth Friendship Festival" last September (see WEEKA 38, item 6) because of concern over "Red Guard" campaign. Three Korean residents of Japan were permitted to visit graves in North Korea last year but their use for propaganda purposes by anti-GOJ Chosen Soren and North Korea on their return strengthened opposition to further visits of this type. Appears probable that GOJ will turn down both applications given political overtones on heels of general election. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. JCP Opposes 1967 Red Congress

a. Akahata December 23 recorded JCP opposition to Soviet-sponsored World Communist Congress in 1967. In first public opposition to projected congress, JCP stated "conditions for holding world meeting not ripe". Since Soviets had not yet reflected upon their responsibility for splitting international Communist movement, there could be no real "gathering for solidarity". Paper

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also charged Soviet sponsorship of international meeting, given background of split in Communist movement, clear indication of "big power interference". JCP also pointed out that congress in which North Vietnamese did not participate would have little usefulness in promoting international struggle against "aggression" in Vietnam. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: We believe JCP decision reflects party's close ties with North Vietnamese and real concern for international unity in assisting North Vietnam comrades. But more important is fact that congress if held would undoubtedly further exacerbate Sino-Soviet split, placing JCP once again in same awkward position it found itself in in late 50's. Given presumable reluctance of JCP to appear, in adopting "independent line", merely to have shifted from support of CCP to support of CPSU and continuing problem of pro-Chicom supporters within party and front groups, JCP understandably loath to involve itself in Soviet-sponsored congress. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. More JCP Expulsions

a. Christmas day Akahata announced December 23 expulsion from JCP of Seimin MIYAZAKI, former Chairman of Board of Directors of Japan-China Friendship Association and Standing Director of Japan Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Miyazaki's sins were advocating Japanese attendance at Japan-China Youth Friendship Festival, support for Chicom position in dispute over recent Chinese trade fair held in Japan, and support of joint Sino-Japanese friendship statement signed October 12 in Peiping which led to split of Japan-China Friendship Society October 25 (Week 43, Item 4). Also expelled was Masuzo AKATSU, former Standing Director of Japan-China Friendship Association and Director of its Organization Department, for his "leading role in schismatic activities against Japan-China Friendship Association". (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Official expulsions from the JCP during 1966 number well over 200, and some indications that number may be four to five times higher. However, activities of Miyazaki and Akatsu were particularly sore point with JCP as both were instrumental in organization of new Japan-China Friendship Association (Orthodox) which serves as focal point of liaison between pro-Chicom Japanese and Communist China. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Reaction to Chicom Nuclear Explosion

a. FonOff December 29 denounced Chicom fifth nuclear explosion as "challenge to world public opinion". Pointing out GOJ has opposed nuclear experiments by any nation, FonOff statement referred to UNGA resolutions

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concerning non-proliferation and banning of nuclear weapons in outer space and said that Chicoms continuing their program of nuclear armament at same time efforts are being made in various quarters to save mankind from disaster of nuclear war. Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito also issued sharply critical statements. DSP said Chicom experiment a "challenge to Asian peace", showing that Chicom-sponsored "peace" is false. Komeito said test was unforgivable and its radioactive fallout constituted a threat to life. On other hand, JSP, while expressing regret over test, said that one should not overlook US intimidation of Communist China as reason why China felt she should acquire nuclear weapons. JSP said it favored comprehensive test ban treaty. Gensuikyo hailed test as "blow against US imperialism", while moderate Kakkin Kaigi bitterly denounced test as challenge to world public opinion and sent telegram to Mao Tse-tung urging cessation of nuclear tests. In absence of total prohibition of nuclear weapons, JCP found Chicom development of nuclear weapons for defense of socialist countries "perfectly understandable". (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Protests run along familiar lines. JSP, whose election platform includes plank favoring closer relations with Chicoms, trying to cast blame upon US for forcing China to arm while other parties and government pin responsibility on Chicoms. Explosion, coming as it does at beginning of election campaign, makes JSP's Chicom plank more awkward. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

7. Media Comment on Fifth Chicom N-Test

a. December 29 announcement of fifth Chicom N-test treated extensively in Japanese news media and evoked considerable comment. General line was that pace of Chicom N-arm development, having been faster than predicted: (1) will act to encourage Hanoi hardliners, (2) may spur US adoption ABM system, (3) necessitates greater disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and an early end to Chicom isolation from international society, (4) compels serious restudy of Japan's security problems, and (5) helps strengthen Mao-Lin hard line. Commentators also expressed concern over "New Year's present" of radioactive fallout. Analyses foresaw possible operational N-armed MRBM some time next year.

b. December 30 Asahi and Sankei editorials took position that intensive Chicom N-arms development effort reflected reaction to isolation and "encirclement" by US and Soviet Union, and urged US and Soviet Union to reflect on fact that their push toward non-proliferation agreement so far ignores security problems of non-nuclear nations, while portending perpetuation of nuclear monopoly of present possessor nations. Asahi complained that great powers

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have not seriously tried to draw Chicoms into international society, while Sankei said Gallois theory that US might not accept threat to US mainland involved in countering Chicom nuclear attack against Japan "bears on French idea of independent N-force, . . . and requires serious restudy of Japan's security problems from all angles." Sankei concluded by saying that if non-proliferation agreement did not satisfactorily deal with problem of security for non-nuclear nations, Japan "should preserve its freedom of action" instead of joining in treaty.




c. Mainichi editorial December 30 protested against continued Chicom N-testing and Peking's rejection of appeals to halt such testing. Reiterated need for dialogue to be initiated between other powers and Chicoms. (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. Chilly Press Response to Ending of Vietnam Ceasefire

a. Japanese press and other news media reacted with disappointment and some cynicism to ending of ceasefire as scheduled and immediate resumption of US bombing. In context of lingering hopes that ceasefire might go into unannounced extension and of information controversy surrounding Harrison Salisbury reports from Hanoi, Japanese commentators over past week were inclined to take overall negative stance toward US position in Vietnam. While some, e.g., Washington Sankei correspondent Sakai December 24, noted that Communists had failed to respond to US soundings on ceasefire extension, others, like Washington Nihon Keizai correspondent Ohara, implied same day that US had not tried hard enough -- especially in not extending bombing halt.

b. Harshes of past week's comment was December 26 Yomiuri front-page cartoon showing Joey Heatherton dancing in tights for troops (in sexy pose lifted from widely used wire-service photo) while emaciated Vietnamese body lies prostrate nearby. Caption: "Joy to the world." Wire-service photo day or two later of AFRTS disc jockey Chris Noel described as firing howitzer served to reinforce same image. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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